Case Digest: Non vs. CA, G.R. No. 137287, February 15, 2000

 Succession | Constructive Partition

Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.

Ponente:

Vitug, J.:

Facts:

Spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and lot in Isarog St., Quezon City.

In 1982, Virginia P. Viado died.

In 1985, Julian C. Viado died.

They were survived by their children:

1. Nilo Viado
2. Leah Viado Jacobs
3. Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non
4. Delia Viado

In 1987, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died. 

Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.

Since 1977, petitioners and respondents share a common residence at the property. 

Rebecca Viado asked Alicia Viado that the property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing children.

Respondents claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter

In 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case for partition.

Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two documents:

1. a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal share of the property in favor of Nilo Viado, and 
2. a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia Viado. 

A new title was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.

Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments, contending that:

1. the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the deed of donation; 
2. Nilo Viado employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement;
3. the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment; and
4. the assailed instruments, although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely, Julian Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died.

RTC-Quezon City: Found for respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being the true owners of the disputed property.

Court of Appeals: Affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification to determine the value of the property and the amount respondents should pay to petitioner Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.

Issue: WoN appellate court erred in affirming the decision. NO

Held:

The appellate court ruled correctly.

When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs — her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. 

The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.

In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due execution of the documents on the grounds heretofore expressed.

Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.

The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and binding.

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated 29 May 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement on costs.