Case Digest: Unduran vs. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284

October 20, 2015

Law on Natural Resources

Peralta, J.

Petitioners:

Loloy Unduran
Barangay Captain Romeo Pacana
Nestor Macapayag
Ruperto Dogia
Jimmy Talino
Ermelito Angel
Petoy Besto
Victorino Angel
Ruel Boling
Jermy Angel
Berting Sulod
Rio Besto
Bendijo Simbalan
Mark Brazil

Defendants:

Ramon Aberasturi
Cristina C. Lopez
Cesar Lopez Jr.
Dionisio A. Lopez
Mercedes L. Gaston
Agnes H. Lopez
Eusebio S. Lopez
Jose Maria S. Lopez
Anton B. Aberasturi
Ma. Raissa A. Velez
Zoilo Antonio A. Velez
Cristina Aberasturi
Eduardo Lopez Jr.
Rosario S. Lopez
Juan S. Lopez
Cesar Anthony R. Lopez
Venancio L. Gaston
Rosemarie S. Lopez
Jay A. Asuncion
Nicolo Aberasturi
Lisa A. Asuncion
Inez A. Veray
Hernan A. Asuncion
Asuncion Lopez
Thomas A. Velez
Luis Enrique Velez
Antonio H. Lopez
Charles H. Lopez,
Ana L. Zayco
Pilar L. Quiros
Cristina L. Picazo
Renato Santos
Geraldine Aguirre
Maria Carmencita T. Lopez

Facts:

Petitioners, except Mark Brazil and Nestor Macapayag, are members of the MILALITTRA or Talaandig tribe, claiming to have been living since birth on the land located at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their forefathers.
Respondents, represented by Ramon Aberasturi, claim ownership of a 105.7361-hectare unregistered agricultural land (Lot No. 7367 Cad 630-D) allegedly within the ancestral domain.
On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria with a request for a Temporary Restraining Order against petitioners.
Petitioners Macapayag and Brazil filed their Answer claiming respondents had no cause of action, while the other petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners argued that under the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (RA 8371), the NCIP had issued them a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in 2003. Thus, NCIP has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

NCIP filed a Motion to Refer the case to the NCIP Regional Hearing Office.
Respondents amended their complaint to one for Injunction and Damages, which petitioners opposed.

Petitioners filed another Motion to Dismiss and requested a writ of injunction.

RTC: Granted the amendment of the complaint and declared petitioners' motions moot.

Petitioners refiled their Motion to Refer the case to NCIP and Motion to Dismiss.

RTC: Denied petitioners' motions and declared them in default, except Macapayag and Brazil, granting the respondents' request for a writ of injunction.

CA: Affirmed the RTC's order but lifted the default status of the petitioners.

The CA ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction and that the amendment of the complaint was proper.

Issues:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the jurisdiction of the court a quo over a complaint for injunction involving an ancestral domain of the Talaandigs.
Whether the CA erred in affirming the resolution of the court a quo allowing the amendment of the complaint, the sole purpose of which is to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
Whether the CA erred in resolving that evidence must be presented before the RTC when in the original action for special civil action for certiorari before it, the court a quo has admitted that a CADT was issued in favor of petitioners.

Held:

On the first issue, petitioners contend that the RTC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 04-03-0 for Injunction, Damages and other Relief, because the 105.7361-hectare land claimed by respondents is undisputedly within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe over which a CADT has already been issued. Petitioners insist that, even granting that the case is purely a personal action, the NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over it as it concerns a claim and dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain.

On the second issue, petitioners argue that the amendment of the complaint from accion reivindicatoria to injunction with damages was clearly meant to oust the NCIP of its jurisdiction over the case and confer it on the RTC by concealing the real issue in the case, which is the parties' conflicting claims over the 105.7361-hectare land in Miarayon, Talakag Bukidnon. According to petitioners, the cause of action in the complaint for accion reivindicatoria is the claim of ownership and recovery of possession of the said land which is undisputedly found within the Talaandig tribe's ancestral domain covered by CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010; hence, a claim within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the NCIP. Petitioners contend that respondents amended the complaint to one for injunction to downplay the real issue which is the dispute over a land that is within the Talaandig tribe's ancestral domain, and mainly capitalized on the acts complained of, such as harassment, threats, acts of terrorism, among others, supposedly committed against respondents.

On the third issue, petitioners fault the CA in ruling that whether the complaint is one for Injunction or Accion Reivindicatoria, the RTC has jurisdiction because nowhere in respondents' original and amended complaints is it stated that petitioners were members of the ICCs or IPs and that the disputed property was part of their ancestral domain. Petitioners take exception to the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, as strict adherence thereto would open the floodgates to the unscrupulous practice of litigants divesting the NCIP of jurisdiction by crafting their complaints in such a way as would confer jurisdiction on their court of choice. Petitioners contend that the literal averments of the complaint are not determinative of the jurisdiction over the subject matter where the actual issues are evidenced by subsequent pleadings; in certain cases, the real nature and character of the pleadings and issues are not merely found in the complaint, but also in the subsequent pleadings submitted by both parties. Petitioners stress that although the complaint banners the subject matter as one for injunction, the pleadings of respondents show that the subject matter is the conflicting ownership claims over the land. In fact, petitioners point out that the records of the case show that various pieces of evidence have been presented to prove that the dispute involves conflicting claims over a land covered by a CADT.

For their part, respondents contend that petitioners do not have legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file this petition, since they failed to make prima facie showing that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they were authorized to represent the Talaandig tribe. Respondents insist that based on the allegations in their amended complaint for injunction and damages, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter which is a purely personal action and incapable of pecuniary estimation. Respondents assert that the real issue is whether or not petitioners are guilty of wrongful acts of violence, terrorism, destruction, intimidation, harassment, etc., to justify a permanent injunction and hold the latter liable for damages. Respondents also point out that petitioners cannot invoke protection under the IPRA 8731, because the conflict does not involve an ancestral domain and they (respondents) are not IPs so the condition precedent before bringing a dispute before the NCIP cannot be satisfied, i.e., exhaustion of remedies under customary laws by the parties.

The petition has no merit.

On the procedural issue raised by respondents, the Court disagrees with their contention that petitioners do not have legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file the petition, for failure to show that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they are authorized to represent the Talaandig tribe.

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the "real parties in interest" rule found in Section 2,10 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such concept of real party-in-interest is adapted in Section 2, Rule VI of the 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the NCIP. That petitioners are the real parties in interest can be gleaned from the Entry of Appearance with

Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing Office of the NCIP filed by the NCIP Special Transition Team-Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU). The STRAT-QRU counsels alleged therein that the respondents' complaint for recovery of ownership (accion reinvidicatoria) sought to recover an unregistered real property situated in Miarayon, Bukidnon, from petitioners, all of whom are, with the exception of Nestor Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member-beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in the name of the Talaandig Indigenous Peoples, located at Talakag, Province of Bukidnon. In support of their allegation, petitioners presented a certification that the disputed land is within the area covered by the same CADT, and the NCIP List of Beneficiaries of Talaandig Ancestral Domain of Miarayon, Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel, Talakag, Bukidnon. In contrast, respondents failed to submit any evidence to dispute petitioners' claim that they are members of the Talaandig Tribe. Hence, respondents' contention that petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition, is without merit.

In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the respondents' amended complaint, foremost in the Court's mind is the principle in "that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."

Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

On the other hand, the NCIP's jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the IPRA as follows:

Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

On the matter of NCIP's jurisdiction and of procedures for enforcement of rights, NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, 1998, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR) of the IPRA, Rule IX, Section 1 states:

Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. - All conflicts related to the ancestral domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to the conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.

All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.

All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or Decision.

In line with Section 69 of the IPRA on the NCIP's quasi-judicial power to promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it, the NCIP issued Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure (NCIP Rules), which reiterates its jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and enumerates the actions that may be brought before it. Section 5, Rule III, of the NCIP Rules provides for the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of the IPRA 8371, including but not limited to the following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer (RHO):

a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICC/IPs;

c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:

a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and

b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371;

(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:

a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.

Anent the condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, Sections 13 and 14, Rule IV of the NCIP Rules pertinently provide:

Section 13. Certification to File Action. - Upon the request of the proper party, members of the indigenous dispute settlement group or council of elders shall likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving due regard to customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it states in substance the failure of settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under customary law or traditional practices.

Section 14. Exceptions. - The certification shall not be required in the following cases:

a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership, association or juridical person or a public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his official functions;

b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC Community, except when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders;

c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; and

d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary certification without justifiable reasons.

Having spelled out the jurisdictions conferred by law to the RTC and the NCIP over the subject matters of their respective cases, the Court now examines the allegations in the original and amended complaints to find out which tribunal may properly exercise jurisdiction over this case.

In their original complaint for accion reivindicatoria, respondents traced the provenance of their title over said land to one Mamerto Decano, a Chieftain of Talaandig tribe, by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on July 27, 1957. They averred that, together with their predecessor-in-interest, they have religiously paid the real estate taxes thereon since 1957 and that they have been in physical, actual, open, prior, notorious, continuous, public and adverse possession of said land in the concept of owners for more than 50 years, even prior to June 12, 1945. They alleged that said land was declared alienable and disposable since August 3, 1927 per certification of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They claimed that by means of fraud, stealth and surreptitious means, petitioners entered the said land, without permission and against the consent of the landowners, caused damages therein and harassed respondents by indiscriminately firing upon their farm workers. They added that petitioners continue such harassment by means of armed men frequenting the campsite and firing M-16 rifles at them during nighttime, causing great fear and threat.

Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following reliefs, among others:

to cause the preliminary injunction to be made permanent for the respondents to enjoy possession of their property, free from threats of physical harm, harassment and undue obstruction caused by petitioners;
to order petitioners to respect and not to harass, intimidate and cause trouble to the prior possession of respondents as the owners by virtue of right of title;
to order petitioners to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees and costs of suit; and
to declare respondents' title as having become a vested right, and as such entitled to all right and incident of an absolute owner.

In their amended complaint for injunction and damages, on the other hand, respondents further alleged that sometime in November 2003, petitioners harassed, intimidated, threatened, and fired high-powered rifles upon respondents' farm workers to drive them away from the land, without legal or justifiable reason. They added that, despite having hired private security guards to secure and protect their property, these violent incidents were followed by more acts of violence, lawlessness, harassment, terrorism to drive away respondents from the land which they claim to lawfully own and possess.

Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following reliefs:

to order petitioners and their representatives, to stop and refrain from committing acts of violence, destruction, assault and other forms of lawlessness and terrorism against respondents, and to maintain the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the 105-hectare land by respondents as an attribute of ownership;
to declare petitioners to have committed acts of violence, harassment, intimidation, destruction, assault and other forms of lawlessness against respondents, and to permanently order petitioners to stop and refrain from committing similar acts; and
to hold petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay respondents actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and treble costs.

After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints, the Court notes that respondents neither alleged therein that the parties are members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in respondents' original complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an interest in a real property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the amended complaint based on allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Meanwhile, contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:

A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the qualifying provision that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP."

The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely:

exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and
compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders.

This is in recognition of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights.

Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive definition, it can be gleaned that it is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the abovesaid two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the abovesaid two conditions. The same holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be violative of the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.

Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and decide this case.

There are, however, exceptional cases where the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP, viz.:

1. Cases under Sections 52 and 62 of the IPRA which contemplate a situation where a dispute over an ancestral domain involving parties who do not belong to the same, but to different ICCs/IPs, to wit:

SECTION 52. Delineation Process. — The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures:

x x x x

h) Endorsement to NCIP. — Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below.

x x x x

SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. — In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.20

2. Cases under Section 54 of the IPRA over fraudulent claims by parties who are not members of the same ICC/IP, to wit:

SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. — The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim found to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may be cancelled by the NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties concerned.

Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes and claims between and among members of the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as the basic administrative law principle that an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict the provisions of the enabling law, the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR, Rule III, Section 524 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules as null and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP.

As the Court held in Paduran v. DARAB, "[j]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot. In the abovesaid exceptional cases where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules validly dispenses with the requirement of certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the failed attempt to settle the dispute according to the customary laws of the concerned ICC/IP.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006, and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, in CAG.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Keypoints:

Allegations and prayers in the complaints – within the RTC:

Respondents did not allege that the parties are members of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) or that the case involves ancestral lands/domains disputes.

The original complaint was an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action involving real property with a value of P683,760.00.
The amended complaint was a civil action for injunction, which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter based on the amended complaint.

Jurisdiction of NCIP – parties must belong to different ICCs/IPs:

Petitioners argued that the case should fall under the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) jurisdiction due to the involvement of ICCs/IPs and ancestral land.
Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA) limits NCIP jurisdiction to disputes between or among members of the same ICC/IP.
Two conditions must be met before a dispute can be brought before the NCIP:

exhaustion of customary law remedies and
certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders.

These conditions apply only when both parties belong to the same ICC/IP.
If parties belong to different ICCs/IPs or one is a non-ICC/IP, the case does not fall under NCIP jurisdiction and should be handled by regular courts.

Rationale:

Parties from different ICCs/IPs have their own separate and distinct customary laws and Councils of Elders/Leaders.
Individuals who are not members of any ICC/IP are not bound by these customary laws or councils.
Forcing parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to adhere to another group's customary laws and councils would violate principles of fair play and due process.

In this case, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP as petitioners, so the RTC retains jurisdiction despite the ancestral land dispute.

Jurisdiction of NCIP – exceptions:

Exceptions where NCIP has jurisdiction even if parties are not from the same ICC/IP include:

Disputes over ancestral domain delineation and boundary conflicts involving parties from different ICCs/IPs.
Cases involving fraudulent claims over ancestral lands by any person or community, regardless of ICC/IP membership.

Null and void provisions in IPRA-IRR and NCIP Rules:

Rule IX, Section 1, of the IPRA-IRR, Rule III, Section 524 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules expanding NCIP jurisdiction beyond the IPRA's provisions are declared null and void.

NCIP Jurisdiction (Section 66, IPRA):

NCIP has jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving ICCs/IPs rights.
Disputes must first exhaust remedies under customary laws before being brought to the NCIP.
A certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders confirming failed settlement efforts is required before filing a petition.

NCIP-IRR, Rule IX, Section 1:

All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.

NCIP Rules, Rule III, Section 52:

Expands the jurisdiction of NCIP.

NCIP Rules, Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14:

Dispenses the certification when the Council of Elders refuses to issue certification without valid reasons.

April 18, 2017

RESOLUTION

Peralta, J.:

For resolution are petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's en banc Decision dated October 20, 2015, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006, and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners maintain that it is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), not the regular courts, which has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) regardless of the parties involved.

Petitioners argue that the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, admits of exceptions and can be relaxed in view of the special and unique circumstances obtaining this case, i.e., the actual issue, as shown by their motion to dismiss, involves a conflicting claim over an ancestral domain. They seek to apply by analogy the principles in Ignacio v. CFI Bulacan, Ferrer v. Villamor, Nonan v. Plan, among others, where it was held that the allegations of tenancy by the defendant in its answer may be used in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court, and if indeed tenancy exists, the same should be lodged before the Court of Industrial Relations (now the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board). They also invoke Leoquinco v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., and Mindanao Rapid Co. v. Omandam where it was ruled that if allegations of labor disputes or employer-employee relations are alleged by defendants in their answer and the same is shown to exist, the Industrial Court (now the National Labor Relations Commission) takes cognizance of the case.

Petitioners also argue that the Court's interpretation of Section 66 of Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997," (IPRA) to the effect that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group, is contrary to law and the Constitution. They posit that the State recognizes that each ICC or IP group is, and has been since time immemorial, governed by their own customary laws, culture, traditions and governance systems, and has the right to preserve and develop them as they may deem fit and necessary. Thus, each ICC and IP group did not, and does not, need an act of Congress such as the IPRA, to enforce their customary laws among themselves and their respective communities, and more so in further developing them.

Petitioners insist that claims and disputes within ICCs/IPs and/or between ICCs/IPs shall be resolved using customary laws, consistent with the State policy under the Constitution and the IPRA to recognize, respect and protect the customs, traditions and cultural integrity and institutions of the ICCs/IPs. They claim that cases of disputes between IPs within the same ICC/IP group are always resolved completely and with finality in accordance with their customary laws and practice, hence, the interpretation that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction in cases of disputes among IPs within the same ICC/IP group is not only absurd but unconstitutional. They aver that even disputes between different ICCs/IPs shall also fall within the jurisdiction of whatever their customary laws and practice provide since Section 65 of the IPRA does not so distinguish. They presume that after coexisting for centuries in adjacent ancestral domains, some of the ICCs/IPs have developed their own indigenous means of settling disputes between other ICCs/IPs.

With respect to unresolved claims and disputes between different ICCs/IP groups and between ICCs/IPs and non-IPs, petitioners theorize that they fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP pursuant to the provisions of the IPRA. They cite the concurring opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. that the second and third parts of Section 66 of the law only provide for a condition precedent that is merely procedural and does not limit the NCIP jurisdiction over disputes involving the rights of ICC/IPs. They contend that such interpretation is consistent with other provisions of the IPRA which lay out NCIP's jurisdiction under Sections 46(g), 62, 69, 70 and 72 of the IPRA.

Petitioners further point out that Section 72 of the IPRA permits the imposition of penalties under customary law even to non-IPs, and does not distinguish as to whom customary law may apply. According to them, any natural or juridical person, IPs or not, found to have violated provisions of then IPRA, particularly those identified in Section 72, may be dealt with by imposing penalties found in the corresponding customary laws. They submit that Section 72 does not require as a condition precedent familiarity of the person to be penalized to the existing customary law of the affected community nor does it require for the said customary law to have been published to allow for its imposition to any person who committed the violation. Thus, they assert that Section 72 negates the ruling that NCIP's jurisdiction applies only to Sections 52, 54, 62 and 66, insofar as the dispute involves opposing parties belonging to the same tribe.

Petitioners likewise aver that Sections 46(g), 62, 69, 70 and 72 of the IPRA, taken together and in harmony with each other, clearly show that conflicts and disputes within and between ICCs/IPs are first under the jurisdiction of whatever their customary law provides, but disputes that are not covered by their customary laws, either between different ICCs/IPs or between an ICC/IP and a non-IP are also within the jurisdiction within the NCIP. Petitioners invoke The City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng and Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng to support their theory that NCIP has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving a dispute or controversy over ancestral domains even if one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same ICC/IP group.

In essence, petitioners argue that:

the IPRA was not enacted to protect an IP from another IP whether from the same or different group, because they have their own means of resolving a dispute arising between them, through customary laws or compromises, as had been done for a very long time even before the passage of the law;
the IPRA is meant to address the greater prejudice that IPs experience from non-IPs or the majority group; and
the limited interpretation of Section 66 of the IPRA to its minute details without looking into the intent of the law will result in an unimaginable situation where the jurisdiction of the NCIP is only limited to those where both parties belong to the same ICCs/IPs; and
the application of the provisions of the IPRA, as a national law and a landmark social justice legislation, is encompassing and not limited to a particular group, i.e., ICCs/IPs.

In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that

the NCIP and not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case under the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is determined by the allegations in the complaint, and pursuant to jurisprudence allowing exemptions thereto;
the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case rests upon the NCIP as conferred by the IPRA;
the IPRA is a social legislation that seeks to protect the IPs not so much from themselves or fellow IPs but more from non-IPs;
the IPRA created the NCIP as the agency of government mandated to realize the rights of IPs;
in the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-judicial body with jurisdiction to resolve claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs;
the jurisdiction of the NCIP in resolving claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs is not limited to IPs of the same tribe;
harmonizing the related provisions of the IPRA supports the argument that the NCIP has jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights whether or not the parties are IPs or non-ICCs/IPs;
the NCIP as quasi-judicial agency provides IPs mechanisms for access to justice in the fulfillment of the State's obligations to respect, protect and fulfill IP's human rights;
the NCIP has the competence and skill that would greatly advance the administration of justice with respect to protection and fulfillment of ICC/IP rights/human rights; and
recognition and enforcement of customary laws and indigenous justice systems fulfill the State's obligations as duty bearers in the enforcement of human rights.

While the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration fail to persuade, there is a need to clarify the NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICC/IPs.

The Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a case is not merely based on the allegations of the complaint in certain cases where the actual issues are evidenced by subsequent pleadings. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend on the defenses raised by the defendant in the answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. Suffice it also to state that the Court is unanimous in denying the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and amended complaint based on the allegations therein is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred with the ponencia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case:

Both original and amended complaints, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, respectively, are incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC. As correctly pointed out by the ponencia, "jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action." It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the mission of the parties or conferred by acquiescence of the court.

In his Separate Opinion, Justice Arturo D. Brion also concurred with the ponencia's conclusion that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case because:

the CA correctly ruled that the RTC's February 14, 2005 Order is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by law and the allegations of the complaint; and
the NCIP's jurisdiction over disputes is limited to cases where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP group.

In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Jose Portugal Perez agreed with the ponencia that jurisdiction over the original and amended complaint, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, correctly lies with the RTC, based on the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint.

In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen likewise voted to dismiss the petition for review on certiorari, and to affirm the assailed decision and resolution of the CA. He concurred with the ponencia in holding that respondents' action, alleged to be involving a claim over the ancestral domain of an ICC/IP, does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP.

In sum, the Court finds no substantial argument in petitioners' motions for reconsideration to justify a reversal of its ruling that jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' original and amended complaint based on the allegations therein lies with the RTC.

The crucial issue in this case, however, revolves around the complex nature of the jurisdiction of the NCIP, as shown by the different but well-reasoned opinions of the Associate Justices concerned vis-a-vis the arguments in petitioners' motions for reconsideration.

To recall, the ponencia has held that pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP. Thus, even if the real issue involves dispute over a land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain of an ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which has the power to hear, try and decide the case. In exceptional cases under Sections 52, 54 and 62 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP group.

Justice Velasco's position is that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, regardless of whether or not they belong to the same IP/IC group. According to him, all cases and disputes where both parties are ICCs/IPs fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP; all cases and disputes where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP are covered by the jurisdiction of the regular courts regardless of the subject matter even if it involves ancestral domains or lands of ICCs/IPs; and regular courts have jurisdiction over cases and disputes as long as there are parties who are non-ICCs/IPs.

For Justice Brion, the IPRA's intent is neither to grant the NCIP sole jurisdiction over disputes involving ICCs/IPs, nor to disregard the rights of non-ICCs/IPs under national laws. However, he stresses that the NCIP maintains primary jurisdiction over:

adverse claims and border disputes arising from delineation of ancestral domains/lands;
cancellation of fraudulently issued Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADTs); and
disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights between members of the same ICC/IP group.

Justice Perez opines that neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. He adds that the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non ICC/IP. He concludes that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited, and confined only to cases involving rights of IPs/ICCs, where both such parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.

Justice Leonen is of the view that the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited to disputes where both parties are members of ICC/IP group and come from the same ethnolinguistic group. He states that the requirements for the proper exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction over a dispute, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, are as follows:

the claim or dispute must involve the rights of ICCs/IPs;
both parties must belong to the same ICC/IP group;
these parties must have exhausted remedies under their ICC/IP's customary laws; and
compliance with this requirement of exhausting remedies under customary laws must be evidenced by a certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute, to the effect that the dispute has not been resolved.

Meanwhile, in Lim v. Gamosa, which was penned by Justice Perez, the Court held that the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is at best concurrent with that of the regular trial courts:

As previously adverted to, we are not unaware of The City Government of Baguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al. and similar cases where we made an implicit affirmation of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties are non-ICCs/IPs. Such holding, however, and all the succeeding exercises of jurisdiction by the NCIP, cannot tie our hands and declare a grant of primary and/or original jurisdiction, where there is no such explicit conferment by the IPRA. At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.

Guided by the foregoing ruling, the Court held in Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan that the NCIP-Regional Hearing Office (RHO), being the agency that first took cognizance of petitioner-appellant's complaint, has jurisdiction over the same to the exclusion of the MCTC. In said case where both parties are members of the same ICC and the subject of their dispute was an ancestral land, petitioner-appellant first invoked the NCIP's jurisdiction by filing with the RHO his complaint against respondents for "Land Dispute and Enforcement of Rights." When the RHO dismissed the complaint without prejudice for his failure to first bring the matter for settlement before the Council of Elders as mandated by the IPRA, petitioner-appellant filed instead a complaint for forcible entry before the MCTC. Aside from its ruling that the NCIP has excluded the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the same subject matter the Court said that petitioner is estopped from belatedly impugning the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO after initiating a complaint before it and receiving ail adverse ruling.

Based on the diverse views on the nature and scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs, the recent jurisprudence on the matter, as well as petitioners' arguments in their motions for reconsideration, the Court is confronted again with the issue of whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to cases where both parties are ICCs/IPs, or primary and concurrent with regular courts, and/or original and exclusive to the exclusion of said courts, on all matters involving the rights of ICCs/IPs.

After a circumspect review of the relevant laws and jurisprudence, the Court maintains that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited to claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.

To begin with, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. A court of general jurisdiction has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. In contrast, a court of limited jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly delegated. An administrative agency, acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are specifically granted to it by the enabling statutes. Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes or which can be exercised only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.

As held in the main decision, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group because of the qualifying provision under Section 66 of the IPRA that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws." Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of a proviso is to limit or restrict the general language or operation of the statute, and that what determines whether a clause is a proviso is the legislative intent, the Court stated that said qualifying provision requires the presence of two conditions before such claims and disputes may be brought before the NCIP, i.e., exhaustion of all remedies provided under customary laws, and the Certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved.

The Court thus noted that the two conditions cannot be complied with if the parties to a case either:

belong to different ICCs/IP groups which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws, or
if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws or a Council of Elders/Leaders, for it would be contrary to the principles of fair play and due process for parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.

In which case, the Court ruled that the regular courts shall have jurisdiction, and that the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is, in effect, limited to cases where the opposing parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.

That the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is limited can be further gathered from Justice Perez' discussion in Lim v. Gamosa, thus:

Section 83 of the IPRA, the repealing clause, only specifies Presidential Decree No. 410, Executive Order Nos. 122B and 122C as expressly repealed. While the same section does state that "all other laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly," such an implied repeal is predicated upon the condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. The two laws refer to different subject matters, albeit the IPRA includes the jurisdiction of the NCIP. As such, resolution of conflicts between parties who are not both ICCs/IPs may still fall within the general jurisdiction of regular courts dependent on the allegations in the complaint or petition and the status of the parties.

There is no clear irreconcilable conflict from the investiture of jurisdiction to the NCIP in instances where, among others, all the parties are ICCs/IPs and the claim or dispute involves their rights, and the specific wording of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Sections 19-21 on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, and Sections 33-35 on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

We should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of the Congress, which is not manifest from the language of Section 66 of the IPRA which, to reiterate:

did not use the words "primary" and/or "original and exclusive" to describe the jurisdiction of the NCIP over "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" and
contained a proviso requiring certification that the parties have exhausted their remedies provided under customary laws.

We are quick to clarify herein that even as we declare that in some instances the regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases which involve rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for these kinds of disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.

In Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan, the Court affirmed and emphasized the afore-quoted ruling in Lim v. Gamosa where it struck down as void an administrative rule that expanded the jurisdiction of the NCP beyond the boundaries of the IPRA.

However, exception must be taken to the pronouncement in Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan that "[a]t best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and remedies."

Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction is that which is "exercised by different courts at the same time over the same subject matter and within the same territory, and wherein litigants may in the first instance resort to either court indifferently, that of several different tribunals, each authorized to deal with the same subject matter, and when a proceeding in respect of a certain subject matter can be brought in any one of several different courts, they are said to have concurrent jurisdiction." While courts of concurrent jurisdiction are courts of equal dignity as to matters concurrently cognizable, neither having supervisory power over process from the other, the rule is that the court which first takes cognizance of an action over which it has jurisdiction and power to afford complete relief has the exclusive right to dispose of the controversy without interference from other courts of concurrent jurisdiction in which similar actions are subsequently instituted between the same parties seeking similar remedies and involving the same questions. Such rule is referred to as the principle of priority or the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. Although comity is sometimes a motive for the courts to abide by the priority principle, it is a legal duty of a court to abide by such principle to reduce the possibility of the conflicting exercise of concurrent jurisdiction, especially to reduce the possibility that a case involving the same subject matter and the same parties is simultaneously acted on in more than one court.

After a careful perusal of the provisions of the entire IPRA, the Court discerns nothing therein that expressly or impliedly confers concurrent jurisdiction to the NCIP and the regular courts over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs between and among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. What the Court finds instead is that the NCIP's limited jurisdiction is vested under Section 66 of the IPRA, while its primary jurisdiction is bestowed under Section 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, and Section 54 thereof.

Having discussed why the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited, but not concurrent with the regular courts, the Court will now expound on the NCIP's primary jurisdiction over claims regardless of whether the parties are non-ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IP groups, namely:

adverse claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands,
cancellation of fraudulently issued CADTs, and
disputes and violations ofiCCs/IPs rights between members of the same ICC/IP.

Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence. Given that the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers that an administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency, it is apt to underscore the provisions of the IPRA which invest primary jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IP groups to the NCIP, as the primary government agency responsible for the recognition of their ancestral domain and rights thereto:

1. Section 52(h) of the IPRA anent the power of the NCIP Ancestral Domain Office (ADO) to deny application for CADTs, in relation to Section 62, regarding the power of the NCIP to hear and decide unresolved adverse claims:

SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures:

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h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below.

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SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. - In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided,further, That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

2. Section 53 on the NCIP-ADO's power to deny applications for CALTs and on the NCIP's power to grant meritorious claims and resolve conflicting claims:

SECTION 53. Identification, Delineation and Certification of Ancestral Lands.-

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e) Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the publication of the application and a copy of each document submitted including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and regional offices of the NCIP and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from the date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspapers and radio station are not available;

f) Fifteen (15) days after such publication, the Ancestral Domains Office shall investigate and inspect each application, and if found to be meritorious, shall cause a parcellary survey of the area being claimed. The Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification. In case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. In case of conflicting claims among individuals or indigenous corporate claimants, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to Sec. 62 of this Act. In all proceedings for the identification or delineation of the ancestral domains as herein provided, the Director of Lands shall represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines; and

g) The Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare and submit a report on each and every application surveyed and delineated to the NCIP, which shall, in tum, evaluate the report submitted. If the NCIP finds such claim meritorious, it shall issue a certificate of ancestral land, declaring and certifying the claim of each individual or corporate (family or clan) claimant over ancestral lands.

3. Section 54 as to the power of the NCIP to resolve fraudulent claims over ancestral domains and lands:

SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. - The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim found to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may be cancelled by the NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties concerned.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP has primary jurisdiction over these cases even if one of the parties is a non ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members of different ICCs/IPs groups. Indeed, the questions involved in said cases demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and services of the NCIP to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. No less than the IPRA states that the NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto, with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions. At this juncture, it is not amiss to state that the NCIP's decision shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, the fatal flaw in petitioners' insistence that the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is exclusive and original, can be gathered from records of the Bicameral Conference Committee cited in Justice Brion's Separate Opinion:

The word "jurisdiction" in the first part of Section 66 is unqualified. Section 66 (then Section 71) of Senate Bill 1728 was originally worded exclusive and original jurisdiction. During the Bicameral Conference, the lower house objected to giving the NCIP exclusive and original jurisdiction:

Sen. Juan Flavier: (Chairman of the Senate Panel)

There is exclusive original. And so what do you suggest?

.... ....

Rep. Zapata (Chairman of the Panel for the House of Representatives)

Chairman, may I butt in?

Sen. Flavier

Yes, please.

Rep. Zapata

This was considered. The original, we were willing in the house. But the "exclusive", we objected to the word "exclusive" because it would only be the commission that would exclude the court and the Commission may not be able to undertake all the review nationwide. And so we remove the word "exclusive" so that they will have original jurisdiction but with the removal of the word "exclusive" that would mean that they may bring the case to the ordinary courts of justice.

Sen. Flavier

Without passing through the commission?

Rep. Zapata

Yes, Anyway, if they go to the regular courts, they will have to litigate in court, because if its (sic) exclusive, that would be good.

Sen. Flavier

But what he is saying is that...

Rep. Zapata

But they may not have the facility.

Rep. ____

Senado na lang.

Rep. Zapata

Oo, iyong original na lang.

Sen. Flavier

In other words, it's not only the Commission that can originate it, pwedeng mag originate sa courts.

Rep. Zapata

Or else, we just remove "exclusive original" so that they will say, the National will have jurisdiction over claims. So we remove both "exclusive and original".

Sen. Flavier

So what version are you batting for, Mr. Chairman?

Rep. Zapata

Just to remove the word "exclusive original." The Commission will still have jurisdiction only that, if the parties will opt to go to courts of justice, then this have (sic) the proper jurisdiction, then they may do so because we have courts nationwide. Here there may be not enough courts of the commission.

Sen. Flavier

So we are going to adopt the senate version minus the words "exclusive original"?

Rep. Zapata

Yes, Mr. Chairman, that's my proposal

Sen. Flavier

No, problem. Okay, approved.

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The Bicameral Committee's removal of the words "exclusive and original" mean that the NCIP shares concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. Thus, I agree with the revised ponencia that it would be ultra vires for the NCIP to promulgate rules and regulations stating that it as exclusive jurisdiction.

Another cogent reason why the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs under Section 66 of the IPRA cannot be exclusive and original, is because of the so-called "Contentious Areas/Issues" identified in the Joint Department of Agriculture-Land Registration Authority-Department of Environment and Natural Resources-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (DARDENR-LRA-NCIP) Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 2012.[48] Such contentious matters arose in the course of the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,[49] the IPRA, the Public Land Act, and the Land Registration Act, as amended by the Property Registration Decree, which created not only issues of overlapping jurisdiction between the DAR, DENR and NCIP, but also operational issues and conflicting claims in the implementation of their respective programs.

Section 12 of the Joint DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP Administrative Order defines those contentious areas/issues which are subject of operational issues and conflicting claims between and among the DAR, the DENR and the NCIP, as follows:

Untitled lands being claimed by the ICCs/IPs to be part of their AD/AL which are covered by approved survey plans and also being claimed by the DAR and/or the DENR.
Titled lands with registered Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs), Emancipation Patents (EPs), and Patents within Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT)/Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC).
Resource access/development instruments issued by the DENR over lands within Ancestral Land/Domain Claims such as, but not limited to, Community-Based Forest Management Agreement (CBFMA), Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA), Socialized Forest Management Agreement (SIFMA), Protected Area Community-Based Resources Management Agreement (PACBRMA), Forest Land Grazing Management Agreement (FLGMA), Co-Management Agreement, Certificate of Stewardship Contract (CSC), Certificate of Forest Stewardship Agreement (CFSA), Wood Processing Plant Permit (WPPP), Special Land Use Permit (SLUP), Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP), Special Private Land Timber Permit (SPLTP), and Foreshore Lease Agreement/Permit (FLA/FLP).
Exploration Permit (EP), Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA); Mineral Agreement (either Production Sharing, Co-Production or Joint Venture) issued within CARP-covered areas.
Reservations, proclamations and other special law-declared areas a portion or the entirety of which is subsequently issued a CADT/CALT.
Areas with existing and/or vested rights after the registration of the CADTs/CALTs but for any reason not segregated/excluded.
Other jurisdictional and operational issues that may arise between and amongst the DAR, the DENR and the NCIP as may be determined by the National/Regional/Provincial Joint Committees, as created under Section 19 of the Joint Administrative Order.
Formal complaints filed by concerned ICCs/IPs or by the NCIP in behalf of the ICCs/IPs over those identified titled areas found within the AD/AL.

It is inevitable that disputes will arise involving the above-stated contentious areas/issues, and affecting the rights of parties who are non-IPs or those who belong to different ICCs/IPs groups. As a matter of fair play and due process, however, such parties cannot be compelled to comply with the two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, since IPs/ICCs are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. Hence, the Court cannot sustain the view that the NCIP shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs.

Moreover, having in mind the principle that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force and effect of law, and are entitled to great respect, the Court cannot ignore that Sections 14 and 16 of the Joint DAR-DENR LRA-NCIP Administrative Order provide for the proper forum where the contentious areas/issues involve lands with prior and vested property rights, thus:

Section 14. Exclusion/Segregation of Lands Covered by Judicially Decreed Titles and Titles Administratively issued by DENR and DAR. In the delineation and titling of ADs/ALs, the NCIP must exclude and segregate all lands covered by titles. For this purpose, the registered owner of the land may opt to submit to the NCIP a copy of the title of the property to facilitate segregation or exclusion pursuant to existing guidelines and other pertinent issuances.

The ICCs/IPs, however, are not precluded from questioning the validity of these titles in a proper forum as hereunder enumerated:

1. DAR Secretary for registered EPs or CLOAs; and

2. Regional Trial Court for registered patents/judicially-decreed titles.

On the other hand, the DAR and DENR shall not process titles pursuant to their mandate on lands certified by NCIP as ancestral domain or ancestral lands except in areas with prior and vested rights. Provided, however, that the certification by NCIP on lands as Ancestral Domains or Ancestral Lands pursuant to Section 52(i) of IPRA presupposes that the provision of Section 13 hereof on the projection of survey plans and issuance of Certification ofNon-Overlap have already been complied with.

xxxx

Section 16. CARP Coverage of Titled Properties.

Titled lands under the Torrens System issued prior to IPRA are deemed vested rights pursuant to the provision of Section 56 of IPRA. Accordingly, the DAR shall proceed with the CARP coverage of said lands, unless a Restraining Order is issued by the Supreme Court without prejudice, however, to the rights of the ICCs/IPs to question the validity of these titles before a court or body of competent jurisdiction.

Note that the "property rights" referred to in Section 56 of the IPRA belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non indigenous peoples, as said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origin of the ownership of these rights. Considering the rule on statutory construction that courts should not distinguish where the law does not do so, the IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they pertain to IPs or non-IPs, and it only requires that these "property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.

On petitioners' assertion that Section 72 of the IPRA negates the ruling that the NCIP has jurisdiction only over claims and disputes under Sections 52, 54, and 62 thereof, even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the Court finds the same as misplaced.

Note that under Section 72 of the IPRA, any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of the IPRA may be punished either:

in accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned, provided that the penalty shall not be a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, and that neither death penalty nor excessive fines shall be imposed; or
upon conviction, by imprisonment of not less than 9 months but not more than 12 years, or a fine of not less than P100,000.00 nor more than P500,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court.

Again, it would be contrary to the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its separate and distinct customary laws, and to be punished in accordance therewith. The Court thus rules that the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over violations of IPRA provisions only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. When the parties belong to different ICC/IP group or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, jurisdiction over such violations shall fall under the proper Regional Trial Court.

Justice Brion has aptly discussed that even if Section 72 of the IPRA is a special penal law that applies to all persons, including non-ICCs/IPs, the NCIP jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights is limited to those committed by and against members of the same ICC/IP group, thus:

Section 72 of the IPRA provides that any person who violates the rights of ICCs/IPs shall be punished "in accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned.... without prejudice to the right of the ICC/IP concerned to avail of the protection of "existing laws. . .[i]n which case," the penalty shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and damages, "upon the discretion of the court."

"Existing laws" refer to national laws as opposed to customary laws; while "the court" refers to the regular courts as opposed to administrative bodies like the NCIP.

Under Section 72, ICCs/IPs can avail of the protection under national laws and file an action before the regular courts, in which case, the penalty shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and damages. From this perspective, Section 72 is a special penal law that applies to ALL persons, including non-ICCs/IPs.

The phrase "without prejudice," however, means without limiting the course of action that one can take. Thus, a recourse under customary laws does not take away the right of ICCs/IPs to secure punishment under existing national laws. An express caveat under the customary law option is that the penalty must not be cruel, degrading, or inhuman, nor shall it consist of the death penalty or excessive fines.

Since the regular courts, not the NCIP, have jurisdiction over national laws, then the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to punishment under customary laws.

The NCIP's power to impose penalties under customary laws presents two important issues:

whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties under customary laws; and
whether a member of a particular ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary laws of another ICC/IP.

Laws that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, must be published.

Most customary laws are not written, much less published. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the NCIP or even the regular courts have the power to penalize non-ICCs/IPs with these penalties under customary laws. A contrary ruling would be constitutionally infirm for lack of due process.

Similarly, an ICC/IP cannot be punished under the customary law of another. Otherwise, the former would be forced to observe a non binding customary law.

Therefore, while the NCIP has jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights, its jurisdiction is limited to those committed by and against members of the same ICC/IP.

This view does not detract from the IPRA's policy to "protect the rights of ICCs/IPs." ICCs/IPs, whose rights are violated by non-ICCs/IPs or by members of a different ICC/IP, can still file criminal charges before the regular courts. In this situation, the NCIP's role is not to adjudicate but to provide ICCs/IPs with "legal assistance in litigation involving community interest."

There is also no merit in petitioners' argument that the Court's interpretation of the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA runs counter to its purpose to protect the rights, customs, customary laws and cultural integrity of the ICCs/IPs. To stress, even as Section 66 grants jurisdiction to the NCIP over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, it is required that the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their remedies under their customs and customary law before bringing their claim and dispute to the NCIP. And, in some instances that the regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for such disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.

It also bears emphasis that the right of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanism under Section 15 of the IPRA pertains only to those customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights. In this regard, it is fitting to quote the Separate Opinion of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment & Natural Resources on the constitutionality of Sections 63, 65 and other related provisions, like Section 15, of the IPRA:

Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use. xxx

xxxx

The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, where all the parties involved are members of indigenous peoples, specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a nonmember of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not required.

Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes concerning ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof through legislation passed by Congress.

Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under the Civil Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence, and it is not contrary to law, public order or public policy. Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991 calls for the recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution of issues involving members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary laws in the settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples.

Likewise, unavailing is petitioners' contention that unresolved claims and disputes between different ICCs/IPs groups, and those between ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs should fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP. In this regard, the Court shares the view of Justice Perez:

That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically excluding disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is non-ICC/IP, is reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and customary law to govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs.

Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since tile NCIP has no power and authority to decide on a controversy involving as well rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a court of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and non members of ICCs ought to be excepted from the NCIP's competence since it cannot determine the right-duty correlative, and breach thereof, between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the controversy necessarily contemplating application of other laws, not only customs and customary law of the ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP.

Anent what Justice Perez described as the "implicit affirmation" done in The City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties is not ICC/IPs, a careful review of that case would show that the Court merely cited Sections 3(k), 38 and 66 of the IPRA and Section 5 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP, as bases of its ruling to the effect that disputes or controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO. However, the Court did not identify and elaborate on the statutory basis of the NCIP's "original and exclusive jurisdiction" on disputes or controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs. Hence, such description of the nature and scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction made without argument or full consideration of the point, can only be considered as an obiter dictum, which is a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for purposes of res judicata and does not embody the determination of the court.

On a final note, the Court restates that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have limited jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group; but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction. However, under Sections 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, as well as Section 54, the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over adverse claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral domains/lands, and cancellation of fraudulently-issued CADTs, regardless of whether the parties are non ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IPs groups, as well as violations of ICCs/IPs rights under Section 72 of the IPRA where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, and Tijam, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., See separate concurring opinion.

Keypoints:

Petitioners’ Arguments:

NCIP has jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral domain, regardless of the parties involved (ICCs, IPs, or non-IPs). The rule that jurisdiction is determined by allegations in the complaint can be relaxed, citing cases where courts considered defenses or subsequent pleadings to establish jurisdiction.
ICCs/IPs are governed by their customary laws and do not require legislative acts to enforce or develop these laws. NCIP has jurisdiction over disputes even when involving different ICCs/IPs or ICCs/IPs versus non-IPs, consistent with several sections of the IPRA (Sections 46(g), 62, 69, 70, 72), invoking Section 72, which allows penalties under customary law to be applied even to non-IPs.
IPRA's purpose is to protect IPs from the majority group (non-IPs), and limiting NCIP’s jurisdiction to disputes within the same ICC/IP group undermines this goal. The limited interpretation of Section 66 of IPRA restricts NCIP jurisdiction unnecessarily and contradicts the law’s broader intent to safeguard IP rights.
NCIP possesses unique competence in handling cases related to IP rights.

Ruling: No merit in petitioners' claims, reaffirming that jurisdiction is determined by the complaint's allegations and that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case based on those allegations.

Opinions:

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Concurring Opinion):

RTC has jurisdiction because both original and amended complaints (accion reivindicatoria and injunction) are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Jurisdiction is determined by law and the allegations in the complaint. It cannot be acquired through waiver, parties' admission, or court acquiescence.

Justice Arturo D. Brion (Separate Opinion):

RTC has jurisdiction, as the CA correctly ruled that the RTC’s order is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Jurisdiction is determined by law and the allegations of the complaint.
NCIP’s jurisdiction is limited to cases where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP group.

Justice Jose Portugal Perez (Concurring Opinion):

RTC has jurisdiction over the original and amended complaints (accion reivindicatoria and injunction).
Jurisdiction is based on law and the allegations in the complaint.

Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Concurring Opinion):

RTC has jurisdiction, as the action does not fall under the NCIP’s exclusive jurisdiction.
NCIP has jurisdiction only over disputes between or among members of the same ICC/IP group. Regular courts have jurisdiction over cases involving disputes between ICC/IP members and non-members, even if ancestral land is involved.
Exceptions to NCIP jurisdiction are IPRA Sections 52, 54, and 62.

Justice Velasco:

NCIP has jurisdiction over disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, regardless of their group affiliation.
Regular courts handle cases where one party is a non-ICC/IP, even if it involves ancestral domains or lands.

Justice Brion:

NCIP does not have sole jurisdiction over ICC/IP disputes, recognizing non-ICCs/IPs' rights under national laws.
NCIP has primary jurisdiction over disputes related to ancestral domains, CADT cancellations, and ICC/IP rights among members of the same group.

Justice Perez:

NCIP jurisdiction is limited to cases involving disputes between members of the same ICC/IP group.
It is not conferred over all ICC/IP rights-related disputes, especially against non-ICCs/IPs.

Justice Leonen:

NCIP jurisdiction is limited to disputes between members of the same ICC/IP group.
Jurisdiction requires exhaustion of remedies under customary laws, evidenced by certification from the Council of Elders.

Lim v. Gamosa (Justice Perez's Opinion):

NCIP’s jurisdiction is concurrent with regular trial courts in cases involving non-ICCs/IPs.
No explicit grant of primary or original jurisdiction to NCIP in such cases.

Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan (Guided by Justice Perez’s Opinion):

NCIP-RHO has jurisdiction over disputes involving members of the same ICC and ancestral land, excluding the jurisdiction of regular courts like MCTC.
A party invoking NCIP jurisdiction is estopped from challenging it after receiving an adverse ruling.

NCIP Jurisdiction:

The court finds no provision in IPRA that grants concurrent jurisdiction to both NCIP and regular courts over disputes involving ICC/IP rights.
NCIP has:

limited jurisdiction under Section 66 of IPRA and
primary jurisdiction under Sections 52(h), 53, and 62 for specific cases.

NCIP Primary Jurisdiction:

Primary jurisdiction is the authority vested by the Constitution or statute to an administrative body to act on matters within its specific competence, requiring its special knowledge and discretion.

Adverse claims and border disputes in ancestral domain delineation.

Section 52(h): Power to reject fraudulent ancestral domain claims and resolve conflicts, especially in boundary disputes.
Section 62: Authority to hear unresolved adverse claims related to ancestral domains.
Section 53: Power to review applications for ancestral land titles and resolve conflicting claims.

Cancellation of fraudulently issued CADTs/CALTs.

Section 54: Authority to cancel fraudulent claims after due process.

Disputes and violations of ICC/IP rights between members of the same group.

The NCIP is designated as the primary government body for adjudicating disputes involving ICC/IP rights due to its expertise and knowledge of ICC/IP customs and traditions.
Even if one party is a non-ICC/IP or if opposing parties belong to different ICC/IP groups, NCIP still has primary jurisdiction.

Appeal

Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Legislative History:

During the Bicameral Conference, the House of Representatives objected to giving NCIP exclusive jurisdiction, as it might exclude regular courts and overburden NCIP.
The conference decided to remove the terms "exclusive" and "original," allowing regular courts to have concurrent jurisdiction with NCIP.

"Contentious Areas/Issues"

NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction over claims under Section 66 of the IPRA cannot be exclusive and original due to operational and overlapping jurisdiction issues.
These contentious issues arose from the overlapping jurisdictions of the DAR, DENR, and NCIP in implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, IPRA, Public Land Act, and Land Registration Act.
Section 12 of the Joint Administrative Order identifies several contentious areas, including:

Untitled lands claimed by ICCs/IPs, DAR, or DENR.
Titled lands with CLOAs, EPs, and patents conflicting with ancestral domain/land claims.
Resource access agreements issued by the DENR over ancestral domains.
Mineral agreements within CARP-covered areas.
Areas with existing vested rights after CADT/CALT registration.
Other operational and jurisdictional issues.

Disputes over these issues will involve parties who are non-IPs or from different ICCs/IPs groups, raising concerns of fair play and due process.

NCIP Limited Jurisdiction:

Section 66 only grants NCIP jurisdiction over disputes between ICCs/IPs from the same group, while cases involving non-ICCs/IPs or different ICCs/IPs should be handled by regular courts.
Section 66 of IPRA should not compel non-IPs or members of other groups to submit to NCIP jurisdiction, given the distinct customary laws of ICCs/IPs.
NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to violations of customary laws between members of the same ICC/IP, with regular courts handling broader legal issues involving non-ICCs/IPs.
Regular courts retain jurisdiction over property rights, particularly those acquired before IPRA's effectivity, regardless of ethnic origin.
Lands with prior and vested property rights are excluded from NCIP coverage. IPRA recognizes "property rights" vested prior to its effectivity, regardless of the ethnic origin of the ownership, as it does not distinguish between IPs and non-IPs.

Criminal Violations

NCIP's role in criminal violations under Section 72 of IPRA is limited to members of the same ICC/IP group; regular courts handle cases involving non-ICCs/IPs.
Under Section 72, violations of IPRA can be punished in two ways:

According to the customary laws of the concerned ICC/IP, with the caveat that penalties must not be cruel, degrading, or inhumane, nor include death or excessive fines.
By imprisonment (9 months to 12 years) or fines (P100,000 to P500,000), or both, at the court's discretion.

It would violate fair play and due process to subject parties from different ICC/IP groups to the same customary laws.
The Court rules that NCIP has primary jurisdiction over IPRA violations only when all parties are from the same ICC/IP group; otherwise, jurisdiction falls to the Regional Trial Court.
ICCs/IPs can pursue protection under national laws, and Section 72 applies to all, including non-ICCs/IPs. The phrase "without prejudice" allows ICCs/IPs to seek both customary and national law recourse, with specific limitations on customary penalties.
Customary laws are often unwritten and unpublished, raising due process concerns if non-ICCs/IPs are penalized under them.
An ICC/IP cannot be punished under another's customary law, as it would violate their rights. NCIP's jurisdiction over ICC/IP violations is confined to those involving members of the same ICC/IP.

ICCs/IPs rights, customs, and cultural integrity

Section 66 grants jurisdiction to the NCIP over disputes involving ICCs/IPs, requiring both parties to be ICCs/IPs who have exhausted remedies under their customs and customary law before bringing claims to the NCIP.
The right of ICCs/IPs to utilize their justice systems and conflict resolution mechanisms under Section 15 of the IPRA applies only to customary laws within their communities, compatible with the national legal system and internationally recognized human rights.
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment & Natural Resources:

While customary laws are permitted for determining ownership and extent of ancestral domains, their use under IPRA is not absolute; highlighting the "primacy of use."

Customary law applies strictly to disputes regarding property rights and relations among members of the same indigenous group; its application is not required when a party is a non-member or when parties belong to different groups.
The objective of IPRA in emphasizing customary law is to ensure justice, aligning with the constitutional policy of recognizing customary law through congressional legislation.
The recognition of customary law is not new; the Civil Code allows its use, provided it meets evidentiary rules and does not conflict with laws, public order, or public policy.
The Local Government Code of 1991 also supports the application of customary laws for resolving disputes among indigenous peoples, particularly in barangays with majority indigenous inhabitants.

Final Note

Petitioners argue that unresolved claims and disputes between different ICCs/IPs groups and between ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs should fall under NCIP jurisdiction, but this contention is unconvincing.
Section 66 of the IPRA specifically excludes disputes involving ICCs/IPs rights when the opposing party is a non-ICC/IP.
Non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP, as it lacks authority to decide on controversies involving non-ICCs/IPs’ rights, which belong in courts of general jurisdiction.
The NCIP is only authorized to determine rights based on customs and customary law in disputes between ICCs/IPs, but not in cases involving non-ICCs/IPs, which may require the application of other laws.
The City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng:

Justice Perez’s description of the NCIP’s jurisdiction in The City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng is seen as an “implicit affirmation,” but the Court did not provide a clear statutory basis for NCIP’s jurisdiction over non-ICCs/IPs cases.
As a result, that description is viewed as obiter dictum—an opinion without binding force, not contributing to res judicata.

The Court reiterates that NCIP has limited jurisdiction under Section 66 for claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, applicable only when parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.
For disputes between parties from different ICC/IP groups or involving non-ICCs/IPs, regular courts have jurisdiction.
However, under Sections 52(h), 53, and 62 of the IPRA, as well as Section 54, the NCIP retains primary jurisdiction over adverse claims, border disputes, and cancellation of fraudulently-issued CADTs, regardless of the parties’ ICC/IP status.

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