Case Digest: Azaola vs Singson, G.R. No. 14003, August 5, 1960

 Art. 811 | Succession, Holographic Will

Provision:

Art. 811.  In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.

In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

Ponente:
Reyes, J.B.L. J.,

Recit Version:

Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died leaving a holographic will. The will designated Maria Milagros Azaola as the sole heir. Cesario Singson contested the will. The Court of First Instance in Quezon City (CFI) denied the probate, citing Article 811 of the Civil Code, which requires three witnesses to establish handwriting and signatures.

The Court agreed with the petitioner that, if authenticity isn't contested, more than one witness is not required. Article 811 of the Civil Code, which states the need for three witnesses, is not mandatory but permissive. Judicial discretion allows the Judge to determine if expert opinion is necessary, regardless of the presence or doubt of lay witnesses.

Facts:

On September 9, 1957,  Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died.

She left a holographic will making Maria Milagros Azaola the sole heir as against the nephew of deceased Cesario Singson;

Francisco Azaola, the petitioner, testified that he saw the holographic will about a month before the testatrix's death, as the same was handed to him and his wife, and recognized her handwriting and signatures.

Azaola presented various documents for comparison, asserting they were in the testatrix's handwriting.

Cesario Singson opposed the probate alleging undue influence and that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, being actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.

CFI-Quezon City: Denied the probate of the will based on Article 811 of the Civil Code, requiring three witnesses to establish the handwriting and signature of the testatrix.

Issue:

WoN the alleged holographic will of one Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance requires three witnesses to sufficiently prove the handwriting of the testatrix. NO

Held:

We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that —

in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (cf. Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present (Art. 810), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the Court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.

Commenting on analogous provisions of Article 691 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the noted Commentator, Mucuis Scaevola (Vol. 12, 2nd Ed., p.421), sagely remarks:

La manera como esta concebida la redaccion del ultimo apartado de dicho precepto induce la conclusion de que siempre o por lo menos, en la mayor parte de los casos, el Juez debe acudir al criterio pericial para que le ilustre acerca de la autenticidad del testamento olografo, aunque ya esten insertas en los autos del expediente las declaraciones testificales. La prudencia con que el Juez debe de proceder en resoluciones de transcendencia asi lo exige, y la indole delicada y peligrosa del testamento olografo lo hace necesario para mayor garantia de todos los interes comprometidos en aquel.

En efecto, el cotejo pericial de letras puede ser una confirmacion facultativa del dicho profano de los testigos y un modo de desvanecer las ultimas dudas que pudieran ocurrir al Juez acerca de la autenticidad que trata de averigaur y declarar. Para eso se ha escrito la frase del citado ultimo apartado, (siempre que el Juez lo estime conveniente), haya habido o no testigos y dudaran o no estos respecto de los extremos por que son preguntados.

El arbitrio judicial en este caso debe formarse con independencia de los sucesos y de su significacion, para responder debidamente de las resoluciones que haya de dictar.

The way in which the wording of the last section of this provision is conceived leads to the conclusion that the Judge must always, or at least in most cases, resort to expert opinion to enlighten them about the authenticity of the holographic will, even if testimonies are already included in the case file. Prudence, demanded by the significance of such decisions, requires this, and the delicate and dangerous nature of the holographic will makes it necessary for the greater assurance of all parties involved.

Indeed, the expert comparison of handwriting can serve as an optional confirmation of the lay testimonies and a way to dispel any lingering doubts the Judge might have regarding the authenticity they seek to ascertain and declare. Hence, the phrase in the aforementioned last section, "(whenever the Judge deems it appropriate)," is included, regardless of whether there have been witnesses or whether these witnesses doubted the aspects they were questioned about.

The judicial discretion in this case must be exercised independently of events and their implications, ensuring the proper justification of the decisions to be rendered.

And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed, no unfavourable inference can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.

Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.

Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been called upon to construe the import of said article, the interest of justice would be better served, in our opinion, by giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses, should the Court deem them necessary.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the records ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with instructions to hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion. But evidence already on record shall not be retaken. No costs.