Law of Public Officers: Chapter III — De Facto Officers
Defined.
One who has the reputation of being the officer that he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law.
He must have acted as an officer for such length of time, under color of title and under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the public and public authorities, as to afford a presumption of election or appointment, and induce people, without inquiry, and relying on the supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be, to submit to or invoke his action.
Legal Effects of Act; Rationale.
The acts of the de facto public officer, insofar as they affect the public, are valid, binding and with full legal effect.
The doctrine is intended not for the protection of the public officer, but for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of a public office.
Elements. PPC
A validly existing public office.
Actual physical possession of said office.
Color of title to the office.
There is color of title to the office in any of the following cases: RFVU
By reputation or acquiescence, the public, without inquiry, relies on the supposition that he is the public officer that he purports to be.
This is acquired usually when the individual has acted as an officer for such a length of time that the public believes that he is the public officer that he assumes to be.
Under a known and valid appointment or election, but the officer failed to conform to a requirement imposed by law.
e.g., taking the oath of office.
Under a known appointment or election, void because of:
the ineligibility of the officer,
or want of authority of the appointing or electing authority, or
because of an irregularity in his appointment or election, such ineligibility, want of authority or irregularity being unknown to the public.
Under a known appointment or election pursuant to an unconstitutional law, before the law is declared unconstitutional.
Entitlement to Salaries.
General Rule: The rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title.
General Manager, PPA v. Monserate, G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002:
The Supreme Court ordered petitioner Ramon Anino to pay to the respondent backpay differentials pertaining to the period from the time he (Anino) wrongfully assumed the contested position of Manager II up to his retirement on November 30, 1997.
Exception: Where there is no de jure public officer, the officer de facto who in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may, in an appropriate action, recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra:
Even as Executive Order No. 284 was declared unconstitutional because it allowed Cabinet members to hold multiple offices in direct contravention of Sec. 13, Art. VII, it was held that during their tenure in the questioned positions, the respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to the emoluments of the office/s for actual services rendered.
Menzon v. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251:
The Supreme Court declared that even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint petitioner [as Acting Vice Governor], at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of Vice Governor under color of appointment, exercised the duties attached to said office for a long period of time, and was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte.
Under the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based, and on basic considerations of justice, it would be iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered.
Sampayan v. Daza, 213 SCRA 807:
It was held that Daza would have been a de facto officer, and as such, he cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts were valid.
Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil 724:
The Supreme Court said that having been duly proclaimed Senator and having assumed office as required by law, the defendant is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which the Constitution provides for the position.
Concurring opinion of Justice Padilla:
If the defendant, directly or indirectly, committed unlawful or tortious acts which led to and resulted in his proclamation as Senator-elect, he would be answerable for damages.
Malaluan v. Comelec, G.R. No. 120193, March 6, 1996:
The Comelec, finding merit in Evangelista’s appeal from the regional trial court, ordered Malaluan to vacate the office of mayor and to pay Evangelista attorney’s fees, actual expenses, unearned salary and other emoluments, obviously considering Malaluan a usurper, inasmuch as he was ordered proclaimed only by the regional trial court.
The Supreme Court deemed the award of salaries and other emoluments improper, holding that Malaluan was not a usurper but a de facto officer, having exercised the duties of the elective office under color of election (having been declared winner by the regional trial court).
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