Land Title and Deeds: Chapter 4 — How Are Lands Acquired and Registered Under the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529 and Other Laws)

Land Title and Deeds: Chapter 4

How Are Lands Acquired and Registered Under the Property Registration Decree

(P.D. No. 1529 and Other Laws)

A parcel of land which has been acquired under the Public Land Act automatically becomes private land after the holding periods discussed in the portion on patents have expired.
Thus, when the parcel of land becomes private, it is the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) that takes the spotlight.

Registered Under the Property Registration Decree

(P.D. No. 1529 and Other Laws)

The Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529) has for its purpose, not to create or vest title, but to confirm and register title already created and already vested.
The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another.
Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.

In rem proceedings

Judicial proceedings for the registration of land throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
Acosta et al., vs. Salazar et al., G.R. No. 161034, June 30, 2009:

It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem and not in personam.
Such a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by mail to those outside of it.
Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue of the power of the court over the res.
Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction between constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.

Victor Benin vs. Mariano Severo Tuason y De La Paz, et al., G.R. No. L-26127 June 28, 1974:

The registration proceedings, as proceedings in rem operate as against the whole world and the decree issued therein is conclusive adjudication of the ownership of the lands registered, not only against those parties who appeared in such proceedings but also against parties who were summoned b y publication but did not appear. (As reaffirmed in De la Cruz vs. CA, 418 SCRA 60 [2003])

Jurisdiction over land registration cases

Anama vs. Citibank, N.A., G.R. No. 192048, 13 December 2017:

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide cases.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
The averments and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

Jurisdiction over land registration cases; RTC has jurisdiction in general

Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 provides for the court which has jurisdiction over cases involving a parcel of land:

Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.
Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.

Jurisdiction over land registration cases; RTC has jurisdiction in general - Exception

Not all cases of land registration are to be handled by the RTC though.
Under Section 34 of B.P. Big. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts can handle land registration cases in the following instances:

Section 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases.-Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

Under Section 34, the MTCs can only handle cases involving cadastral or land registration cases if: D-CV

The Supreme Court duly designates the said cases;
There is no controversy or opposition over the land or the value of the land does not exceed P100,000.00.

As further provided, the jurisdiction of the MTCs, when exercised as a land registration court, shall be appealable with the CA (instead of the RTC).
This is owing to the delegated jurisdiction only.
The result of which is that the MTC is acting as if it is an RTC.
Hence, the foregoing effect.

Jurisdiction over land registration cases; Determination of value of the land

The value of the land at P100,000.00 is determined through the following criterion discussed in the case of Republic vs. Bantigue Point Development Corporation, G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012:

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways: AAT

by the affidavit of the claimant;
by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or,
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.

Jurisdiction over land registration cases; Effect of court being designated as land registration court

Solco vs. Megaworld Corporation, G.R. No. 213699, 05 March 2018:

The Supreme Court has had the occasion to rule on the RTC sitting as a land registration court (LRC).
Petitioner Solco sought to nullify the jurisdiction of the RTC as a land registration court because the question involved both ownership and registration.
The Supreme Court ruled:

It must be remembered that LRC Case No. M-5031 is a petition for declaration of nullity of a condominium certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in lieu thereof. Solco basically seeks for consolidation of ownership and issuance of a new title under his name over the subject property. Needless to say, in such a case, the resolution of the propriety of the claimant's right necessitates the determination of the issue of ownership over the subject property. Simply put, the court cannot just order the cancellation of a title registered under a certain person and the issuance of a new one in lieu thereof under the claimant's name without first ascertaining whether the claimant is the true and rightful owner of the subject property.
Thus, this Court has declared that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, with the intention to avoid multiplicity of suits and to promote expeditious termination of cases, had eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial oourt and the latter's limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues.
Certainly, thus, the courts a quo had jurisdiction to rule on all matters necessary for the determination of the issue of ownership, including the validity of the tax sale.

Jurisdiction over the res and venue of the action

Jurisdiction over the res is important in a land registration case as the acquisition therewith is what will bring a parcel of land into actual custody of law.
Heirs of Regalado vs. Republic, G.R. No. 168155, February 15, 2007:

It discusses the way to acquire jurisdiction over the res-in land registration cases.

Petitioners’ contention fail in light of the following clear pronouncement of this Court in Fewkes v. Vasquez, viz:
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act, an application for registration of land is required to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.

Furthermore, the venue for such actions is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated. (Sec. 7)

Essential questions in registration of a parcel of land

In the proceedings for registration of land, there are two essential questions which must be addressed: AP

The Applicant for registration over the land; and
The Procedure for Original registration.

These are the two primary questions to be answered in the registration of land owing to the intimate relationship of the two to the process of registration as the question involving the applicant also leads to a discussion of the legal basis for registration by the applicant.
The procedure for original registration thereafter discusses the important steps to be taken.

A. The Applicant for registration over the land

As amended by R.A. No. 11573, Sec. 14 provides for the individuals who may apply for registration over land:

Section 14. Who may apply.
The following persons may file at any time, in the proper Regional Trial Court in the province where the land is located, an application f or registration of title to land, not exceeding twelve (12) hectares, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

Those who by themselves or through their predecesors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not covered by existing certificates of title or patents under a bonafide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under this section.
Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of accession or accretion under the provisions of existing laws.
Those who have acquired owner ship of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

Can a private corporation apply for registration of land?

Since there is no mention of the term, it is important to ask if a private corporation can be qualified to apply for registration of lands under P.D. No. 1529.
Republic vs. Manna Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 146527, 31 January 2005:

Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by CA 141 ipso Jure converts s um land into private land. Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely confirms the earlier conversion of the land into private land, the conversion having occurred in law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of Lands v. IAC, Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for judicial confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in interest first.

Sec. 14 (1) on judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title

Section 48 of C.A. 141 and Sec. 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529, as amended by R.A. No. 11573, provides for the requirements for an applicant to be qualified to register on the basis of judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may file a petition at any time, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives, in the Regional Trial Court of the province where the land is located, for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title to land not exceeding twelve (12) hectares:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bonafide claim of ownership, for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. x x x

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file at any time, in the proper Regional Trial Court in the province where the land is located, an application for registration of title to land, not exceeding twelve (12) hectares, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

Those who by themselves or through t heir predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not covered by existing certificates of title or patents under a bonafide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under this section.

As worded, the following requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title — under judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title — are: 12-AD-OCEN-20-TP

That the land must not exceed twelve (12) hectares in area;
That the land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
That the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and
That such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure;
That the parcel of land must not be covered by existing certificates of title or patents.

Sec. 14 (1) on judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title;

That the property in question is alienable and disposable land Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain can be defined as those lands of the public domain which have been the subject of the present system of classification and declared as not needed for forest purposes. (Sec. 3, Revised Forestry Code)

Sec. 14 (1) on judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title; That the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation

Possession is open when it is visible and apparent to a common observer.
Continuous possession consists of uninterrupted acts of non-permissive possession of property by the current occupants and their predecessors.
To be notorious, possession must be so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or at least by the people in the vicinity of the premises.
Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.
Furthermore, the Civil Code requires that possession must be in the concept of an owner for the parcel of land to be susceptible acquisition.

However, from all these premises, the Supreme Court has been clear in pronouncing that possession to ripen into ownership must be coupled with occupation.
Republic vs. Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 198585, July 2, 2012:

Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation (Metro Index) filed an application for judicial confirmation of title over three (3) parcels of land located at Cavite. These properties have a consolidated area of 39,490 square meters.
During the hearings on the application, Metro Index presented two (2) witnesses, who testified that:

the respondent bought the subject properties from Herminia, Melinda Sicap (Melinda), and Hernando Sicap (Hernando);
the subject properties are alienable and disposable as evidenced by the certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); and
the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject properties for more than fifty (5O) years;
from the time they inherited the subject properties, they had actively cultivated them and religiously paid the taxes due; and
the subject properties are planted with coconut, banana, santol, palay and com.

In ruling against the application for original registration, the Court held:

Worse than its failure to see that the subject properties cannot be acquired by prescription, the CA erred in concluding that the possession and occupation of the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest was in the manner contemplated by law. The CA is definitely mistaken in downplaying the importance and indispensability of demonstrating actual cultivation and development in substantiating a claim of imperfect title and in putting much premium on the religious payment of realty taxes effected by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest. It is well-settled that tax declarations are mere bases for inferring possession. They must be coupled with proof of actual possession for them to constitute "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence of a claim of ownership.
Moreover, it is undisputed that the number of coconut trees is unspecified while the number of fruit-bearing trees is too few (three santol, one avocado and one star apple). x x x
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which is an illustration of what is considered casual cultivation, states:

But even granting that the witnesses presented by herein respondent applicants were indeed bona fide overseers and tenants or workers of the land in question, it appears rather strange why only about 3,000 coconut trees and some fruit trees were planted (2,000 coconut trees on Lot 1 which is 119 hectares, and 1,000 coconut trees on Lot 2 which is 19 hectares) on the vast tract of land subject of the instant petition. In a practical and scientific way of planting, a one-hectare land can be planted to about 114 coconut trees. In the instant case, if the hired tenants and workers of respondent applicants managed to plant only 3,000 coconut trees, it could only mean that about only 25 hectares out of the 138 hectares claimed by herein respondent applicants were cleared, cultivated, and planted to coconut trees and fruit trees. Once planted, a coconut is left to grow and need not be tended or watched. This is not what the law considers as possession under claim of ownership. On the contrary, it merely showed casual or occasional cultivation of portions of the land in question. In short, possession is not exclusive nor notorious, much less continuous, so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the government.

We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence of an unspecified number of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who planted them, when they were planted, whether cultivation or harvesting was made or what other acts of occupation and ownership were undertaken, is not sufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's right to the registration of title in her favor.

The case of Republic v.s. Metro Index Realty admittedly sets the bar high for the registration of a parcel of land under Section 1 on judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title — by requiring proof of actual possession and occupation.
What would constitute sufficient proof of possession and occupation then?
Canlas vs. Republic, G.R. No. 200894, 10 November 2014:

Petitioner has sufficiently overcome the burden of proof required in a judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title to land.
Contrary to respondent’s arguments, the trial court specifically found that petitioner’s possession and occupation, through her predecessors-in-interest, started earlier than June12, 1945.
Petitioner has sufficiently shown that she, through her predecessors in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the 9,751-square-meter parcel of land located in Barrio Macamot, Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Documentary evidence to prove possession was presented and substantiated by the witnesses’ testimonies. There were sufficient pieces of evidence to show that petitioner and her predecessors-ininterest exercised specific acts of ownership such as: farming activities; allowing the excavation of land for "pulang lupa" to make clay pots; paying realty taxes; declaring the property for tax purposes; employing a caretaker; causing corrections in entries in public documents with regard to the land; and demanding unlawful occupants to vacate the premises.

From the rulings of the Court cited above, proof that the parcel of land has been possessed and occupied is a factual issue which must be satisfied by the applicant.
Thus, in order to be able to register a parcel of land, the pieces of evidence must be sufficient in the eyes of the court.

Sec. 14 (1) on judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title; That such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application

A bona fide claim of ownership must be proven coupled with possession for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application.
P.D. No. 1529 was amended by R.A. No. 11573 to reflect this significant change in Section 14 (1).
The change constitutes a departure from the requirement of confirmation on the reckoning period of June 12, 1945.
As provided in the title of R.A. No. 11573, the intention of the law seeks to simplify and remove ambiguity in the interpretation and implementation of Section 14
Example:

X inherited a parcel of land that has been owned by his family since at least June 12, 1945. What is the reckoning period that X needs in order to prove that he is entitled to register the land in his favor?
Answer: Applying the present day (2024), X needs to prove that he has a bona fide claim of ownership since 2004 over the parcel of land for registration to be made in his favor.

In introducing the amendment of R.A. No. 11573, it is apparent that Congress had in mind the ruling of the Court in the case of Malabanan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009 on the confluence between the requirements of: possession, its reckoning period and more importantly, t he period when the parcel of land has been declared alienable and disposable.

In reading this case, the author requests that the reader disregard the period of June 12, 1945.
Applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and t hat he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified t o be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAQ 4-1656 on March 15. 1982.

The RTC granted their application. However, on appeal, the CA reversed the Decision granting their application.
The CA ruled that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco's possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan's period of possession.
Hence, the question alluded to earlier on whether a parcel of land needs to be declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945. The Supreme Court ruled:

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

To sum up, the case of Malabanan provided for the following rules to be observed in the disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, while taking into consideration the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 11573:

As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant's possession and occupation of the land dates back to twenty (20) years prior to the filing of the application. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.
Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

Sec. 14 (1) on judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title; That such parcel of land must not be covered by existing certificates of title or patents

For judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title to prosper, it goes without saying that the parcel of land must not be covered by any existing certificates of title or patents; for if it were so, then the protection afforded by the Torrens title to the registered owner shall then take effect.
Furthermore, even granting (for the sake of argument) that title has been secured covering a parcel of land registered under the patent system, the same shall have the effect of being susceptible to an action for nullification of the title
Spouses Galang vs. Spouses Reyes, G.R. No. 184746, August 8, 2012:

Discussion on the effects if a patent is issued to a parcel of land already duly registered.
In their Complaint, the Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties:

a subdivision project known as Ponderosa Heights Subdivision (Ponderosa), and
an adjoining property covered by TCT No. 185252.

The properties were separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried up sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through Ponderosa; that the Galangs, by employing manipulation and fraud, were able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek bed from the DENR.
They discovered the existence of the certificate of title sometime in March 1997 when their caretaker, Federico, informed them that the subject property had been fraudulently titled in the names of the Galangs.
In 1984, prior to such discovery, Enteroso applied for the titling of the property, as he had been occupying it since 1968 and had built his house on it.
The Galangs in their Answer denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and countered that OCT No. P-928 was issued to them after they had complied with the free patent requirements of the DENR.
Assuming ex gratia argument that the creek had indeed changed its course and passed through Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already claimed for themselves the portion of the dried creek which adjoined and co-existed with their property.
Thus the question: which of the two titles should be upheld?
The Court ruled:

With respect to the purported cause of action for reconveyance, it is settled that in this kind of action the free patent and the certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant's name. All that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts which admitting them to be true would entitle the plaintiff to recover title in the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the same.
We rule that private respondents have sufficiently pleaded (in addition to the cause of action for declaration of free patents and certificates of title) an action for reconveyance, more specifically, one which is based on implied trust. An implied trust arises where the defendant (or in this case petitioners) allegedly acquires the disputed property through mistake or fraud so that he (or they) would be bound to hold and reconvey the property for the benefit of the person who is truly entitled to it. In the complaint, private respondents clearly assert that they have long been the absolute and exclusive owners and in actual possession and cultivation of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 and that they were fraudulently deprived of ownership thereof when petitioners obtained free patents and certificates of title in their names. These allegations certainly measure up to the requisite statement of facts to constitute an action for reconveyance.
xxx
If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed through the property of the claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course was automatically acquired by the claimant. Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are:

the old course of the creek,
the new course of the creek, and
the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence.

In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its natural abandonment and the new course. In the face of a Torrens title issued by the government, which is presumed to have been regularly issued, the evidence of the Reyeses was clearly wanting. Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not suffice to convince the Court to order the reconveyance of the property to them.
The conflicting claims here are (1) the title of the Galangs issued by the DENR, through the PENRO, and (2) the claim of the Reyeses, based on unsubstantiated testimony, that the land in question is the former bed of a dried up creek. As between these two claims, this Court is inclined to decide in favor of the Galangs who hold a valid and subsisting title to the property which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court presumes to have been issued by the PENRO in the regular performance of its official duty.
The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, with mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved.
In this case, the allegations of fraud were never proven. There was no evidence at all specifically showing actual fraud or misrepresentation. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the findings of the CA.

As may be seen from this case, whenever two titles are issued for one property, a determination would have to be made as to which one is the valid title.
Thus, as may be compared to the requirement imposed by R.A. No. 11573, the mere precedence of title — whether issued via patent or via Torrens title — shall suffice to defeat a petition / action for original registration via judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title.

Sec. 14 (1) on judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title; Tax Declarations

Republic vs. Sps. Lagramada, G.R. No. 150741, June 12, 2008:

In order to prove ownership and possession, it is usually helpful that realty taxes for the land are paid for. However, a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient evidence of ownership.

Republic vs. Santua, G.R. No. 155703, September 8, 2008:

At most, it is only a prima facie evidence of possession or claim of ownership.

Arzadon Crisologo vs. Ranon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007:

Jurisprudence is clear that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

Sec. 14 (1) on prescription

By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law.
In the same way, rights and conditions are lost by prescription. (Art. 1106, NCC)
Spouses Aguirre vs. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898, October 27, 2006:

Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring ( or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law; namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years.
Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years.

Sec. 14 (1) on prescription; Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription

Possession shall ripen into ownership if the following requirements of the Civil Code are proven under ordinary acquisitive prescription: GJT-OPPU

Possession of things in good faith;
With just title;
For the time fixed by law;
Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. (Art. 1117, NCC; Art. 1118, NCC)

Possession is "in good faith" when there is a reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received has b e e n t h e owner thereof and could thereby transmit his ownership.
There is "just title" when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the granter is neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the right.
For ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in, possession must be for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title.
Spouses Aguirre vs. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898, October 27, 2006:

The Heirs of Villanueva alleged that during the life time of their father, Lucas Villanueva, he owned a parcel of residential land to which they eventually succeeded; that sometime in August 1997, the Spouses Aguirre and their hired labourers fenced the whole land in question without the knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Villanueva.
When confronted, the Spouses Aguirre alleged that they acquired the parcel of land through inheritance from their father, Eutiquiano Salazar, who in turn purchased the subject property from the late Ciriaco H. Tirol.
The Spouses Aguirre allege that Anita S. Aguirre inherited from her deceased parents — Spouses Salazar v— who bought the land from Ciriaco H. Tirol; that the parcel of land is included under Tax Declaration No. 4033 (1953) in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol and possessed ever since; that the land was first fenced with bamboos in 1981 and with cement hollow blocks in 1985 without any opposition from private respondents.
Thus, the issue for resolution involves the ownership of the parcel of land.
The Supreme Court ruled:

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years.
In the instant case, we find sufficient evidence to support petitioners’ claim that the requirements for ordinary prescription are present.
x x x
Contrary however to the findings of the trial court, petitioners possessed the property in good faith.

Petitioner Anita Aguire’s father, Eutiquiano Salazar, bought the subject property from Ciriaco Tirol, whose claim on the property is founded on the following documents:

Tax Declaration No. 729 in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol for the year 1945 (Exhibit "4");
Tax Declaration No. 4033 in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol for the year 1953 (Exhibit "4-A"); and
the survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1952 (Exhibit "6").

Thus, petitioners honestly believed that ownership of the subject parcel of land was transmitted to Anita by succession from his deceased father, and who thereafter possessed the property and exercised dominion over it.

x x x
To prove their ownership, petitioners presented Tax Declaration No. 1264 for the year 1974 (Exhibit "4-B") and other tax declarations (Exhibits "4-C, "4-D", "5" and submarkings) for the year 1980 to 1994, in the name of Eutiquiano Salazar declaring the subject land for taxation purposes. While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.
Records also show that Lucas Villanueva, private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, did not actually possess the subject property during his lifetime. Private respondent Delia Villanueva Dela Torre, testified that her parents while still alive resided in Sitio Din-iwid, Balabag, Malay, Aklan, about less than a kilometer away from the land in question. Neither did any of the private respondents ever reside therein. The actual possession by the private respondents rests solely on the possession of Magdalena Tupas and her husband for eight years allegedly with the permission of Regina Tupas Villanueva. However, the testimonies of Rubio Sastre and Magdalena Tupas regarding the actual possession of Lucas Villanueva through planting of trees and gathering of fruits cannot be given full weight and credence because the witnesses were of tender years then, barely seven or twelve years old, and did not have discernment of the concept of possession and ownership. Moreover, no evidence was presented on how Lucas Villanueva acquired the land in question from Eusebio Sacapano, the uncle of Regina Tupas Villanueva. In addition, Tax Declaration No. 252 for the year 1947 (Exhibit "C") in the name of Lucas Villanueva does not have probative value since it was executed four years after the death of Lucas Villanueva in 1943. Tax receipts submitted by the private respondents in payment for the year 1986 up to 1996 were actually paid on the same day, February 20, 1996 by his son Dionito Villanueva.
On the other hand, after buying the property in 1971, petitioners possessed the same in the concept of an owner. They peacefully occupied it, built fences, planted plants and used the same as ingress and egress towards their cottages. Having been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the disputed land in good faith and with a just title since 1971 until 1997, petitioners doubtlessly obtained title by ordinary acquisitive prescription.

Sec. 14 (1) on prescription; Extraordinary acquisitive prescription

Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith (Art. 1137, NCC) and in the concept of an owner.
The requirements for extraordinary acquisitive prescription are: 30-W-O

Uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years;
Without need of title or good faith;
In the concept of an owner.

Sec. 14 (1) on prescription; Extraordinary acquisitive prescription;

Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo vs. Ranon, G.R. No. 171068, 05 September 2007:

On 18 October 1995, Agrifina Ranon filed a Complaint against the spouses Conrado and Mila Montemayor (spous es Montemayor) with the MCTC in Ilocos Norte, claiming ownership over an unregistered residential lot.
Agrifina Ranon alleges that her family had enjoyed continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted possession and ownership over the subject property since 1962, and had religiously paid the taxes thereon. They had built a house on the subject property where she and her family had resided. Unfortunately, in 1986, when her family was already residing in Metro Manila, fire razed and destroyed the said house. Nonetheless, they continued to visit the subject property, as well as pay the real estate taxes thereon.
However, in August of 1986, her daughter, Zosie Ranon, discovered that the subject property was already in the name of the spouses Montemayor through the issuance of a Tax Declaration which was purportedly issued in their favor by virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership and Possession which the spouses Montemayor executed themselves. The Affidavit was alleged to have created a cloud of doubt over Ranon's title and ownership over the subject property.
Hence, Agrifina Ranon sought a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Montemayor commanding them to cease and desist from further exercising any right of ownership or possession over the subject property. She further prayed that she be finally declared the true and lawful owner of the subject property.
The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged that they acquired the subject lot by purchase from Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon who are the heirs of it s previous owners. Per petitioners' allegations, their predecessors-in interest, spouses Timoteo and Modesta Alcantara bought t he subject property from its owner, Rafael Ladera, on 2 May 1936. From Alcantara, they acquired the subject property.
Who between the two parties is entitled to the subject property?
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents, Ranon:

Were respondents able to sufficiently satisfy the legal requirements to prove prescription?
To recapitulate, respondents traced their claim of ownership from the year 1962 until the filing of their Complaint for Ownership before the MCTC on 18 October 1995. To support their possession, they rely on an Affidavit executed on 19 October 1962 by Valentin Rañon claiming ownership over the subject property by virtue of an alleged sale. The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in declaring that the execution by Valentin Rañon of the Affidavit in 1962 was an express repudiation of petitioners’ claim over the property. By virtue of such Affidavit, respondents were able to cancel Tax Declaration No. 02853 in the name of petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest Timoteo Alcantara who was shown to have paid taxes on the subject property in 1950. Hence, in 1962, Tax Declaration No. 033062 was issued in the name of Valentin Rañon. The same was subsequently cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 033106, which was in the name of his wife, Agrifina Rañon. The same was likewise cancelled in 1967 by Tax Declaration No. 420809, similarly under the name of Agrifina Rañon. In 1977, however, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo filed an Adverse Claim and a Notice of Ownership claiming that the subject property which is not yet registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laoag City is declared under Tax Declaration No. 420809 in the name of Valentin Rañon for taxation purposes only; but that they have been in possession of the said land publicly, peacefully and continuously without any intervention or interruption for more than 15 years.
However, a question must be asked: did the Notice of Adverse Claim filed by petitioners constitute an effective interruption since 1962 of respondents’ possession of the subject property?
The answer is in the negative.
Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical.

Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons,

Article 1124 sets limitations as to when such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to wit:

if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities;
if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse; or
if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.

Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law. In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim.
x x x
As found by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, nothing was done by petitioners to claim possession over the subject property from the time their predecessors-in-interest had lost possession of the property due to their deaths. Plainly, petitioners slept on their rights. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The law comes to the succor only to aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. It was only in 1977 when they attempted to call the attention of respondents, which as earlier discussed, did not even operate as an interruption on the latter’s possession. The RTC and the Court of Appeals held that from 1962 to the time they filed their Complaint before the MCTC and until the present time, respondents occupied without interruption the subject property in the concept of an owner, thereby acquiring ownership via extraordinary acquisitive prescription. To reiterate, the RTC’s factual findings based on the evidence on record were manifestly in favor of respondents, to wit:

Thus, by preponderance of evidence, it has been established preponderantly that the [respondents] have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit continuously, peacefully, publicly, notoriously, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner since 1962 to the present. The fact that the [respondents] have gone to live in Manila right after the house built in the parcel of land in suit was burned in 1988, they, however, then and thereafter intermittently come to Badoc, Ilocos Norte purposely to look after and to visit the parcel of land in suit. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. One needs (sic) not to (sic) stay on it. The acts exercised by the [respondents] over the parcel of land in suit are consistent with ownership. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be said that he is in possession [thereof]. (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175, cited in the case of Somodio v. Court of Appeals, et al., 235 SCRA 307). It is sufficient that the [respondents] were able to subject the parcel of land to the action of their will.
Furthermore, the Court finds it (sic) significant the testimonies of [petitioner] Bernardo Arzadon and his witnesses Leonila Arzadon and Elpidio Evangelista who categorically testified to the effect that Valentin Rañon and [respondent] Agrifina Rañon had been staying in the house standing on the parcel of land in suit since 1947. Basically, the defendants are bound by their admissions and also bound by the testimonies of the witnesses they presented. And going along with their respective testimonies, from 1947 to 1977 or for [a] period of thirty (30) years the [respondents] have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit enough to invoke extraordinary acquisitive prescription, pursuant to the provisions of Article 113439 (sic) of the New (sic) Civil Code. However, as earlier stated, the [respondents], contrary to the claim of the [petitioners] and findings of the trial court, have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit continuously and uninterrupted from 1962 to the present but because of the admissions of the [petitioners], the [respondents] have been in possession of the same from 1947 to the present or for more than fifty (50) years now.

The open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by respondents of the subject property for a period of more than 30 years in repudiation of petitioners’ ownership had been established. During such length of time, respondents had exercised acts of dominion over the subject property, and paid taxes in their name. Jurisprudence is clear that although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. As is well known, the payment of taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the factual findings of the RTC that respondents had validly established their claim of ownership over the subject property through acquisitive prescription.

The case of Heirs of Aaadon-Cnsologo appropriately explained the most important concept needed to solidify a claim for ownership under extraordinary acquisitive prescription; which is the concept of interruption.
The importance of interruption is demonstrated because all the other elements are factual in nature (i.e., possession with just title, in the c oncept of an owner, for a period of 30 years); but interruption though factual in nature — has to be definitively established for extraordinary acquisitive prescription to take place.

Sec. 14 (1) on prescription; Extraordinary acquisitive prescription; The element of just title in the concept of an owner

Abalos vs. Torio, G.R. No. 175444, December 14, 2011:

In this case, Vicente was the owner of a parcel of land in Pangasinan. During the lifetime of Vicente, Salazar occupied the property through mere tolerance by Vicente until the latter died in 1973 and the property was inherited by his heirs.
In 1985, the heirs asked Salazar to vacate the property. Salazar refused alleging that he has been introducing improvements to the land as well as paying the real estate taxes. He concludes that he is now the owner of the property.
When asked to decide, the Supreme Court ruled:

In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the property in question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the year 1984 wherein it contains a statement admitting that Jaime's house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents' immediate predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners never disputed such an acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that they nor their predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot, petitioners' possession could not be deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject land by ordinary prescription.
In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueño, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription.
Moreover, the CA correctly held that even if the character of petitioners' possession of the subject property had become adverse, as evidenced by their declaration of the same for tax purposes under the names of their predecessors-in-interest, their possession still falls short of the required period of thirty (30) years in cases of extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Records show that the earliest Tax Declaration in the name of petitioners was in 1974. Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year period was completed in 2004. However, herein respondents' complaint was filed in 1996, effectively interrupting petitioners' possession upon service of summons on them. Thus, petitioners’ possession also did not ripen into ownership, because they failed to meet the required statutory period of extraordinary prescription.

Sec. 14 (1) on prescription; Rules in computation of time

In the computation of time necessary for prescription, the following rules shall be observed:

The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest;
It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary;
The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. (Art. 1138, NCC)

Sec. 14 (1) on prescription; Registration of lands under prescription; As required by the case of Republic vs. Malabanan

In the case of Republic vs. Malabanan the Court laid down the requirements for original registration under what was then Section 14(2). Reconciling Section 14(2) with the Civil Code provisions governing prescription, the Court held:

x x x Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, asset forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14 (2) x x x
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." The identification [of] what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

It is clear that property of public dominion x x x cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Artide 420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion x x x when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the properly, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands, Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be use donly by the Government.

Sec. 14 (1) on prescription; Registration of lands under prescription; As required by the case of Republic vs. Malabanan -as amended by R.A. No. 11573 and the case of Republic vs. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc.

Admittedly, the case of Republic vs. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc. has drastically altered the landscape of land registration and the grounds for which they are to be applied.
One area that seems to have been hit head-on is the provision on prescription.
Whereas before, prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership and registration of land has been mentioned in particular by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, it has curiously disappeared with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 11573.
Thus, the question: where does that put prescription in the scheme of registration? Shall it still be a valid ground to register property?
The Supreme Court has ruled in the affirmative on this question through the discussion in the same case of Republic vs. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc.:

Effect of R.A. 11573 on prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership under R.A. No.11573
In Malabanan, the Court laid down the requirements for original registration under what was then Section 14(2). Reconciling Section 14(2) with the Civil Code provisions governing prescription, the Court held:

x x x Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2) x x x

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." The identification [of] what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

It is clear that property of public dominion x x x cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

x x x x

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion x x x when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government

Based on the foregoing discussion in Malabanan, the requirements for original registration under then Section 14(2) were:
1. a declaration that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable;
2. an express government manifestation that said land constitutes patrimonial property, or is "no longer retained" by the State for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth; and
3. proof of possession for the period and in the manner prescribed by the Civil Code for acquisitive prescription, reckoned from the moment the property subject of the application becomes patrimonial property of the State.
The second Malabanan requirement, that is, the express government manifestation that the land constitutes patrimonial property, was anchored on the premise that "all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as [property of public dominion] and ought to be used only by the Government." However, this premise was not meant to be adopted in absolute terms.

Once property of public dominion is classified by the State as alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it immediately becomes open to private acquisition, since "alienable lands of the public domain x x x [form] part of the patrimonial property of the State." The operative act which converts property of public dominion to patrimonial property is its classification as alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as this classification precisely serves as the manifestation of the State's lack of intent to retain the same for some public use or purpose.

To emphasize, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are generally presumed to be part of the public domain pursuant to the Regalian doctrine.

Consequently, those who seek registration on the basis of title over land forming part of the public domain must overcome the presumption of State ownership. To do so, the applicant must establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable and thus susceptible of acquisition and subsequent registration.

However, once the presumption of State ownership is discharged by the applicant, the burden to refute the applicant's claim that the land in question is patrimonial in nature necessarily falls on the State. For while the burden to prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable is placed on the applicant, the burden to prove that such land is retained for public service or for the development of the national wealth, notwithstanding its previous classification as alienable and disposable, rests, as it should, with the State.

Where the property subject of the application had not been utilized by the State, and the latter had not manifested any intention to utilize the same, proof of conversion into patrimonial property requires the establishment of a negative fact — the lack of intent on the part of the State to retain the property and utilize the same for some public purpose. In such situations, what precludes the conversion of property of public dominion to patrimonial property is an existing intention to use the same for public purpose, and not one that is merely forthcoming. This is clear from the language of Article 420 of the Civil Code:

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

x x x x

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

In other words, placing on the applicant the burden to prove the State's lack of intent to retain the property would be unreasonable, and totally beyond the text and purpose of PD 1529. Further, this renders illusory the legal provisions in the Civil Code for the acquisition of property. After all, it is the State which has the capacity to prove its own intent to use such property for some public purpose in the absence of any overt manifestation thereof through prior use, occupation, or express declaration.

Jurisprudence instructs that when the plaintiff's case depends upon the establishment of a negative fact, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is placed upon the party averring the negative fact. Conversely, if the means to prove the negative fact rests easily, if not only, upon the defendant, the plaintiff should not be made to bear the burden of proving it.

In cases where land held by the State has not been previously utilized for some public purpose, the State has no prior use to abandon or withdraw the land from. It would therefore be unreasonable to require the applicant to present a law or executive proclamation expressing such abandonment for there never will be one. The imposition of this additional requirement in cases where the land so possessed had never been utilized by the State has dire consequences for those who have occupied and cultivated the land in the concept of owners for periods beyond what is required by law.

However, and to be clear, where the property subject of the application had been previously utilized by the State for some public purpose, proof of conversion requires the establishment of a positive fact — the abandonment by the State of its use and the consequent withdrawal of the property from the public dominion. To establish this positive fact, it becomes incumbent upon the applicant to present an express government manifestation that the land subject of his application already constitutes patrimonial property, or is no longer retained for some public purpose. It is within this context that the second requirement espoused in Malabanan was crafted. This second requirement covered "converted" patrimonial property of the State, or those falling within the scope of Article 422 of the Civil Code.

The early case of Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles (Cebu Oxygen) already established this interpretation of Article 422 of the Civil Code. In Cebu Oxygen, the applicant therein sought the registration of a parcel of land previously used by the local government as a public road. The Court held that the registration of the property should be permitted since the petitioner therein had been able to prove that the parcel of land had been explicitly withdrawn from public use by virtue of a city resolution authorizing its sale in a public bidding.

The fact that explicit withdrawal from public use finds relevance only with respect to "converted" patrimonial property under Article 422 (i.e., property subject to prior state-use) was further emphasized in Laurel v. Garcia (Laurel), which involved consolidated petitions for prohibition to enjoin government officials from selling a 3,179-square meter property in Roponggi, Tokyo which had been acquired by the State through the Reparations Agreement executed between the Philippines and Japan in 1956. The Roponggi property initially served as the site of the Philippine embassy before it was relocated to Nampeidai, Tokyo when the embassy building had to undergo major repairs.

In Laurel, the Court held that the Roponggi property assumes the nature of property of public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code (i.e., intended for some public service or the development of national wealth). Noting that the Roponggi property had been subject of prior state-use, the Court held that its conversion from property of public dominion under Article 420(2) to patrimonial property under Article 422 must be explicit. The Court ruled:

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.

Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed because the lot has been idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public [dominion], not available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such["] x x x.

The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property x x x.

Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.

From these referenced cases, it becomes clear that the need for an express government manifestation confirming that the property in question is "no longer retained" by the State for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth, stems from the principle that abandonment of property of public dominion under Article 420 cannot be inferred solely from non-use. In turn, the determination of whether property has in fact been abandoned by the State is necessary only in cases where there has been prior state-use. To repeat, there is no abandonment to speak of in the absence of prior state-use.

The application of the second Malabanan requirement in cases where there has been no prior state-use, in addition to the requirement of proof that the property in question had been declared alienable and disposable, is thus improper.

The overarching effects of the case of Republic vs. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc. could thus be felt also with prescription as a ground for registration.
First thing has to be realized by the reader: the case of Republic vs. Malabanan stating that the parcel of land still needs to be considered patrimonial before the aforementioned prescriptive periods (10 or 30 years) to begin to apply still finds application. That much can be said.
However, the most important takeaway has to be: if a parcel of land has been declared alienable and disposable, the said case of Republic vs. Pasig Rizal Co. Inc. provides that it suffices that the same has been declared alienable and disposable for the parcel of land to be considered as patrimonial property.
The ruling of the Court in the case of Republic vs. Pasig Rizal Co. Inc paints a clear picture on the effects that property has been declared alienable and disposable, patrimonial and especially those that are coming from the requirement of public use. Thus, as firmly ruled in the same case:

Equally notable is the final proviso of the new Section 14(1) which expressly states that upon proof of possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for the period and in the manner required under said provision, the applicant/s "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under this section." This final proviso unequivocally confirms that the classification of land as alienable and disposable immediately places it within the commerce of man, and renders it susceptible to private acquisition through adverse possession.

The final proviso thus clarifies that for purposes of confirmation of title under PD 1529, no further "express government manifestation that said land constitutes patrimonial property, or is 'no longer retained' by the State for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth" shall henceforth be required. This harmonizes the language of PD 1529 with the body of principles governing property of public dominion and patrimonial property in the Civil Code. Through the final proviso, any confusion which may have resulted from the wholesale adoption of the second Malabanan requirement has been addressed.

In line with the shortened period of possession under the new Section 14(1), the old Section 14(2) referring to confirmation of title of land acquired through prescription has been deleted. The rationale behind this deletion is not difficult to discern. The shortened twenty (20)-year period under the new Section 14(1) grants possessors the right to seek registration without having to comply with the longer period of thirty (30) years possession required for acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code. It is but logical for those who have been in adverse possession of alienable and disposable land for at least twenty (20) years to resort to the immediate filing of an application for registration on the basis of the new Section 14(1) without waiting for prescription to set in years later.

As it affects prescription, the advent of R.A. No. 11573 thus does away with the ruling that was previously put in place in the case of Rizalvo which requires a, so to speak, double requirement of certification that:

the parcel of land has been declared alienable and disposable; and
the requirement that it is no longer needed by the State for public use or for the development of the national wealth.

Both requirements being needed before the parcel of land can be declared as patrimonial in nature.

In its stead, R.A. No. 11573 and the case of Pasig Rizal states that there is no longer a need for the second declaration as the classification of the land as alienable and disposable suffices to declare the same as susceptible of acquisition under prescription.
Note must also be made by the reader of the effect that R.A. No. 11573 has done to the Civil Code provisions on prescription, more particularly, extraordinary acquisitive ones.
For it would thus seem that the requirement of prescription involving immovable lands — for purposes of registration has been lessened to twenty (20) years coming from thirty (30) years.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.
The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: GEA

gradual and imperceptible;
made through the effects of the current of the water; and
taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Laws providing for accretion in favor of the riparian owner

Under the following Civil Code provisions, the private individual shall be the beneficiary of the accretion on the actions of rivers:
Art. 457.

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

Art. 461.

River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.

Art. 465.

Islands which through successive accumulation of alluvial deposits are formed in non-navigable and non-floatable rivers, belong to the owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of them, or to the owners of both margins if the island is in the middle of the river, in which case it shall be divided longitudinally in halves. If a single island thus formed be more distant from one margin than from the other, the owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner thereof.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Requirements of accretion under Article 457

It is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion.
One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law.
The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: GEA

Gradual and imperceptible;
Made through the effects of the current of the water; and
Taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

Republic vs. Tongson, G.R. No. 233304, July 28, 2020:

There is no question that the foregoing requisites must be sufficiently established by the riparian owners applying for land registration over the additional portion. In the event that the land situated along the riverbank is indeed shown to have increased gradually over time from soil deposits brought by the river's current, there arises a disputable presumption that the change was gradual and caused by alluvium. Should the applicant successfully establish the fact of accretion, certainly:

Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of t he owners of the banks. Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act.

It is likewise settled that "an accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot that receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another." For this reason, it is incumbent upon respondents seeking judicial confirmation under land registration laws on a claim that the subject land is a product of accretion to establish the presence of the three cited requisites.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Requirements of accretion under Article 457; (1) The deposit of soil or sediment must be gradual and imperceptible

Agustin vs. IAC, G.R. Nos. L-66075-76, July 5, 1990:

All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:

. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. Within this period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these cases that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is overwhelming as against the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of Tuguegarao Cadastre executed in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded by the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be destroyed by the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27, Rollo.)

The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Requirements of accretion under Article 457; (1) The deposit of soil or sediment must be gradual and imperceptible; Evidence to prove the same

Republic vs. Tongson, G.R. No. 233304, July 28, 2020:

In this case, Norma, married to Ernesto, Sr., is the registered owner of a parcel of land under TCT No. T 135049. Their children are the registered owners of an adjoining parcel of land under TCT No. T-144637, described as Lot No. 9, Pcs-06-000698 and measuring 28,907 square meters.
The registered lots and the land subject of the application were inherited from Norma's predecessors. The subject land is claimed to have been the beneficiary of accretion from alluvial deposits caused by the natural current of the Agusan River along the west side of respondents' combined properties.
When brought to the court for judicial confirmation, the OSG opposed; but the lower court ruled in their favor. The CA-Cebu City found that the pieces of evidence presented by respondents were given proper attention and correct appreciation by the RTC. In particular, it ruled that the CENRO of the DENR had already confirmed that the subject land was alluvium due to the accretion caused by the Aguisan River. Citing Article 457 of the Civil Code, the CA-Cebu City held that the addition to the land formed by alluvion belongs automatically to the riparian owner as a natural incident to ownership.
Was the accretion duly proven? The Court ruled that they did not:

It is likewise settled that "an accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot that receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another." For this reason, it is incumbent upon respondents seeking judicial confirmation under land registration laws on a claim that the subject land is a product of accretion to establish the presence of the three cited requisites.
x x x
The CENRO and DENR's Certifications are not empty requirements; however, Ernesto, Sr., was not competent to testify on the factual and legal conclusions expressed in the said certifications. The records disclose that apart from the CENRO and DENR Certifications, Ernesto, Sr. testified that the registered lots were inherited by his wife Norma and their children from Norma's predecessors, going all the way back to Norma's grandmother.34 By his own admission, he only came to know that the subject land already measured 10,142 square meters, more or less, because of the CENRO's land survey. He could not say whether it was already around 10,000 square meters when he married Norma in 1961. Ernesto, Sr., could only competently testify that he and his family had been cultivating the said land as early as 1990; that it was partly a fishpond; and that he had been paying taxes on the property since 2004.
For the findings of the CENRO and the DENR to be conclusive on the courts to establish the fact of accretion, the certifying officer, the land surveyor, or any similarly competent officer of the said agency should have been presented in court to provide the factual bases of their findings. Given that the application suggests that the subject land incrementally materialized through three or four generations, only a competent officer could testify as to the historical metes and bounds or the soil composition of the subject land within its jurisdiction. Ernesto, Sr.'s testimony alone does not establish whether the registered lots, which were paraphernal properties from Norma's side of the family, originally bordered the east riverbank of the Aguisan River. Ernesto, Sr., could also not be expected to be familiar, in the span of time under consideration, how the river's current changed the property line causing the accretion.
Proceeding from the foregoing, our statement in Republic of the Philippines v. Lydia Capco de Tensuan, that government certifications such as those issued by the CENRO "are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein," applies in this case. The appropriate officer must testify on the facts stated, or other competent evidence must be adduced by the party relying on the certification, even if the application is unopposed by other possible claimants during trial. Then, "[s]uch findings must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant."

Republic vs. Asuncion, G.R. No. 200772, February 17, 2021:

On the witness stand, Pedro testified that as one of the children of the spouses Asuncion, he co-inherited the disputed parcels from his parents. The said parcels are adjacent to the mother property covered by OCT No. 0 423 and TCT No. T-7808 (later TCT No. RT 30648). Pedro further testified that the disputed parcels, which have a total area of 107 hectares, more or less, were formed t hrough accretion along the Wawang Dapdap River and Manila Bay. The accretion happened westward from the mother property between 1933 and 1945 and was surveyed as Psu 115369 (Lots 1 and 2), Psu-115615, and Psu 115616. The spouses Asuncion occupied and possessed the said accretion between 1943 and 1945; and they remained in possession of the accretion until their deaths in 1968 and 1989, respectively, after which their children, the Asuncions took possession thereof. Later, t he spouses Asuncion also had the other areas of the accretion surveyed as Psu-121255 (surveyed in 1950) and Psu-118984 (surveyed in 1948 and divided into two lots). Pedro further testified that after the accretion had developed, i.e., it was no longer washed away or submerged by the surrounding waters, his family utilized the land as a fishpond by digging the soil and surrounding the area with a perimeter dike. Pedro also presented photographs of the lands showing that they are all being utilized as fishponds.
Pedro's testimony was corroborated by that of Carlos, who worked in the spouses Asuncion's fishponds beginning in 1944. Martinez testified that during bad weather or whenever there was typhoon, soil eroded from the Wawang Dapdap River into the banks and the land of t he spouses Asuncion. Once the sabang stabilized, the spouses Asuncion hired day laborers to dig into the sabang to construct a fishpond. The material excavated from the sabang was then deposited along its outer edges to form a dike to protect the ditch from the action of the river. Martinez further testified that by t he time he became overseer of the spouses Asuncion's fishponds in 1948, the accretion had grown to about 33 hectares.
The Asuncions also submitted the following maps in evidence:

a location plan of the mother property dated April 5, 1983 and based on a survey conducted on January 14, 1918;
a Broad Map showing all the lands possessed by the Asuncions, with the mother property colored in green and brown crayon and the disputed lands colored in yellow and orange crayon, dated June 28, 1999;
a survey plan of the mother property approved on January 28, 1938 and based on a survey conducted on August 18-20, 1937;
survey plan of Psu-115615 and Psu-115616, conducted on January 26, 1944;
survey plan of Psu 118984 conducted on March 7, 1948; and
survey plan of Psu-115369.

The foregoing maps show that the Wawang Dapdap River flows to the west, and then turns southwest into Manila Bay. Both the mother property and the disputed lands are located on the north bank of the river. The mother property is the easternmost parcel, and hence farthest from Manila Bay. The disputed parcels lie southwest of the mother property, all located shoreward along the north bank of the Wawang Dapdap River. Based on their location relative to the mother property and the shoreline of Manila Bay, the disputed lots can be divided into four groups:

Group 1, composed of Lot 1 of Psd-121255 (the portions allotted to the Asuncions under their compromise agreement with the Molina-Enriquez group), Lot 1 of Psu-115616, and Lot 1 of Psu-115369, which are bounded on the west southwest by the mother property;
Group 2, composed of Lot 2 of Psd-121255, Lot 2 of Psu-115616, and Lot 2 of Psu-115369, which are located west southwest of and immediately adjacent to the Group 1 lots, with Lot 2 of Psu-115369 forming part of the north bank of the Wawang Dapdap River;
Group 3, composed of Lot 3 of Psu-121255, Psu-115615 (2 lots), and a lot labelled in the Broad Map as Lot 5478-B, which are which are located west southwest of and immediately adjacent to the Group 2 lots, with Psu-115615 forming part of the north bank of the Wawang Dapdap River; and
Group 4, composed of Psu-118984 and Psu-118336, with Psu-118984 forming part of the north bank and mouth of the Wawang Dapdap River, where it meets Manila Bay. Accordingly, the southwestern boundary of Psu-118984 is Manila Bay itself.

A comparison of the Broad Map and the 1938 survey plan of the mother property shows that new land has indeed been created on the west-southwest side of the mother property. The course of the accretion parallels the course of the Wawang Dapdap River. The 1938 survey plan shows that the mother property was separated from Manila Bay by a solitary parcel of land, which is indicated in the Broad Map as Lot 1 of Psu-1153 69. As of 1938, Lot 1 of Psu-115369 was bounded on the southwest by Manila Bay. However, by 1999, as shown in the Broad Map of even date, said lot is now bounded on the southwest by Lot 2 of Psu-115369, which in turn is bounded on the same direction by Psu-115615, which is in turn bounded on the same direction by Psu-118984, on which the shoreline is presently located.
The Broad Map and the 1938 survey plan of the mother property likewise shows that due to the formation of new land along its northern bank, the location of the mouth of the Wawang Dapdap River moved in the same direction as the accretion. In the 1938 survey plan, the river's mouth was adjacent to Lot 1 of Psu-115369; but in the 1999 Broad Map, the river's mouth was adjacent to Lot 1 of Psu-118984. Verily, the accretion caused the river to elongate and chart a new course. Starting from the 1938 location of its mouth adjacent to Lot 1 of Psu-115369, it began to flow in a more southwesterly direction past Lot 2 of Psu-115369 and Psu-118984, where it meets Manila Bay. This finding is bolstered by the individual survey plans, which show the gradual change in the location of the shoreline of Manila Bay and the mouth of the Wawang Dapdap River.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Requirements of accretion under Article 457; (2) Made through the effects of the current of the water and not man-made

Vda. De Nazareno, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 98405, June 26, 1996:

Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514 provides that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature.
Thus, in Tiangco vs. Director of lands, 16 C.A. Rep. 211, where the land was not formed by the sole effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also a consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.

Heirs of Emiliano Navarro vs. IAC, G.R. No. 68166, February 12, 1997:

States what can be considered rivers:

The action of waters formed in waters bounded by Manila Bay belong to the State because the same are actions on the sea, which are outside of the requirement in the case of Meneses that the action of the waters must be one coming from the river under Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1986:

Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed out by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
If accretion is formed on the lands adjoining the Manila de Bay, it belongs to the owner of the land adjoining it because Laguna de Bay is a lake, the accretion on which belongs to the owner of the land thereto.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Requirements of accretion under Article 457; (3) Taking place on lands adjacent to the banks of the rivers

A river bank is part of the bed of the river.

"Banks of a river" refer to those lateral strips of zones of its bed which are washed by the stream only during such high floods as do not cause inundations or to the point reached by the river at high tide. (Hilario vs. Qty of Manila, 19 SCRA, 931, citing the Law of Waters)

Riverbanks used to be owned by the riparian owners.
Under the Siete Partidas, the banks of rivers belonged to the riparian owners, following the rule in Roman law.
Under the Law of Waters and old Civil Code, all river banks are now of public ownership, except river banks which had already become of private ownership under the Siete Partidas.
The old view was adapted to the New Civil Code under Article 420 where riverbanks are owned by the State. The provision reads as follows:

Art. 502.

The following are proper ty of public dominion:

Rivers and their natural beds;

Riverbanks are owned by the State because they form part of the river, as explained in Hilario vs. City of Manila, to wit:

'River' consists of water, a bed and banks.
A "river" consists of water, a bed and banks, these several parts constituting the river, the whole river. It is a compound idea; it cannot exist without all its parts. Evaporate the water, and you have a dry hollow. If you could sink the bed, instead of a river, you would have a fathomless gulf. Remove the banks, and you have a boundless flood. Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should either be totally public or completely private. And since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the same nature also. However, to dispel all possible doubts, the law expressly makes all three elements public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are public under Arts. 339 and 407, respectively, of the Code (old), while the flowing waters are declared so under Art. 33, par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866.

Accretion only takes place in the adjacent lands in the bank of rivers and not on the banks of rivers because the law requires an easement:

Art. 638. The banks of rivers and streams, even in case they are of private ownership, are subject throughout their entire length and within a zone of three meters along their margins, to the easement of public use in the general interest of navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
Estates adjoining the banks of navigable or floatable rivers are, furthermore, subject to the easement of towpath for the exclusive service of river navigation and floatage. If it be necessary for such purpose to occupy land s of private ownership, the proper indemnity shall first be paid.

Henceforth, the accretion will start to benefit the riparian owner only from the start of the three (3) meter mark to the exclusion of the river banks.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Requirements of accretion under Article 457; (3) Taking place on lands adjacent to the banks of the rivers; Intersecting accretions can benefit only those made in the river waters

Republic vs. Asuncion, G.R. No. 200772, February 17, 2021:

Accretion took place on the south of the Wawang Dapdap River flowing into the Manila Bay. The property being sought to be registered in favor of the owners received the increase of accretion on both the side of the river and the side of Manila Bay.
Can accretion be credited in favor of the landowner? The Court ruled:

Given that the disputed land is located at the mouth of a river flowing into the sea, even the Asuncions themselves - who were in possession of the land since 1933 - were unsure about the precise cause of the accretion, for the Manila Bay and the Wawang Dapdap River acted simultaneously upon the land. Moreover, unlike in Heirs of Navarro, the disputed land is not peninsular (as it is bounded by water only on two sides) and the accretion thereon did not develop exclusively along the shore. Here, both the accretion and the mother property are located on the north bank of the Wawang Dapdap River.
Based on the Broad Map, the shape of the perimeter of the mother property and its position relative to the Wawang Dapdap River is such that the Wawang Dapdap River flows west-southwest as it adjoins the property.
As established above, the earliest known location (as of 1938) of the mouth of the Wawang Dapdap River was beside Lot 1 of Psu-115369 which is immediately adjacent to the mother property. It has also been established that the Wawang Dapdap River charted a new course between 1938 and 1948, as indicated by the maps showing the southwesterly advance of the river's mouth from its 1938 location. Since Lot 1 of Psu-115369 is located immediately at the river's mouth, and the mother property is immediately adjacent to said lot, the alluvion carried by the river accumulates not only along the southern margin of both lots (i.e., the north bank of the Wawang Dapdap) but also along the western margin of Lot 1 of Psu-115369 (i.e., the shoreline of Manila Bay).
Article 457 of the Civil Code only contemplates accretions received by "banks of rivers". If the alluvion, despite being carried by the flow of a river, be deposited (or as the Code puts it, "received") along the seashore as the river merges into the sea, such alluvion cannot be considered an accretion under the Civil Code. In the case at bar, the accretion formed shoreward, in the southwestern direction, along the course of the Wawang Dapdap River as its mouth shifted in the same direction. Consequently, the only logical conclusion is that the alluvion was carried by the action of the Wawang Dapdap River but the same was deposited not only along its banks, but also on the seashore forming its mouth, as it exited into Manila Bay. If the accretion were deposited on the bank of the mother property alone, the change in the course of the Wawang Dapdap River would not have been the gradual southwest shift seen on the maps submitted by the Asuncions, but a more abrupt turn southward or a branching out, since the accretion on the banks of the mother property would have blocked or impeded its continued southwesterly flow. Conversely, if the accretion were attributable to the sea alone as claimed by the Solicitor General, the Wawang Dapdap River should not have changed course, as the deposits would accumulate on the shore alone (as in Heirs of Navarro), without significantly affecting the course of the river, considering that the river makes its southwest turn immediately after passing Lot 1 of Psu-115369 (which was the location of its mouth in 1938). However, the maps reveal that the river does not make an abrupt turn or branch out below Lot 1 of Psu-115369; but instead continues gradually along a southwesterly direction, indicating that the alluvion was being deposited on both the riverbank and the shore.
Consequently, the Asuncions can only claim the rights under Article 457 with respect to Psu-115369 and to Psu-115615, since these are the only lots which are adjacent to the north bank of the Wawang Dapdap River as shown on the 1999 Broad Map and the survey plans. Being located along the riverbank, these are the only areas which can be safely presumed to have been formed through the accretion received by the banks of the mother property. Likewise, the other parcels which are not located along the riverbank, or bordering the shoreline of Manila Bay, cannot be registered, since the source of the accretion from these areas cannot be established with certainty; and in accordance with Article 4 of the 1866 Law on Waters, the Constitution, and our earlier findings, these must be presumed to be part of the public domain, either as foreshore lands or unclassified lands

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Requirements of accretion under Article 457; Effects of accretion - Registration of accretion required to be made

In the event that accretion (addition) takes place vis-a-vis a registered land, the case of Republic vs. Tongson, G.R. No. 233304, July 28, 2020, provides that the owner of the registered land must file an application for judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title to perfect his ownership:

There is no question that the foregoing requisites must be sufficiently established by the riparian owners applying for land registration over the additional portion. In the event that the land situated along the riverbank is indeed shown to have increased gradually over time from soil deposits brought by the river's current, there arises a disputable presumption that the change was gradual and caused by alluvium. Should the applicant successfully establish the fact of accretion, certainly:

Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks. Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act.

It is likewise settled that "an accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot that receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another." For this reason, it is incumbent upon respondents seeking judicial confirmation under land registration laws on a claim that the subject land is a product of accretion to establish the presence of the three cited requisites.

Manigbas vs. Abel, G.R. No. 222123, June 28, 2021:

However, for a riparian owner to definitively validate ownership over the accreted land, the registration thereof is a subsequent step entirely distinct from alluvion itself. The Court, in Grande v. Court of Appeals, summarized the distinctions:

x x x The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing. and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land. but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. x x x

Thus, since title to accreted land vests from the time the alluvial deposit is formed, then the land registration proceedings thereon are effectively a request for confirmation of title already vested in the riparian owner by law. The land registration court cannot confer to the riparian owner the ownership over what is already his. Land registration proceedings seek only to judicially declare the riparian owner as such over the accreted land.
Accordingly, lest this ruling be misunderstood, the Court makes no explicit pronouncement on whether or not Manigbas is the riparian owner of the accreted lot. Such is a question properly addressed to the land registration court. Thus, the DENR-MIMAROPA Regional Executive Director, in his Order dated November 6, 2006, correctly directed the completion of the Proposed Survey Plan, in order that Manigbas may file the necessary land registration proceedings to judicially confirm his ownership over the accreted lot. In the same vein, the DENR Secretary inaccurately counted against Manigbas his supposed failure to establish the req uisites of accretion. Indeed, the instant controversy is neither the time nor the avenue for such issues.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Accretion under Article 461

Article 461 provides for accretion which benefits the individual riparian owner instead of the State:

Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.

As required by the provision, the river bed benefits the riparian owner only if: the riparian owner lost areas f r o m tis land due to the river naturally changing its course.
When this condition is met, the action ipso facto belongs to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.

However, the owners o f the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire this land by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.

The Civil Code requires that the change in the course o f the river be brought about by natural causes.
If it is man-made, the accretion is considered reclamation.
Spouses Galang vs. Spouses Reyes, G.R. N o. 184746, August 8, 2012:

If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed through the property of the claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course was automatically acquired by the claimant. Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are:

the old course of the creek,
the new course of the creek, and
the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Accretion under Article 465

Article 465 of the Civil Code provides another instance of accretion which benefits the riparian owner:

Article 465. Islands which through successive accumulation of alluvial deposits are formed in non-navigable and non-floatable rivers, belong to the owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of them, or to the owners of both margins if the island is in the middle of the river, in which case it shall be divided longitudinally in halves. If a single island thus formed be more distant from one margin than from the other, the owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner thereof.

The accretion belong to the owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of them, or to the owners of both margins if the island is in the middle of the river, in which case it shall be divided longitudinally in halves.
If a single island thus formed be more distant from one margin than from the other, the owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner thereof.
As in the case of alluvion, a preferential right is given to those who are nearest to the island, because they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of such island.
This preferential right given to the one nearest to the island is held in high regard by the court as demonstrated in the case of Maximo Jagualing vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94283 March 4, 1991.

In this case, the question hat was asked was: Between the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a non-navigable and non-floatable river and the owner of the land along the margin nearest the island, who has the better right thereto?
The Supreme Court gave the following answer in the following ruling:

The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this regard the Court of Appeals also did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river.
What then, about the adverse possession established by petitioners? Are their rights as such not going to be recognized? It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific act of possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens system must itself still be registered.
Petitioners may therefore, acquire said property by adverse possession for the required plumber of years under the doctrine of acquisitive prescription. Their possession cannot be considered in good faith, however, because they are presumed to have notice of the status of private respondents as riparian owners who have the preferential right to the island as recognized and accorded by law; they may claim ignorance of the law, specifically Article 465 of the Civil Code, but such is not, under Articles 3 and 526 of the same code, an adequate and valid defense to support their claim of good faith. Hence, not qualifying as possessors in good faith, they may acquire ownership over the island only through uninterrupted adverse possession for a period of thirty years.

Sec. 14 (2) on accretion; Laws providing for accretion in favor of the State

Articles 462 and 464 provide for instances when the State may be the beneficiary of the actions of bodies of water:

Article 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural causes, opens a new bed through a private estate, this bed shall become of public dominion.
Article 464. Islands which may be formed on the seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines, on lakes, and on navigable or floatable rivers belong to the State.

Article 462 provides for the unfortunate situation for the owner of a private estate whose property is not bound by the river.

In this instance provided by law, the owner of the private estate loses the ownership of the property due to the fact that the river is considered property of public dominion and inalienable.

Article 464 demonstrates an instance when the accessory follows the principal — in terms of ownership — because the principal (the seas, lakes, navigable rivers) property is owned by the State.

Thus, since ownership encompasses everything at the surface level, the air and the subterranean property, then the islands formed in property of the State is considered State-owned.

Will the opening of the new course on a private estate result in the river banks also being considered to be of public dominion?
Hilario vs. City of Manila:

Since a river is but one compound concept, it should have only one nature, i.e., it should either be totally public or completely private. And since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the same nature also.
However, to dispel all possible doubts, the law expressly makes all three elements public. Thus, riverbanks and beds are public under Arts. 339 and 407, respectively, of the Code, while the flowing waters are declared so under Art. 33, par. 2 of the Law of Waters of 1866.
Articles 70, 72 and 73 of the Law of Waters speak of natural beds and their banks. Plaintiff now equates the term "natural" with the word "original" so that a change in the course of a river would render those articles inapplicable. However, the premise is incorrect.
"Natural" is not made synonymous to "original" or "prior condition". On the contrary, even if a river should leave its original bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would still fall within the scope of the definition provided above. Hence, the law must have used the word "natural" only because it is in keeping with the ordinary nature and concept of a river always to have a bed and banks.
Plaintiff's third point is not lightly to be taken. Indeed, it would seem possible to acquire private ownership of banks under Art. 553.
A study of the history of Art. 553 will however reveal that it was never intended to authorize the private acquisition of riverbanks. That could not have been legally possible in view of the legislative policy clearly enunciated in Art. 339 of the Code that all riverbanks were of public ownership. The article merely recognized and preserved the vested rights of riparian owners who, because of prior law or custom, were able to acquire ownership over the banks. This was possible under the Siete Partidas which was promulgated in 1834 yet.29 Under Law 6, Title 28, Partidas 3, the banks of rivers belonged to the riparian owners, following the Roman Law rule. In other words, they were privately owned then. But subsequent legislation radically changed this rule. By the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, riverbanks became of public ownership, albeit impliedly only because considered part of the bed — which was public — by statutory definition. But this law, while expressly repealing all prior inconsistent laws, left undisturbed all vested rights then existing. So privately owned banks then continued to be so under the new law, but they were subjected by the latter to an easement for public use.
This was perhaps the reconciliation effected between the private ownership of the banks, on the one hand, and the policy of the law on the other hand, to devote all banks to public use. The easement would preserve the private ownership of the banks and still effectuate the policy of the law. So, the easement in Art. 73 only recognized and preserved existing privately owned banks; it did not authorize future private appropriation of riverbanks.
The new law also affirmed the public ownership of rivers and their beds, and the treatment of the banks as part of the bed. But nowhere in the law was there any provision authorizing the private appropriation of the banks. What it merely did was to recognize the fact that at that time there were privately owned banks pursuant to the Siete Partidas, and to encumber these with an easement for public use.

Sec. 14 (3) on acquisition of land under any other manner provided for by law

Sec. 14 (4) gives applicants for registration the right to register lands acquired through other modes of acquiring ownership under the law:

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

The Civil Code provides for the cause of action over which registration of land may be performed aside from the earlier enumerated ways, namely through: DSS

Donation;
Succession; and
Sale.

Sec. 14 (3) on acquisition of land under any other manner provided for by law; Donation

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. (Art. 725, NCC)
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid; Article 749 of the Civil Code requires that: P-A

It must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy;
An acceptance must be made and the acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

It is required for acceptance that: D-L

The acceptance be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document;
The acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor.

The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor.
Arangote vs. Maglunob, G.R. No. 178906, February 18, 2009:

The Supreme Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to t he donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. Where the Deed of Donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the Deed of Donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

Sec. 14 (3) on acquisition of land under any other manner provided for by law; Succession

Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. (Art. 774, NCC)
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (Art. 777, NCC)
The following are the requirements before rights may be transmitted: D-RP-AWC

Death, whether actual or presumptive;
Rights or properties are transmissible;
Transferee must be alive, willing, and capacitated to inherit.

Testate Estate of Tangco Jose de Borja vs. Tasiana Vda. De Borja, 46 SCRA 577:

That rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent and need not wait for the probate proceeding to finish before the transfer of rights.

Sec. 14 (3) on acquisition of land under any other manner provided for by law; Sale

The most common form of acquiring (and disposing of) real property is through the execution of a contract of sale.
Article 1458 of the Civil Code defines a contract of sale as follows:

By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.

The contract of sale involving real property under the Civil Code merely requires that it be registered for it to take effect against third persons.
As a result, two matters are essential to be considered in contracts of sale: P-D

Perfection of consent, and
Delivery

Sec . 14 (3) on acquisition of land under any other manner provided for by law; Sale — 1) Perfection of consent

Under Article 1475 of the New Civil Code, the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
In the case of Quijada vs. C.A., G.R. No. 126444, December 4, 1998, the Supreme Court once again had the occasion to rule that: sale, being a consensual contract, is perfected by mere consent, which is manifested the moment there is a meeting of the minds as to the offer and acceptance thereof on three (3) elements: SPT

Subject matter;
Price certain; and
Terms of payment of the price.

Sec . 14 (3) on acquisition of land under any other manner provided for by law; Sale — 1) Perfection of consent: a) Subject matter

The subject matter involved in a contract of sale (pertinent to this discussion) is the real property.
In relation to the determinative nature of real property, the Supreme Court has ruled that what really defines a piece of land is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty mentioned in the description, but the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. (Dichoso vs. CA, 192 SCRA 169, Erico vs. Chagas, 98 SCRA 575, Paterno vs. Salud, 9 SCRA 81)
Naranja vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160132, April 17, 2009:

The Supreme Court ruled that to be valid, a contract of sale need not contain a technical description of the subject property. Contracts of sale of real property have no prescribed form for their validity; they follow the general rule on contracts that they may be entered into in whatever form, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The failure of the parties to specify with absolute clarity the object of a contract by including its technical description is of no moment. What is important is that there is, in fact, an object that is determinate or at least determinable, as subject of the contract of sale. The form of a deed of sale provided in Section 127 of Act No. 496 is only a suggested form. It is not a mandatory form that must be strictly followed by the parties to a contract.
As long as the deed of sale clearly identifies the subject properties by indicating their respective lot numbers, lot areas, and the certificate of title covering them, it is enough. Resort can always be made to the technical description as stated in the certificates of title covering the two properties.

Sec . 14 (3) on acquisition of land under any other manner provided for by law; Sale — 1) Perfection of consent: b) Price Certain

The price is certain according to scattered provisions of the Civil Code if:

The parties have fixed or agreed upon a definite amount; or
It be certain with reference to another thing certain (see Art. 1742);
The determination of the price is left to the judgment of a specified person or persons and even before such determination. (Art. 1458)

Sec . 14 (3) on acquisition of land under any other manner provided for by law; Sale — 1) Perfection of consent: c) Terms of payment of the price

Boston Bank of the Phils. vs. Manalo, et al., G.R. No. 158149, February 9, 2006:

It is not enough for the parties, however, to agree on the price of the property.
The parties must also agree on the manner of payment of the price of the property to give rise to a binding and enforceable contract of sale or contract to sell.
This is so because the agreement as to the manner of payment goes into the price, such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.

Sec . 14 (3) on acquisition of land under any other manner provided for by law; Sale — 2) Delivery

Cebu Winland Development Corporation VS. Ong Siao Hua, G.R. No. 173215, May 21, 2009:

Perfection per se does not transfer ownership unless there is actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold. That matter is called consummation, which occurs upon the constructive or actual delivery of the subject matter to the buyer when the seller or her successor-in-interest subsequently acquires ownership thereof, as provided for by Article 1477 of the Civil Code.
Delivery has been described as a composite act, a thing in which both parties must join and the minds of both parties concur.

It is an act by which one party parts with the title to and the possession of the property, and the other acquires the right to and the possession of the same.
In its natural sense, delivery means something in addition to the delivery of property or title; it means transfer of possession.
In the Law on Sales, delivery may be either actual or constructive, but both forms of delivery contemplate "the absolute giving up of the control and custody of the property on the part of the vendor, and the assumption of the same by the vendee."

In light of the foregoing, "delivery" as used in the Law on Sales refers to the concurrent transfer of two things:

possession and
ownership.

This is the rationale behind the jurisprudential doctrine that presumptive delivery via execution of a public instrument is negated by the reality that the vendee actually failed to obtain material possession of the land subject of the sale.
In the same vein, if the vendee is placed in actual possession of the property, but by agreement of the parties ownership of the same is retained by the vendor until the vendee has fully paid the price, the mere transfer of the possession of the property subject of the sale is not the "delivery" contemplated in the Law on Sales or as used in Article 1543 of the Civil Code.

Sec . 14 (3) on acquisition of land under any other manner provided for by law; Sale — 2) Delivery — How Performed

Delivery of a parcel of land may be performed through the following different recognized modes:

The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to delivery of the realty which is the subject of the contract is sale. (Municipality of Victorias vs. CA, G.R, No. L-31189, March 31, 1987; Power Commercial and Ind. Corp. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 119745, June 20, 1997)
In some instances, constructive delivery of immovable property may be effected through the symbolic delivery of the keys to the property along with the recording of the sale with the Register of Deeds.
Delivery may also be effected through:

tradicion constitutum possessorium by virtue of which the vendor remains in actual possession of the property in some other concept such as that of a lessee, o
tradicion brevi manu, by virtue of which the possessor changes the character of his possession, such as that from lessee to owner, after the execution of the contract of sale.

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