Case Digest: Vda. de Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. G.R. No. L-40804, January 31, 1978

 Art. | Succession, Witness

Provision:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. 

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Ponente:
Guerrero, J.,

Petitioners: Rosario Feliciano vda. de Ramos, et al.

Respondent: Court of Appeals, Marcelina Guerra

Recit Version:

Eugenia Danila executed a will and codicil. After her death, Adelaida Nista petitioned for probate, which was opposed by adopted children Buenaventura and Marcelina Guerra. A compromise was reached in 1968, recognizing the them as heirs. Later, intervenors sought probate.

The CFI-Laguna allowed probate, relying on Notary Public Atty. Ricardo Barcenas' testimony, despite the testimonies of two witnesses that they did not see the testatrix sign the will. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

The Supreme Court held the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the law. The court emphasized the involvement of lawyers in the execution. In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the Notary Public's testimony is given more weight due to his professional responsibilities. Lack of a photograph of the testatrix signing doesn't negate other competent evidence presented.

Facts:

On March 9, 1963, Eugenia Danila executed an alleged will and testament.

On April 18, 1963, she also executed an alleged codicil.

On May 21, 1966, Eugenia died.

On June 2, 1966, Adelaida Nista filed a petition for the probate of the alleged will and testament and codicil.

Buenaventura and Marcelina Guerra, adopted children of Eugenia Danila, opposed the petition, claiming that the will and codicil were procured through fraud and undue influence and were not properly executed.

On November 4, 1968, a compromise agreement was reached between the parties, recognizing Buenaventura and Marcelina Guerra as the adopted children of the deceased spouses and settling the dispute over the properties.

Intervenors Rosario Feliciano vda. de Ramos, Miguel Danila, Miguela Gavino, Amor Danila, Consolacion Santos, and Raymundo Danila filed a motion to intervene and sought the probate of the will and codicil. They filed a motion to set aside the judgment based on compromise.

CFI-Laguna: Allowed the probate of the will and codicil.

The trial court favored the testimony of Notary Public Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, who assisted in the will's execution, although two of the attesting witness Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, testified that they did not see the testatrix sign the will but that the same was already signed by her when they affixed their own signatures thereon. Another lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero, also supported the execution of the codicil.

CA: Disallowed the probate of the will on the that the evidence failed to establish that the testatrix signed her will in the presence of the instrumental witness in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code, as testified to by the two surviving instrumental witnesses.

Issue:

WoN the CA erred in denying and disallowing the probate of the second last will and codicil of the late Eugenia Danila. YES

Held:

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and restore the decision of the trial court allowing probate of the will and codicil in question.

The main point in controversy here is whether or not the last testament and its accompanying codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities of the law, considering the complicated circumstances that two of the attesting witnesses testified against their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary.

Petitioners argue that the attestation clauses of the win and codicil which were signed by the instrumental witnesses are admissions of due execution of the deeds, thus, preventing the said witnesses from prevaricating later on by testifying against due execution. Petitioners further maintain that it is error for respondent court to give credence to the testimony of the biased witnesses as against their own attestation to the fact of due execution and over the testimonial account of the Notary Public who was also present during the execution and before whom right after, the deeds were acknowledged.

Private respondents, on the other hand reiterate in their contention the declaration of the two surviving witnesses, Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, that the win was not signed by the testatrix before their presence, which is strengthened by two photographic evidence showing only the two witnesses in the act of signing, there being no picture of the same occasion showing the testatrix signing the will. Respondent court holds the view that where there was an opportunity to take pictures it is not understandable why pictures were taken of the witnesses and not of the testatrix. It concludes that the absence of the latter's picture to complete the evidence belies the testimony of Atty. Barcenas that the testatrix and the witnesses did sign the will and the codicil in the presence of each other.

The oppositors' argument is untenable. There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince us that the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. It appears positively and convincingly that the documents were prepared by a lawyer, Atty. Manuel Alvero. The execution of the same was evidently supervised by his associate, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.

If there should be any stress on the participation of lawyers in the execution of a will, other than an interested party, it cannot be less than the exercise of their primary duty as members of the Bar to uphold the lofty purpose of the law. There is no showing that the above-named lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently, respondent court failed to consider the presumption of regularity in the execution of the questioned documents. There were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove their occurrence. There is no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation claim far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution.

The presumption of regularity can of course be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, but not easily by the mere expediency of the negative testimony of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz that they did not see the testatrix sign the will. A negative testimony does not enjoy equal standing with a positive assertion, and faced with the convincing appearance of the will, such negative statement must be examined with extra care. For in this regard —

It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerating what they really know, saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the others. This cannot be said of the condition and Physical appearance of the questioned document. Both, albeit silent, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing. 

Unlike other deeds, ordinary wills by necessity of law must contain an attestation clause Which, significantly is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding that the conduct of execution. Once signed by the attesting witnesses, it that compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had been observed. This Court had previously hold that the attestation clause basically contracts the pretense of undue ex execution which later on may be made by the attesting witnesses. In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to the signature of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will, and their signature following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact at not only to the genuineness of the testatrix's signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attention clause.  By signing the will the witnesses impliedly to the truth of the facts which admit to probate, including the sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testatrix, the absence of undue influence, and the like. 

In this jurisdiction, all the attesting witness to a will if available, must be called to prove the will Under this circumstance, they become "forced witnesses" " and their declaration derogatory to the probate of the will need not bind the proponent hence, the latter may present other proof of due exemption even if contrary to the testimony of or all of the at, testing witness.  As a rule, if any or all of the submitting witness testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful ability, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witness and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner by law.  Accordingly, although the subscribing witnesses to a contested will are the best witness in connection with its due execution, to deserve full credit, their testimony must be reasonable, and unbiased; if otherwise it may be overcome by any competent evidence, direct or circumstantial. 

In the case at bar, the records bear a disparity in the quality of the testimonies of Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz on one hand, and the Notary Public, Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas, on the other. The testimony of Odon Sarmiento was contradicted by his own admission. Though his admission to the effect that "when Eugenia Danila signed the testament, he and the two other attesting witnesses Rosendo Paz and Calixto Azusada were present" was made extrajudicially, it was not squarely refuted when inquired upon during the trial.

With respect to the testimony of Rosendo Paz, it had been refuted by the declaration of Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas. The records show that this attesting witness was fetched by Felix Danila from his place of work in order to act as witness to a will Rosendo Paz did not know what the document he signed was all about. Although he performed his function as an attesting witness, his participation was rather passive. We do not expect, therefore, that his testimony, "half-hearted" as that of Odon Sarmiento, be as candid and complete as one proceeding from a keen mind fully attentive to the details of the execution of the deeds. Quite differently, Atty. Ricardo A. Barcenas, more than a direct witness himself, was Purposely there to oversee the accomplishment of the will and codicil. His testimony is an account of what he actually heard and saw during the conduct of his profession. There is no evidence to show that this lawyer was motivated by any material interest to take sides or that his statement is truth perverted.

It has been regarded that the function of the Notary Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements in the execution of a will.  In the absence of any showing of self-interest that might possibly have warped his judgment and twisted his declaration, the intervention of a Notary Public, in his professional capacity, in the execution of a will deserves grave consideration. An appraise of a lawyer's participation has been succinctly stated by the Court in Fernandez v. Tantoco, supra, this wise:

In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, his statements of a competent attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to anticipate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney being conversant of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory.

One final point, the absence of a photograph of the testator Eugenia Danila in the act of signing her will. The fact that the only pictures available are those which show the Witnesses signing the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other does not belie the probability that the testatrix also signed the will before the presence of the witnesses. We must stress that the pictures are worthy only of what they show and prove and not of what they did not speak of including the events they failed to capture. The probate of a will is a proceeding not embued with adverse character, wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence "to the end that nothing less than the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible" should be presented to the court before a reported will may be probated or denied probate. 

We find here that the failure to imprint in photographs all the stages in the execution of the win does not serve any persuasive effect nor have any evidentiary value to prove that one vital and indispensable requisite has not been acted on. Much less can it defeat, by any ordinary or special reason, the presentation of other competent evidence intended to confirm a fact otherwise existent but not confirmed by the photographic evidence. The probate court having satisfied itself that the win and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, and there being no indication of abuse of discretion on its part, We find no error committed or any exceptional circumstance warranting the subsequent reversal of its decision allowing the probate of the deeds in question.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby reversed in so far its it disallowed the probate of the will and codicil.