Case Digest: Bugayong vs. Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956

Succession | Legal Separation

Art. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed:

(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or

(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.

Art. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

Art. 102. An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.

Ponente:

Felix, J.:

Facts:

In 1949, Benjamin Bugayong married Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan while on leave from the US Navy. They initially lived with Benjamin's sisters in Pangasinan. When Benjamin report back to duty, Leonila moved to her mother's place and later to studied in Dagupan City.

Since July 1951, Benjamin received letters from family members and anonymous writers alleging Leonila's infidelity. He also admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, which he claims to have destroyed, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her.

In 1952, Benjamin visited Leonila in Pangasinan. 

They met in the house of Mrs. Malalang, defendant’s godmother, and proceeded to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong, where they stayed and lived for several days as husband and wife. When Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify truth on the alleged adultery, Leonila, instead of answering him, merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. 

In November 1952, Benjamin filed for legal separation against Leonila in the CFI-Pangasinan.

CFI-Pangasinan: Ordered the dismissal of the action based on condonation.

Issue: WoN the husband’s attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts. YES

Held: 

The Civil Code provides:

ART. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed:

(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or

(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.

ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

ART. 102. An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.

As the only reason of the lower Court for dismissing the action was the alleged condonation of the charges of adultery that the plaintiff-husband had preferred in the complaint against his wife, We will disregard the other 2 grounds of the motion to dismiss, as anyway they have not been raised in appellant’s assignment of errors.

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". It is to be noted, however, that in defendant’s answer she vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity against her husband, and even if We were to give full weight to the testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Court and link such evidence with the averments of the complaint, We would have to conclude that the facts appearing on record are far from sufficient to establish the charge of adultery, or, as the complaint states, of "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" preferred against the defendant. Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law Valeriana Polangco, which must have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant’s infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor the anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, his wife addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity was not established and which admission defendant had no opportunity to deny because the motion to dismiss was filed soon after plaintiff finished his testimony in Court, do not amount to anything that can be relied upon.

But this is not a question at issue. In this appeal, We have to consider plaintiff’s line of conduct under the assumption that he really believed his wife guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of mind. In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife and after finding her they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after which he says that he tried to verify from her the truth of the news he had about her infidelity, but failed to attain his purpose because his wife, instead of answering his query on the matter, preferred to desert him, probably enraged for being subjected to such humiliation. And yet he tried to locate her, though in vain. Now, do the husband’s attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts? In the order appealed from, the Court a quo had the following to say on this point:

"In the hearing of the case, the plaintiff further testified as follows:

‘Q. Now Mr. Bugayong, you have filed this action for legal separation from your wife. Please tell this Hon. Court why you want to separate from your wife?

A. I came to know that my wife is committing adultery, I consulted the chaplain and he told me to consult the legal adviser.’ (p. 11, t. s. n.).

‘Q. Did you finally locate her?

A. Four days later or on the fifth day since my arrival she went to the house of our god-mother, and as a husband I went to her to come along with me in our house but she refused.’ (p. 12, t. s. n.).

‘Q. What happened next?

A. I persuaded her to come along with me. She consented but I did not bring her home but brought her to the house of my cousin Pedro Bugayong." (p. 12, t. s. n.)

‘Q. How long did you remain in the house of your cousin Pedro Bugayong?

A. One day and one night.’ (p. 12, t. s. n.)

‘Q. That night when you stayed in the house of your cousin Pedro Bugayong as husband and wife, did you sleep together?

A. Yes, sir.’ (p. 19, t. s. n.)

‘Q. On the next night, when you slept in your own house, did you sleep together also as husband and wife?

A. Yes, sir.’ (p. 19, t. s. n.)

‘Q. When was that?

A. That was in August, 1952.’ (p. 19, t. s. n.)

‘Q. How many nights did you sleep together as husband and wife?

A. Only two nights.’ (p. 19, t. s. n.)

"The New Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Art. 97, says: ‘A petition for legal separation may be filed:

(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code.’

and in its Art. 100 it says:

‘The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, legal separation can not be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.’

"A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, especially these portions quoted above, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed ‘acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery’ committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. This reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.

"In Shackleton v. Shackleton, it has been held that ‘condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. Such acts necessarily implied forgiveness. It is entirely consonant with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband’s guilt, her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong.’

"In Tiffany’s Domestic and Family Relations, section 107 says:

‘Condonation. Is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for divorce and bars the right to a divorce. But it is on the condition, implied by the law when not express, that the wrongdoer shall not again commit the offense; and also that he shall thereafter treat the other spouse with conjugal kindness. A breach of the condition will revive the original offense as a ground for divorce. Condonation may be express or implied’ .

"It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband.

"In the light of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that the present action is untenable."

Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, We agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.

The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence.

If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute condonation?

Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.

A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue to live together after it was known or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery or sleeping together for a single night, and many others. The resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and wife, especially as against the husband 

There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence but we have no reason to depart from the doctrines laid down in the decisions of the various supreme courts of the United States above quoted.

There is no merit in the contention of appellant that the lower court erred in entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss, because in the case at bar, the question of condonation was raised in the second ground of the motion to dismiss. It is true that it was filed after the answer and after the hearing had been commenced, yet that motion serves to supplement the averments of defendant’s answer and to adjust the issues to the testimony of plaintiff himself (section 4, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court).

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. It is so ordered.