Case Digest: Alvarez vs. Ramirez, GR No. 143439, October 14, 2005

Evidence | Rule 130

Sandoval-Gutierrez J.

Petitioner: Maximo Alvarez

Respondent: Susan Ramirez

 

Facts:

• Susan Ramirez filed an arson case against her brother-in-law, Maximo Alvarez, accusing him of setting fire to her house on May 29, 1998.

• On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez, Maximo's wife and Susan's sister, as a witness. 

• Maximo and his counsel did not initially object to her testimony.

• Esperanza testified that she saw Maximo pouring gasoline on the door of Susan's house and setting it on fire. She identified Maximo in court as the perpetrator:

• During Esperanza's testimony, Maximo displayed "uncontrolled emotions," causing the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.

• Maximo's counsel filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying under the marital disqualification rule (Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court).

RTC-Malabon: Granted Maximo's motion, disqualifying Esperanza from testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied.

CA: Nullified and set aside the trial court's orders, allowing Esperanza's testimony to be considered.

Issue: Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. YES

Held:

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants."

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. 

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. 

In Ordoño vs. Daquigan, this Court held:

"We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:

‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.’"

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule."

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco14), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity."

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.