Case Digest: Republic vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 168 SCRA 77 (1988)
Regalado, J:
Petitioners:
Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the Director of Forestry (now Director of Forest Development)
Respondents:
Honorable Court of Appeals
Miguel Marcelo
Celia Zurbito
Heirs of Jose Zurbito, namely:
Soledad Vda. de Zurbito
Gaspar, Guadalupe, Adelaida, Felipe, Jose and Cecilio, all surnamed Zurbito.
Facts:
From 1909, spouses Jose Zurbito and Soledad Zurbito began purchasing small parcels of land adjoining a 30-hectare property in Sitio Calulod, Barrio Pauwa, Masbate that Jose inherited.
These purchased parcels, along with the inherited land, comprise two parcels described in Plan Psu-104631.
At the time of purchase, the land had fruit-bearing coconut trees.
Jose Zurbito planted more, resulting in around 10,000 trees on the property.
A portion of the land was used for pasture, and a marshy area was converted into a fishpond.
The spouses occupied and cultivated the land peacefully and publicly as owners.
On June 22, 1955 (sic), Jose's died.
His wife Soledad and their children inherited and continued possession of the land.
On April 13, 1943, Soledad sold her rights to the land to her son-in-law, Dr. Miguel Marcelo, for ₱10,000.
On October 24, 1944, Soledad and her children sold the remaining half of the land to Dr. Marcelo under a "pacto de retro" sale with a right to repurchase within five years.
The vendors failed to repurchase the land.
In 1954, Dr. Marcelo consolidated ownership by registering the sale.
Dr. Marcelo paid delinquent taxes.
He also allowed Soledad to manage the property while he lived in Manila, with her remitting income from the land to him.
On February 8, 1955, Dr. Marcelo filed an application for the registration of two parcels of land (116.8441 hectares).
The Director of Forestry opposed, claiming 22 hectares of the land were part of Timberland Block F, as classified in 1924, and subject to a fishpond lease.
CFI-Masbate: Ruled in favor of Dr. Marcelo, confirming his ownership.
The court rejected the government’s evidence, stating it was insufficient to prove the land was forest land.
CA: Ruled that Dr. Marcelo and the heirs were co-owners of the property in stated shares.
Issue: Whether the 22 hectares area which forms part of the land applied for registration by and decreed in favor of herein private respondents is disposable agricultural land. YES
Held.
Petitioner relies mainly upon the testimony of District Forester Anacleto Espinas who submitted a report that the land in dispute is within a forestal zone and cannot, therefore, be awarded to private respondents in land registration proceedings.
A careful perusal of his testimony, however, reveals that, insofar as relevant to this issue, said witness merely Identified and described the condition of the area claimed by the Government and verified the location thereof as stated in Plan Psu-104631 which, as heretofore stated, is covered by Land Classification Project No. 3 under LC Map No. 452, Masbate, Masbate, certified on December 22, 1924. As correctly observed by the trial court, supra, no authentic document evidencing the classification of the land applied for registration as a forest zone was ever presented by the oppositor Director of Forestry.
Furthermore, said forester admitted that the subject area is planted with fruit-bearing coconut trees and nipa palms, and that it is only partly covered by mangroves. Petitioner would, however, insist that since the contested area has manglares or mangrove swamps, then, pursuant to Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, such swamplands with nipa and mangrove growth are distinctly classified as forestal areas.
It has, however, been held that said statutory provision does not warrant the conclusion sought to be drawn therefrom, thus:
... For instance, section 1820 of the administrative Code of 1917 provides: "For the purpose of this chapter, "public forest" includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character. This definition of public forest", it will be noted, is merely "for the purpose of this chapter". A little further on, section 1827 provides: "Lands in public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands. ..."
xxx xxx xxx
Either way we look at this question we encounter difficulty. Indubitably, there should be conservation of the natural resources of the Philippines. x x x On the other hand, the presumption should be, in lieu of contrary proof, that land is agricultural in nature. One very apparent reason is that it is for the good of the Philippine Islands to have the large public domain come under private ownership. Such is the natural attitude of the sagacious citizen.
If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence, will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Furthermore, in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera vs. Obias, et. al., in disposing of the opposition of the Director of Forestry to an application for land registration, it was explicity held that:
This opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that in the land covered by the application there are mangrove lands as shown in this opponent's Exhibit 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress (Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; and Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560).
It is not disputed that the aforesaid Land Classification Project No. 3, classifying the 22-hectare area as timberland, was certified by the Director of Lands only on December 22, 1924, whereas the possession thereof by private respondents and their predecessor-in-interest commenced as early as 1909. While the Government has the right to classify portions of Public land, the primary right of a private individual who Possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated. Thus, We have held that the Government, in the first instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made.
On the matter of classification of the land into either agricultural or forestal area, petitioner's invocation of Section 1838 of the Revised Administrative Code is not in point since said provision is merely a general conferment of authority and administrative control on the Director of Forestry to lease or grant to qualified persons, under the conditions therein stated, permits for the use of forest lands or vacant non-agricultural public lands. However, as to whether the particular land in question is forestry or any other class of land is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case.
Regarding the contention that the controverted lot has been the subject of a fishpond lease agreement between the Bureau of Fisheries and one of the private respondents and is, therefore, incapable of registration, even under considerations of only the res inter alios rule the act of that party cannot bind the applicant in the land registration proceeding. Furthermore, the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer or dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain until such lands have been released for fishery or other purposes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Doctrines:
Prior Possession in Good Faith before Classification:
Private individuals who have possessed and cultivated land in good faith before its classification as public land (such as forest or timberland) have rights that should be recognized.
In this case, the Zurbito family and their successor, Dr. Miguel Marcelo, had been in possession of the land since 1909, well before the government classified 22 hectares as timberland in 1924.
Insufficient Proof by the Government:
The opposition from the Director of Forestry was not supported by sufficient evidence. While a forester testified that the land was part of a forest zone, no authentic documents were presented to substantiate the claim.
Formal opposition without convincing evidence would not suffice to prevent land registration.
Agricultural Presumption:
In the absence of proof to the contrary, land is presumed to be agricultural in nature.
Jurisdiction of the Bureau of Fisheries:
The Bureau of Fisheries does not have jurisdiction over swamplands or mangrove lands until those lands have been released for fishery or other purposes by the government.
Therefore, the existence of a fishpond lease on the land did not affect its status for registration.
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