Case Digest: Crisologo vs. Singson, G.R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962

Succession 

Ponente:
Fernan, J.:

Facts:

In 1948, Dña. Leona Singson died single. Her nearest living relatives were her brothers, her nieces and her grandniece.

Clause IX of her last will reads as follows: .

NOVENO. — Ordeno que se de a mi nieta por parte de mi hermana mia y que al mismo tiempo vive en mi casa, y, por tanto, bajo mi proteccion, y es la CONSOLACION FLORENTINO: —

(A). La mitad de mi casa de materials fuertes con techo de hierro galvanizado, incluyendo la mitad de su solar, ubicado en la Poblacion de Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Calle Plaridel, actualmente arrendada por los hermanos Fortunato, Teofilo y Pedro del appellido Kairuz. Pero si falleciere antes o despues que yo mi citada nieta, esta propiedad se dara por partes iguales entre mis tres hermanos Evaristo, Manuel y Dionisio, o a sus herederos forzosos en el caso de que alguno de ellas murieie antes ... (Exhibit F.)

Translation: Clause IX of her last will reads as follows:

NINTH. — I order that be given to my grandniece by my sister's side, who currently lives in my house and, therefore, under my protection, and she is CONSOLACION FLORENTINO: —

(A). Half of my house made of strong materials with a galvanized iron roof, including half of its land, located in the Poblacion of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Plaridel Street, currently leased by the brothers Fortunato, Teofilo, and Pedro with the surname Kairuz. But if my said grandniece dies before or after me, this property shall be equally divided among my three brothers Evaristo, Manuel, and Dionisio, or their forced heirs in case any of them should die before ... (Exhibit F.)

Spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo filed an action for partition against Manuel Singson.

They allege that Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dña. Leona Singson, the original owner. They had made demands for the partition of said property, but defendant refused.

The defendant claims that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of, and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in question. Thus, she was not entitled to demand partition.

CFI-Ilocos Sur: Declared that the plaintiff is a co-owner pro-indiviso with the defendant and ordered to execute an agreement of partition.

Issue:

WoN the testamentary disposition above-quoted provided for what is called sustitucion vulgar and not for a sustitucion fideicomisaria. YES

Held:

This issue is, we believe, controlled by the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code in force in the Philippines prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code, in view of the fact that the testatrix died on January 13, 1948. They are the following:

Art. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish or should be unable to accept the inheritance.

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it is to apply, shall include the three mentioned in the next preceeding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided:

Art. 781. Fidei-commissary substitutions by virtue of which the heir is charged to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or part of the inheritance shall be valid and effective, provided they do not go beyond the second degree, or that they are made in favor of persons living at the time of the death of the testator." .

Art. 785. The following shall be inoperative: .

1. Fiduciary substitutions not made expressly, either by giving them this name or by imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation of delivering the property to a second heir." ....

In accordance with the first legal provision quoted above, the testator may not only designate the heirs who will succeed him upon his death, but also provide for substitutes in the event that said heirs do not accept or are in no position to accept the inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him.

The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular person with the obligation, on the part of the latter, to deliver the same to another person, totally or partially, upon the occurrence of a particular event (6 Manresa, p. 1112).

It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino — whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix — the property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter. As Manresa says, if the fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the property bequeathed by will, but mere usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, it is obvious that the nude ownership over the property, upon the death of the testatrix, passed to and was acquired by another person, and the person cannot be other than the fideicomisario (6 Manresa p. 145).

It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. For this reason, Art. 785 of the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution shall have no effect unless it is made expressly ("de una manera expresa") either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation ("obligacion terminante") to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir. In this connection Manresa says: .

Para que la sustitucion sea fideicomisaria, es preciso segun el art. 781, que se ordeno o encargue al primer heredero, cuando sea tal, que conserve y transmita a una tercera persona o entidad el todo a parte de la herencia. O lo que es lo mismo, la sustitucion fideicomisaria, como declaran las resoluciones de 25 de Junio de 1895, 10 de Febrero de 1899 y 19 de Julio de 1909, exige tres requisitos: .

1.o Un primer heredero llamado al goce de los bienes preferentemente.

2.o Obligacion claramente impuesta al mismo de conservar y transmitir a un tercero el todo o parte del caudal.

3.o Un segundo heredero.

A estos requisitos anade la sentencia de 18 de Noviembre de 1918, otro mas, el del que el fideicomisario tenga derecho a los bienes de la herencia desde el momento de la muerte del testador, puesto que ha de suceder a este y no al fiduciario.

Por tanto, cuando el causante se limita a instituir dos herederos, y por fallecimiento de ambos o de cualquiera de ellos, asigna la parte del fallecido o fallecidos, a los herederos legitimos o a otras personas, solo existe una sustitucion vulgar, porque falta el requisito de haberse impuesto a los primeros herederos la obligacion de conservar y transmitir los bienes, y el articulo 789, en su parrafo primero, evige que la sustitucion sea expresa, ya dandole el testador el nombre de sustitucion fideicomisaria, ya imponiendo al sustituido la obligacion terminante de conservar y transmitir los bienes a un segundo heredero.

Translation:

For the substitution to be fiduciary, according to article 781, it is necessary that it is ordered or entrusted to the first heir, when such is the case, to preserve and transmit the whole or part of the inheritance to a third person or entity. Or in other words, as stated in the resolutions of June 25, 1895, February 10, 1899, and July 19, 1909, fiduciary substitution requires three requirements:

1. A first heir called to enjoy the assets preferably.
2. Clearly imposed obligation on the same to preserve and transmit the whole or part of the estate to a third party.
3. A second heir.

To these requirements, the judgment of November 18, 1918, adds another one, that the fiduciary has the right to the inheritance assets from the moment of the testator's death, as they are to succeed the testator, not the trustee.

Therefore, when the deceased limits themselves to instituting two heirs, and upon the death of both or either of them, assigns the portion of the deceased to legitimate heirs or other individuals, there is only a simple substitution, because the requirement of imposing on the first heirs the obligation to preserve and transmit the assets is lacking. Article 789, in its first paragraph, requires that the substitution be explicit, either by giving it the name of fiduciary substitution or by imposing on the substituted the definitive obligation to preserve and transmit the assets to a second heir.

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death — whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix — her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.