Case Digest: Yu-Asensi vs Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245 January 19, 2000

                          New Code of Judicial Conduct, Competence and diligence |     Legal Ethics

Facts:

Mr. Antonio Yu-Asensi filed a letter-complaint against Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, accusing him of serious misconduct and inefficiency particularly violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics on promptness and punctuality.

The complaint was related to a criminal case pending before Judge Villanueva's court, in which Yu-Asensi's son was injured. Yu-Asensi alleged that Judge Villanueva consistently arrived late for hearings, causing delays and dissatisfaction among litigants, lawyers, and witnesses.

Judge Villanueva filed a comment denying the allegations and claiming that Yu-Asensi and his lawyer were harassing him due to adverse rulings.

The Court referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court for investigation and report. The Executive Judge submitted a partial report stating that the evidence presentation had been completed and requested summations from both parties. Respondent Judge filed a summation requesting dismissal of the complaint, while complainant filed a memorandum seeking sanctions against Judge Villanueva for repeated violations of promptness and punctuality. The Executive Judge subsequently submitted a final report and recommended that Judge Villanueva be penalized for habitual tardiness, constituting serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Issue:

WoN the respondent judge is administratively liable. YES.

Held:

The Court is convinced that respondent Judge is guilty of habitual tardiness which amounts to serious misconduct and inefficiency. 

Circular No. 13, issued July 1, 1987 which lays down the Guidelines on the Administration of Justice particularly Section 1 of the guidelines set for trial courts states in no uncertain terms that:

1. Punctuality and strict observance of office hours. — Punctuality in the holding of scheduled hearings is an imperative. Trial judges should strictly observe the requirements of at lease (sic) eight hours of service a day, five hours of which should be devoted to trial, specifically from 8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 as required by par. 5 of the Interim Rules issued by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1983, pursuant to Sec. 16 of B.P. 129.

Similarly, Section 5 of Supervisory Circular No. 14, issued October 22, 1985 provides:

5. Session Hours. — Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall hold daily sessions from Monday to Friday from 8:30 to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. assisted by a skeletal force, also on rotation, primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters.

Along the same vein, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 which is entitled and mandates the "Strict Observance Of Session Hours Of Trial Courts And Effective Management Of Cases To Ensure Speedy Disposition" clearly states that —

To insure the speedy disposition of cases, the following guidelines must be faithfully observed:

I. The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities and Municipal Trial Courts shall be from 8:30 A.M. to noon and from 2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M. from Monday to Friday. The hours in the morning shall be devoted to (1) the conduct of pre-trial conferences; (2) writing of decisions, resolutions or orders, or (3) the continuation of trial on the merits whenever rendered necessary as may be required by the Rules of Court, statutes, or circulars in specified cases.

Judges must be punctual at all times. There should be strict adherence to the policy on avoiding postponements and needless delay.

All trial judges must strictly comply with Circular No. 39-98 entitled "Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493" ("An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of all Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes), issued by the Honorable Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa on 11 August 1998 and which took effect 15 September 1998."

The aforesaid circulars are restatements of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which enjoin judges to be punctual in the performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys are of value, and that if the judge is not punctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction in the administration of justice.

The Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. A judge should likewise be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice. The trial court judges being the paradigms of justice in the first instance have, time and again, been exhorted to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within the required period because delay results in undermining the people's faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is anticipated and expected, and reinforces in the minds of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.

It is towards the sacrosanct goal of ensuring the people's faith in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:

CANON 1. — A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.

Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

CANON 3. — A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY DILIGENCE.

Rule 3.01 — A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

Rule 3.09. A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.

Thus, for the foregoing considerations —

. . . [T]his Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. This requirement is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice for, obviously, justice delayed is justice denied; and delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Judges are repeatedly reminded that the failure to decide cases within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency and which is a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.

It need not be overemphasized that any delay in the determination or resolution of a case no matter how insignificant is, at the bottom line, delay in the administration of justice in general. The suffering endured by just one person — whether plaintiff, defendant or accused — while awaiting a judgment that may affect his life, honor, liberty or property taints the entire judiciary's performance in its solemn task of administering justice. Inefficient, indolent or neglectful judges are as equally impermissible in the judiciary as the incompetent and dishonest ones. Any of them tarnishes the image of the judiciary or brings it to public contempt, dishonor or disrespect and must then be administratively dealt with or criminally prosecuted, if warranted, and punished accordingly.

This Court pursuant to Section 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which expressly provides for the observance of daily sessions of Courts of First Instance, called on Judges to calendar as many cases as possible and to dispose of them with dispatch considering the increasing number of litigations pending with courts, adding that all other matters needing the attention of the Judges have to be attended to even outside the schedule of trial. Indeed, as pointed out by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm in the old but nevertheless still very much relevant case of In re Impeachment of Hon. Tomas Flordeliza.

A judge should display that interest in the office which stops not at the minimum of the day's labor fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods.

At the risk of sounding trite, it bears stressing that no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual that a set on the Bench. "[W]ithin the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of government especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. In insulting the Bench from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion."

Verily, "[T]he office of a judge exists for one solemn end — to promote the ends of justice by administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that court, is the visible representation of the law and justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not even have to be emphasized, but to which we are wont to advert to when some members of the judiciary commit legal missteps or stray from the axioms of judicial ethics." To reiterate what has been stated earlier, this Court has —

. . . [c]onstantly impressed upon judges — may it not be said without success — the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary, Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction[s] against them.

All told, the Court views the conduct of respondent Judge as untenable and unjustified. Respondent is presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of Judicial Conduct. As a member of the Bench, he should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.28 Rule 3.01 of Canon 3 calls for a judge to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence. Rule 3.05 admonishes all judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within the periods fixed by law. Rule 3.09 requires a judge to organize and supervise the court personnel to insure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business and requires at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. Respondent judge unfortunately failed to live up to these standards.

It appears, however, that being castigated thrice has not reformed the respondent Judge because the records of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reveal that aside from the present case, respondent Judge has six (6) other administrative complaints still pending against him. Needless to state, such an unflattering record only further erodes the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.

Verily, the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official of otherwise, of the men and women, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel, hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice. For his part, a judge, as the visible representation of the law and the embodiment of the people's sense of justice40 must always strive to live up to his responsibility of assisting parties-litigants in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases and proceedings.

Judicial indolence is considered gross inefficiency punishable by fine of suspension from service without pay with the gravity of the penalty dependent on the attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances. While this Court is not convinced that the magnitude of respondent Judge's culpability warrants the supreme penalty of removal from office, the Court nonetheless deems it appropriate that stiffer sanctions should be meted out to respondent.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, the Presiding Judge of Branch 36 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City is found GUILTY of Serious Misconduct and/or Inefficiency in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Accordingly, he is hereby: a.] FINED an amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and b.] SUSPENDED for One (1) YEAR WITHOUT PAY, with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.