Case Digest: Nuguid vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966

Succession | Art. 854

Article 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.

Ponente:
Sanchez, J.:

Facts:

In 1962, Rosario Nuguid, died single and without any descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

Remedios Nuguid filed a petition for probate of the Rosario's alleged holographic will executed in 1951. The alleged will is as reproduced:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, filed an opposition claiming that as compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line, they were pretirited.

CFI-Rizal: Held that the will is a complete nullity, resulting in intestacy of Rosario Nuguid's estate. 

Issue:

WoN the private respondents have been pretirited. YES

Held:

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus —

Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.

Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.

Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.

Translation: Preterition consists of omitting the heir in the will. Either not naming them at all or, even if mentioned as father, son, etc., not instituting them as heir, not expressly disinheriting them, nor assigning any part of the estate, thereby implicitly depriving them of their right to a legitimate share.

For preterition to exist, in accordance with Article 814, it suffices that the testator omits any of those who, by their death, would be entitled to the forced inheritance.

Therefore, it is necessary: a) That the omission refers to a forced heir. b) That the omission be complete; that the forced heir receives nothing in the will.

It may now appear trite but nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... 

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish.

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. 

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento (Translation: It will always annul the institution of the heir, giving absolute character to this provision)" referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.

The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. 

Says Manresa:

En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817.

Translation:

In regards to the institution of the heir, it is annulled. What is annulled ceases to exist, wholly or in part? No limitation is added, as in Article 851, which states that the institution of the heir will be annulled insofar as it prejudices the legitimate share of the disinherited. Therefore, it must be understood that the annulment is complete or total, and that this article, as specific to the case that motivates it, prevails over Article 817.

The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 

Translation:

The consequence of the annulment or nullity of the institution of the heir due to the preterition of one, several, or all of the compulsory heirs in direct line, is the opening of total or partial intestate succession. It will be total when the testator who commits the preterition had disposed of all the assets by universal title of inheritance in favor of the instituted heirs, whose institution is annulled, as demanded by the generality of the legal precept of Article 814, determining, as an effect of preterition, that it 'will annul the institution of the heir.

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:

... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 

Translation:

... Article 814, which stipulates the nullity of the institution of the heir in cases of preterition, does not allow any interpretation favorable to the instituted person in the sense previously explained, even if it might seem, and in some cases could be, more or less equitable. This is because nullity in law signifies only the assumption that the fact or act has not occurred, and therefore, proceedings must be based on such an assumption. Consequently, in a testament where the institution is lacking, it is obligatory to call the compulsory heirs in any case, just as heirs of another kind would need to be called when the testator has not distributed all their assets in legacies. This legal consequence is all the more necessary, given that in matters of wills, as repeatedly declared in jurisprudence, it is not enough for the testator's will to be known if this will does not appear in the form and conditions required by law for it to be valid and effective. Therefore, deeming an heir whose institution has been annulled as a legatee under the pretext that it better accommodates the testator's will would constitute an arbitrary interpretation within positive law. Even if that were the case, it might be a reason to modify the law, but it does not authorize an interpretation contrary to its terms and the principles that inform testamentary dispositions. Just because something appears better in the realm of constituent law does not warrant turning this judgment into a rule of interpretation, thereby distorting and annulling what the legislator intends to establish.

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion (totally due to the preterition)"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero (while still subsisting... all those other dispositions that do not refer to the institution of the heir)... . As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion (the free portion (that) has not been disposed of by legacy, improvement, or donation)." 

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion (The express deprivation of the legitime constitutes disinheritance. The silent deprivation of the same is called preterition)" Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". Disinheritance is always “voluntary”; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be “involuntary”

Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.