Special Rules and Proceedings: Rule 75
RULE 75
Production of Will;
Allowance of Will Necessary
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. —
No will shall pass either real or personal estate
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court.
Subject to the right of appeal,
such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Probate
A special proceeding to establish the validity of a will.
Kinds of wills
A will has been defined as a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree thze disposition of his estate after his death.
Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of wills which a testator may execute.
The first is the notarial will, which must be acknowledged before a notary public by a testator and the attesting witness and is governed by Articles 804 to 809 of the Civil Code.
The second is the holographic will, which Article 810 of the Civil Code defines as one that is entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator himself. This kind of will, unlike the ordinary type, requires no attestation by witnesses.
A common requirement in both kinds of will is that they should be in writing and must have been executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. '
Interpretation of wills
In the interpretation of wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.
Such construction as will sustain and uphold the will in all its parts must be adopted.
A will is a personal, solemn, revocable, and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. Since the will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed.
Thus, a will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a will.
Allowance of will is conclusive as to its due execution
A will is defined as an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.
The probate of a will is required before its provisions may be carried out.
Probate refers to a judicial act whereby an instrument is adjudged valid and is ordered to be recorded.
It is the statutory method of establishing the proper execution of an instrument and giving notice of its contents.
Its purpose is to finally and definitively settle all questions concerning the capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
Once admitted into probate, it conclusively establishes against the whole world the fact that a will was duly executed with the formalities prescribed by law and that the testator had the capacity to make a will.
The allowance of a will is only conclusive as to its due execution, because the authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
When the court determines the due execution of wills, it means that:
the formalities of the law have been complied with,
the capacity of the testator has been established, and
the will is genuine, all of which refer to the extrinsic validity of a will.
Nittscher v. Nittscher, GR No. 160530, November 20, 2007:
The Supreme Court held that the wife's claim of title to the properties forming part of her deceased husband's estate should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular courts, since these did not refer to the formal validity of the will.
As a consequence of the allowance of a will, it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding.
Nuguid v. Nuguid, G.R. No. 1,-23445, June 23. 1966:
The general rule is that probate proceedings are limited to the examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will.
As an exception, the Supreme Court passed upon the intrinsic validity of the will subject thereof because "practical considerations" so demanded.
Probate of will is mandatory
The law enjoins probate of the will and public policy requires it.
Unless a will is probated and notice given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
Consequently, a petition for probate may be filed any time and the action to admit the decedent's will to probate does not prescribe.
The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.
Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. A decedent's heirs are also precluded from disregarding the provisions of a will and partitioning the estate as they please.
When the decedent leaves a will, the law enjoins its probate. The heirs may validly partition the estate only after the will has been probated.
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Santibanez, G.R No. 149926, February 23, 2005:
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
The requirement of probate is not limited to instruments designated as wills. For as long as the instrument or document involves the disposition of estate that takes effect upon death, it should be presented to the court for probate.
Aluad u. Aluad, G.R No. 176943, October 17, 2008:
The Supreme Court declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities required for the validity of wills. Even if the donation did follow the prescribed formalities on the law on wills. it must still be presented and admitted to probate before rights may arise therefrom.
In this regard, the instrument must have a testamentary character. This testamentary character refers to either the disposition of a property or the appointment of an executor.
A document that neither does any of these, even if it follows the solemnities required for the validity of a will, does not have the requisite testamentary character that calls into application the rules on probate.
To be sure, an instrument that appoints an executor, but does not provide for the disposition of the testator's estate, must also be probated.
In this regard, a codicil that revokes a will previously executed must be probated to effect the revocation. This prevents the probate of a will that has been previously revoked by the testator.
Nature of probate proceedings
The probate of a will is a proceeding in rem because it binds the whole world by virtue of the publication of the petition.
The probate court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, including the State. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
Effect of probate
For a will to take effect, it has to be probated, approved or allowed in the proper testamentary proceedings.
Once allowed, the principle of res judicata applies, which means:
that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence;
that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and
that the will is genuine and not a forgery.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.
During probate the court does not look into intrinsic validity;
exception
The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.
The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will.
Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.
When a judge looks into the due execution of a will, the inquiry essentially goes into the testator's voluntariness of making the dispositions in the will. The testamentary capacity is also examined on this level, which looks into the soundness of the mind of the testator.
Soundness of mind, in turn, refers to knowledge of three important considerations:
nature of the estate,
As to the nature of the estate, a testator must "have a fairly accurate knowledge of what he owns," which depends in part on the size of the estate to be disposed.
objects of bounty, and
The second consideration simply means that the testator "shob know under ordinary circumstances who his relatives in the most proximate degrees are.""
character of the testamentary act.
The testator, in making a will, must know that the document being executed:
gratuitously disposes of one's property,
that shall take effect upon death, which is the very nature of a will.
Finally, the extrinsic validity of a will requires a careful consideration of whether the formalities and solemnities prescribed by the law have been complied with.
It is only when the probate court has authenticated a will and has thus admitted it into probate, that the court looks into the intrinsic validity of the same – i.e., determining whether the provisions of the will do not violate any laws.
During probate, the court is not called upon to rule on intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will."
Jurisprudence, however, provides for exceptions where the probate court looked into the intrinsic validity of a will.
In exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to pass upon certain provisions of will which it may declare invalid even as it upholds the extrinsic validity of will.
When a will is void on face value the probate court may disregard passing on the extrinsic validity of the will for practical considerations. The probate of a will may become an idle ceremony if it is apparent on the face of the will that it is intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
Nuguid v. Nuguid, G.R. No. 1,-23445, June 23. 1966:
The probate court delved into the intrinsic validity of the will because its single testamentary provision showed that the testator's parents were preterited. Rosario Nuguid died single and without issue. She was survived by her parents and six siblings. Remedios, one of Rosario's siblings, presented to the court Rosario's holographic will. In the will, Rosario instituted Remedios as her sole and universal heir to succeed to her property. which constituted her sole estate. The Supreme Court declared that Rosario's parents were preterited in the will, which had only one disposition. The result of the annulment of the institution of heirs was the declaration that the entire will was void considering that it had only one provision. Had Rosario's will included an institution of legacies or devises, then those provisions would have remained valid. However, since Rosario's will contained only the institution of her sister as her sole heir, the will was declared void. Even if the probate court was precluded from looking into the intrinsic validity of the will, to remand the case to the lower court for probate will be a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety, since the will appears to be void on its face.
Section 2. Custodian of will to deliver. —
The person who has custody of a will shall,
within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator,
deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction,
or to the executor named in the will.
Section 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust. —
A person named as executor in a will shall,
within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testate,
or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor
if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator,
present such will to the court having jurisdiction,
unless the will has reached the court in any other manner,
and shall, within such period,
signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust
or his refusal to accept it.
Duties of a custodian
A custodian refers to a person who receives a will with knowledge, or under such circumstances that he ought to have known that he was receiving custody of a will.
The custodian, by accepting the will, does not undertake to exercise diligence in inquiring into the testator's death.
Mere possession of a will does not make the holder thereof a custodian of the will.
A custodian is chosen, by a testator in advance, and entrusted with the custody of a will by mutual agreement with the testator. This custodianship creates a bailor-bailee relationship between the testator and custodian, the latter being the bailee.
The custodian, as bailee, is obligated to keep and preserve the will safely for the benefit of the testator until the latter's death.
As a consequence, the custodian must keep the contents of the will inviolate, and must not reveal its contents to anyone. At any given time, the testator-bailor, however, may order the custodian to return the will on demand.
A custodian is not obligated to discover whether the testator is still alive or already dead.
It is only when the custodian agrees, obligates one's self, and represents to another that one was well-equipped to obtain information as to the death of the maker of the will in his custody, that one must disclose possession of the will and present it to the court for probate within a reasonable time after the testator's death.
Upon knowledge of the testator's death, the custodian must deliver the will either to the clerk of court in the place where the decedent last resided or to the executor named in the will. The same obligation is imposed on the executor who is also the custodian of the will.
The reason behind the custodian's obligation to deliver the will to the court is to ensure discovery of wills and discourage its concealment.
The failure of a custodian to present the will to the court for probate within the period given in the rule, does not preclude its probate.
Duties of an executor
Duties of an executor The executor named in the will is also given 20 days from either knowledge of the testator's death or knowledge that one has been named as executor to present the will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will reached the court in some other manner.
An executor is given the same period to signify to the court in writing the acceptance or refusal of the trust.
A moral obligation in the nature of a trust is imposed on the executor once one receives the will.
Section 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect. —
A person who neglects any of the duties required
in the two last preceding sections
without excuse satisfactory to the court
shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
Section 5. Person retaining will may be committed. —
A person having custody of a will after the death of the testator
who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same,
when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction,
may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will.
In order for a person to be subjected to either a payment of a fine for failure to comply with Sections 2 and 3 or imprisonment for failure or neglect to submit a will to court, the court must be acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration the estates of deceased persons.
Where there is no pending case, the court must require the existence of a petition, information, or affidavit before it of such character to make an action under the foregoing provisions appropriate.
Sections 4 and 5 are different remedies under the rules of procedure.
They are both penal in nature, albeit contained in the Rules of Court, seeking to enJoin the presentation of a will in court.
The fact that the penalty is found in the Rules of Court does not, however, make the proceeding to enforce payment of the fine a civil proceeding.
These provisions, though relating to the presentation of will or acceptance of the trust, have no relation and are not dependent on each other.
When a person is sought to be committed to prison, for violation of Section 5, the court cannot impose the penalty of fine based on Section 4 as an additional penalty.
Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010:
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to rule that mandamus cannot be availed of to compel another person to produce the will of the deceased, there being another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
There, it was noted that the person asking for mandamus has a photocopy of the will. Thus, according to the Court, he may avail of the remedies under Rule 75 of the Rules of Court.
Cases:
Petitioner A.W. Fluemer is the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix.
He claimed that the will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925.
He sought to have it recognized in the Philippines under the laws of West Virginia.
The petitioner attempted to prove the will by presenting an extract from West Virginia’s laws but failed to meet legal requirements for proving foreign laws in Philippine courts.
The due execution of the will was not properly established:
The only testimony came from the petitioner.
No proof showed that the testator acknowledged the will before two witnesses, as required by West Virginia law.
No alternative proof was provided since the witnesses resided outside the Philippines.
The petitioner also failed to prove Hix’s domicile in West Virginia, contradicting his own argument by initiating principal administration proceedings in the Philippines instead of West Virginia.
Whether the alleged will of Edward Randolph Hix properly proven and entitled to probate in the Philippines.
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts.
The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.
The requirements for proving foreign law were not met (failure to comply with Sections 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
The due execution of the will was not sufficiently established by competent witnesses or alternative means.
The petitioner’s actions indicated an intention to make the Philippines the principal place of administration, rather than West Virginia.
There was no proof that the deceased left any property in West Virginia, further questioning the claim of domicile.
Balanay vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452)
Leodegaria Julian created a notarial will desiring her properties not to be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime.
After her death, her son Felix Balanay, Jr. petitioned for probate.
Felix Balanay, Sr., and Avelina B. Antonio opposed, but the former withdrew his opposition and renounced his hereditary rights in favor of their children.
Another lawyer, Atty. MontaΓ±a, filed a motion to withdraw the probate petition and convert the proceedings into intestacy, allegedly on behalf of several heirs.
CFI: Declared the will void, converted the testate proceedings into intestacy, and ordered a notice to creditors.
Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will before ruling on its allowance (formal validity) and in declaring it void.
Testacy Over Intestacy:
Under certain circumstances, the intrinsic validity of a will may be examined before its formal probate.
The probate court acted correctly in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, given its unusual and potentially illegal provisions.
However, it erred in declaring the will void and converting the proceeding into an intestate proceeding without first establishing its formal validity.
Invalid Provisions and Renunciation:
The will contained some invalid provisions (e.g., improper claim over conjugal properties), but these did not invalidate the entire will.
The statement that the testatrix owned the "southern half" of the conjugal lots is contrary to law, as her share was inchoate and proindiviso. However, this does not nullify the entire will.
The provision requiring legitimes to be paid in cash is contrary to Article 1080 of the Civil Code, as the testatrix did not assign the entire estate to one or more children.
The provision that the estate should not be divided during the husband’s lifetime is valid only for a maximum of 20 years from the testatrix’s death.
Felix Balanay, Sr.'s renunciation of his hereditary rights effectively validated the partition of the conjugal estate.
Rodelas vs. Aranza (119 SCRA 16)
In 1962, Ricardo B. Bonilla allegedly executed a holographic will.
In1976, Ricardo died.
Marcela Rodelas files a petition in the CFI-Rizal for the probate of Ricardo's holographic will and requests letters testamentary.
Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla opposed the petition on the following grounds:
Appellant failed to produce the will within twenty days of the testator's death, as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court.
The alleged copy of the holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, therefore it is not a valid will.
The actual holographic will, not a copy, must be produced; otherwise, it would have no legal effect, referencing the Gan v. Yap.
The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.
CFI-Rizal: Dismissed the petition for probate of the holographic will, stating that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original. The court also notes the lapse of more that 14 years from the time of the execution of the will and the death of the testator, suggests that the decedent had discarded the allegedly missing Holographic Will before his death.
Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
A photostatic or xerox copy of a lost holographic will may be admitted as evidence for probate.
Under Article 811 of the Civil Code, a holographic will must be proven in court through identifying witnesses or expert testimony.
If no copy exists, probate is not possible because the testator’s handwriting must be compared with sample writings. However, if a photostatic or xerox copy is available, it may be used for comparison with standard writings to determine authenticity.
In Gan v. Yap (104 Phil. 509), the Court ruled that a lost or destroyed holographic will cannot be proven by mere testimony but may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy, as such copies allow for authentication of handwriting.
Nepomuceno vs. CA (139 SCRA 206)
In 1974, Martin Jugo died.
He left a Will appointing Sofla J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate.
In the said Will, he acknowledged his legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and their children Oecar and Carmellita.
He also stated that he had been living with petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as husband and wife since 1952.
Sofia J. Nepomuceno filed for the probate of Martin Jugo's Will.
Rufina Gomez and her children opposed, alleging that the Will was executed under undue influence, and that the petitioner's living in concubinage with the testator made her unfit for inheritance.
CA: Declared null and void a devisee in favor of the petitioner in the last Will and Testament of Martin Jugo.
Whether the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will.
Jurisdiction of Probate Court:
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will.
In exceptional cases, where the Will is intrinsically void on its face, the court may rule on its validity even before probate.
Testamentary provision in favor of Sofia Nepomuceno is void:
Under Article 739 of the Civil Code, donations are void if made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage.
The law prohibits the donation itself, regardless of the recipient’s intent.
Since the Will explicitly states that Jugo was disposing of property to Sofia Nepomuceno, with whom he had been living in concubinage, the legacy is invalid.
Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez (532 SCRA 642)
Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment in Makati City.
In 1983, Juanito executed a Huling Habilin at Testamento, assigning specific apartment units to petitioner Cresenciana Tubo Rodriguez (live-in partner) and his children.
In 1984, Juanito executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Cresenciana, leading to the issuance of tiltle in her name.
In 2001, Cresenciana filed an unlawful detainer case against respondents Juanito’s children and their tenants, alleging that she tolerated their stay but they later unlawfully leased the units to third parties.
They claimed ownership via succession, asserting that the deed of sale was simulated and void due to Juanito's serious illness and undue influence by Cresenciana.
They also cited a Partition Agreement in 1990 recognizing their co-ownership per the Huling Habilin at Testamento.
MTC: The Deed of Sale was simulated and void; dismissed Cresenciana’s complaint.
RTC: Reversed MTC decision, ruling that Cresenciana’s TCT and deed of sale are valid unless annulled by a competent court. Ordered respondents to vacate.
CA: Reversed RTC, reinstating the MTC decision. Held that the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership and that the Partition Agreement recognized co-ownership.
Whether the Huling Habilin at Testamento can transmit ownership despite not being probated.
Provisional Resolution of Ownership:
Unlawful detainer cases determine possession de facto, not ownership.
Ownership can only be considered provisionally when intertwined with possession.
Under Section 16 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, when ownership is raised as a defense, the court may provisionally resolve the issue of ownership solely to determine possession. This resolution does not bar or prejudice a separate action to resolve ownership.
Effect of Unprobated Will:
Since the Huling Habilin at Testamento was not probated, it has no legal effect in transmitting ownership. Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, a will must be probated before any property transfer occurs.
At the time of the Deed of Sale, Juanito was still the owner and had the absolute right to sell.
The Partition Agreement, based on an unprobated will, has no binding effect on Cresenciana’s ownership.
The Torrens Title is conclusive proof of ownership and cannot be attacked collaterally in an ejectment case.
Cresenciana has the better right of possession but this does not determine the final ownership, which is subject to the pending annulment case.
Caneda vs. CA (GR No. 103554, May 28, 1993)
Mateo Caballero is a widower without any children.
In 1978, Mateo Caballero executed his will on leaving his properties to non-relatives, Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera, and Marcosa Alcantara.
Four months later, he filed a petition for the probate of the will but passed away before the court could hear his petition.
In 1980, Mateo Caballero died.
One of his legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as special administrator and was approved by the probate court.
In 1982, Benoni Cabrera died. The court appointed William Cabrera as the special administrator.
The petitioners claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator opposed the probate of the will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate. They claimed Caballero was in poor health during the will's execution and
questioned the genuineness of his signature.
RTC: Ruled in favor of the will's validity, emphasizing Caballero's initiation of the probate process during his lifetime.
CA: Upheld the probate court's decision.
Whether the will of Mateo Caballero is valid.
Defective Attestation Clause
The attestation clause must explicitly state that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and each other. This requirement is mandatory and must be strictly complied with to ensure the authenticity and due execution of the will.
The attestation clause in Caballero’s will did not explicitly state that the witnesses signed in the presence of the testator and each other.
Substantial Compliance Rule
Article 809 of the Civil Code allows for substantial compliance only when the defect pertains to the form or language of the attestation clause.
Since the attestation clause in Caballero’s will omitted an essential requirement, the rule could not be invoked to cure the defect.
Article 809 of the Civil Code allows for substantial compliance only when the defect pertains to the form or language of the attestation clause.
While courts have been more liberal in interpreting will formalities, this leniency does not apply to defects involving the complete absence of a required element.
Due to the fatal defect in the attestation clause, the will was declared invalid.
Maninang vs. CA (GR No. L-57848, June 19, 1982)
In 1977, Clemencia Aseneta died, leaving a holographic will, naming Dra. Soledad L. Maninang as her heir.
Bernardo Aseneta, claiming to be the adopted son and sole heir, filed an intestate proceeding, asserting that he was preterited, making the will void.
CFI: Dismissed the petition for probate and appointed Bernardo as administrator of the estate.
CA: Denied the certiorari, stating that appeal—not certiorari—was the proper remedy.
Whether the lower court exceed its jurisdiction in dismissing the testate case based on preterition before determining the will’s extrinsic validity.
Probate is mandatory unless the will is intrinsically void.
The probate of a will is mandatory under Article 838 of the Civil Code.
The court’s role in probate proceedings is limited to determining the extrinsic validity of the will, such as the testator’s capacity and compliance with legal formalities.
Intrinsic validity is generally addressed after probate.
Preterition vs. Disinheritance:
Preterition (total omission of a compulsory heir) voids the institution of heirs.
Disinheritance is a deliberate act that does not automatically void the will.
The lower court’s assumption of preterition was not indubitable from the face of the will.
Probate courts should focus on extrinsic validity, not intrinsic issues like preterition.
The lower court acted in excess of jurisdiction, making certiorari a proper remedy.
The testate case was reinstated and consolidated with the intestate case for further proceedings.
Aluad vs. Aluad (GR No. 176943, October 17, 2008)
Matilde Aluad inherited six lots from her deceased husband, Crispin Aluad.
In 1981, she executed a "Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of Maria Aluad, petitioners' mother, with a provision that the donation would take effect upon Matilde’s death.
Matilde, however, continued to exercise ownership rights over the properties, including selling Lot 676 to respondent Zenaido Aluad in 1991 and devising Lot 674 to him in her 1992 last will and testament.
Matilde died in 1994, followed by Maria later that year.
Petitioners, Maria’s heirs, filed a complaint to recover Lot Nos. 674 and 676, claiming ownership through the Deed of Donation.
RTC: Ruled in their favor, declaring the donation valid and awarding possession of the lots to petitioners.
CA: Reversed the decision, holding that the donation was mortis causa and did not comply with the formalities of a will.
Whether the "Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" executed by Matilde in favor of Maria was a valid donation inter vivos or an invalid donation mortis causa.
The donation was mortis causa.
The donation:
Transferred no ownership during Matilde’s lifetime.
Was revocable at Matilde’s will.
Would be void if the donee (Maria) predeceased the donor (Matilde).
Since it was a donation mortis causa, it should have complied with the formalities of a will under Article 805 of the Civil Code, which it did not.
Thus, the donation was void, and ownership of the properties remained with Matilde.
The sale of Lot 676 to Zenaido was thus valid, and he was declared its rightful owner. Lot 674, however, was not awarded to him as Matilde’s last will had not yet been probated.
Nuguid vs. Nuguid (GR No. L-23445, June 23, 1966)
In 1962, Rosario Nuguid died and left no descendants but had surviving parents and six siblings.
In 1963, her sister Remedios Nuguid filed for the probate of a holographic will that Rosario allegedly executed in 1951.
The will named Remedios as the universal heir, with no other provisions.
Rosario's parents, Felix and Paz Nuguid, opposed the probate, arguing that they were preterited, violating their rights as compulsory heirs.
CFI: Ruled that the will was a complete nullity due to preterition and dismissed the probate petition.
Whether the court should rule on the intrinsic validity of the will at the probate stage.
Intrinsic Validity of the Will:
Although the probate court's primary role is to determine the extrinsic validity of the will, the Supreme Court addressed the intrinsic validity of the will to avoid prolonging the litigation.
The issue of preterition was central to the case and warranted immediate resolution.
The will's intrinsic validity could be addressed even at the probate stage if the parties raised it and if doing so would prevent unnecessary delays.
In this case, the Court ruled that the will was intrinsically void due to preterition, and no further proceedings were necessary
Effects of Preterition:
The will was invalid because Rosario's parents were completely omitted, constituting preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code.
This provision annuls the institution of an heir if a compulsory heir is omitted, leading to intestate succession.
Preterition and disinheritance are distinct, and the omission of compulsory heirs in this case resulted in a complete annulment of the will, as there were no other testamentary provisions.
United States vs. Guimco (GR No. 12184, Sept. 27, 1917)
Joaquin Cruz, a Chinese merchant residing in Gingoog, Misamis, had a significant estate and executed a will naming Chiu Guimco (the accused) and Co-Iden as executors.
In 1910, Cruz died. After Cruz's death, Guimco failed to produce the will for probate, and no further action was taken to distribute the estate.
In 1915, Guimco was urged by Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Cruz's wife Uy Cuan, to produce the will, but Guimco claimed he had never seen or possessed it.
Guimco had made several dealings regarding the estate but did not fulfill contractual obligations or take legal steps to settle the estate.
A complaint was filed against Guimco for failing to produce the will, violating Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Trial Court: Imposed a fine of P1,800 and ordered Guimco to be jailed until he produced the will or a further order from the court.
Whether the lower court erred in ordering the accused, Chiu Guimco, to be committed to jail for failure to produce his deceased brother's will under Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in a criminal prosecution under Section 628.
Guimco guilty of failing to produce the will.
Guimco was found guilty of failing to produce the will, as he was in possession of it when it was shown to a witness.
Distinction Between Sections 628 and 629:
Section 628 provides for a criminal penalty (fine) for withholding a will, while section 629 provides a civil remedy (imprisonment) to compel the production of a will.
These remedies are separate and cannot be combined in the same proceeding.
Right Against Self-Incrimination:
Forcing Chiu Guimco to produce the will during the criminal trial would effectively compel him to incriminate himself, violating his constitutional rights.
The trial court exceeded its authority by imposing both a fine and imprisonment in a criminal prosecution under section 628. The proper remedy under section 629 requires a separate civil proceeding.