Case Digest: Causing v. People, G.R. No. 258524, October 11, 2023

Criminal Law, Prescription of Cyber Libel

Facts:

On February 4, 2019, and April 29, 2019, Berteni Catalufia Causing uploaded  several posts on Facebook, which made it appear that Ferdinand L. Hernandez, a duly elected member of the House of Representatives of the Second District of South Cotabato, stole public funds intended for Marawi siege victims. 

February 4, 2019 post:

"PLEASE LIKE & SHARE 

 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 

KATARUNGAN 

Hindi titigil ang sigaw ng katarungan dahil sa pagnanakaw ng P226 milyon mula sa relief goods para sa Marawi evacuees. Dahil tinanggal ng Radyo Inquirer itong video sa kanilang website, ini-upload ko ito para patuloy na mapapanood ng lahat ang pagsampa ng kasong PLUNDER o HIGANTENG PAGMANAKAW (sic) laban sa Region 12 DSWD Director Bai Zorahaida Taha at South Cotabato Co[n]gressman Dinand Hernan dez.

Mabuti na lang na nai-record ko."

April 29, 2019 post:

"KAMPON NG MGA MAGNANAKAW HUWAG KALIMUTAN ANG NAGNAKAW NG PERA NG BAKWIT MARAWI na sina Dinand Hernandez, Zorahayday Taha, Maria Virginia Hernandez-Villaruel, at ang kanilang mga kasama na kampon ng demonyo. 

Ninakaw nila ang P225 million na pera ng mga Maranao na biktima ng giyera sa Marawi sa pamamagitan ng pag-OVERPRICE sa pagkain. Ang isang pack ng pagkain, ay NIYARI ng Tacurong Fitmart at DSWD Region XII na emergency bidding. Pinalabas nila na P515.00 ang halaga ng isang food pack. Pero kung bilhin mo ang mga items sa nasabing food pack directa sa Tacurong Fitmart, nagkahalaga lamang ng P270.50 kada isang pack at idagdag na lang dito ang P48 na tuyo o bulad."

On December 16, 2020, Hernandez filed a complaint charging Causing with Cyber Libel under Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act No. 10175, or the "Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012," in relation to Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 

Hernandez averred that Causing's Facebook posts in a public profile page maligned and discredited him by portraying him as a thief unworthy of trust and public office.

Office of the City Prosecutor-Quezon City: Found probable cause and filed with the RTC-Quezon City two separate Informations charging Causing with two (2) counts of Cyber Libel.

Causing filed his Motion to Quash praying that the Informations in the Cyber Libel Cases be quashed on the ground of prescription. 

RTC-Quezon City: Denied Causing's Motion to Quash. Assuming that the RPC may be applied suppletorily to Cyber Libel, paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC is controlling, which makes Cyber Libel prescribe in 15 years in accordance with Tolentino v. People (2018) ruling.

Causing filed a Petition directly with the Supreme Court raising purely legal issues, particularly, the correct interpretation of criminal laws on prescription of Cyber Libel.

OSG: The RTC correctly applied the applicable laws on prescription of Cyber Libel as its ruling is consistent with Tolentino v. People G.R. No. 240310 (Notice), August 6, 2018, that though an unsigned resolution, serves as a binding precedent pursuant to Eizmendi v. Fernandez.

Issue: Whether Article 90 of the RPC or Section 1 of Act No. 3326 determines prescription of Cyber Libel. (Article 90 of the RPC)

• Article 90 of the RPC — one year 
• Section 1 of Act No. 3326 — 12 years
• Tolentino v. People — 15 years

Held: 

RA 10175 did not create a new crime but merely implements the RPC's  provisions on libel when written defamatory remarks are published through a computer system. 

Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 merely implements the RPC's provisions on Libel under Articles 353 and 355 thereof when it is committed through a computer system. Thus, in determining the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, the RPC, not Act No. 3326, should be applied.

First, a textual analysis of Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 readily reveals that the special law did not create any new crime. Instead, it merely enforces Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the RPC on Libel when committed "through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future." Verily, in defining the act to be punished, RA 10175 itself refers to Article 355 of the RPC, viz.:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - 

The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act: 

xxxx 

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx 

(4) Libel. - The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. (Underscoring supplied) 

Second, the Court could not have been more categorical in its Disini Decision: Cyber Libel is not a new crime because Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the RPC, already punishes it. The offense under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 and felony under Article 355 of the RPC are one and the same crime with the same elements. RA 10175 simply recognizes a computer system as "similar means" of publication and makes the use of information and communications technology (ICT) in the commission of Libel as a qualifying circumstance: 

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "'similar means" for committing libel. 

xxxx 

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the Internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

xxxx 

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. l O l 7 5 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.

In resolving the motion for reconsideration of the Disini Decision, the Court reiterated that Cyber Libel is not a new' crime for it is "essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised Penal Code and transposed to operate in the cyberspace."

Finally, even the lawmakers recognized that RA 10175 did not create a new crime of cyber or online Libel because it is already defined by the RPC. In passing Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, they acknowledged that the RPC is a very old law dating back to the Spanish occupation, where the legislators could not have contemplated the use of technologies not yet existing at that time, such as a computer system, to publish libelous statements. With RA 10175, the law recognizes computer systems and ICT as novel means of committing Libel.  Thus, by including a specific RPC provision in RA 10175, the legislators intended to implement existing laws on Libel when the defamatory remarks are made online, which are "just online versions of actual criminal activities in the real world."

The foregoing irrefragably shows that RA 10175 did not create a new crime of Cyber Libel but merely enforces the felony of Libel as already defined and penalized by Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC, when it is committed with the use of a computer system. Otherwise stated, RA 10175 simply identifies a computer system as a means of publishing libelous statements and increases the penalty for Libel by one degree higher than that prescribed by the RPC when the crime is committed with the use of ICT. Cyber Libel is therefore a crime defined and penalized by the RPC.

Articles 90 and 91 of the RPC, not Section 1 of Act No. 3326, define the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel. 

Considering that Cyber Libel is a crime defined and penalized by the RPC, the latter governs in determining the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel. 

Act No. 3326 is not controlling because Section 1, in relation to Section 3 thereof, makes the said law applicable only if the offense is defined and penalized by a special law without its own prescriptive period, and not when the crime is already defined and penalized by the RPC.  

Even assuming arguendo that Cyber Libel is considered as an offense that is defined and penalized by Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, a special law without its own prescriptive period, the law's direct reference to Article 355 of the RPC precludes the automatic application of Act No. 3326 to define its prescriptive period. Instead, the Court must examine both Section 1, Act No. 3326 and Article 90 of the RPC, determine which statutory provision has the shortest prescriptive period and is most favorable to the accused, and apply the latter in setting the prescription of Cyber Libel. This is based on the settled rule that statutory provisions on the prescription of crimes must be construed in favor of the accused.

People v. Terrado (Terrado) is apropos. In that case, the accused were charged with Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 of the RPC because they supposedly submitted false affidavits to the Bureau of Lands in support of a claim regarding lands of the public domain sometime in 1952 and 1953. The Informations were filed in 1962, or more than eight years from the date of the alleged commission of the crimes. The accused in Terrado argued that the charges against them have prescribed because they constituted violations of Section 129 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, as amended, which states that any person who submits such false affidavits "shall be deemed guilty of perjury and punished as such." They contended that Section 1 of Act No. 3326 must therefore be applied, which would make the charges against them prescribe in eight years from the alleged commission of the offense.

ln resolving Terrado and holding that the crimes charged against therein accused have prescribed, the Court was guided by the well-established rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Because the charges in Terrado were covered by both the RPC and Section 129 of CA 141, a special law without its own prescriptive period for the crimes charged, the Court had to examine the provisions on prescription of both the RPC and Act No. 3326, identify which provisions of law provided the shortest prescriptive period, and apply the latter because it was the most favorable to the accused, viz.: 

Falsification of public documents is punishable by prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00. Prision mayor is an afflictive penalty, and hence, prescribes in 15 years. Perjury, upon the other hand, is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four ( 4) months, which is correctional in nature, and prescribes in ten (10) years. However, Public Act No. 3326, as amended by Act 3585 and Act 3763, provides that "violations penalized by special laws shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x ( c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; x x x", so that perjury which is punishable by imprisonment of from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months prescribes after eight years. 

Penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural are, by c011secrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. As it would be more favorable to the herein accused to apply Section 129 of Commonwealth Act 141 and Act 3326, as amended, in connection with the prescriptive period of the offenses charged, the same should be applied. Considering, therefore, that the offenses were alleged to have been committed during the period from May 15, 1952 to February 2, 1953, with respect to Criminal Case No. 7613; from May 28, 1952 to August 18, 1952, with respect to Criminal Case No. 7614; and from November 16, 1951 to February 21, 1952, with respect to Criminal Case No. 7615, and the informations were filed only on March 13, 1962, or more than eight (8) years after the said offenses were allegedly committed, the lower court correctly ruled that the crimes in question had already prescribed. (Underscoring ours)

Here, Cyber Libel is penalized under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, but the same section of the law also refers to Article 355 of the RPC to define the prohibited act. Following Terrado, either Section I, Act No. 3326 or Article 90 of the RPC may be applied to determine the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel; as between the two, the law that sets the shorter period for prescription and the more favorable to the accused must be applied. Considering that Article 90 of the RPC provides the shorter prescriptive period at only one year and is therefore more favorable to the accused, it should prevail over the application of Act No. 3326, which would make Cyber Libel prescribe in 12 years.

Paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC is controlling, making the crime of Cyber Libel prescribe in one year; thus, the ruling in Tolentino must be abandoned.

Article 90 of the RPC provides the prescriptive period for the crimes covered thereby. It states: 

ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. - 

Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years. 

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years. 

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arr es to mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. 

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. 

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months. 

 Light offenses prescribe in two months. 

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. 

Causing argues that paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC must be applied because it clearly states that the "crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." He insists that Cyber Libel, being the same crime of Libel under Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC, is covered by the foregoing provision. 

The Court agrees with Causing and abandons the Tolentino doctrine on the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel. To emphasize, what governs the prescription of Cyber Libel is paragraph 4, not paragraph 2, of Article 90 of the RPC. Hence, the crime of Cyber Libel prescribes in one year. 

First, paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC must be given its literal and plain meaning: the crime of Libel shall prescribe in one year. This provision must therefore determine the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, consistent with the Court's finding that Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 is the same crime of Libel under Article 355 of the RPC when it is committed through a computer system. Indeed, laws are presumed to have been passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all statutes existing on the subject. By referencing Article 355 of the RPC in RA 10175, the lawmakers are presumed to know all laws bearing on Libel, including the applicable provisions of the RPC on the period for its prescription. Had it been the intention of the Legislature to exclude Cyber Libel from the crime of "libel" in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC, it would have used the appropriate language to do so, but it did not. The absence of any such amendatory or exclusionary clause warrants the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to create a prescriptive period for Cyber Libel that is different from what is already provided in Article 90 of the RPC for Libel under Article 355 of the same Code.

Second, it is an elementary rule in statutory construction that a special and specific provision of law prevails over a general provision of the same law irrespective of their relative position in the statute (Generalia specialibus non derogant). Where there is, in the same statute, a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. This rule has been applied by the Court in fixing the prescriptive period for an action for breach of warranty, for a response to be filed in deficiency tax assessment cases, and for the duration of a contract.

In the present case, a perusal of Article 90 of the RPC readily shows that paragraph 2 thereof is a general provision on prescription of crimes punishable by afflictive penalties, while paragraph 4 specifically governs Libel or other similar offenses. Applying the foregoing rule on statutory construction, paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC indisputably prevails over paragraph 2 thereof in setting the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel. 

Third, the history of the prescriptive period of Libel under Article 90 of the RPC discloses the Legislature's intent to set it apart from other crimes punishable with a correctional penalty. When the RPC was passed, the prescriptive period of Libel was two years. Congress further reduced the period by passing RA 4661, which amended Article 90 of the RPC to specifically shorten the prescriptive period of Libel and other similar offenses from two years to one year. 

Significantly, the Court has held that the prescription of a crime is intimately connected with and depends upon the gravity of the offense. Hence, a reduction or shortening of the prescriptive period "implies an acknowledgment on the part of the sovereign power that the greater severity of the former statute relative to the substances of the criminal action is unjust." Excepting Libel from the general 10-year prescriptive period for other crimes with correctional penalties may therefore be taken as an acknowledgment by the Legislature that it is "less grave" compared to other crimes at the same penal scale.

In addition, as aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, RA 4661, which originated from House Bill No. 1037 (HB 1037), was enacted by the Legislature to synchronize the prescriptive period of Libel with the one-year prescriptive period of civil actions for defamation under Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Apart from this, Senator Lorenzo Tañada, who sponsored HB 1037, mentioned that a shorter prescriptive period for Libel will especially benefit the members of the press by allowing them to "discharge their functions better." These very same rationales remain true to this day and equally apply to the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.

Given the foregoing, the Court cannot subscribe to the classification of Cyber Libel as a crime punishable with an afflictive penalty under paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC that would increase its prescriptive period to 15 years. Such interpretation disregards the clear intent of the lawmakers to set Libel apart from the general class of crimes punishable with afflictive or correctional penalties. Absent any amendment of the statute clearly raising the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, or an enactment on the prescription of said crime that is different from that provided in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC, the Court must apply the latter.

Finally, it bears repeating that in interpreting statutory provisions on the prescription of crimes, what is more favorable to the accused must be adopted. Hence, when there are several conflicting provisions of the RPC in classifying the penalty for a felony as light, correctional, or afflictive, in relation to Article 90 of the same Code, the Court must adopt the interpretation of the law that sets the shortest prescriptive period. In the present case, consistent with the foregoing principle of liberality in favor of the accused, there is no doubt that paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC prevails over paragraph 2 thereof as the latter would make Cyber Libel prescribe in 15 years instead of just one.

Pursuant to Article 91 of the RPC, the crime of Cyber Libel prescribes in one year from its discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.

In determining when the one-year prescriptive period of Cyber Libel should be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the RPC, which sets forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive period of offenses: 

ART. 91. Computation of Prescription of Offenses. - 

The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted . by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. 

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago. 

Despite the foregoing provision of law, a review of jurisprudence reveals conflicting decisions on when the prescriptive period of Libel is to be reckoned.

In earlier cases, the discovery rule was adopted by the Court. 

In Alcantara v. Amoranto (Alcantara), it was held that the period to file a civil action for written defamation commences on the date that the crime is discovered, as provided in the RPC. The Court explained that "the libelous matter must first be exhibited to the person libeled before the action could be brought" because the person defamed "could hardly be expected to institute the proceedings for damages arising from libel when he has no knowledge of the said libel."

In Alcantara, the libelous letter was published on October 23, 1955, but the contents thereof came to the knowledge of the offended party only on January 6, 1956. Hence, the action for Libel therein was timely filed on January 5, 1957, within the one-year prescriptive period counted from discovery of the crime. 

The prescriptive period was also reckoned from discovery in Inciong v. Tolentino, where the criminal action for Libel filed on May 23, 1954 was held to have been filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period because the offended party received the purportedly libelous material on October 8, 1952.

Subsequently, several cases were decided by the Court where the prescriptive period of Libel commenced on the date of the publication of the libelous remarks. 

In People v. Hon. Gines (Gines), the period was counted from the date of the publication of the allegedly libelous newspaper, although the Court ruled that based on Article 91 of the RPC, "the prescriptive period commences to run from the day following the commission of the offense or discovery by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information." In Gines, the criminal complaint filed on September 25, 1987 was deemed time-barred as it was filed more than one year from the date of the publication of the purportedly libelous newspaper on August 3, 1986. 

Similarly, in Syhunliong v. Rivera (Syhunliong), prescription was counted on the date when the allegedly libelous text message was sent to a third party. In that case, the criminal complaint for libel was dismissed on the ground of prescription because it was filed only on April 16, 2007, or more than one year from the date when the supposed libelous text message was sent on April 6, 2006. 

Other cases decided by the Court counted the one-year prescriptive period of Libel from the date of publication in holding that the criminal proceedings therein were not time-barred. In Hon. Calderon-Bargas v. RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 162, prescription was deemed to commence from the date of the publication of the allegedly libelous newspaper. In Sr. Arambulo v. Hon. Laqui, the period of prescription for a criminal action for Libel started to run on the date when the accused circulated the letter containing the malicious imputations against the private complainant. 

Upon a careful evaluation of the foregoing cases, the Court holds that the prescriptive period of Libel under Article 355 of the RPC and Cyber Libel under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, in relation to Article 355 of the RPC, must be counted from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The Court affirms its ruling in Alcantara that prescription is counted from discovery of the published libelous matter by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, because they could hardly be expected to institute criminal proceedings for Libel without prior knowledge of the same. This is more in keeping with Article 91 of the RPC. 

The prescriptive period may be reckoned from the publication of the libelous matter only when it coincides with the date of discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. Verily, although Gines and Syhunliong reckoned prescription from the date of publication, the offended parties in the said cases did not allege a later date of discovery different from the publication date. It thus appears that in these two cases, the publication and discovery dates are one and the same, or, at the very least, have been impliedly admitted to be the same by the offended parties therein.

The prescription of the Cyber Libel charges against Causing is a question of fact to be determined by the RTC after hearing the parties thereon. 

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court holds that despite the RTC's erroneous application of the laws to determine the period of prescription of Cyber L1bel, it was nevertheless correct in denying the Motion to Quash.

The Court's conclusion is based on the rule that prescription is a matter of defense and the Prosecution need not even anticipate or meet it in the Informations. Unless prescription is apparent on the face of the Information, the accused bears the burden to prove that the crime has prescribed. Thus, the matter of prescription requires the presentation of evidence and when necessary, the trial court must set a hearing thereon.

In the present case, Causing sought the quashal of the Informations by computing prescription from the date of publication or posting of the allegedly libelous remarks on Facebook as alleged in the Informations, i.e., on February 4, 2019 and April 29, 2019, respectively. Notably, he did not attach any affidavit, document, or other evidence in support of his allegation that the two counts of Cyber Libel charged against him have prescribed. Instead, the Motion to Quash relied solely on the date of publication of the allegedly libelous Facebook posts as provided in the Informations, in relation to the filing date of the Complaint-Affidavit of Hernandez with the OCP Quezon City. 

However, as earlier discussed, the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel commences from the day when the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities, "or their agents. In this regard, the records bear that the prescription of the two counts of Cyber Libel charged against Causing is not apparent on the face of the Informations because the dates of discovery are not stated therein. 

Given the situation, Causing bore the burden to prove that the two counts of Cyber Libel charged against him have prescribed. Thus, he should have attached evidence in support of this defense in his Motion to Quash to prove prescription. Absent such evidence, the Court must affirm the RTC's denial of the Motion to Quash, as the trial court could not have determined the prescription of the crimes charged based only on the Informations that are bereft of any statement on the date of discovery of the purportedly libelous Facebook posts. Neither could it have simply presumed that the dates of discovery coincided with the dates of publication without any proof thereon. 

It would have been different had Causing attached the supporting evidence to his Motion to Quash. In such a case, given that the discovery date and prescription do not appear of record, the trial court could have set the Motion to Quash for hearing so that the evidence may be examined and the parties heard thereon, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this is not the case, the RTC did not commit any error in denying the Motion to Quash, setting the Cyber Libel Cases for arraignment and pre-trial, and proceeding with trial.

Notably, in denying the Motion to Quash, the RTC ruled that Hernandez filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the OCP Quezon City on December 17, 2020, just a few weeks from the alleged date of discovery of Causing's defamatory Facebook posts. The RTC's findings are based on first, the statements of Hernandez in his Complaint-Affidavit, wherein he asserted that he only "recently discovered" the purportedly libelous remarks of Causing in Face book at the time of filing of the case; and second, the printouts of the Facebook posts attached to Causing's Complaint-Affidavit, which were allegedly "last accessed" on October 5, 2020, or a little over two (2) months before the case was filed with the OCP Quezon City. 

Significantly, Causing has been arraigned on November 24, 2021. Considering that the accused in a criminal case does not waive the defense of prescription despite arraignment in light of Article 89 of he RPC, which expressly states that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the prescription of the crime, Causing may continue to prove that the crimes charged against him have prescribed by presenting his evidence thereon during trial on the merits with the RTC. 

To emphasize, whether the Cyber Libel charges against Causing have prescribed is a factual matter to be resolved by RTC and on which, the Court makes no conclusions at this time. Nevertheless, to resolve this issue, the RTC must compute the prescriptive period of the charges of Cyber Libel against Causing based on the Court's pronouncements in the present case by applying paragraph 4, Article 90 and Article 91 of the RPC, i.e., within one year from discovery of the allegedly libelous Facebook posts by Hernandez, the authorities, or their agents.

As a final point, the Court is aware of its earlier dictum in Disini, where it recognized the greater perversity of crimes committed through or with the use of ICT, given that such technology allows offenders to perpetrate their crimes across national boundaries, with a larger audience and far more victims, all with the advantage of anonymity. Because of substantial distinctions between traditional crimes and cybercrimes, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 6 of RA 10175, which makes the use of ICT a qualifying circumstance in the commission of a crime punished under the RPC, including Libel.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is nothing in RA 10175 or any other enactment by the Legislature that amends the prescriptive period of Libel through or with the use of a computer system or ICT. Without the same, the Court can only apply and interpret the existing laws on the subject. A prescriptive period of Cyber Libel longer than what is provided in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC is something for the Legislature, not this Court, to address. 

It is also not amiss to point out that the present case has again brought to the fore the continuing debate against criminal libel vis-a-vis a basic principle of criminal law, i.e., that a crime is an offense against the State concerning matters of public - not of private - interests. 

Indeed, many have lobbied for the limitation of actions for libel and defamation to civil actions only, upon the argument that these crimes concern only the private interest of an individual over his or her reputation. 

Verily, while libel was initially criminalized due to its tendency to breach the peace, the modern view has ignored this aspect altogether and made "a libelious publication criminal if its tendency is to injure the person defamed, regardless of its effect upon the public."

Changing societal mores have thus forwarded the decriminalization of libel because penal sanctions must be reserved for "harmful behavior which exceptionally disturbs the community s sense of security," and personal calumny does not fall into this category. (See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 (1964), citing the 10th draft of the Model Penal Code, and Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. (2023) [Concurring Opinion (J. Sotomayor)])

In addition, criminal libel is historically rooted in the State's concern with the prevention of sedition and the avoidance of speech that "engender hatred of the king or his government." (Ashton v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 562, 567-68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966); State v. Hoskins, 62 N.W. 270, 60 Minn. 168 [1895])

 While a monarch indisputably had the absolute power to suppress political speech for being "libelous," many have raised doubts if the same could withstand our present democratic and liberal system of governance, where power is lodged in the people and public discussion is not merely encouraged but considered a political duty of the populace. Certainly, in a democracy, "it is as much [the people's] duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer."

Thus, when it comes to political speech and the criticism of those who occupy public office, repression cannot be justified even when the utterance may include half-truths and misinformation, unless the regulation passes the clear and present danger test and the utterer acted with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of its probable falsity.  Also, both criminal and civil actions for libel were considered impermissible repression, for whether by fear of imprisonment in a criminal case or fear of pecuniary loss arising from liability for damages in a civil case, the resulting self-censorship and repression of political speech is equally achieved. Libertarians further insist that political speech of the populace must enjoy the same immunities from suit enjoyed by members of the Congress and the President during their tenure. (De Lima v. Duterte, 865 Phil. 578 [2019]). To these advocates, withholding a fair equivalent of such immunity to the political speech of the citizenry would result in an absurd situation where public servants are granted unjustified preference over the very public whom they must serve. 

Still, the Court reiterates its ruling in Disini that "libel is not a protected speech." 122 While an honest utterance, even when inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, a lie that is knowingly and deliberately published about a public official does not enjoy immunity. Such calculated falsehoods or statements in reckless disregard of their probable falsity "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."

Ultimately, the continuing recognition of criminal libel is a prerogative of the Legislature. Just like with the prescriptive period of Libel and Cyber Libel, only Congress can lift the continuing recognition of criminal libel, and as long as it operates within the bounds of the Constitution, the Court's duty is to apply it.