Property: Ownership, In General

 Title II. — OWNERSHIP 

Chapter 1 

 OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL

 Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights. 

1. ‘Ownership’ Defined

• Ownership is the independent and general right of a person to control a thing particularly in his possession, enjoyment, disposition, and recovery, subject to no restrictions except those imposed by the state or private persons, without prejudice to the provisions of the law. 

PNB v. CA 84 SCAD 209 (1997) 

• Under Art. 428, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. 
• As an incident of ownership, therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner form donating his naked title to the land. 
• However, the new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. 
• Sec. 7 of RA 3844, as amended (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) gives the agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding once the leasehold relationship is established.
• Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. 
• Also, under Sec. 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of legal possession of the landholding.

Marcos’ Alleged ‘Ill-gotten Wealth’

• Republic of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan 406 SCRA 190 (2003)
• The Philippine Supreme Court adduced the following points in adjudicating that the reported Swiss banks’ accounts reportedly under the names of foreign foundations — and, thus, rightfully belonging to the Philippine Government thus:

1. the following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of this Swiss deposits may be effected: 
1. ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and 
2. the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i.e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer. 
2. respondent’s willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic of the Phils. only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no persons would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not, in fact, own them;
3. the reasons relied upon by the Supreme Court in declaring the nullity of the agreements entered into by the Marcoses with the Republic never in the least bit even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of the Marcoses’ admission with respect to their ownership of the Swiss funds; and 
4. inasmuch as the ownership of the foreign foundations in the assets was repudiated by Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as indispensable parties and their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.

(2) Kinds of Ownership

• Full ownership (dominium or jus in re propia) 
• this includes all the rights of an owner.
• Naked ownership (nuda proprietas) 
• this is ownership where the right to the use and the fruits has been denied. 
• Naked ownership + Usufruct = Full ownership
• Usufruct = Full ownership - naked ownership. 
• Naked ownership = Full ownership - usufruct
• A usufructuary’s right may be called jus in re aliena because he possesses a right over a thing owned by another.
•  Sole ownership 
• where the ownership is vested in only one person. 
• Co-ownership (or Tenancy in Common) 
• when the ownership is vested in two or more owners. 
• Manresa says: 
• “The concept of co-ownership is unity of the property, and plurality of the subjects. Each co-owner, together with the other co-owners, is the owner of the whole, and at the same time, the owner of an undivided aliquot part thereof.” 

(3) Where Questions of Ownership Should be Decided 

• Questions relating to ownership or even to the validity or discharge of a mortgage should generally be ventilated in an ordinary civil action or proceeding, and not under the proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act, inasmuch as the latter proceedings are summary in nature, and more or less inadequate.
• There are, of course, exceptions, as when both parties concerned, are given full opportunity to present their sides, and the court is able to obtain sufficient evidence to guide the Land Registration Court in formulating its decision. 
• This, however, naturally falls within the sound discretion of the Court.

(4) Possessory Information 

• Querubin v. Alconcel L-23050, Sep. 18, 1975
• An informacion possessoria (possessory information) duly recorded in the Registry of Property is prima facie evidence that the registered possessor is also the owner of the land involved. 

Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.

The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. 

(1) Rights of an Owner 

• Under the Civil Code Under Art. 428, the owner has: EDR
• the right to enjoy 
• the right to dispose 
•  the right to recover or vindicate. 
• The right to enjoy includes: PUF
• the right to possess
• the right to use
• the right to the fruits. 
• The right to dispose includes: CA
• the right to consume or destroy or abuse 
• the right to encumber or alienate. 

(2) Rights of an Owner Under Roman Law PUFDV

1. jus possidendi — the right to possess 
2. jus utendi — the right to use
3. jus fruendi — the right to the fruits jus abutendi — the right to consume (and also to trans form or abuse) 
4. jus disponendi — the right to dispose 
5. jus vindicandi — the right to recover.

• Distilleria Washington, Inc. v. La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. 87 SCAD 613 (1997) 
• The general rule on ownership must apply and petitioner be allowed to enjoy all the rights of an owner in regard the bottles in question, to wit: 
• the jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing what it produces; 
• the jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use; 
• the jus disponendi or the power of the owner to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy the thing owned; and 
• the jus vindicandi or the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing. 
• What is proscribed is the use of the bottles in infringement of another’s trademark or incorporeal rights.

(3) Example

• If I am the owner of a house, I can:
• live in it 
• use it 
• receive rentals from a tenant in case I lease it 
• destroy it
• sell or mortgage or donate or alter it
•  recover it from anyone who has deprived me of its rightful possession.

(4) Jus Possidendi 

• The right to possess means the right to hold a thing or to enjoy a right. 
• In either case, it means that the thing or right is subject to the control of my will.
• If I sell what I own, I am duty bound to transfer its pos session, actually or constructively, to the buyer.
• If I buy a house from X, and X is renting it to Y, I can ask Y to leave the premises so that I may possess the same unless the lease is still unexpired and duly recorded in the Registry of Property, or unless at the time of sale, I already knew of the existence and duration of the lease. The reason for the general rule is that the right to use the house is one of the rights transferred as a consequence of the change of ownership.
• The right I can exercise even if there is an acute housing shortage and Y does not have any place to go to, except of course if some law expressly and directly prohibits me from doing so. 
• If I lease my house to L, L has the right to physically possess my house for the duration of the lease as long as he complies with the conditions of the contract, otherwise, if I should eject him forcibly from the house, he may bring an action of forcible entry against me, even if I am the owner. 

(5) Jus Utendi 

• The right to use includes the right to exclude any person, as a rule, from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
• For this purpose, the owner-possessor may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of the property. 
• Upon the other hand, the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such manner as to injure the rights of a third person. 
• Otherwise, he may be held liable for damages, and if his property is a nuisance, it may even be destroyed. 
• Also as a consequence of ownership, it has been held that when a person using his brother’s land, with the latter’s permission, is sued by a stranger who claims to be the owner thereof, the owner is entitled to intervene in the action so that he can adequately protect his rights. 
• If he be not allowed to intervene, a judgment against the brother-possessor would generally not be binding on the brother-owner.

(6) Jus Fruendi 

• The right to the fruits includes the right to three kinds of fruits — natural, industrial and civil fruits (such as rents from buildings). 
• The right to natural fruits extends to the young of animals. 
• It has been held that only owners, and not mortgagees, can claim damages for injury to the fruits of a piece of land and for injury caused by the deprivation of possession. 
• The recovery of these damages is indeed an attribute of ownership.

(7) Jus Abutendi

• In Roman law, jus abutendi did not really mean the right to abuse, but the right to consume. 
• However, modern terminology allows both meanings.
• A person can indeed burn his own house if in an isolated place, but not where the burning would endanger the properties of others. 
• A person can dispose of his wealth, but he must leave enough for his own support and for those whom he is obliged to support.
• If a person wastes his money for the purpose of depriving his compulsory heirs of their rightful legitime, he may be declared a spendthrift or prodigal.

(8) Jus Disponendi 

• The right to dispose includes the right to donate, to sell, to pledge or mortgage.
• However, a seller need not be the owner at the time of perfection of the contract of sale. 
• It is sufficient that he be the owner at the time of delivery. 
• It is essential in the contract of mortgage or pledge that the mortgagor or the pledgor be the owner of the thing mortgaged or pledged, otherwise the contract is null and void. 
• A mortgage, whether registered or not, is binding  between the parties, registration being necessary only to make the same valid as against third persons. 
• A husband cannot ordinarily donate property of considerable value to his wife as long as the marriage lasts. Such a donation is considered null and void. 
• The same rule is applicable to a donation between a common-law husband and a common-law wife, according to a decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals. 

(9) Jus Vindicandi

• The right to recover is given expressly in Art. 428 which provides that “the owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.” 
• Moreover “every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court.”
• Thus, jus vindicandi is transmissible to the heirs or assignees of the person entitled to it.
• If somebody actually possesses a piece of property, and claims to be the owner thereof, the law raises a disputable presumption of ownership. 
• The true owner must then resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
• In other words, the true owner must not take the law into his own hands.

(10) Actions to Recover 

• Recovery of Personal Property 
• The proper action to recover personal property is replevin, governed by Rule 60, Rules of Court. 
• Recovery of Real Property 
• There are three usual actions to recover the possession of real property: 
• Forcible entry or unlawful detainer
• either action was formerly referred to as accion inter dictal).
• Accion publiciana
• or the plenary action to recover the better right of possession). 
• Accion reivindicatoria 
• a reivindicatory action
• We can also make use in certain cases of the:
• writ of preliminary mandatory injunction; 
• writ of possession

(11) Nota Bene

• Oliveras, et al. v. Lopez, et al. L-29727, Dec. 14, 1988
• A “move in the premises” resolution is not a license to occupy or enter the premises subject of litigation especially in cases involving real property. 
• A “move in the premises” resolution simply means what is stated therein: the parties are obliged to inform the Court of developments pertinent to the case which may be of help to the Court in its immediate disposition. 
• In other words, this phrase must not be interpreted in its literal sense. 
• Tabora v. Velio L-60367, Sep. 30, 1982 
• In case of disputes involving real property, the proper barangay court is where the property is situated, even if the parties reside somewhere else in the same municipality or city. 
• If this is not followed, the Lupong Barangay (under PD 1508) would have no jurisdiction. 

(12) Replevin 

• Replevin is defined as an action or provisional remedy where the complainant prays for the recovery of the possession of personal property. 
• Machinery and equipment used for an industry and indispensable for the carrying on of such industry, cannot be the subject of replevin, because under the premises, they are real, and not personal property.
• At the commencement of the action, or at any time before the other party answers, the applicant may apply for an order of the delivery of such property to him. 
• When he applies for the order, he must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows of the facts —
• that the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof; 
• that the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to his best knowledge, information and belief; 
• that it has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment or otherwise placed under custodia legis or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and 
• the actual market value of the property.
• The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the ad verse party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return thereof be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action. 
• The court then orders the sheriff to take such property into his custody. 
• Under the old law, it was the clerk of court who made the order. 
• If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a build ng or enclosure, and not delivered upon demand, the sheriff must cause the building or enclosure to be broken open. He then takes the property. 

• Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. CA 208 SCRA 336 (1992) 
• Leisure’s Club, Inc.’s act of filing a replevin suit without the intention of prosecuting the same, constitutes a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive and malevolent breach of contract which justifies the award of exemplary damages under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code. 
• La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. v. CA 209 SCRA 544 (1992) 
• If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should  within 5 days from such taking: 
• post a counterbond in double the value of said property; and 
• serve plaintiff with a copy thereof — 
• both requirements, as well as compliance therewith within the 5-day period mentioned, being mandatory. 
• The remedy of a stranger to the action for replevin is a third-party claim under Sec. 7, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. 
• To avail of the remedy of intervention, prior determination of whether one is a proper party defendant or a stranger to the action is necessary
• Arabesque Industrial Phils. v. CA 216 SCRA 602 (1992) 
• A writ of replevin cannot be directed against the lawful possessor. 
• Chua v. CA 41 SCAD 298 (1993) 
• Replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. 
• Navarro v. CA 41 SCAD 859 (1993) 
• As to the properties sought to be removed, the court sustains the possession by plaintiff of all equipment and chattels recovered by virtue of a writ of replevin. 
• Sebastian v. Valina 43 SCAD 71 (1993)
• Under the Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff.
• Tan v. CA 46 SCAD 435 (1993) 
• Although a replevin action is primarily one for possession of personalty, yet it is sufficiently flexible to authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties, arising from or growing out of the main controversy. 
• Filinvest Credit Corp. v. CA 64 SCAD 598 (1995) 
• A party is held liable for damages not because it commenced an action for replevin to recover possession of a truck prior to its foreclosure but because of the manner it carried out the seizure of the vehicle, using its own employees who misrepresented themselves as deputy sheriffs to seize the truck without having been authorized by the court to do so. 
•  For employing subterfuge in seizing the truck by misrepresenting its employees as deputy sheriffs, and then hiding and cannibalizing it, the petitioners commit ted bad faith in violation of Art. 19 of the Civil Code. 
• Citibank, N.A. v. CA 104 SCAD 614, 304 SCRA 679 
• There is substantial compliance with the rule requiring that an affidavit of merit to support the complaint for replevin if the complaint itself contains a statement of every fact required to be stated in the affidavit of merit and the complaint is verified like an affidavit. 
• Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corp. v. CA 307 SCRA 731 
• The condition that the lessor has deprived the lessee of possession or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of applying Art. 1485 of the Civil Code was fulfilled in  this case by the filing by petitioners of the complaint for replevin to recover possession of movable property. 
• Fernandez v. International Corporate Bank 316 SCRA 326 
• A writ of replevin may be served anywhere in the Philippines. Movers-Baseco Integrated 
• Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corp. 317 SCRA 327 
• Actual damages in the form of unpaid rentals are not mere incident of the action for the return of a forklift where the plaintiff specifically sought in the complaint not only the seizure of the forklift but likewise the payment of unpaid and outstanding rentals. 
• Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. CA 318 SCRA 493 
• An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor cannot just be deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin. 
• Factoran, Jr. v. CA 320 SCRA 530 
• When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it.

Property Already Placed Under Legal Custody May Not be a Proper Subject of Replevin 

• Basic is this rule; moreso, the time periods set by law, and which are not to be treated lightly.
• Vda. de Danao v. Ginete, 395 SCRA 542 [2003]:
• In this respect, a judge cannot defer action indefinitely on a preliminary investigation pending in his action. 

(13) Forcible Entry (Detentacion)

• Definition 
• Forcible entry is a summary action to recover material or physical possession of real property when a person originally in possession was deprived thereof by force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or stealth. (FISTS).
• Prescriptive Period 
• The action must be brought within one year from the dispossession. 
• However, in case of strategy or stealth, it would seem that the better rule would be to count the period of one year from the time of discovery of such strategy or stealth
• Issue Involved
• The issue involved is mere physical possession (pos session de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership. 
• Cases 
• Masallo v. Cesar 39 Phil. 134 
• If an owner deprives a person lawfully entitled to possession (such as, for example, a tenant who has com plied with all his obligations) thru FISTS, said tenant may bring an action of forcible entry even as against the owner. 
• This is because the owner in the example presented had surrendered material possession to the tenant by virtue of the lease contract. 
• The fact that he is the owner is immaterial. 
• Monteblanco v. Hinigaran Sugar Plantation and Coruna 63 Phil. 794 
• The law insists that an action for forcible entry must be filed within one year because public interest is involved, and therefore the case must be tried and decided as soon as possible. 
• Supia and Batioco v. Quintero and Ayala 59 Phil. 312 
• Purpose of forcible entry — “The purpose is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to property, the party, in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence, or terror … In affording this remedy, breaches of the peace and criminal disorder would be minimized. A party out of possession must respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.’’ 
• Gumiran v. Gumiran 21 Phil. 174 
• Facts to be stated in the complaint for forcible entry — The complaint must allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of said possession by another thru: 
• force, or 
• intimidation, or 
• threat, or 
• strategy, or 
• stealth. 
• Sps. Benitez v. CA 77 SCAD 793 (1997)
• In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. 
• Thus, he must allege and prove prior possession. 
• If the forcible entry was not accomplished thru any of the above-mentioned means, “forcible entry is not the proper action.’’ 
• It is not essential to set forth in the complaint for forcible entry the exact language of the law. 
• It is sufficient if stated substantially, or if facts are alleged showing that the dispossession took place thru any of the means set up by the law.
• Examples:
• A, in a complaint for forcible entry stated in the complaint that he had been “deprived” of the land he owned. Is this suffi cient?
• HELD: No, this is not sufficient for he did not state in what way he had been deprived. (
• A, in a complaint for forcible entry stated in the complaint that the defendant had “unlawfully turned the plaintiff out of the possession” of land or building. Is this sufficient?
• HELD: Yes, this is suffi cient. It is true that prior physical possession must be alleged. But this can be implied from the fact that the complaint states that the plaintiff had unlawfully been deprived of his possession. (
• Is it essential in the complaint for forcible entry or detainer to state that the action is being brought within the one-year period or is it sufficient to just prove this in court without the necessity of alleging the same in the complaint? 
• HELD: This fact need not be alleged in the complaint, but must be proved during the trial. 
• City of Manila v. Gerardo Garcia, et al. L-26053, Feb. 21, 1967 
• The City of Manila is the owner of parcels of land forming one area in Malate, Manila. Shortly after liberation, several persons entered upon these premises without the City’s knowledge and consent, built houses of second class materials, and continued to live there till action was instituted against them.
• In 1947, the presence of the squatters having been discovered, they were then given by then Mayor Valeriano Fugoso written permits each labelled a “lease contract.” For their occupancy, they were charged nominal rentals.
• In 1961, the premises were needed by the City to expand the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. 
• When after due notice the squatters refused to vacate, this suit was instituted to recover pos session. Defense was that they were “tenants.” 
• HELD:
• They are squatters, not tenants. The mayor cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or for that matter, executing leases. 
• Squatting is unlawful and the grant of the permits fosters moral decadence.
• The houses are public nuisances per se and they can be summarily abated, even without the aid of the courts. The squatters can therefore be ousted. 
• Villaluz v. CA 210 SCRA 540 (1992) 
• One in possession of public land may file an action for forcible entry. 
• Sen Po Ek Marketing Corp. v. CA 212 SCRA 154 (1992) 
• While the pendency of a suit for declaration of the inefficiency of a deed of sale does not constitute a compelling reason to delay the termination of an ejectment case, a judgment of annulment may be a ground for ordering the reconveyance of the disputed property to the original lessees. 

 Allegation of Ownership by Defendant in Forcible Entry Cases

• Ganadin v. Ramos L-23547, Sep. 11, 1980 
• If what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by  either party. 
• The municipal court will still have jurisdiction.
• Aquino v. Deala 63 Phil. 582
• Under the law, justice of the peace courts and munic ipal judges have jurisdiction over cases involving forcible entry and unlawful detainer but have no jurisdiction to pronounce judgments regarding ownership. Now then, A brings an action of forcible entry against B in the justice of the peace court. B, however, alleges his ownership over the property in question. Does B’s allegation deprive the court of its jurisdiction? HELD: No, otherwise the jurisdiction of a court can be changed by the mere allegation by the defendant, and the ends of justice would be easily frustrated. Of course, if the question of ownership really becomes essential in determining the question of possession, the justice of the peace court would no longer have jurisdiction, for the is sue has changed. Thus, the Supreme Court has said, “if in the course of the hearing and in the presentation of evidence it is found that the question of possession can not be resolved without fi rst determining the title to the property, its jurisdiction is lost, and the case should be dismissed.’’ (Torres v. Peña, 4 O.G. 8, p. 2699; Peñalosa v. Garcia, 44 O.G. 8, 2709, decided Apr. 1, 1947). [NOTE: The amendment to the Judiciary Act, al ready referred to with respect to city courts (not municipal courts) and CFI’s having concurrent jurisdiction in cases where possession cannot be determined unless the issue of ownership is also resolved.]. [NOTE: If a court without jurisdiction decides a case, the judgment is completely null and void, and may be attacked at any time, directly or collaterally. This is true even if no appeal has been made. Indeed, there would be no res judicata on the issue of ownership. (Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752).]. [NOTE: The Rules of Court provides: “The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be  conclusive with respect to the possession only, and shall in no wise bind the title or affect ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.’’ (Sec. 18, Rule 70, Rules of Court).].
•  Patricio S. Cunanan v. Court of Appeals and Basaran L-25511, Sep. 28, 1968:
• FACTS: In a forcible entry case, a judgment by com promise was given stating that according to the terms of the compromise, each party admitted the ownership and possession by the other, of half of the land. Issue: What is the effect of the pronouncement of this “ownership”? HELD: The judicial pronouncement did not amount to an adjudication of the title of the land involved. The ownership thereof was mentioned in said agreement merely as a BASIS for the right of possession therein acknowledged by both parties. Such right of possession was the only question sought to be settled and actually decided therefore by the inferior court. [NOTE: Incidentally in the above case, defendant was a Muslim. The compromise agreement was attacked as void under Secs. 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu on the ground that the same did not have the approval of the Provincial Governor or his duly authorized representative. The court held that such approval is needed only in ordinary contracts, not in agreements for the settlement of judicial proceedings, approved by the court before which the same are pending. The approval by the governor or his representative can not be given greater weight than that given by a court of justice — a court which can properly hear both sides.].
• Pabico v. Ong Pauco 43 Phil. 572
• FACTS: Land owned by A was sold at public auction. Now under the law, the owner is entitled to redeem said  property within a period of one year. Before the expira tion of said period, the sheriff put the purchaser forcibly in possession of the land. May A fi le an action of forcible entry against both the sheriff and the purchaser? 
• HELD: Yes, because here, the sheriff and the pur chaser had no right to eject A since the period of redemp tion had not yet expired
• Saturnino A. Tanhueco v. Hon. Andres Aguilar, et al. L-30369, May 29, 1970 
• FACTS: During the pendency of an ejectment case, the defendant DIED, and his heirs vacated the property. Issue: Can the recovery of the damages proceed despite the death and the leaving of the premises or should the claim now be instituted in the estate proceedings of the deceased? HELD: The claim for damages here can continue. In a case of ejectment or unlawful detainer, the main issue is possession of the property, to which the right to damages for the withholding of possession is merely INCIDENTAL. The case must continue until final judgment.

(14) Unlawful Detainer (Desahucio) 

• Definition
• Unlawful detainer is the action that must be brought when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person of any land or building is being unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
• In such a case, prior physical possession is not required.
• It is, however, not the proper remedy if the purpose is not to recover possession but to exact specific performance of a contract.
• To make out a case of unlawful detainer, the complaint must show that the withholding of possession, or the refusal to vacate, is unlawful.
• Thus, where the complaint shows prior possession by the defendant, but does not allege that the right of possession had terminated, and that occupancy was being unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff, there is no case of unlawful detainer. 
• However, the precise terminology of the law does not necessarily have to be employed. 
• A person or squatter who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment or unlawful detainer is the proper remedy against him. 

• Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga L-53788, Oct. 17, 1980 
• S sold a lot to B a retro. 
• S failed to redeem within the stipulated period of repurchase, and B was able to consolidate his ownership over the property. 
• However, despite demand on S, he failed to surrender the land. 
• What  is B’s remedy? 
• An action for unlawful detainer because of the withholding of possession. 
• Villamin v. Echiverri L-44377, Dec. 15, 1982 
• If there is no legal ground for ejectment of a tenant of an apartment, the suit cannot prosper. 
• Under PD 20, increase of rent is not allowed if the monthly rental is P300 or less. 
• Ganadin v. Ramos L-23547, Sep. 11, 1980 
• If in an unlawful detainer case the lessor wins, he is entitled to the fair market value of the property. 
• Cañiza v. CA 79 SCAD 863 (1997) 
• In an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff and a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 
• Chua v. CA 81 SCAD 907 (1997) 
• Public policy dictates that unlawful detainer cases be resolved with the least possible delay and judgments in favor of plaintiff are executed immediately. 
• Sole issue in an action for unlawful detainer is physical or material possession. 
• The pendency of an action for quieting of title before the RTC does not divest the city or municipal trial court of its jurisdiction to proceed with the ejectment case over the same property. 
• The subsequent acquisition of ownership by any person is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case.
• Lao v. CA 84 SCAD 341 (1997) 
• Although an action for unlawful detainer is inadequate for the ventilation of issues involving title or ownership of controverted real property, it is more in keeping with procedural due process that where issues of title or ownership are raised in the summary proceed ings for unlawful detainer, said proceeding should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, unless, in the case of an appeal from the inferior court to the Court of First Instance (CFI) (now Regional Trial Court [RTC]), the parties agree to the latter court hearing the case in its jurisdiction in accordance with Rule 40, Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court. 
• Villaluz v. CA 86 SCAD 589 (1997) 
• Anent the ejectment case, the 1-year reglementary period under Rule 70, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court for filing an unlawful detainer case is counted from the time of the “unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.’’ 
• Such unlawful deprivation occurs upon expiration or termination of the right to hold possession. 
• And such right legally expires or terminates upon receipt of the last demand to vacate. 
• Nueva Vizcaya Chamber of Commerce v. Court of Appeals L-49059, May 29, 1980 
• It is the nature of the suit alleged in an ejectment complaint that will determine if an inferior court has jurisdiction over the same.
• Now then, if an ejectment case is decided by the CFI (now RTC) in the exercise of its original (not appellate) jurisdiction, the parties are estopped to question the jurisdiction of the court. Ordinarily however, jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived, and the lack of jurisdiction may be raised any time.
•  Buenavente v. Melchor L-33145, Mar. 30, 1979 
•  A “squatter’’ is one who settles on the land of another without any lawful authority.
• The term is particularly applied to a person who settles on “public land.’’
•  But even if the land is private, the unlawful settler may still be regarded as a squatter. 
• If before the ejectment case is filed, the defendant had previously filed an action against the plaintiff to annul the sale of the land, the ejectment suit should be held in abeyance until after the question of title is decided. 
• Where the consideration has been paid for the purchase of land, but the sale has not been actually completed due to the inability of the vendor to furnish title deeds, an action for ejectment will not lie, the remedy in such cases being fulfillment of the contract (specific performance), or for damages if fulfillment be impossible.
• But if the complaint is for possession and a declaration of ownership, plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for possession, even though he fails to establish his right of ownership.
• People v. Echavez L-47757-61, Jan. 28, 1980
• Squatting in an urban community is penalized under PD 722. This decree does not apply to squatting in pasture lands.
• It is RA 947 that punishes squatting on public agricultural lands; squatting has now been decriminalized.
• Central Bank v. Bichara GR 131074, Mar. 27, 2000 
• Facts: The deed of sale provided, among other things, that the sellers “shall convey the property free from all liens and encumbrances.’’ 
• The buyers delayed the payment of the purchase price due to the presence of squatters who were not evicted by the sellers. Moreover, the deed of sale contains a clause saying the seller shall pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps tax, and other transfer fees. The seller failed to pay the said taxes and fees. 
1. Was the delay in payment justified?
• No. The squatters’ illegal occupation cannot be deemed a lien or encumbrance.
• By the express terms of Art. 1590 of the Civil Code, a mere act of trespass will not authorize the suspension of payment of the price. 
2.  May the buyer retain the purchase price in view of this failure?
• No. The clause is a standard one in most contracts of sale and is nothing more than a specification as to which party shall bear such fees and taxes.

 (b) Prescriptive Period The action must be brought within one year from the time possession becomes unlawful, thus — 1) 2) if there is a fi xed period for the termination of the lease, the lease ends automatically without need of any demand; hence, the one-year period begins from the expiration of the lease. if the reason for ejectment is non-payment of rent or the non-fulfi llment of the conditions of the lease, then the one-year period must be counted from the date of demand to vacate. (Thus, if the demand to vacate comes only 3 years from the time tenant had begun not to pay the rents, the landlord still has a period of one year to be counted from the date of such demand.

NOTE: The demand to vacate must be absolute, not conditional. Moreover, the complaint must state WHEN the demand was made, and the fact that such demand had been served personally, or by serving written notice, or by posting such notice. (Gallarde v. Moran, L-19572, July 30, 1965). The demand must be made at least 5 days (building) or 15 days (land) before the action is brought. (Ibid., citing Sec. 2, Rule 70, Rules of Court).]. [NOTE: If several demands had been made, the pe riod of one year must be counted 5 days or 15 days as the case may be from the time of the LATEST demand, unless in the meantime an accion publiciana has been brought. (Calubayan v. Pascual, L-22645, Sep. 18, 1967).]. Bormaheco, Inc. v. Abanes L-28087, July 13, 1973 ISSUES: 1) 2) If a squatter is sought to be ejected, from what time should we compute his unlawful possession of the premises? If an ejectment suit is dismissed on a certain ground, may another ejectment suit prosper, this time, based on other grounds? HELD: 1) 2) A squatter’s possession is by tolerance. This kind of possession becomes unlawful from the time the owner makes a demand on the squatter to vacate the premises. Yes, the latter ejectment case, based as it is, on another ground, may prosper. [NOTE: From the time the lessee begins paying monthly rentals LESS than the stipulated amount, he is in DEFAULT, and can be considered as illegally possessing the property, where despite demands he refuses to pay or to vacate the property. (Uichanco v. Laurilla, L-13935, June 30, 1960; Richards v. Gonzales, L-14939, Sep. 26, 1960).]

 (c) Issue The issue is possession de facto (material possession), not possession de jure nor ownership. (See Reyes v. Villafl or, et al., L-15755, May 30, 1961, where the Court held that if a lease contract expires and the lessee refuses to vacate, a case of unlawful or illegal detainer is present). [NOTE: If the defendants in a case are evidently pos sessors and sales applicants in good faith of public land, and the case does not involve the failure of a tenant to pay rent, the action is one involving the right of owner ship and possession, and is not one of unlawful detainer. (Garcia v. Muñoz, L-11613, 1958).]. Tiu v. Court of Appeals L-32626, Jan. 28, 1971 FACTS: Tenant persists in remaining on the premises, alleging that lessor is not the owner, and is not a Filipino citi zen. He, however, admits the existence of the lease contract, and its expiration. Issue: Has tenant a proper defense? HELD: No, because ownership is not the issue involved in an unlawful detainer or ejectment case. His appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds stated may even be considered frivolous and made solely for delay. Cantillana v. Vda. de Scott L-39450, Aug. 29, 1950 If an adverse judgment concerning land registration or any ordinary case is rendered against a person, the buyers or successors-in-interest from said person are likewise bound by said judgment. Tayag, et al. v. Yuseco, et al. L-8139, Oct. 24, 1955 FACTS: An attorney leased the land of X but because of the attorney’s legal services to X, X made him understand that