VI. BILL OF RIGHTS

A. In General

1. Definition.

The series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights.
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality, and security “against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles” [quoted in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973].
PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973:

Officers and members of the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization joined a peaceful mass demonstration against alleged police abuses, despite their employer’s warning that absence from work would violate the “no strike” clause of their collective bargaining agreement, leading to the dismissal of eight union leaders. The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal was unconstitutional, holding that the workers’ rights to free speech, peaceful assembly, and petition are fundamental guarantees under the Bill of Rights and took precedence over the company’s property interests and procedural rules, ordering their reinstatement with back pay.

Generally, any governmental action in violation of the Bill of Rights is void.
These provisions are also generally self-executing.

[a] Civil Rights.

Those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of government.
They include the:

rights to property, marriage
equal protection of the laws
freedom of contract, etc.

They are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community.
Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.

[b] Political Rights.

They refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, e.g.,:

the right of suffrage,
the right to hold public office,
the right to petition and,
in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-à-vis the management of government.

Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994

Quezon City officials ordered the demolition of stalls and small shops operated by members of a vendors’ association, who then filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) claiming violations of their rights. CHR issued orders stopping the demolition, fining the officials for contempt, and granting financial aid to the vendors. The Supreme Court ruled that the CHR’s power to investigate covers only violations involving civil and political rights, such as the right to vote, hold office, or petition government, and that the vendors’ “business rights” did not fall under this scope. CHR had no authority to stop the demolition or impose penalties.

2. Interregnum Doctrine.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003:

The Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative from the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the EDSA revolution until the adoption, on March 24, 1986, of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution.
During this period, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law, because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under the Bill of Rights, because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights at the time.
However, the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

B. Due Process of Law

Sec. 1, Art. III

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law x x x.

1. Origin.

By the 39th chapter of the Magna Carta wrung by the barons from King John, the despot promised that:

No man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseized or outlawed, or in any manner destroyed; nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land (per legem terrae).

2. Definition.

A law which hears before it condemns,

which proceeds upon inquiry

and renders judgment only after trial.

[Darmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518].

Responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,

obedience to the dictates of justice”

Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July 20, 1967:

The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7783, which prohibited certain lawful businesses in the Ermita-Malate area, including motels, inns, and entertainment venues, and required existing establishments to close, transfer, or convert their operations. Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), which operated Victoria Court (a motel), challenged the ordinance. The Supreme Court declared the ordinance null and void for being an invalid exercise of police power because it imposed an absolute prohibition (not mere regulation) on lawful businesses.

The embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.

[Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp. 32-33].

3. Who are Protected.

Universal in application to all persons, without regard to any difference in race, color, or nationality.
Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only insofar as their property is concerned.

Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 163

Smith, Bell & Co., a Philippine corporation with mostly British stockholders, applied for a certificate of Philippine registry for its vessel but was denied under Act No. 2761, which barred corporations with alien stockholders from engaging in coastwise trade. The company claimed this violated its property rights and the constitutional guarantee of due process. The Supreme Court held that while corporations, as artificial persons, are protected under the due process and equal protection clauses regarding their property, the restriction was a valid exercise of the State’s police power to protect national interests, and thus the law was constitutional.

The guarantee extends to aliens and includes the means of livelihood.

Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978

Manila passed Ordinance No. 6537 requiring all aliens working or doing business in the city to first secure an employment permit from the mayor and pay a ₱50 fee. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, a legally employed alien, challenged it as discriminatory and a violation of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance, ruling that due process and equal protection extend to all persons, including aliens, and that this protection covers the means of livelihood. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.

4. Meaning of Life, Liberty, and Property.

[a] Life.

Includes the right of an individual to his body in its completeness, free from dismemberment, and extends to the use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable. [Justice Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 320-321].
See: Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200.

[b] Liberty.

Includes “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. x x x (It) includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways x x x”
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660:

Rubi, a member of the Mangyan tribe in Mindoro, and others were forcibly relocated by provincial authorities to a government-designated reservation under Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, and one was jailed for leaving it. They challenged the law as an unlawful deprivation of liberty without due process. The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling that “liberty” under due process is not absolute but subject to reasonable restraints imposed for the common good. The provincial government believed that requiring the Mangyanes to live in a designated settlement at Tigbao would protect them from harm, preserve public order, safeguard the public forests where they roamed, and help introduce them to “civilized” customs.

[c] Property.

Anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the subject of contract.
It represents more than the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure, use, and dispose of them.
Torraco v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197:

A Washington landowner and a Japanese citizen sought to enter into a farm lease, but Washington's Alien Land Law prohibited aliens ineligible for U.S. citizenship from owning or leasing agricultural land, with violations punishable by forfeiture and criminal penalties. They argued this violated due process, equal protection, and the U.S.–Japan treaty. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling that restricting agricultural land ownership and use to those eligible for citizenship was a valid exercise of state power, and property rights are subject to reasonable limitations imposed for legitimate public purposes.

[i] Public Office.

Public office is not property; but one unlawfully ousted from it may institute an action to recover the same, flowing from the de jure officer’s right to office.
Nunez v. Averia, G.R. No. L-38415, June 28, 1974:

Constantino A. Nuñez contested the 1971 mayoral election in Ternate, Cavite, alleging fraud and irregularities, but the trial court dismissed his protest as “moot” after the proclaimed mayor was killed and succeeded by the vice mayor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a duly elected official’s right to hold public office may be defended and recovered if unlawfully taken, and that courts retain jurisdiction to decide election protests to protect the de jure officer’s right to office and the integrity of the electoral process.

While public office is not property to which one may acquire a vested right, it is nevertheless a protected right.
Bince v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 111624-25, March 9, 1995:

Alfonso C. Bince Jr. was proclaimed as the winning candidate for a seat in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan’s Sixth District, but his proclamation was later annulled by the COMELEC after discovering mathematical errors in the vote tally that showed his opponent, Emiliano S. Micu, actually won. The Supreme Court upheld COMELEC’s action, stressing that while public office is not property to which one can acquire a vested right, it is still a protected right that cannot be taken away without due process, and that correcting manifest errors was necessary to reflect the true will of the electorate.

One’s employment, profession, or trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong.
Thus, an order of suspension, without opportunity for hearing, violates property rights.
Crespo v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. L-33237, April 15, 1988:

Mayor Gregorio T. Crespo was preventively suspended by the Provincial Board after an ex parte hearing on an administrative complaint, without being given notice or the chance to present his side. The Supreme Court ruled that although public office itself is not property, a person’s employment is a protected property right, and issuing a suspension without affording the official an opportunity to be heard violates due process and unlawfully interferes with that right.

But its proper regulation has been upheld as a legitimate subject of the police power of the State, particularly when its conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare, and public morals.
JMM Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996:

Talent agencies and performers challenged Department of Labor orders requiring overseas entertainers to obtain an Artist Record Book (ARB) after passing training and skills tests, claiming it violated their right to work and due process. The Supreme Court upheld the ARB requirement as a valid exercise of the State’s police power, ruling that proper regulation of a profession or trade is lawful when aimed at protecting public welfare, morals, and the safety of workers, especially in high‑risk overseas employment.

[ii] Mining License.

A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of law under which it is granted is void.
Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights in the holder.
Thus, without offending the due process and the non-impairment clauses of the Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the public interest.
Republic v. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149927, March 30, 2004:

Rosemoor was granted a quarry license covering over 330 hectares in Bulacan, despite Presidential Decree No. 463 limiting such licenses to 100 hectares per province. The license was later cancelled by the DENR and the President through a proclamation restoring the land to the Biak‑na‑Bato National Park. The Supreme Court ruled that because the license violated a mandatory legal limit from the outset, it was void ab initio and, being a mere privilege rather than a vested property right, could be revoked by the State in the public interest without violating due process or the non‑impairment clause.

Mere privileges, such as the license to operate a cockpit, are not property rights and are revocable at will.
Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 53 Phil. 123:

Gregorio Pedro obtained a municipal license to operate a cockpit in Caloocan, but the provincial board later suspended the ordinance under which it was granted, citing health concerns due to its proximity to a tuberculosis sanatorium. The Supreme Court upheld the suspension, ruling that a license to operate a cockpit is not a property right but a mere privilege that may be revoked at any time when public interest so requires.

[iii] Firearm License.

The license to carry a firearm is neither property nor a property right.
Neither does it create a vested right.
A permit to carry a firearm outside one’s residence may be revoked at any time.
Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police power.
Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004:

President Arroyo directed the PNP to impose a nationwide gun ban and revoke all existing Permits to Carry Firearms Outside Residence, which was challenged by Chavez as a violation of due process and of his right to life and property. The Supreme Court upheld the Guidelines, ruling that the possession and carrying of firearms is a mere privilege, not a constitutional or vested property right, and may be regulated or revoked anytime as a superior and legitimate exercise of the State’s police power to maintain peace and order.

[iv] Suspension from Office.

The mandatory suspension from office of a public official pending criminal prosecution for violation of R.A. 3019 cannot amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994:

Eastern Samar Vice‑Governor Marcelino C. Libanan was charged under R.A. 3019 for acts committed in a prior term as a provincial board member. The Sandiganbayan ordered his 90‑day preventive suspension from office pending trial, which he claimed violated his constitutional right to due process and deprived him of property. The Supreme Court upheld the suspension, ruling that under Section 13 of R.A. 3019 such suspension is mandatory, that public office is a public trust rather than a property right, and therefore its temporary loss during prosecution does not constitute deprivation of property without due process of law.

5. Aspects of Due Process.

[a] Substantive.

Restriction on government’s law- and rule-making powers.
The requisites are:

The interests of the public, in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the intervention of the State.
The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.

Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103:

An ordinance requiring all laundry establishments to issue their receipts in English and Spanish was held valid.

A Chinese laundryman challenged Manila Ordinance No. 532, which required all laundries to issue duplicate receipts in English and Spanish showing the kind and number of articles received, claiming it was discriminatory, unreasonable, and violated due process. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance, ruling that it was a valid exercise of the city’s police power applied equally to all laundries, did not oppress or unjustly discriminate against Chinese operators, and did not infringe their due process rights.

Yu Eng Cong v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500:

The Court declared as unconstitutional a law prohibiting traders from keeping their books of accounts in a language other than English, Spanish, or any local dialect.

Chinese merchants in the Philippines challenged Act No. 2972, the “Chinese Bookkeeping Act,” which prohibited keeping business records in the Chinese language, arguing that it unfairly targeted them and harmed their ability to conduct business. The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the law, ruling that it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Philippine Autonomy Act because it unreasonably restricted lawful business practices and discriminated against a specific group.

See also Layno v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-65848, May 24, 1985

Lianga, Surigao del Sur Mayor Hernando C. Layno Sr. was preventively suspended by the Sandiganbayan under the Anti‑Graft and Corrupt Practices Act while facing criminal charges, and the suspension continued for an extended period before trial. The Supreme Court ruled that although preventive suspension may be valid, its prolonged and indefinite application violated due process and equal protection, as it unjustly deprived both the official of his right to hold office and the electorate of their chosen leader’s service.

Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 86889-93, May 15, 1989.

Zambales Governor Amor D. Deloso was preventively suspended without a definite period under Section 13 of the Anti‑Graft and Corrupt Practices Act while facing criminal charges for acts allegedly committed when he was mayor, and the Sandiganbayan denied his request for an earlier trial. The Supreme Court ruled that while preventive suspension may be valid, making it indefinite is unreasonable and violates due process, and limited such suspension of elective officials to 90 days, after which they must be allowed to resume office pending trial.

GSIS v. Montesclaros, G.R. No. 146494, July 14, 2004:

The Supreme Court declared as invalid Sec. 18, P.D. 1146, which provides that the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension benefits if the surviving spouse contracted marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension benefit.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, employees have vested rights in the pension.
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits protected by the due process clause.
Sec. 18, P.D. 1146 is seriously oppressive in outrightly denying the claim of a dependent spouse for survivorship pension benefits if the dependent spouse contracted marriage within the three-year prohibited period.

[b] Procedural

This serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of government.
Requisites: IJ-OJ

An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.
Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard
Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

[i] An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.

[ia] Javier v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986:

There was denial of due process when Commissioner Opinion, who was formerly a law partner of respondent Pacificador, obstinately insisted in participating in the case, thus denying the petitioner “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.”

Evelio B. Javier contested the proclamation of Arturo F. Pacificador as Assemblyman of Antique, alleging massive election fraud and violence, and sought the annulment of the COMELEC Second Division’s decision after Commissioner Opinion, who was formerly Pacificador’s law partner, refused to inhibit himself despite a request to do so. The Supreme Court held that this refusal violated the constitutional guarantee of due process by denying the petitioner “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge,” rendering the proceedings null and void had the case not been mooted by supervening events.

Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1986

The Court held that the People was denied due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecution.

The relatives of Rolando Galman and several prominent citizens sought to nullify the trial and acquittal of 26 military men accused in the assassination of Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. and Galman, alleging that the prosecution suppressed vital evidence and the Sandiganbayan justices were biased due to pressure from then President Marcos. The Supreme Court found that the proceedings were stage‑managed from Malacañang, depriving the People of due process, and declared the trial a mistrial, ordering a retrial before an independent tribunal.

[ib] Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 103501-03, February 17, 1997:

Reiterated in Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, the Supreme Court held that when the Court cross-examined the accused and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness, assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and thus denied the accused due process of law.

Manila International Airport Authority officials Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta were convicted of malversation of ₱55 million, but the trial records showed that Sandiganbayan justices extensively and aggressively questioned defense witnesses and the accused in a manner resembling cross‑examination, far exceeding the role of a neutral judge. The Court noted that many of these questions were probing, confrontational, and even insinuating. The Supreme Court reversed their convictions, holding that the court’s over‑zealous interrogation denied the accused their constitutional right to due process.

Imelda R. Marcos was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for entering into a lease agreement allegedly grossly disadvantageous to the government. Presiding Justice Garchitorena asked defense witness 79 leading, misleading, and baseless hypothetical questions, compared to only 73 questions from the prosecutor, far beyond what could be considered mere clarificatory questioning. The Supreme Court, voting 9–5 for acquittal, held that this demonstrated bias and prejudice which denied Marcos an impartial trial, and since the justices of the Special Division had already retired and all evidence was before the Court, there was no reason to remand the case, making acquittal the proper remedy.

Rivera v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 115147, January 4, 1995 and in Singson v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 122389, June 19, 1997:

The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that a public officer who decided the case should not be the same person to decide it on appeal because he cannot be an impartial judge.

George I. Rivera, a Land Bank manager dismissed for grave misconduct, argued that his right to due process was violated because CSC Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde took part in deciding his appeal after having earlier participated in the same case as chair of the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that due process requires an impartial tribunal, and that a commissioner who had acted on the case in a lower body must inhibit from reviewing it, thus setting aside the CSC resolution and remanding the case for decision without her participation.

Philippine Airlines employee Miguel Singson filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was initially resolved in his favor by Labor Arbiter Raul T. Aquino. However, after Aquino’s promotion to Presiding Commissioner of the NLRC, he took part in reviewing and ultimately reversing his own prior ruling. The Supreme Court held that this violated Singson’s right to due process because an impartial tribunal is required, and the same official cannot review his own prior decision, rendering the NLRC resolution void and necessitating a remand for impartial review.

GSIS v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128523, September 26, 1998:
The police chief inspector who had earlier recommended that the application for death benefits be approved, was held to be biased and should have inhibited himself from the proceedings.

[ib1] People v. Herida, G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001, reiterated in People v. Medenilla, G.R. Nos. 131638-39, March 26, 2001:

Even as the transcript of stenographic notes showed that the trial court intensively questioned the witnesses (approximately 43% of the questions asked of prosecution witnesses and the accused were propounded by the judge), the Supreme Court held that the questioning was necessary.
Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points overlooked by counsel.

People v. Adora, G.R. Nos. 116528-31, July 14, 1997:

It was held that the judge should be given reasonable leeway in directing questions to witnesses in order to elicit relevant facts; it is expedient to allow the judge to question a witness so that his judgment may rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts.

Cosep v. People, G.R. No. 110353, May 21, 1998, and in People v. Galleno, G.R. No. 123546, July 2, 1998:
The Supreme Court said that questions which merely clear up dubious points and elicit relevant evidence are within the prerogative of the judge to ask.

[ib2] People v. Larranaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, January 31, 2006:

The Supreme Court said that the test is whether the intervention of the judge tends to prevent the proper presentation of the case or the ascertainment of the truth in the matter where he interposes his questions or comments.
When the judge remarked that the testimonies of two witnesses were incredible, that another witness was totally confused and appeared to be mentally imbalanced, and that two witnesses were liars, his comments were just honest observations intended to warn the witnesses to be candid to the court. He merely wanted to ascertain the veracity of their contradictory statements.

In the Cebu Chiong sisters case, the trial judge made sharp comments about some witnesses and asked clarificatory questions, prompting claims of bias by the defense. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that a judge may intervene to clarify and pursue the truth, and that such remarks are not reversible error unless they prevent proper case presentation or truth-finding, which did not occur here.

[ic] Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001:

The Court rejected petitioners' contention that they were denied due process ostensibly because the Civil Service Commission acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge.
The CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal. Neither can it be denied that petitioners were formally charged after a prima facie case for dishonesty was found to exist. They were properly informed of the charges. They submitted an answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves.

[id] Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005:

The petitioner attributed partiality to Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite his having earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was Special Prosecutor.
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner, saying that it is a steadfast rule that the officer who reviews a case on appeal should not be the same person whose decision is under review.

[ie] Read also Rule 137, Rules of Court, on disqualification of judges.

[ii] Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.

[iia] It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant but also to afford the latter the opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.

Thus, compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction.
Sarmiento v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002.

[iib] While jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired by the service of summons, it can also be acquired by voluntary appearance before the court, which includes submission of pleadings in compliance with the order of the court or tribunal.

De los Santos v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121327, December 20, 2001.

[iii] The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded the opportunity to be heard.
If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee.
Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, May 28, 2004.

[iiia] Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court:

Executive Order 626-A was declared violative of due process because the owner of the carabaos confiscated was denied the right to be heard in his defense and immediately condemned and punished.

Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985:
The closure of radio station DYRE, where the order was issued summarily without a hearing, was deemed violative of due process.

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 72335-39, March 21, 1988:
It was held that the unreasonable delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan violated the guarantee of due process.

Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 105752, September 2, 1993:
There was deemed a denial of due process where the notice to petitioner to report back to work within five days otherwise he would be dropped from the rolls was sent to petitioner’s Quezon City address, when the office knew that petitioner was temporarily residing in San Jose, California.

Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111397, August 12, 2002
The Supreme Court said that the closure of Bistro violated the due process clause.
Instead of arbitrarily closing down the establishment’s business operations, Mayor Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its license.

[iiib] Unicraft Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134309, March 26, 2001:

Even as it is conceded that decisions of Voluntary Arbitrators are generally accorded finality, where (as in this case) the petitioner was not given the chance to present evidence, there is a violation of the due process clause, and the Arbitrator’s decision is null and void.

[iiic] Caras v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129900, October 2, 2001:

Knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the act of making, drawing, and issuing a check payment which is refused by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days from the date of issue.
But this presumption does not hold when the maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the payment of the check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check had been dishonored.
Thus, it is essential for the maker or the drawer to be notified of the dishonor of the check, so that he can pay the value thereof, or make arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law.
Absent such notice of dishonor, the maker or the drawer cannot be convicted of violating B.P. 22, as there would be a violation of procedural due process.

[iiid] Not all cases require a trial-type hearing.

Due process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers, to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would support their respective claims.
Mariveles Shipyard v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144134, November 11, 2003.
Zacarias v. National Police Commission, G.R. No. 119847, October 24, 2003.

Thus, there is no denial of due process where the DOLE regional director decided a case on the basis only of position papers submitted by the parties.
Indeed, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are authorized to decide a case on the basis of position papers and documents submitted; the holding of an adversarial trial depends on the discretion of the Labor Arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right.
Fernandez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 105892, January 28, 1998.
Vinta Maritime v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113911, January 23, 1998.

[iiie] Torres v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987:

The Supreme Court said that Sec. 64 of the Revised Administrative Code is not repugnant to the due process clause, and the accused is not constitutionally entitled to another judicial determination of whether he breached the condition of his pardon.

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79690, April 27, 1988:
The Supreme Court declared that “to be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court.
One may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

[iiif] Neither is the respondent entitled to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

P.D. 1069 affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition.
The extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees, which can be precipitated by premature information on the basis of the request for extradition.
No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater powers over matters involving foreign relations.

Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000

Cuevas v. Muñoz, G.R. No. 140520, December 18, 2000.

[iiig] Government of the United States of America v. Judge Puruganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002:

The Supreme Court said that upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible:

a prima facie finding whether they are sufficient in form and substance,
whether they comply with the Extradition Treaty, and
whether the person sought is extraditable.

If no finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if there is a finding, the judge must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at the scheduled summary hearings.
Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
Thus, also, the grant by the judge of bail was deemed null and void, as persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.
Accordingly, in the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration (December 17, 2002), the Supreme Court denied with finality Mark Jimenez’ motion, saying that extradition is sui generis and does not fall within the ambit of the right to bail.

Government of Hongkong v. Hon. Felixberto Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007:
The Supreme Court said that it cannot ignore the modern trend in public international law which places primacy on the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights.
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty, the principles contained therein are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community.

Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-2855, July 30, 1949:
This Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in the Declaration are part of the law of the land.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.
After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

[iiig1] The ruling in Puruganan was modified in Government of Hongkong, adopting a new standard to be used in granting bail in extradition cases, denominated “clear and convincing evidence.”

As Chief Justice Puno explained, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt, but higher than preponderance of evidence.
The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court for entitlement to bail.

[iiih] Roxas v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 114944, June 21, 2001:

It was held that the lack of notice to, or participation of, petitioners (who had already been cleared by the Ombudsman in its original resolution) at the reinvestigation does not render the subsequent resolution (on reinvestigation) null and void, even if the said subsequent resolution reinstated the complaint against them.
But in the Resolution dated May 29, 2002, on the Motion for Reconsideration in the said case, the Supreme Court said that the petitioners were denied due process when the Special Investigator reinstated the complaint against the petitioners without their knowledge.
At the very least, they should have been notified that the complaint against them had not yet been finally disposed of.
They should have been apprised of their possible implication in the criminal case, to enable them to meet any new accusation against them head-on and to prepare for their defense.

[iiii] The right of a party to cross-examine the witness against him in a civil case is an indispensable part of due process.

Ortigas v. Lufthansa, G.R. No. 28773, June 30, 1975:

Emin v. De Leon, G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002:
But in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
Since nothing on record shows that petitioner asked for cross-examination, he cannot argue that he has been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place.

Rodson Phil., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004:
Likewise, it was held that where the petitioners were amply afforded the opportunity to register objections to respondent's offer of evidence, there was no denial of due process.

[iiij] The filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect of absence of a hearing.

The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is:

an opportunity to explain one's side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Chua v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33; reiterated in Marohombsar v. Judge Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004, and in Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014:

Emin v. De Leon, supra.

Quintos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149800, November 21, 2002:

It was held that petitioner was not denied due process because he subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC considered and acted upon, albeit unfavorably.

[iiik] Villaruel v. Fernando, G.R. No. 136726, September 24, 2003:

It was held that there was no denial of due process where the appellate court dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure of the Office of the Solicitor General to file the required memorandum.
As a rule, the negligence of counsel binds the client.
Moreover, petitioner in this case is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the OSG's failure to file the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages, and to have the order declaring the petitioner in default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another lawyer.
The same principle was reiterated in Borromeo Bros. Estate v. Garcia, G.R. No. 139594-95, February 26, 2008.

[iiil] There are cases in which notice and hearing may be dispensed with without violating due process: Among these are:

the cancellation of the passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime,
the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges,
the distraint of property for tax delinquency,
the padlocking of restaurants found unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and
the abatement of nuisances per se.
Suntay v. People, 101 Phil. 833.
Co v. Barbers, G.R. No. 129952, June 16, 1998.

Equitable Banking Corporation v. Calderon, G.R. No. 156168, December 14, 2004:

The Supreme Court ruled that no malice or bad faith attended the Bank's dishonor of Calderon's credit card, inasmuch as the dishonor was justified under its Credit Card Agreement which provided that the cardholder agreed not to exceed his approved credit limit, otherwise the card privilege would be automatically suspended without notice to the cardholder.

[iiim] Jesus Garcia v. Hon. Ray Alan Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013; reiterated in Tua v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 170101, January 22, 2014:

Sec. 15 of R.A. 9262 ("An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children"), providing for the ex parte issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), does not violate the due process clause.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of the property, in the same way, the victim of violence against women and children (VAWC) may already have suffered harrowing experiences at the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.

[iiin] National Housing Authority v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 140945, May 16, 2005:

A person who is not impleaded in a complaint cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.
In this case, the respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property, and title was already transferred to him.
It will be the height of inequity to allow respondent's title to be nullified without the respondent being given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of the property. It is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.

[iiio] Shu v. Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014:

Respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process during the NBI investigation.
The functions of the NBI are merely investigatory and informational in nature.
The NBI has no judicial or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause.

probable cause — reasonable certainty of conviction

[iiip] Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Baguio City v. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation, G.R. No. 160025, April 23, 2014:

Prior notice and hearing, as elements of due process of law, are only required in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not when the government agency is engaged in the performance of quasi-legislative or administrative functions.

[iv] Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

This is necessary, because otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered meaningless.
Relate this to Sec. 14, Art. VIII, which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

[iva] Insular Life Assurance Co. v. Young, G.R. No. 140964, January 16, 2002:

Due process demands that the parties to a litigation be informed how the case was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.

[ivb] Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139884, February 15, 2001:

It was held that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default, because judgments of default are frowned upon except in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay.
Where the order of default is immoderate, there is a violation of due process.

6. Publication as part of due process.

Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985:

The Court held that publication is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders, administrative rules and regulations, and is an indispensable part of due process.

Republic (National Telecommunications Commission) v. Express Telecommunications, G.R. No. 147096, January 15, 2002:

The National Telecommunications Commission, in granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate, applied the 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, and not the 1993 Revised Rules, because the latter had not yet been published (although the same had already been filed with the National Administrative Register).

7. Appeal and due process.

Appeal is not a natural right nor is it part of due process.
Tropical Homes, Inc. v. NHA, G.R. No. L-48672, July 31, 1987.

Generally, it may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretion.
But where the Constitution gives a person the right to appeal, e.g., in the cases coming under the minimum appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Sec. 5[2], Art. VIII), denial of the right to appeal constitutes a violation of due process.
Where there is a statutory grant of the right to appeal, denial of that remedy also constitutes a denial of due process.

[a] Alba v. Nitorreda, G.R. No. 120223, March 13, 1996:

The Supreme Court reiterated that the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Accordingly, the constitutional requirement of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal, because the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of one's case.

Producers Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002. In Barata v. Abalos, G.R. No. 142888, June 6, 2001,

It was held that the failure to provide the complainant the right to appeal in certain cases (e.g., from the decision of the Ombudsman) is not a denial of due process. It may be noted that in appropriate cases involving oppressive or arbitrary action, the complainant is not deprived of a legal recourse by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman.

[b] Sajot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109721, March 11, 1999:

It was held that there was no denial of due process where the court denied the appeal due to the negligence of the accused and of his counsel.
An appellant must strictly comply with the rules inasmuch as appeal is purely a statutory right.

8. Preliminary Investigation and Due Process

It is doctrinally settled that the right to preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by statute.
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003.

But while the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.
Saturnino Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014.

In such a case, the right to preliminary investigation is not merely formal or technical; to deny it to the petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process
Yusop v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 138859-60, February 22, 2001.

[a] A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on trial:

to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution, and
to protect him from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public trial.
It is also intended to protect the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trials.

Thus, while the right is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component of due process in administering criminal justice.
Victor Jose Tan Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, July 27, 2008.

[b] It is now provided in Sec. 1, Rule 112, Rules on Criminal Procedure that a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment of at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day, without regard to the fine.

[i] However, when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation, provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules.

Sec. 7, Rule 112, Rules on Criminal Procedure

In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel.
Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail, and the investigation must be terminated within 15 days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within 5 days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule.

[ii] Be that as it may, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective.

The denial of the motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the information or oust the court of its jurisdiction.
Budiongan v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 170288, September 22, 2006.

The lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground for a motion to quash; but the case must be suspended with respect to the petitioner even if the case is already undergoing trial.
Yusop v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

[iii] The right may be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it.

Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001.

It cannot be invoked for the first time on appeal.
People v. Lagao, G.R. No. 118457, April 8, 1997.

The right is not waived by the filing of a motion to be admitted to bail.
But the right is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea during arraignment.
People v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 132635, February 21, 2001.
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, supra.

[c] The preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ is merely inquisitorial; it is not a trial on the merits, and its sole purpose is to determine:

whether a crime has been committed and
whether the respondent therein is probably guilty of the crime.

It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence, and upon satisfaction of the investigating prosecutor that probable cause exists based on the evidence presented, he may terminate the preliminary investigation and resolve the case.
Judy Ann Santos v. People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008.

[i] A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.

Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc v. Tan Tiong Bio, aka Henry Tan, G.R. No. 186652, October 6, 2010.

[d] A preliminary investigation is essentially an inquiry to determine whether:

A crime has been committed, and
Whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.

The public prosecutor determines during the preliminary investigation whether probable cause exists; thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor.
Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against the offender.
Baviera v. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 168580, February 8, 2007.

[i] Datu Andal Ampatuan v. Secretary Leila de Lima, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013:

Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigation, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders.

Sanrio Company v. Lim, G.R. No. 168380, February 8, 2008.

The Supreme Court reiterated the policy of non-interference with executive discretion in the determination of probable cause. It held that a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation.

[ii] Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008:

The possible exception to this rule of non-interference is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public prosecutor.
Such grave abuse of discretion will then justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. The same ruling was reached in Datu Andal Ampatuan v. Secretary Leila de Lima, supra.

[e] Saturnino Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014:

The Supreme Court declared that the petitioners were not denied due process:

“In the context of preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity to be heard x x x The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's defense x x x Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one's own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.”

[f] Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015:

The petitioner sought to restrain the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting further proceedings on preliminary investigation, and to declare all proceedings thus far relative to the complaint for Plunder as void, upon the allegation that the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, and he, petitioner, was denied due process of law.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

First, there is no law or rule that requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Senator Estrada's claim. The right of the respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant." The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay v. CIR are not applicable to preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights.
Second, Senator Estrada's petition for certiorari is premature. He did not file any pleading, much less a motion for reconsideration, to the 27 March 2014 Order in OMB-C-C13-0313; he immediately proceeded to file this petition for certiorari before this Court. He failed to present a compelling reason that the present petition falls under the exceptions to the general rule that filing a motion for reconsideration is required prior to filing a petition for certiorari.
Third, Senator Estrada's present petition for certiorari constitutes forum shopping and should be summarily dismissed. In his certification of non-forum shopping, he alleged that he filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014. This motion has yet to be resolved.

[g] Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public officials.

Roque v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999:

Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years clearly violates this mandate and the public official's rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint [].

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, supra:

The Court said that unreasonable delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan violated the due process clause.

But where the delay is due to the complexity of the issues involved, or is caused by the petitioner's own acts, not by the inaction of the prosecution, there is no violation.
Defensor-Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, December 2, 1993.
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 116259-60, February 20, 1996.

[i] The Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman's findings are essentially factual in nature, and the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts [Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, supra].

9. Administrative Due Process

In Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635, the Court enumerated the requisites of administrative due process, as follows: HESS-EOP

The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof;
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
The decision must have something to support itself;
The evidence must be substantial;
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decision.

[a] Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the COMELEC requires notice and hearing.

The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his proclamation.

Namil v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150540, October 28, 2003:

The COMELEC issued the questioned order annulling the proclamation on the basis of private respondent's allegations and the recommendation of the law department, without giving notice to the candidate proclaimed. Thus, the COMELEC order was declared void.

[b] See further discussion in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.

C. Equal Protection of the Laws

Sec. 1, Art. III:

x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

1. Meaning; persons protected.

All persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,

both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

Natural and juridical persons are entitled to this guarantee; but with respect to artificial persons, they enjoy the protection only insofar as their property is concerned.

2. Scope of Equality.

[a] Economic.

See constitutional provisions on:

Free access to courts [Sec. 11, Art. III];
Marine wealth reserved for Filipino citizens [Sec. 2, par. 2, Art. XII];
Congress may reserve certain areas of investments [Sec. 10, Art. XII]; and
Reduction of social, economic, and political inequities [Secs. 1, 2 & 3, Art. XIII].

Ichong v. Hernandez, supra.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, supra.
Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980.

[i] Tan v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994:

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 7496 limiting the allowable deductions from gross income of single proprietorships and professionals.
It was held that uniformity of taxation does not prohibit classification, provided the requirements of valid classification are complied with.

[b] Political.

See constitutional provisions on:

Free access to courts [Sec. 11, Art. III];
Bona fide candidates being free from harassment or discrimination [Sec. 10, Art. IX-C]; and
Reduction of social, economic, and political inequities [Sec. 1, Art. XIII].

[i] As a general rule, the Constitution places the civil rights of aliens on an equal footing with those of citizens; but their political rights do not enjoy the same protection.

Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534.

Peralta v. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30:

The Court upheld the adoption of block voting, saying that if a candidate wishes to avail of the advantage of block voting, he was free to join a political party.

Ceniza v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763:

The law excluding the residents of Mandaue City from voting for provincial officials was justified as a “matter of legislative discretion,” and the equal protection clause would be violated only if groups within the city were allowed to vote while others were not.

UNIDO v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17:

The Court denied the request of the opposition for equal time and media coverage of its Plaza Miranda rally (as that given to President Marcos) because the “head of State of every country in the world must, from the very nature of his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally available to those who are opposed to him.”

[ii] In the criminal process, Sec. 11, Art. III ensures free access to the courts.

Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420:

Petitioners who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the complex crime of rebellion with murder were ordered released after 12 years of incarceration when, in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no complex crime of rebellion with murder, inasmuch as common crimes are deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion.

Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433:

The constitutional mandate for the creation of a special court to hear offenses committed by public officers was the authority to make a distinction between prosecution for dishonesty in public service and prosecution for crimes not connected with public office.

[c] Social.

Sec. 1, Art. XIII:

“The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. x x x To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments.”

3. Valid Classification.

Persons or things ostensibly similarly situated may nonetheless be treated differently if there is a basis for valid classification.
The requisites are:

Substantial distinctions which make for real differences.
Germane to the purpose of the law
Not limited to existing conditions only
Must apply equally to all members of the same class

[a] Substantial distinctions which make for real differences.

[i] Mirasol v. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006:

Where the petitioners assailed the validity of DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, which prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways on the basis of R.A. 2000 (Limited Access Highway Act), the Supreme Court held that there is a real and substantial distinction between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles.
Not all motorized vehicles are created equal — real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the tollways.

[ii] Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386:

It was held that Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risks to which their class was exposed.

Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666:

Substantial distinction was found to exist between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers, because of dissimilarities in work environment, safety, danger to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civil, and spiritual activities.

JMM Promotions and Management v. Court of Appeals, supra:

The Court upheld the classification on the ground that the DOLE Order applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for jobs abroad, as they are prone to exploitation and abuse being beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies.

Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra:

The Court upheld the validity of the law disqualifying from running for the same elective office from which he retired, any retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received payment of retirement benefits and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected.

[iii] Espinas v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 198271, April 1, 2014:

The Supreme Court found substantial distinctions between government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government financing institutions (GFIs) and their subsidiaries on the one hand, and national government agencies (NGAs) on the other hand.
The extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses (EME) of GOCCs and GFIs and their subsidiaries are, pursuant to law, allocated by their own internal governing boards, while the EME of NGAs are appropriated in the annual general appropriations law duly enacted by Congress.
Accordingly, the Commission on Audit (COA) may impose more stringent regulations on officials of GOCCs and GFIs and their subsidiaries when claiming reimbursement for extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses.

[iv] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.:

In its Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration (October 30, 1995), the Court rejected the contention that the exemption from VAT of electric cooperatives and sales of realty to the “homeless poor” violated the equal protection clause.
The classification between electric and other cooperatives rests on a Congressional determination that there is greater need to provide cheaper electric power to as many people as possible, especially in the rural areas; and there is a difference between the “homeless poor” and the “homeless less poor,” because the latter class can afford to rent houses in the meantime that they cannot yet buy their own homes, while the former cannot.

Ichong v. Hernandez, supra.

The Court upheld the validity of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law despite the objection that it violated the equal protection clause, because there exist real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national.

[v] Policemen and Other Government Employees.

The preventive suspension of a policeman lasting until termination of the criminal case against him, as provided in Sec. 47, R.A. 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), does not violate the policeman's right to equal protection of the laws.
There is substantial distinction between policemen and other government employees; policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law, which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them.
Besides, Sec. 42 of P.D. 807 (Civil Service Law), which was raised as argument for equal treatment, refers to preventive suspension in administrative cases, not in criminal cases.

Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286:

It was held that the Ombudsman’s authority to commence an investigation on the basis of an anonymous letter does not violate the equal protection clause.
Firstly, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself; secondly, in permitting the filing of complaints “in any form and in any manner,” the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoing; finally, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay, or dismiss investigations held against them.

[vi] Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337:

The Supreme Court found substantial distinction between the print and broadcast media which would justify different treatment under B.P. 881, viz: the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the pervasive presence of the broadcast media in the lives of Filipinos, and the earlier ruling that the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser than the freedom accorded to the print media.

Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999:

It was held that the petitioner's and intervenors' right to equal protection of the law was not directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases.
Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable, and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.

[vii] Jose Jesus Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, April 22, 2014:

In the motion filed by petitioners for the reconsideration of the Court's decision of February 18, 2014, relative to the validity of the provisions of R.A. 10125, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, an issue raised was whether Sec. 6 of the law imposing a penalty one degree higher when a crime is committed with the use of information and communications technologies (ICT) was valid.
The Supreme Court said yes, finding substantial distinctions between crimes committed with the use of ICT and those without this technology.
Besides, the power to fix penalties for violations of penal laws, like the Cybercrime Law, exclusively belongs to Congress.

[viii] People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, February 3, 2000:

It was held that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable basis for valid classification in criminal law enforcement.
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in their liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000:

The Court said that there is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by "foreign hires" and "local hires" as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to these teachers.

GSIS v. Montesclaros, 434 SCRA 441:

In declaring as invalid Sec. 18 of P.D. 1146, which provides that a surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension benefits if the surviving spouse contracted marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension, the Court said that the classification does not rest on substantial distinctions.
If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent deathbed marriages, there is no reason why the proviso reckons the 3-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for the pension and not from the date the pensioner died.
It lumps all marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience.

[ix] In Re: Request of Assistant Court Administrators, 40 SCRA 16:

The Supreme Court held that there is no reasonable basis for the exclusion of the Assistant Court Administrator, the Assistant Clerks of Court and Division Clerks of Court of the Court of Appeals, and the Division Clerks of Court of the Sandiganbayan from the grant of special allowances provided in R.A. 9227.

Louis "Barok" Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010:

The Supreme Court declared Executive Order No. 1, creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 invalid and unconstitutional insofar as it violates the equal protection clause, inasmuch as the focus of its inquiry is limited to the immediately preceding administration.

[x] Jesus Garcia v. Hon. Ray Alan Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013:

The Supreme Court declared that R.A. 9262 (An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes), which took effect March 27, 2004, does not violate the equal protection clause.
First, the law rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women — all make for real differences justifying the classification.
Second, the classification is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children, as spelled out in its Declaration of Policy.
Third, the classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and the law applies equally to all members. The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
And the law applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.

[b] Germane to the Purpose of the Law

The distinctions which are the bases for the classification should have a reasonable relation to the purpose of the law.

[c] Not Limited to Existing Conditions Only

[i] People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12:

The Court upheld the validity of the law prohibiting members of non-Christian tribes from drinking foreign liquor, on the ground that their low degree of culture and unfamiliarity with the drink rendered them more susceptible to its effects.

Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, 22 SCRA 603:

The ordinance was declared invalid because it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, and none other, such that if a new sugar central is established in Ormoc, it would not be subject to the ordinance.

[d] Must Apply Equally to All Members of the Same Class

[i] Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993:

Sec. 35 of R.A. 7354, which withdrew franking privileges formerly granted to the judiciary but remained with the executive and legislative departments, was declared unconstitutional, because the three branches of government are similarly situated.

Villegas v. Hui Chiong, supra.

The ordinance imposing a work permit fee of P50.00 upon all aliens desirous of obtaining employment in the City of Manila was declared unconstitutional, because the fee imposed was unreasonable and excessive, and failed to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who were required to pay it.

Olivares v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118533, October 4, 1995:

It was held that when the Mayor issued a permit in favor of unidentified vendors while imposing numerous requirements upon the Baclaran Credit Cooperative, he violated the equal protection clause because he failed to show that the two were not similarly situated.

[ii] Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999:

The constitutional right to equal protection is not violated by an executive order, issued pursuant to law, granting tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone, and denying them to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in" territory.

The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents; it is enough that all persons under like circumstances or conditions are given the same privileges and required to follow the same obligations.
In short, a classification based on valid and reasonable standards does not violate the equal protection clause
This was reiterated in Coconut Oil Refiners Association v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005.

Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998:

But the compromise agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos family providing that the assets to be retained by the Marcos family are exempt from all taxes violates the equal protection clause.
Any special grant of tax exemption in favor of the Marcos family would constitute class legislation.

D. Searches and Seizures

Sec. 2, Art. III:

The right of the people to be secure

in their persons, houses, papers and effects

against unreasonable searches and seizures

of whatever nature and for any purpose

shall be inviolable,

and no search warrant or warrant of arrest

shall issue, except upon probable cause

to be determined personally by a judge,

after examination under oath or affirmation

of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,

particularly describing the place to be searched,

or the persons or things to be seized.

1. Basis; Scope of the Protection

[NOTE] For recall:

Constitutional Right to Privacy
Universal Application of the Guarantee
Personal Nature and Waiver of the Right
The State, Not Private Persons, as the Target of Restraint
Judicial Determination of Reasonableness
Waiver of Objections to Arrest by Entering a Plea
Filing of Charges Cures Defect of Invalid Detention

[a] The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415 (1968), where it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty: it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.

A judge challenged the biennial SALN filing under R.A. 3019, Sec. 7 as violating privacy, due process, search-and-seizure, and self-incrimination rights. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and upheld the requirement as a reasonable police-power measure, while explicitly recognizing the right to privacy as a constitutionally protected value.

Jose Jesus Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, arguing that they violated fundamental rights including the right to privacy. The Supreme Court struck down Section 12 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act because it allowed law enforcement to collect real-time traffic data without a court order, violating the constitutional right to privacy and the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Similarly, Section 19 was invalidated for granting the government unchecked authority to restrict or block access to computer data, which the Court found to be an unconstitutional prior restraint and a breach of due process and privacy rights.

[i] Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy."

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo Sabio; Miguel v. Senator Richard Gordon, 535 Phil. 687 (2006):

“Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a 'constitutional right' and the 'right most valued by civilized men,' but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that 'no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy' and 'everyone has the right to protection against such interference or attacks.”

The Senate compelled PCGG officials and PHC directors to attend a hearing on alleged anomalies, but they refused based on EO No. 1, §4(b) and invoked privacy and self-incrimination rights. The Court held that §4(b) had been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, upheld the Senate’s inquiry and enforcement powers, recognized constitutional zones of privacy yet found no violated privacy here, and ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination must be raised per question.

[ii] Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy:

the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone; and
the right to privacy of communications and correspondence.

[Disini v. Secretary of Justice, supra.].

[iii] But the right to be let alone is not unqualified.

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977):

The U.S. Supreme Court classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy:

Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions.
Informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.

Informational privacy has two aspects:

the right not to have private information disclosed, and
the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.

In determining entitlement to the right, the Court has laid down a two-fold test:

Subjective test: one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter..
Objective test: his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable/

[Disini v. Secretary of Justice, supra.].

[b] The protection guaranteed by Sec. 2, Art. III is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not.

Artificial persons are also entitled to the guarantee, although they may be required to open their books of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of police and taxing powers [⭐Moncada v. People’s Court, 80 Phil. 1].

Hilario Moncado challenged the warrantless seizure of his documents and sought their return, but the Court refused, allowing the State to use the papers despite the alleged illegality under the then-existing rule. The case is taught for the principle that the search-and-seizure guarantee protects “all persons,” including aliens and corporations (with qualified book-inspection powers), even though the exclusionary rule would come later in Stonehill.

[c] The right is personal; it may be invoked only by the person entitled to it.

⭐[Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383].

The NBI used 42 broadly worded warrants to raid the homes and offices of Stonehill and associates, seizing sweeping categories of business papers based only on generic allegations of law violations. The Supreme Court held that only the person whose rights were violated may object (officers lack standing to suppress corporate records), struck down the general warrants, and adopted the exclusionary rule, rendering the home-seized items inadmissible.

As such, the right may be waived [Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320],

Customs agents seized a vessel for alleged smuggling and, during the investigation, searched Velasco’s hotel room without a warrant after the occupant consented and produced documents used to support forfeiture. The Supreme Court upheld the search as a valid consent (waiver) search and affirmed the CTA’s ruling, reiterating that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be waived by voluntary consent.

either expressly or impliedly [People v. Malasugui, G.R. No. 44335, July 30, 1936],

After a mortally wounded victim named “Kagui” as his assailant, police arrested Kagui Malasugui, who voluntarily produced stolen bracelets; a search without protest yielded the victim’s pocketbook, cash, and ID. The Court ruled the warrantless arrest was justified, the search valid as consented to and incident to arrest, and that the right against unreasonable searches may be waived, either expressly or impliedly, thus affirming the conviction.

but the waiver must be made by the person whose right is invaded, not by one who is not duly authorized to effect such waiver [⭐ People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992].

Police, acting without a warrant, entered a house allegedly rented by Basilio Damaso based on the consent of two women present and seized an M-14 rifle and “subversive” materials used to convict him. The Supreme Court reversed and acquitted Damaso, ruling that waiver of the search-and-seizure right must come from the person whose right is invaded (or an expressly authorized agent) and that no warrantless-search exception applied, with the remaining proof hearsay and insufficient.

[d] The right applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.

The protection cannot extend to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring them within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government [⭐ People v. Andre Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991].

A private freight forwarder independently opened Marti’s boxes, discovered marijuana, and then called the NBI, which only witnessed what had already been found. The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the search-and-seizure clause limits government conduct only, so a private search does not trigger the exclusionary rule.

This is reiterated in Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997, where the Supreme Court said that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by private individuals.
In this case, petitioner’s officer opened an envelope addressed to the respondent and found therein a check evidencing overprice in the purchase of medicine; the check was deemed admissible in evidence.
In People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 109279-80, January 18, 1999, the same principle was applied relative to the memorandum receipt and mission order (to carry firearms) discovered by the accused-appellant’s father-in-law, a private citizen.
In People v. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002, the shabu in the baggage of the accused was found by private security officers of the interisland passenger vessel who then reported the matter to the Philippine Coast Guard. The search and seizure of the suitcase and contraband items were carried out without government intervention. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule may not be invoked.

[e] What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved [⭐Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989].

Petitioners sought to stop police/military checkpoints as violations of the right against unreasonable searches, arguing they allowed arbitrary intrusions. The Supreme Court upheld checkpoints, ruling that reasonableness, judged by circumstances, permits brief, non-intrusive inspections, while more intrusive searches still require probable cause.

But where the search and consequent seizure of fish allegedly caught by the use of explosives was made without a warrant, and a search warrant was obtained by the officers only much later, it was held that there was a violation of this constitutional guarantee. [Manlavi v. Gacott, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293, May 9, 1995].

[f] Objections to the warrant of arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea [People v. Codilla, G.R. No. 100720, June 30, 1993;

People v. Robles, G.R. No. 101335, June 8, 2000].

Robles was tried and convicted of robbery with homicide, then argued on appeal that his arrest and warrant were invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that challenges to a warrant of arrest must be raised before plea; failure to do so waives the objection and the case is decided on the evidence.

Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of his right against unlawful restraint of liberty [People v. Peñaflorida, G.R. No. 130550, September 2, 1999, reiterating Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79543, October 16, 1996; People v. Gastador, G.R. No. 123727, April 14, 1999].

Indeed, even assuming that their arrest was illegal, their act of entering a plea during their arraignment constituted a waiver by the accused of their right to question the validity of their arrest [People v. Cachola, G.R. Nos. 148712-15, January 21, 2004].

After a 1999 La Union massacre, several accused were arraigned, entered pleas, and went to trial; they later argued their arrests were illegal. The Supreme Court held that, even if the arrests were defective, the accused waived their right to contest them by pleading at arraignment without objection, so the convictions stood on the trial evidence.

[i] The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention, or at least deny him the right to be released [Francisco Juan Larrañaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998].

Larrañaga challenged his warrantless detention through habeas corpus, but during the proceedings the prosecutor filed informations and the RTC issued warrants for his arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA and denied habeas, holding that the subsequent filing of charges and issuance of a warrant cure the earlier detention defect or at least justify continued custody, so release is not available via habeas corpus.

2. Some Procedural Rules

[NOTE] For recall:

Effect of Illegal Arrest on Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction in Issuing Search Warrants
Proper Court to Issue Warrant of Arrest After Filing Information
Proper Forum for Motions Against Warrants
Quashal of Warrants and Inadmissibility of Evidence

[a] The conspicuous illegality of the arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the trial court, because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection [People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999].

Del Rosario was arrested without a warrant, then pleaded and went to trial without objecting, later claiming on appeal that his arrest was illegal and the court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that even a conspicuously illegal arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and that failure to object before plea waives the issue.

[b] It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the Court wherein it is filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, the executive judges, or their lawful substitutes, in the areas and for the offense contemplated in Circular 1-91, shall have primary jurisdiction [Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104879, May 6, 1994].

Officers obtained a search warrant from the RTC of Caloocan and served it in Quezon City against EILER, leading to seizures and arrests; the accused argued lack of territorial jurisdiction and violation of Circular 1-91. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA, holding that a search warrant is a judicial process with no territorial enforcement limit, and that while primary jurisdiction lies with the court where a case is pending or, if none, with Executive Judges under Circular 1-91, this is a policy allocation that does not invalidate a warrant otherwise issued with probable cause and proper judicial examination.

This does not mean, however, that a Court, whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched, cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of such search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place [Ilano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109560, May 26, 1995].

The RTC of Caloocan issued warrants to search Ilano’s Quezon City premises, leading to drug seizures and a QC prosecution; Ilano attacked the warrants for territorial and circular-based defects. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while primary jurisdiction lies with the local court or Executive Judge, any competent court may issue a warrant outside its territorial area when urgency, subject, time, and place justify it, provided probable cause and searching judicial examination are satisfied.

The determination of the existence of compelling considerations of urgency, and the subject, time and place necessitating and justifying the filing of an application for a search warrant with a court other than the court having territorial jurisdiction over the place to be searched and things to be seized or where the materials are found is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court where the application is filed, subject to review by the appellate court in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction [People v. Chui, G.R. No. 142915-16, February 27, 2004].

Police sought and obtained a search warrant from a court outside the area of the premises to be searched; the warrant yielded shabu, and the accused were convicted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court may issue a non-territorial search warrant when compelling considerations exist, with its determination reviewed only for grave abuse, and that constitutional issuance requirements controlled, not administrative venue preferences.

[i] Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People, G.R. No. 199052, November 19, 2014:

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the search warrant issued by Judge Peralta, Vice Executive Judge of RTC-Manila, upon application of the Philippine National Police for the search of three caves in the Laud Compound in Davao City, where, as alleged, the remains of the victims of the so-called "Davao Death Squad" could be found.
The ruling was based on Sec. 12, Chapter V, of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which authorized the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to issue search warrants in special criminal cases, when the following requirements are complied with: HPE

The cases involve heinous crimes, such as murder;
The application is made by, among others, the Philippine National Police;
The Executive Judge or, when he is on official leave or not physically present, the Vice Executive Judge, issues the warrant, if justified.

These warrants may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of these RTCs.

Acting under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, the RTC–Manila Vice Executive Judge issued search warrants for three caves in Laud Compound, Davao City to recover murder victims’ remains allegedly tied to the Davao Death Squad. The Court affirmed the warrants’ validity, holding that the circular authorizes Manila/QC RTCs in heinous-crime cases, upon PNP application and proper judicial examination, to issue particularized warrants enforceable nationwide.

[ia] Even if the authority of Judge Peralta as Vice Executive Judge had been divested by virtue of the imposition of administrative penalties, the search warrant issued by him was, nonetheless, valid, because Judge Peralta may be considered to have issued the warrant as a de facto officer.

[c] But the moment an information is filed with the RTC, it is that court which must issue the warrant of arrest. The MTC Judge who continued with the preliminary investigation and issued warrants of arrest violated procedure [Espino v. Judge Salubre, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1255, February 26, 2001].

If the case had already been remanded to the MTCC, after the information for perjury was erroneously filed with the RTC, it was error for the RTC Judge not to recall the warrant of arrest issued, because contrary to her claim, the issuance of a warrant is not a ministerial function of the judge [Alib v. Judge Labayen, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1576, June 28, 2001].

[d] Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant or to retrieve things thereunder seized may be filed only with the issuing court.

Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing court or that in which the criminal action is pending [People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126379, June 26, 1998].

However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping [Garaygay v. People, G.R. No. 135503, July 6, 2000].

[e] The judge may order the quashal of the warrant he issued even after the same had already been implemented, particularly when such quashal is based on the finding that there is no offense committed. This does not trench upon the duty of the prosecutor. The effect of such a quashal is that the items seized shall be inadmissible in evidence [Solid Triangle Sales v. Sheriff, RTC QC, Br. 33, G.R. No. 144309, November 30, 2001].

Indeed, when the warrant is shown to be defective, all evidence obtained from the search shall be inadmissible in evidence [People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 129035, August 20, 2002].

3. Only a Judge May Validly Issue a Warrant

The Constitution grants the authority to issue a warrant of arrest or a search warrant only to a judge upon fulfillment of certain basic constitutional requirements.

[a] ⭐ Salazar v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990:

Art. 38 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which granted the Secretary of Labor and Employment the authority to issue orders of arrest, search and seizure, was declared unconstitutional, because the Labor Secretary is not a judge.

The POEA closed Salazar’s premises and seized items under Article 38(c) and presidential decrees, without a judge-issued warrant. The Supreme Court invalidated the executive warrant power, declared Article 38(c) unconstitutional for authorizing arrest/search by the Labor Secretary, and quashed the general, non-particularized seizure order.

Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112708, March 29, 1996:

An order issued by the PCGG directing the respondent to submit all bank documents which the PCGG representative might find necessary and relevant to the investigation was held to be in the nature of a search warrant which the PCGG cannot validly issue, because the PCGG is not a judge.

The PCGG issued an order compelling submission of all bank documents that its agent might consider necessary and relevant to an investigation into ill-gotten wealth. The Supreme Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan and voided the order, ruling that it was in the nature of a search warrant—a power reserved to judges—and that such general, non-particularized directives violate the Constitution.

[i] Jose Jesus Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014:

The Court declared invalid Section 19, R.A. 10175 (Cybercrime Law), which provides that when computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the Department of Justice shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
In declaring this section unconstitutional, the Court said that here, the government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a valid warrant (which only a judge can issue).
In the same case, the Court said that the content of the computer data can also constitute speech; thus, Section 19 also operates as an impermissible restriction on freedom of expression.

The Cybercrime Law’s Section 19 let the DOJ order online takedowns on a mere prima facie finding. The Supreme Court struck it down, holding that such executive seizures of computer data require a judge-issued warrant and that takedowns also act as prior restraints on speech, making Sec. 19 unconstitutional.

[b] Morano v. Vivo, 128 Phil. 923 (1967):

It was held that orders of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities, but only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of a violation of law, e.g., an order of deportation or an order of contempt, but not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution.

Morano was detained under an administrative arrest order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration to aid an ongoing investigation, without any judge-issued warrant or final deportation order. The Supreme Court annulled the order and directed release, holding that administrative arrest orders are valid only to execute final determinations (e.g., deportation/contempt), while arrests for investigation/prosecution require a judicial warrant.

Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag, G.R. No. 78596, July 13, 1989:

The Supreme Court nullified the order of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, because it was issued simply on the basis of a complaint filed with the Commission on Immigration against the alien.

Board of Commissioners, Commission on Immigration and Deportation v. Judge de la Rosa, G.R. No. 95122, May 31, 1991:

It was held that a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation is null and void for being unconstitutional.

[c] [Aberrant Case] ⭐ Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. L-82544, June 28, 1988:

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the arrest of pedophiles on orders of Immigration Commissioner Santiago because there was probable cause, occasioned by months of surveillance made by CID agents on the suspected pedophiles.
According to the Court, the requirement that probable cause is to be determined only by a judge does not extend to deportation cases which are not criminal but purely administrative in nature.
The existence of probable cause justified the arrest as well as the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs, and posters without warrant. Furthermore, petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, and under the circumstances, the CID agents had reasonable ground to believe that petitioners had committed “pedophilia,” which, though not punished under the Revised Penal Code, is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth.
Note: This case was decided prior to the enactment of R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act).

After months of surveillance, immigration agents arrested foreign suspects on the Commissioner’s orders and seized indecent materials, with some suspects found with young boys in their rooms. The Supreme Court upheld the arrests and seizures, holding that deportation is administrative, so executive probable cause—not a judge-issued warrant—can justify immigration custody and incidental seizure of evidence.

4. Requisites of a Valid Warrant

Probable Cause
Determination of Probable Cause Personally by a Judge
After examination, under oath or affirmation, of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
Particularity of description

[a] Probable Cause.

Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that, in themselves, are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof [People v. Syjuco, 64 Phil 667; Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil 33].

For a search:

such facts and circumstances

which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe

that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

[⭐Burgos v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984.

Military officers used broad search warrants to raid the WE Forum newsroom, seize presses and papers, and halt operations, based on conclusory affidavits. The Supreme Court quashed the warrants, ruling that probable cause for a search requires specific facts showing the crime and that the objects sought are in the place to be searched, and that general warrants and non-searching judicial determinations are constitutionally void.

See also Corro v. Lising, G.R. No. L-69899, July 15, 1985;
⭐Prudente v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989.

Police obtained a search warrant against Dr. Nemesio Prudente based on hearsay-laden affidavits and a perfunctory judicial examination, then used it to search PUP premises. The Supreme Court quashed the warrant, reiterating that probable cause for a search demands concrete facts personally tested by the judge, showing that a crime occurred and that the items connected to it are in the specified place.

[i] Must refer to one specific offense [Asian Surety v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312; Castro v. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477].

People v. Dichoso, G.R. No. 101216, June 4, 1993:

However, it was held that the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs, and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species; thus, one search warrant may be validly issued for several violations thereof.
This is reiterated in People v. Salanguit, G.R. Nos. 133254-55, April 19, 2001.

[ii] As applied to illegal possession of firearms, probable cause should be such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe:

that a person is in possession of a firearm and
that he does not have the license or permit to possess the same.

Nala v. Barroso, G.R. No. 153087, August 7, 2003:

The Court said that nowhere in the affidavit of the witness or applicant was it mentioned that the petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. Neither was there a certification from the appropriate government agency that petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm. The search warrant is, therefore, null and void.

[iii] In cases involving violation of P.D. 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property), a basic requirement for the validity of the search warrant is the presentation of the master tape of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films are supposed to have been copied [20th Century Fox v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 655].

But this decision, which was promulgated on August 19, 1988, should apply only prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith [⭐Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111267, September 20, 1996].

A 1986 anti-piracy search warrant issued on sworn testimony was later quashed after 20th Century Fox (1988) required master tapes to establish probable cause. The Supreme Court reinstated the warrant, ruling that 20th Century Fox applies prospectively only and that master tapes are not an absolute requirement, so a warrant valid under pre-1988 standards remains enforceable.

[iv] Where a search warrant was issued for the seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia, but probable cause was found to exist only with respect to the shabu, the warrant cannot be invalidated in toto; it is still valid with respect to the shabu [People v. Salanguit, supra.].

[b] Determination of Probable Cause Personally by a Judge.

Placer v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-60349, December 29, 1983 reiterated in
⭐ Lim v. Felix, G.R. No. 94054, February 19, 1991:

The Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of the judge.
While he could rely on the findings of the fiscal, he is not bound thereby.

After an information was filed and the fiscal certified probable cause, the trial judge issued a warrant of arrest, which the accused challenged as a ministerial rubber stamp. The Supreme Court held that issuance of a warrant is not ministerial; the judge must personally determine probable cause, may consider but is not bound by the fiscal, and may require more proof if needed.

Kho v. Judge Makalintal, G.R. Nos. 94902-06, April 21, 1999:

Thus, the determination of probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicant and the witnesses.

After surveillance tied Kho’s properties to unlicensed firearms, explosives, and “chop-chop” vehicles, an RTC judge personally examined NBI agents, issued several search warrants, and seizures followed. The Supreme Court sustained the warrants, reiterating that probable cause is for the issuing judge to decide following a personal, searching examination, and that such finding stands absent grave abuse of discretion.

⭐People v. Inting, G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause is the function of the judge; and the judge alone makes this determination.

In an election-offense case filed by COMELEC, the trial judge questioned COMELEC’s role and treated the filing as invalid without the provincial fiscal, despite having first issued a warrant. The Supreme Court granted the People’s petition, clarifying that COMELEC may investigate and prosecute election offenses, while the judge alone must personally determine probable cause for an arrest warrant based on the record (and require more if needed).

People v. Delgado, G.R. No. 93419, September 18, 1990:

The same rule applies in election offenses even if, in such cases, the preliminary investigation may be done by the COMELEC.

[i] Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest

It is sufficient that the judge “personally determine” the existence of probable cause. It is not necessary that he should personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
[⭐Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. L-82585, November 14, 1988].

Journalists Luis Beltran and Maximo Soliven were charged with libel by President Corazon Aquino, and the trial judge issued warrants of arrest without personally examining the complainant or her witnesses, relying instead on the prosecutor’s report and supporting documents. The Supreme Court upheld the warrants, ruling that the Constitution only requires the judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause, which may be done by evaluating the prosecutor’s findings and evidence, without the need to personally question the complainant or witnesses.

De los Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, A.M. No. RTJ-93-983, August 7, 1995:

The Court said that a hearing is not necessary for the determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The judge should evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining whether probable cause exists.

Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995:

It was held that the judge would simply personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
He merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in so doing, he need not conduct a de novo hearing.

de novo – from the beginning

Indeed, in the preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation; it is sufficient that the judge should personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining probable cause [Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 110436, June 27, 1994].

Reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Cerbo, G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999.

[ia] Alfredo Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014:

The Supreme Court said there are two kinds of determination of probable cause:

executive and
judicial

The executive determination of probable cause

concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an information being filed.

The judicial determination of probable cause,

on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.

While it is within the trial court's discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor's finding.
In this case, the trial court judge made an independent assessment of the evidence on record, and concluded that “the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa.” Thus, the judge dismissed the case, on the basis of Sec. 6(a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which mandates the judge to “immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause.”

[ib] Cruz v. Judge Areola, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 6, 2002:

Following established doctrine and procedure, the judge shall:

Personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
If, on the basis thereof, he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause.

It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the judge to issue a warrant of arrest, even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses for the determination of probable cause. Whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to his sound judgment and discretion.

[ib1] Saturnino Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014:

Issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance of a warrant of arrest are primarily a question of fact that are normally not within the purview of a petition for certiorari.

[ic] Thus, the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is within the exclusive province of the judge.

Sales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, November 18, 2001, the Supreme Court, citing People v. Judge Inting, said:

The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge and the judge alone;
The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge, as it is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause;
Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the:

preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest from the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released; and

Only a judge may issue a warrant of arrest.

In this case, the Supreme Court found that there was undue haste in the filing of the information; the State Prosecutors were over-eager to file the case and secure the warrant of arrest. The Sandiganbayan should have taken careful note of the contradictions in the testimony of complainant's witnesses as well as the improbabilities in the prosecution evidence.

[id] Lim v. Felix, G.R. No. 94054, February 19, 1991; reiterated in Roberts v. People, 294 SCRA 307:

If the judge relied solely on the certification of the Prosecutor [since all the records of the preliminary investigation were still in Masbate], then he cannot be said to have personally determined the existence of probable cause, and, therefore, the warrant of arrest issued by him is null and void.

Ho v. People, G.R. No. 106632, October 9, 1997:

The warrant of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan was invalidated because it was based merely on the report and recommendation of the investigating prosecutor; there was no showing that the court personally determined the existence of probable cause by independently examining sufficient evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation.

Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994:

Likewise, it was held that there is failure to comply with this requirement where the judge merely relied on the resolution of the Panel of Prosecutors and the latter's certification that probable cause existed.
Judges and prosecutors should distinguish the:

preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, from the
preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.
The first is made by the judge;
The second is done by the prosecutor.

[id1] Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure now embodies the rulings in Soliven and Lim, with modifications, as follows:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. -

(a) By the Regional Trial Court — Within ten days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Sec. 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the complaint or information."

[id2] Okabe v. Judge Gutierrez, G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004:

The Supreme Court found the respondent judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable cause for the petitioner's arrest, because the investigating prosecutor had submitted to the respondent judge only the resolution after his preliminary investigation of the case and the affidavit-complaint of the private complainant. The prosecutor failed to include the affidavits of the witnesses of the private complainant, and the latter's reply affidavit, the counter-affidavit of the petitioner, as well as the evidence adduced by the private complainant.

[ie] Talingdan v. Judge Eduarte, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1610, October 02, 2001:

More reprehensible was the action of the judge who issued a warrant of arrest not only without following the procedure to determine the existence of probable cause but was so negligent not to notice that there was not even a prosecutor's certification to rely upon because there was no information that had yet been filed in court.

Concerned Citizen of Maddela v. Judge Yadao, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1639, December 12, 2002:

A judge was likewise sanctioned for failing to issue a warrant of arrest where there was a clear showing of the existence of probable cause, and as a result of such failure, the accused could no longer be apprehended.

[if] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997:

The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is judicially recognized as an executive function and is made by the prosecutor.
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free a respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his guilt has been passed upon in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent officer designated for that purpose.

Crespo v. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987:

It was emphasized that the public prosecutor controls and directs the prosecution of criminal offenses, and where there is a clash of views between a judge who did not investigate and a fiscal who conducted a re-investigation, those of the prosecutor would normally prevail.

Gozos v. Tac-An, G.R. No. 123191, December 17, 1998:

Where the trial judge conducted an inquiry not only to determine the existence of probable cause, but also to determine what the charge should be and who should be charged, it was held that the judge acted beyond his authority.

Dupasquier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112089, January 24, 2001:

It was held that courts must respect the discretion of the prosecutor in his findings and determination of probable cause in preliminary investigation. When the prosecutor is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments, he is under no obligation to file the criminal information.

[ig] Mantaring v. Judge Roman, A.M. No. RTJ-94-964, February 28, 1996:

In the cases when it is the judge who himself conducts the preliminary investigation, for him to issue a warrant of arrest, the investigating judge must:

Have examined, under oath and in writing, the complainant and his witnesses;
Be satisfied that there is probable cause; and
That there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice ().

[ii] Issuance of a Search Warrant

Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court requires that the judge must personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainants and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them, and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

See Silva v. Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII, G.R. No. 81756, October 21, 1991.

[iia] United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163958, June 28, 2005:

A search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal action or the commencement of a prosecution. The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of public necessity.
It resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe proceedings.
While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an action.

[iib] People v. Mamaril, G.R. No. 147607, January 22, 2004:

Where the judge failed to conform with the essential requisites of taking the deposition in writing and attaching them to the record, it was held that a search warrant is invalid, and the fact that the objection thereto was raised only during the trial is of no moment, because the absence of such depositions was discovered only after the arrest and during the trial.

People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003:

However, the Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that the depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant.
The omission would not be fatal if there is evidence on record showing that such personal examination was conducted and what testimony was presented.

[iic] Flores v. Sumaljag, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1115, June 5, 1998:

Where the trial judge not only asked searching questions but leading questions, as well, the same was not considered improper, because the complainant and the witnesses were reticent and had to be made to explain.

[iid] Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People, G.R. No. 199032, November 14, 2014:

The Supreme Court found the existence of probable cause evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the commission of the crime, and was, in fact, part of the group who committed the offense.
Avasola, who was personally examined by Judge Peralta, testified to facts and circumstances which sufficiently show that, more likely than not, the crime of murder of six persons had been perpetrated and the human remains were in the place sought to be searched.

[c] After examination, under oath or affirmation, of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

The personal examination must not be merely routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive.
The purpose of this rule is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause.

[i] For the procedure in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, see Soliven v. Makasiar, supra.

[ii] The evidence offered by the complainant and his witnesses should be based on their own personal knowledge and not on mere information or belief.

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant or his witnesses, because the purpose is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause (Cupcupin v. People, G.R. No. 132389, November 19, 2002).
Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil. 33:

"Reliable information" was held insufficient;

Burgos v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984,

"Evidence gathered and collated by our unit" was not sufficient; and

Quintero v. NBI, G.R. No. L-35149, June 23, 1988:

NBI Agent Castro did not have personal knowledge that Quintero committed an offense, while Congressman Mate's statement was characterized by several omissions and replete with conclusions and inferences, lacking the directness and definiteness which would have been present had the statement dealt with facts which Congressman Mate actually witnessed.

Sony Music Entertainment v. Judge Espanol, G.R. No. 156804, March 14, 2005:

The Supreme Court said that absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of the search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, the issuance being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.

Mata v. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388:

It was held that mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses were not enough to sustain the issuance of a search warrant.

[iii] People v. Woolcock, G.R. No. 110658, May 22, 1995:

Where the police officers acted not merely on the information given by the Thai Royal Police, but also conducted thorough surveillance on the accused, it was held that the police officers had personal knowledge.

[iv] Columbia Pictures v. Judge Flores, G.R. No. 78631, June 29, 1993:

The Supreme Court held that the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements for the issuance of a search warrant, including the need to personally examine the applicant and the witnesses through searching questions.

People v. Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 140657, October 25, 2004:

The Supreme Court said that it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive and not merely routinary, general, peripheral or perfunctory. If the Judge fails to determine probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions before issuing a search warrant, it constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

[d] Particularity of Description

People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003:

It was held that this requirement is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to:

Readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and
Leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.

⭐ Corro v. Lising, G.R. No. L-69899, July 15, 1985:

The Court said that the evident purpose of this requirement is to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and abuses may not be committed.

A general, catch-all warrant allowed the raid and padlocking of the Philippine Times newsroom, with officers seizing broadly described publications and office materials. The Supreme Court quashed the warrant and ordered the return of the items, stressing that probable cause must rest on specific facts and that particularity exists to leave officers no discretion over what to seize.

It is also aimed at preventing violations of security of persons and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such usurpation when attempted (People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992).

[i] General Warrants

“General warrants” are proscribed and unconstitutional.
(⭐Nolasco v. Pano, G.R. No. L-69803, October 8, 1985;

A search warrant with sweeping descriptions led to the seizure of 431 items from Aguilar-Roque’s residence after month-long surveillance. The Supreme Court annulled the warrant as a proscribed general warrant for lack of particularity and searching judicial inquiry, while allowing retention of the items incident to a related arrest subject to trial-level objections.

Burgos v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984).

Tambasen v. People, G.R. No. 89103, July 14, 1995:

Where the search warrant charged violations of two special laws, it was considered a “scatter-shot warrant,” and was declared null and void.
Indeed, as held in People v. Tee, supra, what the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad and general characterization or sweeping descriptions which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense.

[ii] Warrant of Arrest

A warrant of arrest is said to particularly describe the person to be seized if it contains the name/s of the person/s to be arrested.
If the name of the person to be arrested is not known, then a “John Doe” warrant may be issued.
A “John Doe” warrant will satisfy the constitutional requirement of particularity of description if there is some descriptio personae which will enable the officer to identify the accused.

[iia] Pangandaman v. Casar, G.R. No. L-71782, April 14, 1988:

Warrants issued against “50 John Does,” none of whom the witnesses could identify, were considered as “general warrants,” and thus, void.

[iii] Search Warrant

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when:

the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law, by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or
when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Bache & Co. v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-32409, February 27, 1971).

If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence other than those articles, to prove said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence (Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111267, September 20, 1996).

[iiia] Kho v. Judge Makalintal, G.R. No. 94902-06, April 21, 1999:
However, it was held that the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrant does not necessarily make the warrant a general warrant. Citing Justice Francisco, the Supreme Court said that the “description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily precise, and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property, or its character, is a matter of concern. The description is required to be specific only in so far as circumstances will allow.” Thus, in People v. Tee, supra, “an undetermined amount of marijuana” was held to satisfy the requirement for particularity of description.

[iiib] Furthermore, a search warrant is severable.

Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 129651, October 20, 2000:

The Supreme Court said that the general description of most of the documents in the warrant — if there are others particularly described — will not invalidate the entire warrant.
Those items which are not particularly described may simply be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.
This ruling is reiterated in Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, September 13, 2004.

[iiic] Only the articles particularly described in the warrant may be seized.

People v. Salanguit, supra:

Where the warrant authorized only the seizure of shabu, and not marijuana, the seizure of the latter was held unlawful.

Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001:

The Supreme Court said that the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the warrant.

Veroy v. Layague, G.R. No. 95630, June 18, 1992:

It was held that even while the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the subject firearm is illegal per se.
Thus, inasmuch as the consent to the search was, in scope, limited to the search for NPA rebels, the confiscation of the firearm was held invalid.

[iiid] Place to be Searched.

The place to be searched should, likewise, be particularly described.
The description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community (Retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud v. People, G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014).

[iiid1] In Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 122092, May 19, 1999:

The search warrant issued to search the compound of petitioner for unlicensed firearms was held invalid for failing to describe the place with particularity, considering that the compound is made up of 200 buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers, 23 warehouses, 6 depots, and 800 miscellaneous structures, spread out over 155 hectares.

[iiid2] People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126379, June 26, 1998:

The place to be searched, as described in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the peace officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises or the evidence which they adduced in support of their application for a warrant.
Thus, where the warrant designated the place to be searched as “Abigail’s Variety Store, Apt. 1207, Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave., Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,” and the search was made at Apt. No. 1 which was immediately adjacent to the store (but an independent unit), it was held that there was an infringement of the constitutional guarantee, the clear intention of the requirement being that the search be confined to the place so described in the warrant.

Yousef Al Ghoul v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001:
Where the search warrant authorized the search of Apartment No. 2, Obinia Compound, Caloocan City, but the searching party extended the search and seizure of firearms to Apartment No. 8 in the same compound, the Supreme Court, while upholding the validity of the search of Apartment No. 2, invalidated the search done at Apartment No. 8.

[iiie] Persons to be searched.

The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to be searched, but also the persons to be searched.
People v. Tiu Won Chua, G.R. No. 149878, July 1, 2003:

The validity of the search warrant was upheld despite the mistake in the name of the persons to be searched, because the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing it.
They had personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to be searched, although they did not specifically know the names of the accused.

People v. Priscilla del Norte, G.R. No. 149462, March 29, 2004:

The situation is different.
The search warrant was issued against one Ising Gutierrez Diwa, residing at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
Arrested in the house at the address named, and eventually charged, was Priscilla del Norte, who claimed to be a resident of 376 Dama de Noche, Caloocan City, as later shown by the certification of the Barangay Chairman, a receipt evidencing rental payment for the house at Dama de Noche, and the school ID of her daughter who testified in court.
The authorities did not conduct any prior surveillance. It was only when they implemented the warrant that they coordinated with barangay officials, and one of the barangay officials informed the police officers that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla del Norte were one and the same person, but said barangay official was not presented in court. Thus, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

5. Properties Subject to Seizure (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Rules of Court):

SSU

Subject of the offense;
Stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
Property used or intended to be used as means for the commission of an offense.

[a] Burgos v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984:

It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the warrant is issued; it is sufficient that the property is within his control or possession.

6. Conduct of the Search

Sec. 7, Rule 126, Rules of Court, requires that no search of a house, room, or any of the premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family, or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, residing in the same locality. Failure to comply with this requirement invalidates the search [People v. Gesmundo, G.R. No. 89373, March 9, 1993].

[a] The police officers may use force in entering the dwelling if justified by Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

People v. Salanguit, supra.:

The occupants of the house refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times, and the agents saw suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry, as it was done on the apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they did so.

[b] People v. Benny Go, G.R. No. 144639, September 12, 2003:

But even as the police officers were armed with a Search Warrant of appellant's residence and to seize shabu, the Supreme Court declared that the manner in which the officers conducted the search was unlawful. The police officers arrived at appellant's residence and, to gain entry into the house, they "side-swiped (sinagi) a little" appellant's car which was parked outside. Jack Go, appellant's son, the only one present in the house at the time, opened the door, and the policemen at once introduced themselves, informed Jack that they had a warrant to search the premises, and promptly handcuffed Jack to a chair.

7. Warrantless Arrests [Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court]

A peace officer, or even a private person, may effect an arrest without a warrant:

When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence.
When an offense had just been committed and there is probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or of other circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed the offense.
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
When the right is voluntarily waived, then the illegality of the arrest may no longer be invoked to effect the release of the person arrested.

[a] When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence.

[i] ⭐Umil v. Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990:

The Supreme Court held that rebellion is a continuing offense. Accordingly, a rebel may be arrested at any time, with or without a warrant, as he is deemed to be in the act of committing the offense at any time of day or night. See also the Court's Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in the same case (October 3, 1991).

Amid anti-insurgency operations, alleged CPP–NPA members arrested without warrants sought habeas corpus, claiming illegal arrests and seizures. The Supreme Court denied the petitions, ruling that rebellion is a continuing offense that allows warrantless arrest (and search incident thereto) when specific facts show the arrestee’s active connection to the ongoing rebellion.

Parulan v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-28519, February 17, 1968:

However, even if kidnapping with serious illegal detention is deemed a continuing crime, it can be considered as such only when the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another [Francisco Juan Larrañaga v. Court of Appeals, supra.].

[ii] People v. Sucro, G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991:

It was held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant. The offense is deemed committed in the presence of or within the view of the officer.

[iii] Hot pursuit.

People v. Armando de Lara, G.R. No. 94953, September 5, 1994, and reiterated in People v. Recepcion, G.R. No. 141943, November 13, 2002:

The arrest of the accused inside his house following hot pursuit of the person who committed the offense in flagrante was held valid.

[iv] An arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant of arrest; it is reasonable and valid under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 [People v. Bohol, G.R. No. 171729, July 28, 2008].

[iva] A "buy-bust" operation is a valid in flagrante arrest.

The subsequent search of the person arrested and of the premises within his immediate control is valid as an incident to a lawful arrest
[People v. Hindoy, G.R. No. 132662, May 10, 2001; People v. Cunanan, G.R. No. 198024, March 16, 2015].

[ivb] People v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 113255-56, July 19, 2001:

This ruling is reiterated where the Supreme Court added that the defense of "frame-up", like alibi, is viewed with disfavor, as it can easily be concocted, and thus, in the absence of proof of any ill motive on the part of the apprehending officers, this defense will not prosper.

People v. Yong Fung Yuen, G.R. Nos. 145014-15, February 18, 2004:

The Court said that an allegation of frame-up and extortion by the police officers is a common and standard defense in most dangerous drugs cases. It is, however, viewed with disfavor, for such defenses can be easily concocted and fabricated.
To prove such defenses, the evidence must be clear and convincing.
See also People v. Chua, G.R. No. 133789, August 23, 2001; and People v. Lacap, G.R. No. 139114, October 23, 2001.

The well-entrenched principle is that the accused commits the crime of illegal sale of drugs as soon as he consummates the sale transaction, whether payment precedes or follows delivery of the drug sold [People v. Chu, G.R. No. 143793, February 17, 2004].

[ivc] People v. Rodrigueza, G.R. No. 95902, February 4, 1992:

However, the police officer, acting as poseur-buyer in a "buy-bust operation", instead of arresting the suspect and taking him into custody after the sale, returned to police headquarters and filed his report.
It was only in the evening of the same day that the police officer, without a warrant, arrested the suspect at the latter's house where dried marijuana leaves were found and confiscated.
It was held that the arrest and the seizure were unlawful.

[v] But to constitute a valid in flagrante arrest, as held in People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001, reiterated in People v. Sy Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003, in People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003, and in the more recent People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause to justify the arrest.

It is necessary that two requisites concur:

The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he had just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

This principle is reiterated in George Antiquera v. People, G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013.

[va] ⭐People v. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001:

The accused while holding a bag on board a tricycle cannot be said to be committing, attempting to commit, or to have committed a crime. It matters not that the accused responded, "Boss, if possible, we will settle this", as such response is an equivocal statement which, standing alone, will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante arrest.

Police stopped a trisikad after a tip, forced open a black bag handed between Mula and Molina, found marijuana, and arrested them without a warrant, leading to death sentences at the RTC. The Supreme Court acquitted them, holding that in flagrante delicto requires an overt act done in the officer’s presence, which was absent, so the arrest and search were illegal and the seized marijuana inadmissible.

This is reiterated in People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 136790, March 26, 2001, and People v. Conde, G.R. No. 113269, April 10, 2001.

However, in these cases, for failure of the accused to assert their constitutional right prior to arraignment, and by entering a plea of not guilty and participating actively in the trial, they were deemed to have waived their right to raise the issue of the illegality of the arrest.

[vb] People v. Sy Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003:

The apprehending officers had already prior knowledge from the very same informant (who had been telling them about the activities of the accused for two years prior to the actual arrest). Considering that the identity, address, and activities of the suspected culprit were already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting the accused-appellant and searching him.

[vi] For a successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs after a buy-bust operation, what is important is the fact that:

the poseur-buyer received the goods from the accused-appellant and
the same was presented in court as evidence.

There is no rule of law that requires that there must be simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.
There is also no rule that requires the police to use only marked money in buy-bust operations. The failure to use marked money or to present it in evidence is not material since the sale cannot be essentially disproved by the absence thereof [People v. Antinero, G.R. No. 137612, September 25, 2001].

[via] People v. Enrile, G.R. No. 79189, May 26, 1993:

However, the mere discovery of marked money on the person of the accused did not mean that he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure.

[vii] In view of the enactment of R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), as amended by R.A. 10640, it is imperative that for the successful prosecution for the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, there be compliance with Sec. 21 thereof, which prescribes the requirements of the chain of custody. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing the identity of the corpus delicti.

Section 21, as amended, provides that PDEA shall take charge and custody of all dangerous drugs, as well as instruments so confiscated, seized or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

The apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated, or his representative or counsel, with an elective public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory; provided that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure and custody over said items.
Within 24 hours from confiscation/seizure, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination.
A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results shall be issued immediately upon receipt of the subject items; provided, that when the volume of dangerous drugs does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued, and a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion of the said examination and confiscation.

[viii] People v. Garry dela Cruz, G.R. No. 205821, October 1, 2014:

The Supreme Court said that compliance with the chain of custody requirement ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects, namely:

the nature of the substances or items seized;
the quantity of the substances or items seized;
the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and
the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them.

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating or tampering of evidence in any manner.

[viiia] People v. Viterbo, G.R. No. 203434, July 23, 2014, cited in People v. Charlie Sorin, G.R. No. 212635, March 25, 2015:

The Supreme Court said that the prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.

[ix] People v. Butial, G.R. No. 192785, February 4, 2015:

Thus, where PO2 Martinez admitted that he did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets handed to him by Borlagdan after the latter's purchase of the same from the accused in the buy-bust operation, the Court held that there was failure to comply with the chain of custody requirement, and the accused must be acquitted.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial chain.
Thus, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked, because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the marking as reference. The absence of the markings creates an uncertainty, and the lack of certainty on a crucial element of the crime warrants the reversal of the judgment of conviction.

[b] When an offense had just been committed and there is probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or of other circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed the offense.

[i] Under this paragraph, two stringent requirements must be complied with, namely:

an offense had just been committed, and
the person making the arrest has probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or of other circumstances, that the person to be arrested had committed it.

Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense is committed and the time of the arrest. Where there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime.

[ii] No valid arrest.

People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999:

It was held that these requirements were not complied with. The arrest came a day after the offense was committed and thus, the offense had not been "just" committed. Furthermore, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense, since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of the identity of the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

People v. Samus, G.R. No. 135957, September 17, 2002:

The same conclusion was reached, inasmuch as the killing was not done in the presence of the arresting officer, and the incident took place eight days before the warrantless arrest.

⭐ Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992 (206 SCRA 138):

Six days after the shooting, the petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted. The police detained him because an eyewitness had positively identified him as the gunman who shot Maguan. The Court held that there was no valid arrest; it cannot be considered as within the meaning of "the offense had just been committed" inasmuch as six days had already elapsed; neither did the policemen have personal knowledge of facts that Go shot Maguan.

Rolito Go was detained six days after the Maguan shooting based only on an eyewitness identification, without a warrant. The Supreme Court reversed the CA and held the arrest invalid, ruling that “hot pursuit” demands immediacy and personal knowledge by the arresting officers, neither of which existed here.

People v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 77865, December 5, 1998:

It was held that the warrantless arrest of the accused two days after the discovery of the crime was unlawful.

People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004:

The warrantless arrest of the accused for selling marijuana two days after he escaped was held invalid.

San Agustin v. People, 432 SCRA 392:

Similarly, the warrantless arrest of the barangay chairman for illegal detention seven days after he locked up somebody was declared illegal.

[iia] People v. Cubcubin, G.R. No. 136267, October 2, 2001:

It was held that the policemen, not having "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused committed the crime, the arrest was invalid.

[iib] People v. Bansil, G.R. No. 120163, March 10, 1999:

It was held that there was no probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest considering the following circumstances:

the arresting team was only armed with the knowledge of the suspect's "attire" which the prosecution witness admitted during the trial he could not remember;
the team did not have a physical description of the suspect nor his name;
the team was not given a specific place to search, as only "a vicinity of the Muslim area in Quiapo" was given; and
the team zeroed in on the accused who were eating halo-halo, which is not a crime in itself.
The "bulging waistline," in light of prevailing circumstances, is insufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

[iii] Valid Arrest

⭐ People v. Gerente, G.R. No. 95847, March 10, 1993:

Where the policemen saw the victim dead at the hospital and when they inspected the crime scene, they found the instruments of death — and the eyewitnesses reported the happening and pointed to Gerente as one of the killers — the warrantless arrest of Gerente only three hours after the killing was held valid, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of the facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed the victim.
Further, the search of Gerente's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves were valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.

Police verified a violent killing, inspected the scene, received eyewitness identifications of Gerente, and arrested him within three hours, then found marijuana on his person during a post-arrest search. The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that this was a valid hot-pursuit arrest based on personal knowledge, and that the seizure of marijuana was a lawful search incident to arrest.

Robin Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997:

Thus, the Court held that there was a valid arrest, as there was neither supervening event nor a considerable lapse of time between the hit-and-run and the apprehension. After the policemen had stationed themselves at possible exits, they saw the fast-approaching vehicle, its plate number, and the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting officers' personal knowledge of the fact that Padilla's vehicle was the one involved in the incident.

[iiia] Joey Pestilos v. Moreno Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014:

The police officers arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged mauling; they found Atty. Generoso wounded; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible.
Petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived in the same neighborhood, and when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation, although they narrated a different version.
The police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the arrest, circumstances which were well within the police officers' observation, perception, and evaluation at the time of the arrest.

People v. Abriol, G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001:

Likewise, it was held that the warrantless arrest was valid, as it was made after the fatal shooting and pursuit of a fast-moving vehicle seeking to elude pursuing police officers, and a more than reasonable belief on the part of the police officers that the fleeing suspects aboard the motor vehicle had just engaged in criminal activity.

[iiib] Cadua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123123, August 19, 1999:

The Supreme Court, quoting Ricardo Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 2nd ed. (1994), pp. 207-208, said that it has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts" in arrests without a warrant must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
Peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace.
Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty.
This was reiterated in People v. Escordial, G.R. Nos. 138934-35, January 16, 2002, where the Supreme Court added that the reasonable suspicion must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officer making the arrest.
In Cadua, the Supreme Court held that the arrest without warrant was valid. The fact that the robbery case was never brought to trial does not mean that the legality of the arrest was tainted, for such arrest does not depend upon the indubitable existence of the crime.
The legality of apprehending the accused would not depend on the actual commission of the crime but upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such characterization it may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.

[iv] Posadas v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131492, September 29, 2000:

When the attempted arrest does not fall under any of the cases provided in Rule 113, Sec. 5, Rules of Criminal Procedure (for warrantless arrests), the NBI agents could not, regardless of their suspicion, authorize the arrest of the students without a warrant, or even effect the arrest themselves, because only the courts could decide the question of probable cause.

[c] When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

[d] When the right is voluntarily waived, then the illegality of the arrest may no longer be invoked to effect the release of the person arrested.

Appellant is estopped from questioning the illegality of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court:

by entering a plea of not guilty and
by participating in the trial.

[People v. Salvatierra, G.R. No. 104663, July 24, 1997; People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 98321, June 30, 1993; People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 104662, June 16, 1995; People v. Tidula, G.R. No. 123273, July 16, 1998; People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998].

[i] It is necessary, therefore, that the petitioner should question the validity of the arrest before he enters his plea.

Failure to do so would constitute a waiver of his right against unlawful restraint of his liberty.
[People v. Cunanan, G.R. No. 198024, March 16, 2015; People v. Cachola, G.R. Nos. 148712-15, January 21, 2004; People v. Peñaflorida, G.R. No. 130550, September 2, 1999, citing Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79543, October 16, 1996].

[ii] Note, however, that the waiver is limited to the illegal arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto, or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search.

Thus, when the arrest is incipiently illegal — even if the right to question the same is deemed waived by the accused entering his plea — it follows that the subsequent search is similarly illegal.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.
[People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 145176, March 30, 2004].

[iii] In a number of cases, the Supreme Court held that the posting of a bail bond constitutes a waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest [Callanta v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-24646, June 20, 1977; Bagcal v. Vilaraza, G.R. No. L-61770, January 31, 1983; People v. Dural, G.R. No. 84921, June 8, 1993; Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134307, December 21, 1998].

But under Sec. 26, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an application for, or admission to, bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest, provided that he raises the challenge before entering his plea.

[iv] The consequent filing of charges and the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of such detention or, at least, deny him the right to be released [Francisco Juan Larrañaga v. Court of Appeals, supra].

8. Warrantless Searches.

When the right is voluntarily waived

Searches of passengers at airports

When there is valid reason to "stop-and-frisk"
Where the search (and seizure) is an incident to a lawful arrest.
Search of Vessels and Aircraft
Inspection of Buildings and Other Premises for the Enforcement of Fire, Sanitary, and Building Regulations
Inspection of Buildings and Other Premises for the Enforcement of Fire, Sanitary, and Building Regulations
Where prohibited articles are in plain view.
Search and seizure under exigent and emergency circumstances.

[a] When the right is voluntarily waived.

For the valid waiver of a constitutional right:

it must appear first that the right exists;
secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
thirdly, that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right [De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689].

The consent must be voluntary, i.e., unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Whether consent to a search was, in fact, voluntary, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances:

the age of the defendant,
whether he was in a public or secluded location,
whether he objected to the search or passively looked on,
the education and intelligence of the defendant,
the presence of coercive police procedure,
the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found,
the nature of police questioning,
the environment in which the questioning took place, and
the possible vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.

It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was voluntarily and freely given [Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002].

[i] Some cases showing valid waiver.

⭐People v. Omaweng, G.R. No. 99050, September 2, 1992:

The accused, driving a vehicle, was stopped at a checkpoint, and when the vehicle was inspected, the soldiers asked permission to see the contents of a bag which was partially covered by a spare tire. The accused consented, and upon inspection, the bag was found to contain marijuana.

Stopped at a checkpoint, Omaweng consented to a vehicle check and to opening a bag partly hidden by a spare tire, leading to the discovery of 41 packets of marijuana. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, holding that the search was valid under the consent exception and that transporting dangerous drugs is punishable regardless of ownership.

People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September 5, 1997:

The occupants of the taxicab readily consented when the policemen sought permission to search the vehicle.

People v. Correa, G.R. No. 119246, January 30, 1998:

Where police officers, informed that the accused would deliver marijuana, followed the accused, then later accosted him and one of the policemen opened a tin can in the jeepney of the accused but the accused did not protest, the Supreme Court held that there was consent.

⭐People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 329:

The accused gave written consent for the NBI agents to search his bags.

NBI agents searched hotel bags after obtaining the accused’s written consent, finding shabu, and later searched Cuizon’s home without a warrant. The Court upheld the bag search under the consent exception (supporting Pua’s conviction) but struck down the home search as unconstitutional, acquitting Cuizon and remanding Lee’s case for further proceedings.

People v. Exala, G.R. No. 76005, April 23, 1993:

The right was deemed waived because the accused did not object to the admissibility of the evidence during the trial, and the submissive stance after the discovery of the bag and the absence of any protest which thus confirmed their acquiescence.

People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 101804, May 25, 1993:

The Supreme Court said that the evidence for the prosecution clearly disclosed that Ramos voluntarily allowed himself to be frisked, and that he gave the gun voluntarily to the police. Thus, there was deemed a valid waiver.

[ia] Searches of passengers at airports.
Sec. 9, R.A. 6235, provides:

“Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: 'Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holders refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft,' which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.”

[ia1] People v. Gatward, G.R. No. 119772, February 7, 1997:

It was held that when the accused checked in his luggage as a passenger of a plane, he agreed to the inspection of his luggage in accordance with customs laws and regulations, and thus waived any objection to a warrantless search.

People v. Susan Canton, G.R. No. 148825, December 27, 2002:

it was held that a search made pursuant to routine airport security procedure is allowed under R.A. 6235, which provides that every airline ticket shall contain a condition that hand-carried luggage, etc., shall be subject to search, and this condition shall form part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing the passenger entry into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by the appellant), and thereby depriving the security personnel of "the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society."
Thus, in this case, the strip search in the ladies' room was justified under the circumstances.

[ia2] People v. Johnson, G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000:

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of searches conducted on passengers attempting to board an aircraft whose carry-on baggage, as well as checked-in luggage, are subjected to x-ray scans, and passengers themselves are made to pass through metal detectors.
Given the minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel, these searches are reasonable.

People v. Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670, October 23, 2003:

The Supreme Court held that PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct searches for prohibited materials or substances at the airport, and to effect the arrest of those found to be carrying such prohibited materials.
To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected illegal items to enter the pre-departure area, as claimed by the appellant, is to deprive the authorities of their duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning impotence and ineffectiveness of the law enforcers, to the detriment of society.

[ii] No waiver.

⭐ People v. Barros, G.R. No. 90640, March 29, 1994:

The silence of the accused was not construed as consent; rather, it was a "demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law." In this case the warrantless search was declared invalid because there was no showing of any circumstance which constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton. Neither did the peace officers receive any information or "tip-off" from an informer; nor did they contend that they detected the odor of dried marijuana.

Police opened a closed carton on a public jeepney after the accused remained silent, found marijuana, and secured a conviction based on the seizure. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that silence is not consent, there was no probable cause or valid warrantless-search exception, and the evidence must be excluded, leading to acquittal.

Aniag v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994:

The Supreme Court said that, in the face of 14 armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano, being alone and a mere employee of the petitioner, could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search conducted on the vehicle. "Consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is not consent within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

[iia] People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003:

The Supreme Court said that acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.
In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by the allegation of appellants that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them before asking them to open the subject box. Appellant's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and thus, is considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Consequently, appellant's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.

[iia1] People v. Victor Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014:

The Court ruled that the accused did not waive his constitutional rights when he allowed the police officers to search his bags. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police officer's excessive intrusion into his private space.

[iia2] Lui v. Matillano, G.R. No. 141176, May 27, 2004:

While admittedly, Paulina Matillano failed to object to the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties, such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against the unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui had threatened and intimidated her; and her husband was out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search. Waiver by implication cannot be presumed; there must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right in order that there may be a valid waiver.

[iii] Waiver must be given by the person whose right is violated.

People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992:

PC officers sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Dagupan City, reached a house suspected to be rented by a rebel. Outside the house, they saw one Luz Tanciangco (who turned out to be a helper of the accused). The PC officers told Luz that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA, and requested that they be allowed to look around. Luz consented. Inside the house, the team found subversive materials and firearms, which Luz identified as belonging to the accused.
The Court held that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded, or one who is authorized to do so in his behalf.
Here, there was no evidence that Luz was authorized to open the house of the accused in his absence. Accordingly, the search, as well as the seizure, was declared illegal.

[iiia] Jose Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-27968, December 3, 1975:

There was deemed a valid waiver where, upon a warrantless search of a hotel room, consent and voluntary surrender of papers belonging to the registered but absent occupant was given by a woman identified as the wife of the occupant although it turned out later that she was, in fact, a "mere manicurist".

People v. Asis, G.R. No. 142531, October 15, 2002:
This ruling was not applied because at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, appellant Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being the subject of the search, he himself should have given consent. Added to this is the fact that the appellant is a deaf-mute who could not understand what was happening at the moment, there being no interpreter to assist him. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and simple confusion and ignorance.

[iv] Scope of the waiver.

Veroy v. Layague, G.R. No. 95630, June 18, 1992:

It was held that where permission to enter the residence is given to search for rebels, it is illegal to search the rooms therein and seize firearms without a search warrant.

[b] When there is valid reason to "stop-and-frisk".

"Stop and frisk" searches are necessary for law enforcement, that is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens. The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds himself.
A basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts, leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person.
This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one's basic right to security of one's persons and effects [People v. Victor Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014].

[i] Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 7, 1997:

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the search as akin to "stop-and-frisk" which, in the landmark U.S. case Terry v. Ohio, was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons whenever he observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot.
In this case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs; thus, the search.

[ii] Requisite.

People v. Sy Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 04, 2003:

The Supreme Court said that for a "stop-and-frisk" situation, the police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.
The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons or contraband concealed about him.
It should, therefore, be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for the principle to apply.

[iii] People v. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996:

Thus, the Supreme Court found justifiable reason to apply the "stop-and-frisk" rule, because of the drunken actuations of the accused and his companions, and because of the fact that his companions fled when they saw the policemen, and finally, because the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming the vicinity.

Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997:

But the rule was not applied where police officers, conducting a patrol on the strength of an information that a Muslim group would explode a grenade, saw petitioner and companions attempting to explode a grenade but who, upon seeing the policemen, desisted and ran away; then, two days later, police officers saw petitioner at a street corner, accosted him when his companions ran away, then searched him and found a grenade.
In this case, the Supreme Court said that there was no valid search because there was nothing in the behavior or conduct of the petitioner which could have elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving fast. There was no reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon.

[c] Where the search (and seizure) is an incident to a lawful arrest.

Sec. 12, Rule 126, as clarified in the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides that "a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."

[i] The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest is:

to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and
to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.

It is, therefore, a reasonable exercise of the State's police power to protect:

law enforcers from injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and
evidence from being destroyed by the person arrested [People v. Calantiao, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014].

[ii] People v. Estella, G.R. Nos. 138539-40, January 21, 2003:

The Supreme Court said that the prevailing rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found upon the latter's person —

that which was used in the commission of the crime or
was the fruit of the crime, or
which may provide the person arrested with the means of committing violence or escaping, or
which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.

The search must, however, be contemporaneous to the arrest and made within a permissible area of search.

People v. Gregg Buenaventura, G.R. No. 184807, November 23, 2011:

The Supreme Court said that in a buy-bust operation, the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized, but duty bound, to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.

[iii] Requisite.

As a rule, the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search [People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007].

[iiia] In order that a valid search may be made as an incident to a lawful arrest, it is necessary that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting the arrest which could be considered as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests enumerated in Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

People v. Montilla, G.R. No. 123872, January 30, 1998:

In this case, the officers could reasonably assume — since the informant was by their side and had so informed them and pointed out the culprit — that the drugs were in the appellant's luggage, and it would have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd, for them to adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing their quarry.

[iv] Some cases illustrating the principle.

People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 83260, April 18, 1990:

The Supreme Court said that while it may be conceded that in a "buy-bust" operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person without a search warrant, nonetheless, because the search is an incident to a lawful arrest, there is no necessity for a search warrant.

People v. Kalubiran, G.R. No. 84079, May 6, 1991:

Similarly, where the accused, arrested in a "buy-bust" operation, was frisked by the operatives who found marked money which was used to buy two sticks of marijuana cigarettes and 17 more marijuana cigarettes, the search was deemed valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.

⭐People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993:

It was held that in a "buy-bust" operation, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without a search warrant.

After a buy-bust, agents arrested Musa on the signal, seized the drug packets and marked money from his person, and confirmed the substance as a dangerous drug. The Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that the immediate seizure of marked bills after a lawful buy-bust arrest is a valid search incident to arrest, requiring no warrant.

People v. Zapanta, G.R. No. 90853, March 13, 1991:

However, where, as an incident to a "buy-bust" entrapment operation, a raid of the house of the accused was conducted and one marijuana stick was found under the mat, the Supreme Court said that apart from the uncertainty among the witnesses as to how many marijuana cigarettes, if any, were found in Zapanta's possession during the raid, the search was made without a warrant; therefore, the marijuana cigarettes seized in the raid were inadmissible in evidence.

People v. Luisito Go, G.R. No. 116001, March 14, 2001:

Where the police saw a gun, plainly visible, tucked in appellant's waist, and appellant could not show any license for the firearm, the warrantless arrest was held valid, and consequently, the discovery of drug paraphernalia and shabu in appellant's car, as well as the seizure of the same, was justified.

[iva] People v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, April 13, 1998:

However, the Court invalidated the search and seizure made on a woman, "Aling Rose", who, upon alighting from a bus, was pointed out by the informant.
The Supreme Court declared that in a search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest, it is necessary for probable cause to be present, and probable cause must be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In this case, the accused was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner which would engender a reasonable ground to believe that she was committing or about to commit a crime.

[Note that in this case, there was the additional fact that the identity of the accused had been priorly ascertained and the police officers had reasonable time within which to obtain a search warrant. The presence of this circumstance distinguishes this case from People v. Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991.]

[v] Cases where search was declared valid without necessarily being preceded by an arrest.

People v. Sucro, G.R. No. 93239, March 18, 1991:

The Supreme Court held that a warrantless search and seizure can be made without necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided that the said search is effected on the basis of probable cause.

People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 127801, March 3, 1999:

The arrest of the accused and the subsequent search and seizure of the marijuana by SPO1 Mariano was held valid on the basis of probable cause.
Mariano had probable cause to stop and search the buses coming from Banaue in view of the information he got from the "civilian asset" that somebody having the same appearance as the accused and with a green bag would be transporting marijuana.

Posadas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89139, April 6, 1990:

The Court upheld the validity of a search made by police officers on one who, confronted by the police because "he was acting suspiciously", ran away.

People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 79965, May 25, 1994:

Although, the arrest and consequent search of the accused, simply because "he was acting suspiciously" was held invalid.

⭐ People v. Tangliben, G.R. No. 63630, April 6, 1990:

Where two policemen on surveillance, after receiving a tip from an informer, noticed a person carrying a red bag acting suspiciously, then confronted the person and found inside the bag marijuana leaves, the Supreme Court held that the seizure was valid, as "an incident to a lawful arrest".
The Court said that the matter presented urgency; when the informer pointed to the accused as the one who was carrying marijuana, the police officers, faced with such on-the-spot information, had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant.

People v. Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991:

Where soldiers manning a checkpoint [set up because of persistent reports that vehicles were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs] noticed a bulge on the accused's waist, and the pouch bag was found to contain hashish, the search was deemed valid as an incident to a lawful arrest [as the accused was then transporting prohibited drugs] — and there was sufficient probable cause for the said officers to believe that the accused was then and there committing a crime.

[va] People v. Chua Ho San, G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999:

However, the Supreme Court said that while a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected for dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede a search.
The process cannot be reversed.
In this case, there was no valid arrest that could justify the search, because none of the tell-tale clues — e.g.,

a bag or package emanating the odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug [People v. Claudio, G.R. No. L-72564, April 15, 1988; People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September 5, 1997], or a
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of couriers of prohibited drugs and/or the time and place where they will transport the same [People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991], or
suspicious demeanor or behavior [People v. Tangliben, G.R. No. 63630, April 6, 1990], or a
suspicious bulge in the waist [People v. Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991] — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest.

There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao Beach bearing prohibited drugs on the date in question.
The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing vessels in the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.

[vi] Permissible area of search.

The warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control [People v. Hindoy, G.R. No. 132662, May 10, 2002].

People v. Cuenco, G.R. No. 128277, November 16, 1998:

Thus, where the accused was arrested in a "buy-bust" operation while standing by the door of the store which was part of the house, it was proper for the police officers to search the house of the accused, the same being in the area within his immediate control.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Barron, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1420, October 8, 1998:

Where the judge was caught in flagrante as he was placing the bundles of money under the driver's seat of his car, and the money was seized by the NBI agents, it was held that there was no need for a warrant to seize the fruits of the offense, the seizure being incidental to a lawful arrest.

People v. Catan, G.R. No. 92928, January 21, 1992:

The same rule was applied where a "buy-bust operation" was made at the house of the accused, and immediately after the purchase, the accused was arrested and a search made of the premises.

[via] Espano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120431, April 1, 1998:

Where the accused was frisked and arrested in the street for possession of two cellophane bags of marijuana, and when asked if he had more answered that he had more marijuana at his house, the search conducted by the police officers in the house and the consequent seizure of ten cellophane bags of marijuana was held invalid, because the house was no longer within the reach and control of the accused.

People v. Che Chun Ting, G.R. No. 130568, March 31, 2000:

Likewise, where the accused was outside the apartment unit and in the act of delivering to the poseur-buyer the bag of shabu — and the apartment unit was not even his residence but that of his girlfriend — the inside of the apartment unit was no longer a permissible area of search, as it could not be said to be within his reach and immediate control. The warrantless search therein was, therefore, unlawful.

People v. Cubcubini, G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001:

It was held that, since neither the T-shirt nor the gun seized was within the area of immediate control of the accused, the same could not have been validly seized as an incident to a lawful arrest.

[vii] Seizure of allegedly pornographic materials.

P.D. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials involved in the violation of Art. 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused was acquitted. [Fredrik Nogales v. People, G.R. No. 191080, November 21, 2011].

[viia] Pita v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989:

But, it was held that the respondents had not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the magazines they were not possessed of a lawful court order

finding the materials to be pornographic, and
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure.

To justify a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must be on account of a crime having been committed.
Here, no party has been charged, neither is any charge being pressed against any party.
The Supreme Court outlined the procedure to be followed, thus:

a criminal charge must be brought against the person/s for purveying the pornographic materials;
an application for a search and seizure warrant obtained from the judge (who shall determine the existence of probable cause before issuing such warrant);
the materials confiscated brought to court in the prosecution of the accused for the crime charged;
the court will determine whether the confiscated items are really pornographic, and the judgment of acquittal or conviction rendered by the court accordingly.

[d] Search of Vessels and Aircraft

[i] People v. Belen Macarios, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010:

A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house, or other immobile structure.
But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, or an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles, since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.

[ii] Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336:

A fishing vessel found to be violating fishery laws may be seized without a warrant on two grounds:

firstly, because they are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuit; and
secondly, because the seizure would be an incident to a lawful arrest.

Hizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119619, December 13, 1996:

Thus, the Court upheld the warrantless search of a fishing boat made by the police on the strength of a report submitted by Task Force Bantay Dagat.

[iii] People v. Aminnudin, G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1988:

Where the accused was searched and arrested upon disembarkation from a passenger vessel, the Court held that there was no urgency to effect a warrantless search, as it is clear that the Philippine Constabulary had at least two days (from the time they received the tip until the arrival of the vessel) within which they could have obtained a warrant to search and arrest the accused. Yet, they did nothing; no effort was made to comply with the law.

People v. Encinada, G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997:

A similar ruling was made when a search and seizure was made of a passenger who disembarked from M/V Sweet Pearl. The Court noted that since the informer's tip was received at 4:00 p.m. on the day before the arrival of the vessel, the authorities had ample time to obtain a search warrant. The Tangliben ruling cannot apply because the evidence did not show that the accused was acting suspiciously when he disembarked from the vessel.

[iiia] People v. Saycon, G.R. No. 110995, September 5, 1994:

The situation is different, because the NARCOM agents received the "tip" in the early morning of July 8, 1992, and the boat on which the accused boarded was due to arrive at 6:00 a.m. on the same day.
Furthermore, there was probable cause consisting of two parts:

firstly, the agents conducted a "buy-bust" operation; and
secondly, they received confidential information that the boat was due to leave soon.

[iiib] People v. Ayangao, G.R. No. 142356, April 14, 2004:

Similarly, the informant arrived at the police station at 5:00 a.m. on August 13, 1999, and informed the officers that the appellant would be arriving at 6:00 a.m. that day. The circumstances clearly called for an immediate response from the officers.

[e] Search of Moving Vehicles

A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be moved quickly out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
Searches without warrant of automobiles are also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided that such searches are made at borders or "constructive borders," like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.

[i] One such form of search is the "stop and search" without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, which has been declared not to be illegal per se so long as it is required by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists [Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989].

[ii] A checkpoint search may either be a mere routine inspection, or it may involve an extensive search.

For a mere routine inspection, the search is normally permissible when it is limited to a mere visual search, where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search.
On the other hand, when the vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, it would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched [Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002; People v. Libnao, G.R. No. 136860, January 20, 2003].

[iia] Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002:

The petitioner's vehicle was flagged down because the police officers on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute probable cause as would justify the search without a warrant.

[iib] People v. Libnao, G.R. No. 136860, January 20, 2003:

On the other hand, it was held that the warrantless search was not bereft of probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operations for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused transport drugs in big bulks.
At 10 p.m. of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two would be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. The two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellant's bag was not illegal.

[iic] People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004:

When the appellants sped away after noticing the checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they passed to one another, the reply of Vinecario that he was a member of the Philippine Army (apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with the inspection), and the smell of marijuana that emanated from the package wrapped in paper — all these showed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the appellants were offenders of the law and the contents of the backpack were instruments used in, or subject of, the offense.

[iii] Some Cases:

People v. Balingan, G.R. No. 105834, February 13, 1995:

The search of the luggage of a passenger in a bus after the officers had tailed the bus for 15 to 20 minutes was held valid because of a tip received by the officers.

People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991:

This reiterates the ruling, where the Court gave approval to a warrantless search done on a taxicab which eventually yielded shabu because of a confidential report made by an informer.

Mustang Lumber v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, June 18, 1996:

The Supreme Court declared that the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the rule that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge.
The rationale for this exception, as explained by the Court in Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125959, February 1, 1999, and reiterated in People v. Mariacos, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010, is that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things, and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.
It is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. In this case, the ruling in Aminnudin was held not applicable, because the police authorities had already identified the shabu dealer, and even if they did not know the time he would show up in the vicinity and were uncertain what type of vehicle he would use, there was probable cause inasmuch as the same police officers had a previous encounter with the petitioner who was then able to evade arrest.

[iiia] Bagalihog v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 96356, June 27, 1991:

However, where respondent Roxas confiscated and impounded petitioner's motorcycle which was believed one of the vehicles used by the killers of Rep. Moises Espinosa, the Supreme Court ruled that the confiscation, without warrant, was unlawful.
The constitutional provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
The necessity for the immediate seizure of the motorcycle had not been established; neither can the vehicle be detained on the ground that it is a prohibited article.
In Valmonte, the rationale for allowing the "checkpoints" was to enable the NCRRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. After all, as held in the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, the inspection is limited to a visual search, and neither the vehicle nor the occupants are subjected to a search.

[f] Inspection of Buildings and Other Premises for the Enforcement of Fire, Sanitary, and Building Regulations

This is basically an exercise of the police power of the State, and would not require a search warrant.
This refers to a routine inspection which, however, must be conducted during reasonable hours.

[g] Where prohibited articles are in plain view.

Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes upon an incriminating object [People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993, reiterated in Elenita Fajardo v. People, G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011].

[i] Requisites

People v. Musa, supra, reiterated in People v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120515, April 13, 1998; People v. Doria, G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999; and in People v. Sarap, G.R. No. 132165, March 26, 2003, the Supreme Court enumerated the elements of a valid seizure based on the "plain view" doctrine, as follows:

A prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are;
The evidence must be immediately apparent; and
"Plain view" justified the seizure of the evidence without any further search.

[ia] People v. Figueroa, G.R. No. 97143, June 27, 1991:

Thus, where, while serving a warrant of arrest, police officers searched the house and found a pistol, a magazine, and seven rounds of ammunition, the seizure of the firearm and ammunition was held lawful, because the objects seized were in plain view of the officer who had the right to be in the place where he was.

People v. Macalaba, G.R. Nos. 146284-86, January 20, 2003:

The evidence clearly shows that on the basis of intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle was driven by Abdul, who was also a suspect in drug pushing, the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for the carnapped car.
They spotted the suspected carnapped car which was indeed driven by Abdul. While Abdul was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the registration papers of the car, the CIDG agents saw four transparent sachets of shabu. These sachets of shabu were, therefore, in "plain view" of the law enforcers.

[ii] An object is in "plain view" if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight.

Where the object seized is inside a closed package, the object is not in plain view and, therefore, cannot be seized without a warrant.

Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15, 2002:

However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.

People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007:

If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains prohibited articles, then the article is deemed in plain view.

[iii] People v. Salanguit, G.R. Nos. 133254-55, April 19, 2001:

The peace officers entered the dwelling armed with a search warrant for the seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia.
In the course of the search, they (presumably) found the shabu first, and then came upon an article wrapped in newspaper which turned out to be marijuana.
On the issue of whether the marijuana may be validly seized, the Supreme Court said once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view" doctrine can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. (Note that the marijuana was wrapped in newspaper which was not transparent.)

[iiia] in Musa, the Supreme Court said that the "plain view" doctrine may not be used:

to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures, nor
to extend to a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt.

People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000:

Thus, it was held that although the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot, they were not apparent. A police team had to be dispatched to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. Accordingly, the plain view doctrine could not be validly invoked to justify the seizure.

People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2000:

Noting that the police authorities had ample time to secure a warrant, the seizure of the marijuana plants and the consequent arrest were held to be tainted with constitutional infirmity. The implied acquiescence of the appellant could not have been more than passive conformity given under intimidating circumstances.

People v. Compacion, G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001:

Where the peace officers had to enter the dwelling of the appellant in order to get to the backyard where they seized two marijuana plants, the Supreme Court said that the "plain view" doctrine cannot be invoked to justify the seizure. The four requisites enumerated in Musa had to be satisfied.

[iv] The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant.

It merely serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused.
It is recognition of the fact that when executing police officers come across immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating or evidence of some other crime.
It would be needless to require the police to obtain another warrant [United Laboratories v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005].

[iva] The "immediately apparent" test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence.

It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between the viewed object and criminal activity.
[United Laboratories v. Isip, supra].

[v] People v. Huang Zhan Hua, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004:

Police officers, in implementing a warrant which authorized the search of the residence of the accused for methamphetamine hydrochloride, also seized credit cards, a passbook, a passport, photographs, and other documents and papers.
On the contention of the accused that the seizure of such items was illegal, the Supreme Court ruled that the seizure was legal because the articles were in plain view.
Their seizure was authorized because of their close connection to the crime charged.
The passport would show when and how often the accused had been in and out of the country; her credit cards and passbook would show how much money she had amassed and how she acquired them; the pictures would show her relationship to the co-accused.

[vi] The doctrine allows the seizure of personalty even without a warrant as long as the area of search is within the immediate control of the arrested person and the object of the seizure is open to the eye [People v. de Guzman, G.R. Nos. 117952-53, February 14, 2001].

[h] Search and seizure under exigent and emergency circumstances.

People v. de Gracia, G.R. No. 102009, July 6, 1994:

The raid of, and the consequent seizure of firearms and ammunition in, the Eurocar Sales Office at the height of the December 1989 coup d'etat was held valid, considering the exigent and emergency situation obtaining.
The military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed, and they had no opportunity to apply for a search warrant from the courts because the latter were closed. Under such circumstances of urgency and exigency, a search warrant could be validly dispensed with.

[i] ⭐Guanzon v. de Villa, G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990:

The Supreme Court upheld, as a valid exercise of the military powers of the President, the conduct of "areal target zoning" or "saturation drives."

[NOTE: In this case, the validity of the search was not directly questioned; raised in issue were the alleged abuses committed by the military personnel who conducted the "saturation drives." In the absence of complainants and complaints against specific actors, no prohibition could be issued. However, the Court temporarily restrained the alleged banging of walls, kicking of doors, herding of half-naked men for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences, even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to the conscience. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for reception of evidence on the alleged abuses.]

Citizens challenged military saturation drives, citing door-kicking, forced herding, and home intrusions, while the AFP defended them as public-safety operations. The Supreme Court refused a blanket ban, upheld the practice in principle under military/police powers, but temporarily restrained abusive acts and remanded for evidence on specific violations.

9. Exclusionary Rule.

Evidence obtained in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding [Sec. 3(2), Art. III], because it is "the fruit of the poisoned tree."

[a] Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89393, January 25, 1991:

Objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby are deemed waived when not raised during the trial.

People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 110829, April 18, 1997:
Because of the failure of the accused to object to the admissibility of evidence obtained through an unlawful arrest and search, it was held that the accused were deemed to have waived their right, and the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence presented.

[b] People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 99355, August 11, 1997:

However, even if the accused were illegally arrested, such arrest does not invest eyewitness accounts with constitutional infirmity as "fruits of the poisonous tree"; thus, where the conviction could be secured on the strength of testimonial evidence given in open court, the illegality of the arrest cannot be invoked to reverse the conviction.

[c] Alih v. Castro, supra; Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-71410, November 25, 1986:

It does not necessarily follow that the property illegally seized will be returned immediately; it could remain in custodia legis.

People v. Estrada, G.R. No. 124461, June 26, 2000:

Thus, even as the search warrant was declared illegal and the medicines or drugs seized were shown to be genuine, their return was not ordered because the producer, manufacturer, or seller did not have any permit or license to sell the same.

Tambasen v. People, supra:

But the money which was not indicated in the warrant, and thus, illegally seized, was ordered returned.

For the retention of the money, the approval of the Court which issued the warrant is necessary [People v. Gesmundo, supra]; in like manner, only the Court which issued the warrant may order its release.

[d] Pita v. Court of Appeals, supra:

Because the magazines subject of the search and seizure had already been destroyed, the Court declined to grant affirmative relief.

[e] The property illegally seized may be used in evidence in the case filed against the officer/s responsible for the illegal seizure.

E. Privacy of Communications and Correspondence

Sec. 3, Art. III:
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence

shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court,

or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section

shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

1. Inviolability. Exceptions:

Lawful order of the court; or
Where public safety or order requires otherwise, as may be provided by law.

2. The guarantee includes within the mantle of its protection tangible, as well as intangible, objects.

Read R.A. 4200 [Anti-Wire-Tapping Act].

[a] Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995:

It was held that R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communications by means of a tape recorder. The law does not make any distinction.

Socorro D. Ramirez secretly recorded her heated conversation with Ester S. Garcia and used the transcript to support her civil claim for damages, but Garcia countered by charging her under the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The Supreme Court held that even a participant in a conversation commits a violation if they record it without the other party’s consent, since R.A. 4200 “makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication.” The law requires the consent of all participants before recording a private communication.

Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-69809, October 16, 1986:

It was held that a telephone extension was not among the devices covered by this law.

Atty. Gaanan listened to a settlement call between Atty. Pintor and Atty. Laconico using an extension telephone, after which he executed an affidavit confirming Pintor’s monetary demands, leading Pintor to charge him with violating the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The Supreme Court ruled that merely listening through an extension telephone does not violate R.A. 4200 since it is not among the prohibited “devices or arrangements,” holding that “the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable, must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature.”

3. The right may be invoked against the wife

Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996:

The right may be invoked against the wife who went to the clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting of private communications between her husband and his alleged paramour.

Cecilia Zulueta forcibly entered her husband Dr. Alfredo Martin’s clinic and took private documents to use as evidence in a legal separation case, but the trial court and Court of Appeals ordered her to return the papers and barred their use. The Supreme Court upheld the rulings, declaring the documents inadmissible because the constitutional right to privacy of communication is inviolable, stressing that “the intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other.”

4. Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures made by private individuals.

Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997:

However, the Supreme Court said that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures made by private individuals.
In this case, an officer of the petitioner corporation opened an envelope addressed to the private respondent and found therein a check evidencing an overprice in the purchase of medicine. Despite the lack of consent on the part of the private respondent, the check was deemed admissible in evidence.

Waterous Drug Corporation dismissed pharmacist Antonia Melodia Catolico for alleged dishonesty after she supposedly pocketed a refund check from a supplier, but the evidence consisted only of a disputed check and hearsay reports. The Supreme Court ruled the dismissal illegal because it was based on mere suspicion without substantial evidence, affirming her monetary awards while clarifying that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches applies only to government action, not to private acts.

5. Exclusionary Rule.

[a] In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382:

Letters addressed by a lawyer (of one of the parties to a case) to individual Justices of the Supreme Court in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court — and thus, are not covered by the constitutional guarantee.

Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, after losing her petition before the Supreme Court regarding the estate of Digna Maravilla, sent accusatory letters to individual Justices alleging corruption and undue influence, and later filed a complaint before the Tanodbayan; she claimed these letters were private communications protected by the constitutional right to privacy. The Court rejected this claim, ruling that letters to Justices about their judicial functions form part of the judicial record and are not protected by the right to privacy, and found her and her counsel guilty of contempt and misconduct for undermining the Court’s integrity.

People v. Albofera, G.R. No. L-69377, July 20, 1987:

A letter written by the accused to a witness which was produced by the witness during the trial is admissible in evidence; it was not the result of an unlawful search, nor through an unwarranted intrusion or invasion into the privacy of the accused.
It was produced by the recipient of the letter who identified the same.
Besides, there is nothing self-incriminatory in the letter.

Alexander Albofera and Romeo Lawi-an were convicted of murdering Forester Teodoro Carancio, who was abducted, tied, and killed due to resentment over his strict enforcement of forestry laws, with guilt proven through circumstantial evidence and witness testimony. The Supreme Court ruled Albofera’s confession inadmissible for lack of counsel but upheld the admissibility of his letter to a witness, clarifying that the constitutional right to privacy was not violated since the letter was voluntarily sent and produced by its recipient, and ultimately affirmed their conviction for murder but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

F. Freedom of Expression

Sec. 4, Art. III:
No law shall be passed abridging

the freedom of speech, of expression or of the press,

or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and

petition the government for redress of grievances.

1. Scope.

Any and all modes of expression are embraced in the guaranty.
Reinforced by Sec. 18 (1), Art. III.

2. Aspects:

Freedom from censorship or prior restraint.
Freedom from subsequent punishment.

[a] Freedom from censorship or prior restraint.

[i] There need not be total suppression; even restriction of circulation constitutes censorship [Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233].

In 1934, Louisiana enacted a 2% gross receipts tax on advertising in newspapers with a circulation over 20,000 copies per week, affecting only thirteen papers, and the publishers sued, claiming it was an unconstitutional attempt to suppress critical voices. The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the tax, holding that it was a deliberate device to penalize and limit the circulation of certain newspapers, violating the freedom of the press guaranteed against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.

⭐ Burgos v. Chief of Staff, supra.:

The search, padlocking and sealing of the offices of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum by military authorities, resulting in the discontinuance of publication of the newspapers, was held to be prior restraint.

Two search warrants were issued against the offices of the We Forum and Metropolitan Mail newspapers, leading to the seizure of printing equipment, documents, and vehicles based on allegations of subversion, which effectively shut down the publications. The Supreme Court declared the warrants null and void for lack of probable cause and for being general warrants, holding that they violated constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and amounted to prior restraint on press freedom.

See also: Corro v. Lising, supra.

The RTC issued a search warrant authorizing the seizure of various publications, documents, and equipment from the Philippine Times office for alleged inciting to sedition, but the warrant’s description of items was broad enough to cover virtually all records and machines regardless of their connection to the offense.The Supreme Court voided the warrant for lack of probable cause and particularity, ruling that the closure was an unconstitutional prior restraint that violated freedom of the press and the constitutional protection of privacy in communication.

Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985:

The arbitrary closure of radio station DYRE was held violative of the freedom of expression.

In October 1980, the government summarily closed radio station DYRE in Cebu for allegedly inciting sedition through its public affairs programming, doing so without prior notice, hearing, or evidence, which the station challenged as a violation of due process and press freedom. The Supreme Court ruled the closure unconstitutional, affirming that broadcast media enjoy constitutional protection under the freedom of expression clause and may only be restrained upon a clear showing of a present danger of a substantive evil, established through due process.

Mutuc v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32717, November 26, 1970:

The COMELEC prohibition against the use of taped jingles in the mobile units used in the campaign was held to be unconstitutional, as it was in the nature of censorship.

COMELEC prohibited Constitutional Convention candidate Amelito R. Mutuc from using taped political jingles in his campaign, claiming they were prohibited propaganda materials under the Constitutional Convention Act, prompting him to challenge the order as a violation of his right to free speech. The Supreme Court ruled in his favor, holding that COMELEC had no legal basis for the ban and that prohibiting taped jingles constituted unconstitutional censorship and prior restraint on political expression, which is entitled to the highest protection during elections.

Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 90878, January 29, 1990:

The Court annulled the COMELEC prohibition against radio commentators or newspaper columnists from commenting on the issues involved in the scheduled plebiscite on the organic law creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region as an unconstitutional restraint on freedom of expression.

In the 1990 Cordillera plebiscite, COMELEC barred media columnists and broadcasters from using their regular platforms to campaign for or against the Organic Act, prompting columnist Pablito V. Sanidad to challenge the rule as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court struck down the prohibition, holding that it had no legal basis in a plebiscite where there are no candidates and that it unjustifiably restricted the public’s access to a full and open discussion of issues, thereby violating the constitutional guarantee of press freedom.

[ia] ⭐Chavez v. Secretary Gonzalez, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008:

The Supreme Court held that acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission in warning television stations against playing the “Garci tapes” under pain of revocation of their licenses were content-based restrictions, and should be subjected to the “clear and present danger test.”
They focused only on one subject — a specific content — the alleged taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC official; they did not merely provide regulations as to time, place, or manner of dissemination. Respondents’ evidence fell short of satisfying the clear and present danger test.

DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales and the NTC publicly warned media outlets that airing the alleged “Hello Garci” wiretapped conversations could lead to prosecution or loss of broadcast licenses. Francisco Chavez challenged these warnings as unconstitutional restraints on press freedom. The Supreme Court struck down the warnings as content-based prior restraints that failed the clear and present danger test, ruling they created a chilling effect on the media without proof of any imminent and substantive harm to national security.

Aspect	Content‑Based Regulation	Content‑Neutral Regulation
Definition	Restricts speech because of the message, idea, subject matter, or viewpoint expressed.	Regulates the time, place, or manner of speech without regard to its content or viewpoint.
Focus	Government must examine what is being said to decide if it’s allowed.	Government regulates how, when, or where speech occurs, regardless of the message.
Test Applied	Strict scrutiny — must show: (1) a compelling state interest, and (2) the regulation is narrowly tailored using the least restrictive means.	Intermediate scrutiny — must show: (1) an important/substantial interest, (2) interest is unrelated to suppression of expression, and (3) restriction is no greater than essential.
Presumption	Unconstitutional unless it passes strict scrutiny.	Generally valid if it meets the intermediate scrutiny test.
Burden of Proof	On the government to justify the restriction with compelling reasons.	On the government to justify the restriction with substantial, content‑neutral reasons.
Key Rationale	Targets the content of the speech; risk of censorship is high, so protection is strongest.	Focuses on conditions of speech; regulation allowed if it avoids overbreadth and undue burden.

[ib] ⭐ Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015:

It was asserted by COMELEC that the order for the removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation, while petitioners argued that it is content-based because it applies only to political speech and not to other forms of speech such as commercial speech.
The Supreme Court said that the regulation may be reasonably considered as either content-neutral or content-based; regardless, the disposition of the case will be the same.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and the Court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. x x x Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.” Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality. x x x Here, there is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of freedom of expression. x x x We reiterate that the regulation involved is content-based.

If the test for content-neutral regulation is applied, the questioned acts of COMELEC will not pass the requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech, as enumerated in Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, discussed below. x x x The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations.

The message of petitioner (contained in the tarpaulin), taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of the Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily, even almost incidentally, will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation should be:

provided by law;
reasonable;
narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression; and
demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.

The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message.

In 2013, the Diocese of Bacolod displayed large tarpaulins on church property labeling senatorial and party-list candidates as “Team Buhay” or “Team Patay” based on their stance on the RH Law, prompting COMELEC to order their removal for exceeding size limits under election propaganda rules. The Supreme Court struck down COMELEC’s order, ruling that its regulatory authority does not extend to independent political expression by non-candidates, and that the tarpaulins were protected speech whose suppression constituted unconstitutional prior restraint.

[ic] Jose Jesus Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR. No. 203335, February 18, 2014:

The Supreme Court invalidated Section 4[c](3) of R.A. 10175 (Cybercrime Law) which penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic communications which x x x seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services, etc.
Ruling that the section is unconstitutional, the Court said that:

the government has presented no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the “efficiency of computers”;
people, before the arrival of computers, have already been receiving unsolicited ads by mail; these have never been outlawed; and the recipient has always had the option to delete or not to read them; and
to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads; and the State cannot rob him of this right without violating his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

In the same case, even as the Supreme Court ruled as valid and constitutional Section 4[c](4) which penalizes online libel with respect to the original author of the post; it declared as void and unconstitutional the same provision as applied to others who simply receive the post and react to it.
In the same case, the Court also invalidated Section 5, which would punish the act of aiding and abetting the commission of cybercrimes in Section 4[c](4) on Libel, in Section 4[c](3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and in Section 4[c](2) on Child Pornography. The Court said that the provision cannot stand scrutiny. Its vagueness raises apprehensions on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on freedom of expression, especially since the crime of “aiding and abetting” ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, formal crimes like libel are not punishable unless consummated.
But the crime of “aiding and abetting” the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 is not constitutionally infirm and it can be made to apply to:

Section 4 on Illegal Access,
Section 4 on Illegal Interference,
Section 4 on Data Interference,
Section 4 on Misuse of Devices,
Section 4 on Cyber-squatting,
Section 4 on Computer-related Forgery,
Section 4 on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4 on Computer-related Theft, and
Section 4 on Cybersex.

None of these offenses borders on the exercise of freedom of expression. Furthermore, in these cases, the actors aiding and abetting can be identified with reasonable certainty through adroit tracking of their works.
In the same case, the Supreme Court said that the authority that Section 12 grants law enforcement agencies in the “real time collection of Traffic Data” is too sweeping and lacks restraint. Nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies, with these data in their hands, from looking into the identity of the sender, or receiver, or what the data contain. x x x The limitation “associated with specified communications” is no limitation at all since it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement agencies to engage in “fishing expeditions,” threatening the right of individuals to privacy.

Various petitioners, including journalists and media groups, challenged provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act that criminalized online libel and penalized those who aided or abetted it, arguing these were vague, overbroad, and would chill legitimate press and public discourse. The Supreme Court upheld cyberlibel only against the original author but struck down the aiding-or-abetting provision for cyberlibel as unconstitutional prior restraint, finding it vague, overbroad, and a threat to freedom of expression and of the press.

[ii] Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969:

The Court upheld the validity of the law which prohibited, except during the prescribed election period, the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office.

In 1967, petitioners Arsenio Gonzales and Felicisimo Cabigao challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4880, which prohibited the early nomination of candidates and limited the period for election campaigns or partisan political activities, arguing that these restrictions infringed on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. The Supreme Court, while divided on some provisions, ultimately upheld the validity of this prohibition as a legitimate exercise of Congress’ power to regulate elections in order to curb the harmful effects of prolonged campaigning, finding it consistent with the Constitution despite its impact on press freedom.

National Press Club v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992:

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Sec. 11(b), R.A. 6646, which prohibited any person making use of the media to sell or to give free of charge print space or airtime for campaign or other political purposes except to the COMELEC.
This was held to be within the constitutional power of the COMELEC to supervise the enjoyment or utilization of franchises for the operation of media of communication and information, for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space and the "right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities.

In 1992, various media organizations, broadcasters, candidates, and voters challenged Section 11(b) of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibited newspapers, radio, and television from selling or giving print space or airtime for campaign purposes—except through COMELEC’s allocated “Comelec space” and “Comelec time”—arguing that it violated freedom of speech and of the press. The Supreme Court upheld the law as a valid constitutional regulation during the election period to ensure equal opportunity among candidates, ruling that it reasonably limited only paid political advertisements while leaving intact the media’s freedom to report, comment, and cover election-related matters.

Osmeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998:

This ruling was re-examined, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of Sec. 11(b) of R.A. 6646, as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State to regulate media of communication and information for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns.
The regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech, as any restriction on freedom of expression occasioned thereby is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting equality.
Consistent with this policy are Secs. 90 and 92, B.P. 881, on the right of the COMELEC to procure newspaper space and broadcast time to be allocated equally among the candidates.
Osmeña v. COMELEC does not violate the principle laid down in Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995, because in the latter, the Supreme Court simply said that COMELEC cannot procure print space without paying just compensation therefor.

In 1998, presidential candidate Emilio Osmeña and Cebu governor Pablo Garcia sought to strike down Section 11(b) of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which bars mass media from selling or giving print space or airtime for political ads except through COMELEC‑procured “Comelec space” and “Comelec time,” claiming it violated freedom of speech and of the press. The Supreme Court upheld the law as a valid, content‑neutral regulation intended to ensure equal media access among candidates, ruling that it reasonably promotes fair and credible elections without suppressing press freedom.

[iii] Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998:

In the same vein, the Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 92, B.P. 881, is constitutional, even as it provides that airtime may be procured by the COMELEC free of charge, the same being an exercise of the plenary police power of the State to promote the general welfare.
The Court brushed aside the arguments of petitioners, in this wise:

All broadcasting, whether by radio or television, is licensed by the Government, and the franchise issued to a broadcast station is always subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good requires, and there is no better measure for the common good than one for free airtime for the benefit not only of the candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be informed of the issues in an election, for after all, it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not of the broadcasters, that is paramount;
The COMELEC does not take over the operation of radio and television stations, but only the allocation of airtime to the candidates, to ensure equal opportunity, time and the right to reply, as mandated by the Constitution; and
There are substantial distinctions in the characteristics of the broadcast media from those of the print media which justify the different treatment accorded to each for purposes of free speech, viz: the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the uniquely pervasive presence of the broadcast media in the lives of all Filipinos, and the earlier ruling that the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser than the freedom accorded to the print media.

The Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. and GMA Network challenged Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code, which requires radio and television stations to provide COMELEC with free airtime during the campaign period for allocation to candidates, claiming it was an unconstitutional taking of property, denied equal protection, and exceeded COMELEC’s regulatory powers. The Supreme Court upheld the law as a valid condition attached to broadcast franchises, ruling that the requirement served the common good by ensuring equal media access for candidates and protecting the public’s right to information, and that broadcast media—unlike print—operate under government-allocated frequencies and may be subject to such reasonable regulation in the interest of fair elections and press freedom.

[iv] GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014:

However, the Supreme Court held that when the COMELEC drastically reduced the airtime within which national candidates and political parties in the 2013 elections may air political advertisements on television and radio to an "aggregate" of 120 minutes and 180 minutes, respectively, the COMELEC unduly restricted and constrained the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
The adverted reason for imposing the "aggregate-based" airtime limits — leveling the playing field — does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And this is especially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
But Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry. The legal duty of monitoring compliance with the Resolution lies with the COMELEC. Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain documents to aid the COMELEC in ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in excess of allowed limits. Thus, the reporting requirement for the COMELEC's monitoring is reasonable.
The Resolution also provides that, for purposes of monitoring by the COMELEC and ensuring that parties and candidates are afforded equal opportunity to promote their candidacy, the media entity shall give prior notice to the COMELEC of the appearance or guesting by a candidate on any bona fide newscast, news interview, news documentary, if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects of the news. If prior notice is not feasible, notice shall be sent within 24 hours from the first broadcast or publication. The Court held that this directive to give prior notice is not unduly burdensome and unreasonable; that it cannot be characterized as prior restraint since there is no restriction on dissemination of information before broadcast.
Similarly, the Court finds the "right to reply" provision of the Resolution to be reasonable and consistent with the constitutional mandate. The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest, fair and credible elections, a task addressed to COMELEC to provide for a right to reply [Sec. 4, Art. IX-C]. Thus, the equation is not simply between the press and the right to reply; the constitutionally-mandated desiderata of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections must be factored in.
“Broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.”

In the 2013 elections, several broadcast networks, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, and Senator Alan Peter Cayetano challenged COMELEC Resolutions Nos. 9615 and 9631, which changed the Fair Election Act’s airtime limits for political ads from a “per station” to a nationwide “aggregate total” basis, arguing that this severely reduced candidates’ ability to reach voters and imposed vague, burdensome rules that infringed on freedom of expression, of the press, and the public’s right to information. The Supreme Court struck down the aggregate airtime rule as beyond COMELEC’s authority and an unreasonable restriction on political speech, holding that it lacked a reasonable basis, contradicted legislative intent, and unconstitutionally curtailed the press’s role in disseminating election-related information.

[v] Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193956, March 31, 1992:

The COMELEC's resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers in mobile units like cars and other moving vehicles was declared unconstitutional for infringement of freedom of expression. Furthermore, the restriction was so broad as to include even the citizen's privately owned vehicles, equivalent to deprivation of property without due process of law.
Besides, the constitutional objective of giving the rich and poor candidates equal opportunity to inform the electorate is not violated by the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other vehicles.

Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate, challenged a COMELEC resolution that prohibited posting decals and stickers on “mobile” places such as private vehicles, arguing it violated the constitutional right to free speech and expression, especially given the ban on other forms of political advertising. The Supreme Court struck down the prohibition as unconstitutional, holding that it unduly infringed on individual expression, lacked a substantial public interest to justify the restriction, and was void for overbreadth, emphasizing that such limits impermissibly curtailed the free flow of political information essential to meaningful elections.

Diocese of Bacolod, etc., v. COMELEC, supra.:

Consistent with this ruling in Adiong, the act of respondents in seeking to restrain the petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their own private property is an impermissible encroachment on the right to property.

[vi] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra. (Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, October 30, 1995):

On the contention that R.A. 7716 discriminates against the press because it removed the exemption still granted to others, the Court declared that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege any time without offense to the Constitution. By granting an exemption, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.

The Philippine Press Institute and several media companies challenged the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law (R.A. No. 7716) after it removed the press’s exemption from VAT, arguing that subjecting newspapers and other media entities to the tax violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling that the VAT was a general, nondiscriminatory revenue measure that did not single out or target the press, and therefore did not constitute an unconstitutional restraint on press freedom.

[vii] Movie Censorship.

In an old U.S. case, it was observed that movies, compared to other media of expression, have a greater capacity for evil and must, therefore, be subjected to a greater degree of regulation.
But the power of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (BRMPT) [now the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB)] can be exercised only for purposes of classification, not censorship.

Gonzales v. Maria Kalaw Katigbak, G.R. No. L-69500, July 22, 1985:

Where the petitioner questioned the classification of the movie as "For Adults Only," the petition was dismissed because the Board did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Film producer Jose Antonio Gonzalez, along with Lino Brocka and others, challenged the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television’s classification of their film Kapit sa Patalim as “For Adults Only,” arguing that it was an unjustified restraint on artistic expression and that the Board’s standards for obscenity were overly restrictive. The Supreme Court held that motion pictures are protected under freedom of expression and that censorship is allowed only upon clear proof of a present danger of a substantive evil, but dismissed the petition because there were not enough votes to declare the Board’s action a grave abuse of discretion, thereby allowing the adult‑only classification to stand.

Lagunzad v. Sotto Vda. de Gonzales, G.R. No. L-32066, August 6, 1979:

The Court granted the petition to restrain the public exhibition of the movie Moises Padilla Story, because it contained fictionalized embellishments.

Journalist‑producer Manuel Lagunzad created the film The Moises Padilla Story based on a book he had purchased rights to, but included portrayals of Padilla’s mother and private life without her consent; after she objected and threatened legal and public action, they signed a licensing agreement for payment and royalties, which Lagunzad later refused to honor, claiming duress and invoking freedom of expression. The Supreme Court upheld the agreement and ruled that while freedom of expression is a preferred right, it is not absolute, and in this case must yield to the right to privacy of Padilla’s surviving relatives, especially where the expression touches on essentially private matters and the filmmaker had contractually agreed to obtain consent.

Ayer Productions v. Judge Capulong, G.R. No. L-82380, April 29, 1988:

The tribunal upheld the primacy of freedom of expression over Enrile's "right to privacy," because Enrile was a "public figure," and a public figure's right to privacy is narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Besides, the movie A Dangerous Life would not have been historically faithful without including therein the participation of Enrile in the EDSA Revolution. Thus, the intrusion into Enrile's right to privacy is not unreasonable.

Australian filmmakers Hal McElroy and Ayer Productions planned to produce The Four Day Revolution, a docu‑drama on the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution that included references to Senator Juan Ponce Enrile’s public role, but Enrile sought and obtained a trial court injunction to stop the film, claiming it would violate his right to privacy. The Supreme Court set aside the injunction, ruling that the film’s subject was a matter of public interest, that Enrile was a public figure whose participation in the EDSA events could be portrayed without his consent so long as it was truthful and avoided private or intimate details, and that stopping production at that stage would amount to unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of expression.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996:

Even as the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the BRMPT to review the petitioner's television program, it held that the Board acted with grave abuse of discretion when it gave an "X-rating" to the TV program on the ground of "attacks against another religion."
Such a classification can be justified only if there is a showing that the television program would create a clear and present danger of an evil which the State has the right to prevent.

The Iglesia ni Cristo’s religious TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo was given an “X” rating by the MTRCB for allegedly attacking other faiths, prompting the church to challenge the Board’s authority to review religious programs and to argue that the ban was an unconstitutional prior restraint on its freedoms of speech, expression, and religion. The Supreme Court ruled that while the MTRCB has the power to review all television programs, including religious ones, it could not ban the episodes absent proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, holding that mere criticism of other religions is protected expression and cannot be censored simply because it offends.

Viva Productions v. Court of Appeals and Hubert Webb, G.R. No. 123881, March 13, 1997:

The same rule was applied where the Supreme Court invalidated the orders issued by the lower courts restraining the public exhibition of the movie The Jessica Alfaro Story.

Viva Productions planned to release The Jessica Alfaro Story about a key witness in the high‑profile Vizconde massacre case, but Hubert Webb—then an accused—secured restraining orders from two different trial courts to stop the film’s showing, claiming it would violate the sub judice rule and his rights as an accused. The Supreme Court nullified both injunctions for constituting forum shopping and noted the absence of any clear and present danger to justify prior restraint, effectively lifting the ban and affirming that such suppression of expression was unwarranted.

[viia] Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 155282, January 17, 2005:

The Court upheld MTRCB's power of review over the TV program The Inside Story, citing Sec. 7 of P.D. 1986 which exempts only television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels. The Inside Story, a public affairs program described as a variety of news treatment, cannot be considered a newsreel.

ABS‑CBN and host Loren Legarda aired an episode of The Inside Story on student prostitution without submitting it to the MTRCB for review, leading the Board to fine them and require future episodes to be reviewed; they argued the program was a public affairs news documentary protected by freedom of expression and of the press, and thus outside MTRCB’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled that under P.D. No. 1986 the MTRCB has authority to review all television programs, including public affairs shows, and upheld the penalty, finding no constitutional exemption from prior review for such content.

[viii] ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000:

The Supreme Court declared that there is no law prohibiting the holding and the reporting of exit polls.
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for immediately after they have officially cast their ballots.
The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted.
The freedom of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage.

The COMELEC issued a resolution stopping ABS‑CBN from conducting and broadcasting exit polls during the national elections, claiming they could confuse voters, undermine the official count, and threaten the integrity of the electoral process, which ABS‑CBN challenged as an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of speech and of the press. The Supreme Court struck down the ban, holding that exit polls are protected expression and may only be regulated through narrowly tailored measures to prevent actual disruption, and that COMELEC’s blanket prohibition was overly broad, speculative, and unjustifiably restricted the public’s right to information.

[ix] ⭐ Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001:

Sec. 5.4 of R.A. 9006 which provides that "surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published 7 days before an election," was held to be an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of expression for laying a prior restraint on the freedom.
While the Court in National Press Club v. COMELEC, supra. sustained the ban on media political advertisements, the same was made on the premise that the grant of power to the COMELEC (to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchises for the operation of media of communications) is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space and the right to reply."

In the same case, the Supreme Court said that the test for the validity of Sec. 5.4, R.A. 9006, is the O'Brien Test [U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 365], where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a government regulation is valid if:

It is within the constitutional power of government;
It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
The incidental restriction on the freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publications might undermine the integrity of the election, it actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by news columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers.
In effect, it shows bias for a particular subject matter by preferring personal opinion to statistical results. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a limited period. The section also fails to meet criterion (4) of the test.
The section aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating known as "dagdag-bawas." These cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts rather than speech, just because of the apprehension that speech creates the danger of such evil acts.
Thus, the section is invalid because:

it imposes a prior restraint on freedom of expression;
it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period; and
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.

In one concurring opinion in the same case, the offending section is deemed an invalid exercise of the police power, inasmuch as the means used to regulate free expression are not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and worse, it is unduly oppressive upon survey organizations which have been singled out for suppression on the mere apprehension that their survey results will lead to misinformation, junking or contrived bandwagon effect.

In another concurring opinion, the section is stigmatized because of the Overbreadth Doctrine, which prohibits government from achieving its purpose by "means that sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching constitutionally protected as well as unprotected activity." The essence of overbreadth is that the government has gone too far; its legitimate interest can be satisfied without reaching so broadly into the area of "protected freedom."

Chavez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004:

Where the issue of constitutionality for being overbroad was raised against the COMELEC resolution requiring the removal of all advertisements showing the image or mentioning the name of a person who subsequently became a candidate, the Supreme Court said that a statute or regulation is void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that a government purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulation may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
The challenged resolution is limited in its operation as to time and scope. It only disallows the continued display of the advertisements after a person has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the campaign period. There is no blanket prohibition of the use of advertisements. Thus, the resolution is not constitutionally infirm.

In 2004, Francisco Chavez, who had existing commercial billboards featuring his name and image for product endorsements, filed his candidacy for senator and was ordered by the COMELEC under Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 to remove them within three days to prevent premature campaigning, which he challenged as unconstitutional and a violation of his rights. The Supreme Court upheld the provision as a valid, content‑neutral regulation aimed at leveling the playing field among candidates, ruling that once he became a candidate the billboards took on a partisan political character, and their removal was a reasonable restriction that did not unlawfully infringe freedom of expression.

[b] Freedom from Subsequent Punishment

Without this assurance, the individual would hesitate to speak for fear that he might be held to account for his speech, or that he might be provoking the vengeance of the officials he may have criticized. However, this freedom is not absolute, and may be properly regulated in the interest of the public. Accordingly, the State may validly impose penal and/or administrative sanctions, such as in the following:

[i] Libel.

A public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead [Art. 353, Revised Penal Code].
Oral defamation is called slander [Art. 358, Revised Penal Code].

[ia] Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious [Alonzo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110088, February 1, 1995], but this presumption of malice does not exist in the following instances:

A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of a confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions [Art. 353, Revised Penal Code].

[ib] Baguio Midland Courier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107566, November 25, 2004:

It was reiterated that the public has the right to be informed on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of candidates for public office.
However, the rule applies only to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that which is true, or if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds.
The principle does not grant an absolute license to authors or writers to destroy the persons of candidates for public office by exposing the latter to public contempt or ridicule by providing the general public with publications tainted with express or actual malice.
In the latter case, the remedy of the person allegedly libelled is to show proof that an article was written with the author’s knowledge that it was false, or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

[ic] Sec. 4(c)(4) of Republic Act No. 10125 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012), which punishes libel, does not violate the right to free expression.

Libel is not protected speech; there is no freedom to unjustly destroy the reputation of a decent woman by publicly claiming that she is a prostitute.
The constitutional guarantee against prior restraint and subsequent punishment, the jurisprudential requirement of "actual malice," and the legal protection afforded by "privileged communications" all ensure that protected speech remains guarded. As long as the expression or speech falls within the protected sphere, it is the solemn duty of courts to ensure that the rights of the people are protected [Jose Jesus Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, April 22, 2014].

[ii] Obscenity.

There is no perfect definition of "obscenity," but the latest word is that of Miller v. California, which established basic guidelines, to wit:

Whether the average person, applying contemporary standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct. What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be treated on a case-to-case basis, and on the judge's sound discretion [Fernando v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006].

[iia] U.S. v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352:

The Supreme Court acquitted the accused who was charged of having offered for sale pictures of half-clad members of non-Christian tribes, holding that he had only presented them in their native attire.

People v. Go Pin, G.R. No. L-7491, August 8, 1955:

The accused was convicted for exhibiting nude paintings and pictures, notwithstanding his claim that he had done so in the interest of art. The Supreme Court, noting that he had charged admission fees to the exhibition, held that his purpose was commercial, not merely artistic.

Pita v. Court of Appeals, supra:

The Supreme Court declared that the determination of what is obscene is a judicial function.

[iib] The suspension of the TV program "Ang Dating Daan" did not constitute prior restraint, but partook of the nature of subsequent punishment for petitioner’s statements which were contextually violative of the program’s "G" rating that should be suitable for all ages. The vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time television was inappropriate for children [Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010].

[iib1] The utterances which the petitioner made on television were deemed obscene.

The standard to be employed in judging the harmful effects of the statements would be those for the average child, not those for the average adult.
The ratings and regulation of television broadcasts take into account the protection of the child, and it is from the child’s narrow viewpoint that the utterances must be considered.

The US case, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, does not apply in this jurisdiction. The "safe harbour" of 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., wherein broadcasts of indecent material may be permitted, is inapplicable here. There is no legislative enactment or executive issuance setting a similar period for indecent material to be aired. [Soriano v. Laguardia, supra].

[iii] Criticism of Official Conduct.

U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731:

This leading case is authority for the rule that the individual is given the widest latitude in criticism of official conduct.
The Supreme Court compared criticism to a "scalpel that relieves the abscesses of officialdom."

[iiia] However, consider the following:

People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265:

It was held that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts.

In Re: Atty. Emiliano P. Jurado, Jr.:

The Court said that a publication that tends to impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present danger to the administration of justice is not protected by the guarantee of press freedom and is punishable by contempt.
It is not necessary to show that the publication actually obstructs the administration of justice; it is enough that it tends to do so.

In Re: Sotto, 46 O.G. 2570:

A senator was punished for contempt for having attacked a decision of the Supreme Court which he called incompetent and narrow-minded, and announcing that he would file a bill for its reorganization.

In Re: Column of Ramon Tulfo, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 17, 1990:

Tulfo’s "Sangkatutak na Bobo" column (on the SC decision in Valmonte v. De Villa, supra) was held contumacious. Freedom of the press is subordinate to the decision, authority, integrity, and independence of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice.
While there is no law to restrain or punish the freest expression of disapprobation of what is done in or by the courts, free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade, and even destroy the courts and their members.

[iiib] In Re: Laureta, supra:

A lawyer was held in contempt and suspended from the practice of law for writing individual letters to the members of the SC division that decided a case against his client, arrogantly questioning their decision and threatening an expose if the same was not reconsidered in his favor.

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 19690, February 1, 1989:

A member of the Bar who imputed charges of improper influence, corruption, and other misdeeds to members of the Supreme Court, was suspended from the practice of law, as "neither the right of free speech nor the right to engage in political activities can be so construed or extended as to permit any such liberties to a member of the bar."

Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-75209, September 30, 1987:

Required to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt, the workers involved in a labor dispute who had mounted a 24-hour picket along Padre Faura, pitched tents thereon, blocked traffic, and maintained a continuous harangue pleading their case, extended apologies to the court and desisted, promising they would not take similar action again.

In Re Emil Jurado, Ex Rel: PLDT, A.M. No. 93-2-037-SC, April 6, 1995:

The Court said that Jurado is being called to account as a journalist who has misused and abused press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and present danger of disrepute and of public odium and opprobrium, to the detriment of the administration of justice.
That he is a member of the Bar has nothing to do with the imposition of these sanctions, although it may aggravate liability.

[iiic] Marc Douglas IV Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185, February 25, 2014:

Petitioner wrote a "personal" letter to Court Administrator Midas Marquez, which contained invectives and defamatory statements against members of the Supreme Court.
Required to explain why he should not be punished for contempt, the petitioner apologized, but the Court found the explanation unsatisfactory.

Cagas v. COMELEC, supra:

The Court held that the constitutional right to privacy of communications and correspondence cannot protect the petitioner, especially after his admission that he requested Court Administrator Marquez to show certain DVDs to the members of the Court. In any event, messages addressed to the members of the Court, regardless of media or intermediary, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions, become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court
Likewise, the constitutional right to freedom of speech cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. The defamatory statements in the letter impaired the public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and not just of the ponente in the case.
A criticism after a case has been disposed of can no longer influence the Court, and on that ground it does not constitute contempt. But an insult hurled against the Court, even after a case is decided, can under no circumstance be justified, and would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of its members, and it constitutes contempt..

[iiid] Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino v. Evardone, G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2007:

Where petitioners imputed contumacious statements to respondent for referring to rumors that Chief Justice Panganiban has intentions of running for the Senate, the Supreme Court found as sufficient and acceptable the defense of respondent that he had no intention to undermine the integrity of the Court, and that nothing in his statements insinuate or suggest that the Court was susceptible to influence.
Nothing in his statements can be considered as a malicious attack on the proceedings of the Court as to cast doubt on its integrity. His remarks about the Chief Justice were mere speculations and personal observations based on a precedent not derogatory or contumacious enough to warrant sanction from the Court.

[iv] Right of Students to Free Speech in School Premises

This right must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.
While the Campus Journalism Act provides that a student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of articles he or she has written, the same should not infringe on the school's right to discipline its students.
Thus, this section of the Campus Journalism Act should be read to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of rights of others [Miriam College Foundation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127930, December 15, 2000].

[v] COMELEC violated Ang Ladlad's freedom of expression and assembly when it denied, on moral grounds, petitioner's application for registration as a party-list group, despite meeting the legal requirements for registration [Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010].

3. Tests of Valid Governmental Interference

[a] Clear and Present Danger Rule

Whether the words are used in such circumstances and of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the State has the right to prevent [Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 97].
“The substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.”

[i] The rule is that the danger created must not only be clear and present but also traceable to the ideas expressed.

In Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, the Court said that the term “clear” seems to point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned; while “present” refers to the time element, identified with imminent and immediate danger.
The danger must not only be probable, but very likely inevitable.

In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, supra., on the argument of Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzalez that it was error for the Court to apply the “visible tendency” rule rather than the “clear and present danger” rule in disciplinary and contempt charges, the Supreme Court said that it did not purport to announce a new doctrine of “visible tendency”; it was merely paraphrasing Sec. 3 (d), Rule 71, Rules of Court
Under either the “clear and present danger rule” or the “balancing of interest” test, the statements of Gonzalez transcended the limits of free speech.
The “substantive evil” consists not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the court.

In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, supra., the Court held that the “X-rating” would have been justified only if there was a clear and present danger of an evil which the State has the right to prevent.

In Viva Productions v. Court of Appeals and Hubert Webb, G.R. No. 123881, March 13, 1997, the Supreme Court held that the action of RTC Parañaque and RTC Makati in restraining the exhibition of the movie, “The Jessica Alfaro Story”, violated the petitioner’s right to free expression. The Court noted that the lower court specifically failed to lay down any factual basis constituting a clear and present danger that would justify prior restraint.

[ii] As applied to assembly and petition, the Supreme Court declared in J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, that the denial of a permit (to hold a public rally) was invalid as there was no showing of the probability of a clear and present danger of an evil that might arise as a result of the meeting. The burden of proving such eventuality rests on the Mayor.

[b] Dangerous Tendency Rule

As explained in Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152, if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which the State has the right to prevent, then such words are punishable.
It is sufficient if the natural tendency and the probable effect of the utterance were to bring about the substantive evil that the legislative body seeks to prevent. See: People v. Perez, 45 Phil. 599.

[c] Balancing of Interests Test

“When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, or partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented” [American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 282].

In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, supra., the Supreme Court said that the “clear and present danger rule” is not the only test which has been recognized and applied by the courts.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedoms of speech and of the press is the “balancing of interests test,” which requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation.
See also Ayer Productions v. Capulong, supra.

4. Assembly and Petition

The right to assemble is not subject to prior restraint.
It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from government authorities.
However, the right must be exercised in such a way as will not prejudice the public welfare, as held in De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 126183 & 129221, March 25, 1999.

De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 126183 & 129221, March 25, 1999:

In this case, the Supreme Court said that by staging their mass protest on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even after they were ordered to do so, the teachers committed acts prejudicial to the best interests of the service.

[a] If the assembly is to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.

But the power of local officials in this regard is merely one of regulation, not prohibition [Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71; Reyes v. Bagatsing, supra.].

[i] Thus, in B.P. 880 [Public Assembly Act of 1985], a permit to hold a public assembly shall not be necessary where the meeting is to be held:

in a private place,
in the campus of a government-owned or -operated educational institution, or
in a freedom park.

Where a permit is required, the written application shall be filed with the mayor’s office at least 5 days before the scheduled meeting and shall be acted upon within two days, otherwise the permit shall be deemed granted.
Denial of the permit may be justified only upon clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, safety, convenience, morals or health.
Action on the application shall be communicated within 24 hours to the applicant, who may appeal the same to the appropriate court. Decision must be reached within 24 hours.
The law permits law enforcement agencies to detail a contingent under a responsible officer at least 100 meters away from the assembly in case it becomes necessary to maintain order.
See Ruiz v. Gordon, G.R. No. L-65695, December 19, 1983.

[ii] Bayan v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 23, 2006, upheld the constitutionality of B.P. 880. The Court said that it is not an absolute ban on public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.

Osmeña v. COMELEC:

The Court referred to it as a “content-neutral” regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it “content-based,” because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes; otherwise, they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are the words “opinion,” “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of public assembly “content-based,” since they can refer to any subject. Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
The permit can only be denied on the ground of “clear and present danger” to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The law is not overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. It does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies.
The delegation to the Mayors of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally sound “clear and present danger” standard.

[b] Subayco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 117267, August 22, 1996:

Regarding the Escalante massacre, the Court bewailed the use of bullets to break up the assembly of people petitioning for redress of grievances. In this case, the Court declared: “It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feelings are always brought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution were permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous uprising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare, and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasions and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment.”

[c] Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124678, July 23, 1997:

However, the suspension/dismissal of the public school teachers, who staged a strike to dramatize their grievances, was held valid.
They were not being penalized for their exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition, but because of their successive, unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students.

This rule is reiterated in Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124540, November 14, 1997; in De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 126183 & 129221, March 25, 1999; and in Acosta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132088, June 28, 2000.

[i] GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006:

Likewise, the Court reiterated the principle that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.
It may be, as the appellate court urged, that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties.
However, the appellate court’s position is contrary to what Sec. 4, Art. III (Constitution), in relation to Sec. 5 of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 021315, provides. Thus, any suggestion that these rights include the right on the part of government personnel to strike ought to be, as it has been, thrashed.

[d] As applied to student rallies and demonstrations:

Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-62270, May 21, 1984:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the students did not shed their constitutional rights to free speech at the schoolhouse gate, and permitted the students to re-enroll and finish their studies.

Villar v. TIP, G.R. No. L-69198, April 17, 1985:

While the Court upheld the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, which includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students, it was held that this right cannot be utilized to discriminate against those who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceful assembly and free speech.

Non v. Dames, G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990:

The Supreme Court abandoned its earlier ruling in Alcuaz v. PSBA, 165 SCRA 7 (that enrolment of a student is a semester-to-semester contract and the school may not be compelled to renew the contract), upholding the primacy of freedom of expression, because the students do not shed their constitutionally protected rights at the school gate.

[e] PBM Employees Association v. PBM Steel Mills, supra.

The Court ruled that the right to free assembly and petition prevails over economic rights.

De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra.

However, the Supreme Court said that the education of the youth occupies a preferred position over — or, at the very least, equated with — the freedom of assembly and petition.

[f] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra:

The Supreme Court said that on the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts, it is clear that the:

warrantless arrest of petitioners David and Llamas;
the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU members;
the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and
the warrantless search of the Daily Tribune offices and the whimsical seizure of some articles for publications and other materials,

are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence; not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

G. Freedom of Religion

Sec. 5, Art. III:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion

or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,

without discrimination or preference,

shall forever be allowed.

No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

1. Two guarantees contained in Sec. 5:

Non-establishment Clause; and
Freedom of religious profession and worship.

2. Non-establishment clause.

This reinforces Sec. 6, Art. II, on the separation of Church and State.
Recall other constitutional provisions which support the non-establishment clause, namely:

Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C → a religious sect or denomination cannot be registered as a political party.
Sec. 5(2), Art. VI → no sectoral representative from the religious sector.
Sec. 29(2), Art. VI → prohibition against the use of public money or property for the benefit of any religion, or of any priest, minister, or ecclesiastic.

See ⭐Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201;

Aglipay challenged the Postal Director’s issuance of stamps commemorating a Catholic congress as unconstitutional support of a sect, but the stamps were printed under a law allowing new designs when advantageous to the state and intended only to promote tourism. The Supreme Court ruled that the stamps served a secular government purpose and that any religious association was merely incidental, so the petition was denied.

⭐ Garces v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-53487, May 25, 1981.

The Valencia barangay council used private donations to build a shed and acquire a patron saint’s image for its traditional fiesta, sparking a custody dispute with the parish priest. The Supreme Court held these acts did not use public funds or property to support a religion and thus did not violate the non-establishment clause.

[a] Exceptions:

Sec. 28(3), Art. VI → exemption from taxation of properties actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes.

Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352

Sec. 4(2), Art. XIV → citizenship requirement of ownership of educational institutions, except those established by religious groups and mission boards.

Sec. 3(3), Art. XIV → optional religious instruction in public elementary and high schools: at the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religious instruction taught within regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government.

Sec. 29(2), Art. VI → appropriation allowed where the minister or ecclesiastic is employed in the armed forces, in a penal institution, or in a government-owned orphanage or leprosarium.

[b] Scope.

Everson v. Board of Education, 30 U.S. 1:

The U.S. Supreme Court said that the non-establishment clause means that the State:

cannot set up a church, nor
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another, nor
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will, or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (the "School Prayer Case"):

The recitation by the students in public schools in New York of a prayer composed by the Board of Regents was held unconstitutional.

[i] Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43:

In line with the constitutional principle of equal treatment of all religions, the State recognizes the validity of marriages performed in conformity with the rites of the Mohammedan religion.
As to the expression "non-Christian" used in some restrictive laws applicable to "non-Christian" tribes, the Supreme Court, conscious of the implication of religious discrimination in the term, has given the interpretation that it does not refer to religious belief, but to degree of civilization.

See ⭐People v. Cayat, supra;

Cayat, a member of a non-Christian tribe in Baguio, was prosecuted for possessing imported gin under Act No. 1639 and fined by lower courts. The Supreme Court affirmed the law’s validity as a reasonable classification and proper exercise of police power that neither violates equal protection nor due process.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.

[ii] Laws such as Art. 133, Revised Penal Code, which punish blasphemy or acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of a religious ceremony, do not violate the freedom of religion.

[iii] Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003:

The Supreme Court declared that freedom of religion is accorded preferred status by the framers of the fundamental law, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."
Without doubt, classifying food products as halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs.
By giving the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption.
Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has, in effect, forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.

[iv] Intramural religious dispute.

⭐Gonzales v. Archbishop of Manila, 51 Phil. 420:

The Supreme Court said that where a civil right depends upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal tries the civil right and nothing more.

Petronila de Guzman’s 1816 endowment made her family line chaplains of her Binondo property until Angel Gonzalez’s 1910 resignation, after which the Church managed the rents and masses. The Supreme Court ruled that while civil courts can enforce property rights in church trusts, they cannot compel ecclesiastical appointments or override church qualifications, reversing the trial court’s order.

⭐Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 417:

Where the dispute involves the property rights of the religious group, or the relations of the members where property rights are involved, the civil courts may assume jurisdiction.

After new bishops Bayaca and de los Reyes Jr. replaced him under the church’s constitution, Fonacier was sued for failing to hand over church assets and account for funds. The Supreme Court ruled that courts can decide property disputes among church members and must enforce the church’s own rules on removal and turnover, affirming Fonacier’s obligation to comply.

[iva] ⚡Austria v. NLRC and Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists, G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999:

Concerning the dismissal of petitioner, a minister, for misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duties, the Supreme Court had occasion to define an ecclesiastical affair as "one that concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership" [Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (1979), p. 460].
Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship, and governance of the congregation. Examples of these affairs in which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordination of religious ministers, administration of sacraments, and other activities to which is attached religious significance.
In this case, what is involved is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship, or doctrine of the church.

[ivb] Taruc v. Bishop Porfirio de la Cruz, G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005:

The Supreme Court declared that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons of such institution/organization.
It is not for the Court to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

3. Free Exercise Clause.

[a] Aspects of freedom of religious profession and worship:

[i] Right to believe, which is absolute.

[ii] Right to act according to one's beliefs, which is subject to regulation.

[iia] ⭐Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256:

The Supreme Court reversed ⭐Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2, and the Balbuna decision, and upheld the right of the petitioners, public school students, to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious scruples.

Members of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Cebu were expelled from public schools for refusing to participate in the flag ceremony due to their religious beliefs, despite standing quietly in respectful silence. The Supreme Court ruled that such expulsion violated their rights to religious freedom and free public education, holding that absent a grave and present danger, the State must accommodate sincere religious objections to the flag ceremony.

Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil. 2: Members of Jehovah’s Witnesses refused to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, or recite the patriotic pledge in public school, claiming it violated their religious beliefs, and were expelled under Department Order No. 8 implementing the compulsory flag ceremony law. The Supreme Court upheld their exclusion, ruling that while belief is absolute, the State may regulate actions for the public good, and the flag ceremony is a secular patriotic act, not a religious one.

⭐Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54:

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of R.A. 3350, exempting members of a religious sect from being compelled to join a labor union, even if there is an existing collective bargaining agreement with a closed shop or union shop clause.

Victoriano, whose sect forbade union membership, resigned from the union and faced dismissal under a closed shop clause but relied on R.A. 3350’s exemption for religious objectors to keep his job. The Supreme Court affirmed that R.A. 3350 is a valid exercise of police power protecting freedom of religion and association and upheld the injunction against his dismissal.

American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386:

The Supreme Court recognized the "right to proselytize" as part of religious freedom, and invalidated the application of a City Ordinance imposing license fees on the sale of merchandise to the sale of religious tracts.

proselytize - convert

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, supra:

Citing American Bible Society case, the Supreme Court said that the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information, and any restraint of such right can be justified only on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of an evil which the State has the right to prevent.

⭐ German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514:

But the petitioners who were marching along Mendiola St., in the direction of Malacañang, when stopped, claimed that they were on their way to St. Jude Church to attend a religious service. The Supreme Court made a finding that the petitioners were not sincere in their profession of religious liberty and were merely using the same in order to openly express their opposition to the government.

A group of protesters in yellow shirts tried to enter St. Jude Chapel by Malacañang to pray but were stopped by security enforcing a restricted zone. The Supreme Court ruled that their action was a political protest cloaked in religion, so blocking them under security rules did not violate their freedom of worship or movement.

[iia1] Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164765, March 15, 2010:

In the matter of the suspension of the TV program "Ang Dating Daan," the Supreme Court said that the exercise of Soriano's religious beliefs and profession cannot take precedence over the right and duty of the State as parens patriae.
The interest of the Government in protecting children who may be subjected to petitioner's invectives must take precedence over his desire to air publicly his dirty laundry.
Petitioner's invocation of Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals is inappropriate, because in that case, the Court merely declared that the exercise of religious profession and worship can be regulated by the State when it will bring about a clear and present danger of an evil which the State has the right to prevent.
Accordingly, it was held that the INC's religious program on television is subject to regulation by the MTRCB.

[iib] The Compelling State Interest Test

⚡ Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003:

Respondent was administratively charged with immorality for living with a married man not her husband. As members of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, they executed a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" before their religious elders.
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, the Constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests, but at the same time, strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits.
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interest.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent's right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious belief and practice and family on the other, puts a burden on her free exercise of religion.
The second step is to ascertain respondent's sincerity in her religious belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice, and is not merely using the "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality.
This being a case of first impression, the parties were not aware of the burden of proof they should discharge in the Court's use of the "compelling state interest" test. It is apparent that the state interest it upholds is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency.
However, there is nothing in the memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how the interest is so compelling that it should override the respondent's plea of religious freedom, nor is it shown that the means employed by the government in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious exercise. The case was ordered remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator for the application of this test.

[iib1] The Lemon Test

In this case, the Court, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, also discussed the Lemon test, such that a regulation is constitutional when:

it has a secular legislative purpose;
it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

[iib2] Final Resolution (June 22, 2006)

It was held that if the burden is great and the sincerity of the religious belief is not in question, adherence to benevolent neutrality accommodation approach requires that the Court make an individual determination and not dismiss the claim outright.
Accordingly, the Court found that in this particular case and under the distinct circumstances prevailing, respondent Escritor's arrangement cannot be penalized as she made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
Concluding, the High Tribunal said that the Court recognizes that the state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms, including religious freedom, may be enjoyed. But in the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that the violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the infinite.

[iic] Diocese of Bacolod, etc., v. COMELEC, supra:

In, the Supreme Court declared that the COMELEC order to remove the tarpaulin did not violate freedom of religion.
As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church." xxx The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

[iid] ⭐ Centeno v. Villalon, 236 SCRA 197:

State regulations imposed on solicitations for religious purposes do not constitute an abridgment of freedom of religion.
However, solicitations for religious purposes are not covered by P.D. 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law) which requires a prior permit from the DSWD in solicitations for "charitable or public welfare purposes."]

Centeno and his group solicited donations in 1985 to repair a chapel without a DSWD permit, leading to charges under PD 1564. The Supreme Court ruled that PD 1564 applies only to charitable or public welfare solicitations, not religious fundraising, and acquitted Centeno.

[iie] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra:

R.A. 7716, insofar as the sale of religious articles, as well as their printing and publication, is subject to VAT, is not unconstitutional.
As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, the free exercise clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.
In the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration (October 30, 1995), the Supreme Court said that the resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other economic imposition that might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly. At any rate, liability for VAT must be decided in concrete cases in the event the BIR assesses this tax on the Philippine Bible Society.

4. The RH Law Controversy

Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014:

On the challenge to the constitutionality of a number of provisions in R.A. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law, for short), the Supreme Court admitted that it cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures is:
(a) moral from a religious standpoint; or
(b) right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine whether the law contravenes the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

[a] The State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives does not violate religious freedom. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate the non-establishment clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, amount to the establishment of a state religion. The State can, therefore, enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of petitioners.

[b] But Secs. 7, 23 and 24 of the RH Law, which compel a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible health care provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs, violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. xxx

Secs. 7 and 23(a)(1), which compel non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so, as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty [Sec. 23(a)(1) and (a)(2), in relation to Sec. 24], also violate the freedom of religion.

While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance therewith, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective implementation of the law.

[c] Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and their private counterparts. Furthermore, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual, and the protection of this freedom remains even if he is employed in the government.

[d] Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the foregoing provisions. xxx

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are the least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective, since Congress has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected with the passage of such laws as R.A. 4729 (An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation and Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices), R.A. 6365 (An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes), and R.A. 9710 (Magna Carta for Women). xxx

The Court recognized that exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these cases, the life of the mother should be given preference considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service resulting in an unnecessary and grave danger to the life of the mother.

[e] But Sec. 15, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding, and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of the police power by the government. It does not violate religious freedom.

H. Liberty of Abode and of Travel

Sec. 6, Art. III:

The liberty of abode

and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law

shall not be impaired

except upon lawful order of the court.

Neither shall the right to travel be impaired

except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health,

as may be provided by law.

1. Limitation on Liberty of Abode: Lawful Order of the Court

[a] ⭐Villavicencio v. Lukban, supra:

The "deportation" of some 170 women of ill repute to Davao on orders of the Mayor of Manila was held unlawful.

About 170 women of ill repute were secretly confined in Manila and shipped to Davao without their consent or any legal basis. The Supreme Court granted habeas corpus, ruled their deportation unlawful, restored their right to choose residence, and punished the mayor for contempt.

⭐ Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851:

It was held that a maid has the right to transfer to another residence even if she had not yet paid the amount advanced for her transportation from the province by an employment agency which was then effectively detaining her because of the moral duress exerted on her.

Estelita Flores was prevented from leaving her employer’s home by demands to repay a travel advance, effectively detaining her under moral duress. The Supreme Court granted her habeas relief, holding that mental or moral coercion violates the fundamental right to freedom of movement and cannot be justified by an unpaid debt.

[i] ⭐ Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra:

However, it was held that the respondents were justified in requiring the members of certain non-Christian tribes to reside only within a reservation. This restriction was intended to promote their better education, advancement, and protection.

Mangyanes challenged a provincial directive forcing them onto a Tigbao reservation, claiming it violated their freedom to choose where they live. The Supreme Court upheld the order as a lawful exercise of police power under the Administrative Code to advance the tribe’s welfare, and denied their habeas corpus petition.

[b] Art. 13, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Art. 12, Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provide that everyone has the right of freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.

2. Limitations on Right to Travel: Interest of National Security, Public Safety, or Public Health, as May Be Provided by Law

[a] ⭐Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, supra:

An administrative order issued by the Secretary of Labor temporarily suspending the deployment of Filipino female domestic helpers abroad was upheld, in view of the need to extend protection to female domestics who were most prone to exploitation and abuse by their foreign employers.

The Philippine Association of Service Exporters sought to overturn a DOLE order halting the deployment of Filipina domestic workers overseas, claiming it violated their right to travel and discriminated by sex. The Supreme Court upheld the suspension, ruling that the order was a valid police power measure, justifiably tailored to protect a vulnerable class and permissible under the Constitution.

⭐ Marcos v. Manglapus, 178 SCRA 760:

The Supreme Court sustained the refusal of the government to allow the petitioner's return to the Philippines, on the ground that it would endanger national security.

Marcos and his family sought court relief from President Aquino’s order blocking their return, arguing it violated their right to enter their own country under international covenants. The Supreme Court upheld the ban, holding that the President’s implied residual powers include measures necessary to protect national welfare and that the order was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion.

[b] The constitutional guarantee of the right to travel has never been considered as absolute. The Constitution itself allows restrictions, provided that such restrictions are in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law [Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Ignacio Macarine, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012].

[c] A lawful order of the court is also a valid restriction on the right to travel.

⭐ Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149:

The Court held that the trial court may validly refuse to grant the accused permission to travel abroad, even if the accused is out on bail.

Manotoc, out on bail for estafa, sought repeatedly to travel to the U.S. for business but was denied by trial and appellate courts for lack of urgency and surety consent. The Supreme Court dismissed his petition, ruling that bail conditions and lawful court orders validly restrict travel abroad to keep the accused under judicial control.

⭐Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 760:

The Court said that Art. III, Sec. 6 should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without court order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limiting phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text. xxx
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered a valid restriction on his right to travel, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.

Silverio posted bail for a securities charge but missed arraignments by leaving the country, prompting a court order to cancel his passport and bar his travel. The Supreme Court held that enforcing bail conditions by restricting foreign travel is a valid court-ordered limitation on the right to travel.

⭐ Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633:

The Court further clarified the foregoing principles, saying:

The hold-departure order is but an exercise of the respondent court's inherent power to preserve and maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused;
By posting bail, the accused holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, thus, she may be legally prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case; and
Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor, since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.

Miriam Defensor-Santiago posted bail after an Anti-Graft charge and then received a hold-departure order when she announced plans to study abroad. The Supreme Court held that such an order is a valid use of the court’s inherent power to secure its jurisdiction and that bail conditions can lawfully limit an accused’s travel.

⭐ Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 115132, August 9, 1995:

The Court upheld the denial by the Sandiganbayan of the request to travel abroad filed by Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, inasmuch as she had already been convicted.
The person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice.
Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the country for humanitarian reasons is a matter addressed to the court's discretion.

Imelda Marcos, already convicted in two graft cases, sought leave to travel abroad for complex medical treatment but failed to prove the necessity of overseas tests. The Supreme Court held that travel can be lawfully restricted by court orders to safeguard justice and that granting humanitarian travel is a matter for the trial court’s discretion.

See also ⭐ Yap v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001.

Petitioner was convicted of estafa involving ₱5,500,000.00, obtained bail at that amount with conditions limiting his travel and residence, and appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court reduced his bail to ₱200,000.00 but held that a lawful court order imposing travel and residence restrictions validly limits the constitutional right to abode and travel.

[d] Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provides that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provides that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

But see Marcos v. Manglapus, supra.

I. Right to Information

Sec. 7, Art. III:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern

shall be recognized.

Access to official records, and to documents and papers

pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,

as well as to government research data

used as basis for policy development

shall be afforded the citizen,

subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

1. Scope of the Right.

Chavez v. PEA and Amari, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002:

It was held that the right to information contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.
Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, or if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
However, the right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them at his expense.
The exercise is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of public records and to minimize disruption of government operations.

Francisco Chavez sued to compel PEA to reveal all documents on its renegotiations with Amari over Manila Bay reclamation and to block any new agreement until judicial review. The Supreme Court held that the people’s right to information covers official records of ongoing negotiations once they crystallize into definite propositions, while preserving confidentiality for privileged, security, and pre-prosecution materials, and allowing reasonable disclosure rules.

[a] Exceptions.

The right does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information rooted in separation of powers, nor to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused (Chavez v. PEA and Amari, supra).

Garcia v. Board of Investments, 177 SCRA 374:

Likewise, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Board of Investments in denying the petitioner access to trade and industrial secrets.

2. Need for Publication of Laws Reinforces this Right.

⭐ Tanada v. Tuvera, supra:

The Court said, "Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people."

Petitioners challenged the nonpublication of presidential decrees and asked for clear rules on when and where publication must occur under Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Court held that full publication in the Official Gazette is essential for due process, that the “unless otherwise provided” clause only alters effectivity dates, and that unpublished laws have no binding force on the public.

3. Distinction Between Duty to Permit Access and Duty of Full Disclosure.

⭐ Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services (IDEALS) v. Public Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012:

The Court distinguished between this duty to permit access to information on matters of public concern and the duty of "full public disclosure" of all "transactions involving public interest" under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.
First, under Sec. 28, the disclosure of information is mandatory, while Sec. 7 requires a demand or request for one to gain access to documents and papers of the agency.
Second, under Sec. 28, the duty to disclose covers only transactions involving public interest, while under Sec. 7, the duty to allow access covers a broader scope, which embraces any matter contained in official communications and public documents of the particular agency.
Thus, in this case, relief was granted by directing PSALM to allow petitioners access to the papers and documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the winning bidder.

Civil society groups and Rep. Bello sued to enjoin the privatization of the Angat hydro plant and to compel PSALM to release withheld bidding documents and the winning bidder’s profile. The Supreme Court held that while full disclosure of public-interest transactions is automatic under Sec. 28, Art. II, the public may also demand access under Sec. 7, Art. III to any official records—so PSALM must grant petitioners access to the winning bidder’s company profile and legal capacity documents.

4. Some Cases.

⭐ Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14:

The Supreme Court sustained the right of a municipal mayor to examine judicial records, subject to reasonable rules and conditions. Quoting from Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, the Court said:

"Except perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful or sheer idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the person seeking access to the records."

Baldoza, acting for the Mayor, sought to examine criminal dockets for a peace-and-order report but Judge Dimaano required supervised inspection to guard against misuse. The Supreme Court held that while court records are public and must be accessible to officials with legitimate need, judges may adopt reasonable rules to regulate inspection and dismissed the abuse-of-authority complaint.

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra:

It was held that while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records, cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion.
The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

⭐ Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998:

The Supreme Court upheld the right of the petitioner, a former Solicitor General, to disclosure of any agreement which may have been arrived at concerning the purported ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.

Francisco Chavez challenged PCGG’s secret 1993 compromise agreements with the Marcos heirs over their alleged ill-gotten wealth, which included sweeping tax breaks and awaited Sandiganbayan approval. The Supreme Court ruled that the people’s right to information and the duty of full public disclosure require revealing all definite negotiating terms, invalidated the agreements for usurping Congress’s taxing power, and upheld equal protection.

[a] ⭐Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 203 SCRA 515:

It was held that voting slips constituting the decision of the members of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board are not private nor confidential because they are made in the exercise of official functions.

Aquino-Sarmiento, an MTRCB member, was barred from inspecting the Board’s voting slips after Chairman Morato and the Board deemed them private in Resolution 10-89. The Supreme Court held that those slips are public records under the constitutional right to information and struck down the resolution.

⭐ Valmonte v. Belmonte, supra:

The Court rejected the contention of GSIS that to give the information would violate the right to confidentiality of the borrower, saying that this is a right personal to the borrower and may not be invoked by the GSIS. Further, the GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were members of the defunct Batasan Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board.

Media practitioners led by Atty. Valmonte sought GSIS records showing which opposition lawmakers got “clean loans” before the 1986 election, but GSIS claimed confidentiality. The Supreme Court held that GSIS loan files are public records under the constitutional right to information, that confidentiality is personal to borrowers, and ordered GSIS to grant access subject to reasonable rules.

[b] ⭐ Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998:

It was held that Sec. 19 of the rules and regulations implementing R.A. 8177, which provides that the manual setting forth the procedure for administering the lethal injection shall be confidential, was unduly suppressive, because the contents of the manual are matters of public concern affecting the lives of the people and such matters naturally arouse the interest of the individual citizen.

Echegaray challenged the secrecy clause in Section 19 of the lethal injection rules, arguing it denied convicts and counsel access to the execution manual. The Court invalidated Section 19, ruling that vital procedures impacting life and public concern must be open to review and cannot be kept confidential.

[c] Re: Request for Live Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, A.M. No. 00-1-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001:

The Supreme Court denied petitioners' request to televise and broadcast live the trial of President Joseph Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.
The Supreme Court said that when the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial race against another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind unbridled by running emotions or passions.
[i] In its resolution on the motion for reconsideration (September 13, 2001), the Court ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, not for live or real-time broadcast. Only later will they be made available for public showing.

[d] Bantay Republic Act No. 7941 (BA-RA) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007:

The Court declared that the COMELEC has the constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.
The right to information is a public right, where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens, to be precise. The right to information and its companion right of access to official records, like all constitutional guarantees, are not absolute. The people's right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Similarly, the policy of public disclosure in Sec. 28, Art. II, is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. As may be noted, however, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.

[e] Hilado v. Reyes, G.R. No. 163155, July 21, 2006:

Where petitioners, who had filed an action for damages against the decedent during his lifetime and whose claims for damages were included in the inventory of liabilities in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate, sought to see the court records and obtain true copies of the inventory of the assets of the deceased but was denied by the probate court, the Supreme Court granted access to the information sought.
The Court held that unlike court orders and decisions, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public concern or interest, and that access to public records may be restricted on a showing of good cause.
In the case at bar, given the rights of the parties based on relevant factors, including the nature of the controversy and the privacy interests involved vis-à-vis the right to information, the purpose of petitioners to monitor the compliance with the rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate is legitimate.

[f] Privatization and Management Office (PMO) v. Strategic Alliance Development Corp., G.R. No. 200402, June 18, 2014:

PMO, then operating the Asset Privatization Trust, held a public bidding to sell Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) properties. On the day of the bidding, the indicative price was announced at ₱7-billion. The respondent gave the highest offer of only ₱1.2-billion. Consequently, PMO rejected all bids.
Respondent filed suit with the RTC, and the RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, saying that PMO's failure to explain the basis of the ₱7-billion indicative price violated the public's right to information.
The Court ruled that respondent cannot successfully anchor its claim on a violation of the public's right to information, because the said right merely gives access to public records, and does not precipitate a positive right to obtain an award of the PNCC properties.

J. Right to form associations.

Sec. 8, Art. III

The right of the people,

including those employed in the public and private sectors,

to form unions, associations or societies

for purposes not contrary to law

shall not be abridged.

The right is reinforced by Sec. 2 (5), Art. IX-B, and Sec. 3, par. 2, Art. XIII.

1. Scope.

The right to form, or join, unions or associations includes the right not to join or, if one is already a member, to disaffiliate from the association.

Volkschel Labor Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 137 SCRA 42:

The right of a labor union to disaffiliate from a labor federation was held to be part of the right to association.

Central Negros Electric Cooperative v. Secretary of Labor, 201 SCRA 584:

The Supreme Court upheld the right of employees of the electric cooperative to withdraw their membership from the cooperative in order to join a labor union.

[a] The right to strike.

However, even if the provision expressly guarantees the right to form unions in public and private sectors, members of the civil service may not declare a strike to enforce economic demands [Alliance of Government Workers v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1;

⭐ Social Security Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686].

SSS employees barricaded their office in June 1987 to demand unpaid benefits, leading the SSS to secure and enforce an RTC injunction, which the Court of Appeals upheld. The Supreme Court affirmed that civil service employees cannot strike because their employment terms are set by law and public service continuity outweighs that part of the right to association.

Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, supra.:

The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association.
The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees was clearly recognized at common law; thus, it has been frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit strikes, either by statute or by judicial decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common law rules.

This was reiterated in Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124540, November 4, 1997, in De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra., and in Acosta v. Court of Appeals, supra.

[i] GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006:

The claim that the right to strike is part of the freedom of expression and the right to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, and should thus be recognized even in the case of government employees, was rejected by the Supreme Court.

2. The right is not absolute.

⭐ People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382:

It was held that the Anti-Subversion Act does not violate this provision, because the purpose of the statute was to outlaw only those organizations aimed at the violent overthrow of the government.
The government has a right to protect itself against subversion.

Tarlac prosecutors charged Co and Tayag in March 1970 under the Anti-Subversion Act for leading groups plotting to overthrow the government, and the trial court quashed the cases as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court overturned that ruling, holding that penalizing only organizations seeking violent overthrow does not violate the right to association or due process.

⭐ Occena v. Comelec, 127 SCRA 404:

It was held that the right to association was not violated when political parties were prohibited from participating in the barangay elections in order to ensure the non-partisanship of candidates; political neutrality is needed to discharge the duties of barangay officials.

Samuel C. Occeña challenged the COMELEC’s ban on political party activity in the December 1980 barangay elections as a violation of his right to form associations. The Supreme Court ruled that the ban is valid because the right to association can be reasonably restricted to ensure non-partisan, impartial local elections.

⭐ Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, supra., reiterated in Gonzales v. Central Azucarera de Tarlac, 139 SCRA 30:

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of R.A. 3350, allowing workers to dissociate from or not to join a labor union despite a closed-shop agreement, if they are members of any religious sect which prohibits affiliation of their members in such labor organization.

United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 122226, March 25, 1998:

It was held that Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which makes managerial employees ineligible to join, assist or form a labor union, does not violate Sec. 8, Art. III of the Constitution.
Those who qualify as top or middle managers are executives who receive from their employers information that is not only confidential but also not generally available to the public, to competitors, or to other employees.

⭐ In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 554:

It was held that compulsory membership of a lawyer in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines does not violate the constitutional guarantee.

Atty. Marcial A. Edillon was removed from the Roll of Attorneys for refusing to pay his IBP membership dues despite repeated notices, comments, and a hearing culminating in his disbarment on August 3, 1978. The Court ruled this sanction did not violate due process because practicing law is a privilege, not a property right, and the Supreme Court has inherent power to regulate the legal profession.

K. Non-impairment clause.

Sec. 10, Art. III:

"No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."

1. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition does not prohibit every change in existing laws.

To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial.
Moreover, the law must effect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other, and not with respect to non-parties [Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association v. Secretary, DILG, G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003].

[a] Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract.

There is substantial impairment when the law:

changes the terms of a legal contract between the parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or
imposes new conditions, or
dispenses with those expressed, or
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms .

Clements v. Nolting, 42 Phil 702.

[b] The purpose of the non-impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State.

As a rule, contracts should not be tampered with by subsequent laws which would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties. x x x There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties [Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013].

[i] In this case, what is challenged is Sec. 47, R.A. 8791 (effective June 13, 2000), which amended Act No. 3135, and provided that juridical persons whose property is sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure shall have the right to redeem the property x x x until, but not after the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds, which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. x x x In upholding the constitutionality of the law, the Supreme Court said that Sec. 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties, but only modified the time for the exercise of the right by reducing the one-year period originally provided by Act 3135. x x x There is also no retroactive application of the new redemption period.

[ii] The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons does not violate the equal protection clause.

The classification is based on the nature of the property foreclosed—whether they are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets.

2. Limitations.

[a] Police Power.

Public welfare is superior to private rights [PNB v. Remigio, G.R. No. 78508, March 21, 1994].

[i] ⭐Ortigas v. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533,

Ortigas & Company sold two lots with annotated residential‐use covenants, but Feati Bank acquired them, secured permits, and erected a commercial building after the municipality rezoned the area for commercial and industrial use. The Supreme Court upheld the municipal zoning resolution over the private covenants, holding that valid police power measures prevail over restrictive covenants without violating the non-impairment clause.

reiterated in Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 719, and in ⭐Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association, 201 SCRA 13, the Supreme Court said that a municipal zoning ordinance is a police measure and prevails over a restriction contained in the title to property.

Bel-Air Village Association sued to stop a pan de sal store on property restricted to residential use and to collect unpaid dues and fees, and the CA affirmed the injunction and assessments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a valid municipal zoning ordinance enacted under police power overrides private covenants without violating the non-impairment clause.

⭐Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323:

B.P. 22 was sustained as not violative of the non-impairment clause, and even if it were, the law was a police measure and therefore superior to contracts.

Florentina Lozano challenged her prosecution under BP 22 for issuing a dishonored check as an unconstitutional impairment of her contract rights. The Supreme Court dismissed her petition, ruling that BP 22 validly exercises the police power to curb a public nuisance and that any contract impairment is justified for the public welfare.

Illusorio v. CAR, 17 SCRA 25:

Pre-existing share tenancy contracts could be validly converted into leasehold tenancy through the valid exercise of police power.

Tiro v. Hontanosas, 125 SCRA 697:

An administrative order discontinuing the assignment of salaries of public school teachers to their creditors was declared not violative of the guarantee, as the latter could still collect its loans after the salaries had been received by the teachers themselves.

Canleon v. Agus Development Corporation, 207 SCRA 748:

B.P. 25, regulating the rentals of dwelling units, was held as a constitutional exercise of the police power, and an exception to the non-impairment clause.

⭐ Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, supra.:

The POEA resolution and memorandum circular increasing and adjusting rates of compensation and other benefits in the POEA Standard Employment Contracts for seafarers, being a valid implementation of E.O. 797 enacted under the police power of the State, prevail over the non-impairment clause.

Licensed manning agencies asked the Court to strike down POEA rules that raised seafarer benefits, claiming POEA exceeded its authority and impaired contracts. The Court upheld the rules as a valid exercise of delegated power under EO 797, held the non-impairment clause subject to police power, and found no equal protection or board-composition flaw.

See also PNB v. Office of the President, supra., where the Supreme Court said that P.D. 957, being a police measure, prevails over the non-impairment clause.

Blaquera v. Alcala, G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998:

It was held that the productivity incentive benefit, limited to only ₱2,000 by Administrative Order No. 29 issued by President Ramos, is in the nature of a bonus which is not a demandable or enforceable obligation.

[ii] Ganzon v. Inserto, 123 SCRA 713:

But it was held that the clause would be violated by the substitution of a mortgage with a security bond as security for the payment of a loan, as this would change the terms and conditions of the original mortgage contract over the mortgagee's objections.

[b] Eminent Domain.

See Kabiling v. NHA, 156 SCRA 623.

Lot owners attacked P.D. No. 1808 for seizing their ALTA Subdivision lots without notice or fair pay. The Court ruled the decree constitutional as a police power measure, requiring publication and compensation, and held contract impairments permissible when protecting public welfare.

[c] Taxation.

See La Insular v. Machuca, 39 Phil. 567.

La Insular added ₱10 per box to cover a new cigarette tax shift under Acts 2432 and 2445, Nubla paid until defaulting on 56 cases, and Machuca stood as surety. The Court ruled that tax increases, as external legislative acts, do not impair contractual obligations or release sureties under the constitutional non-impairment clause.

3. Franchises, privileges, licenses, etc.

These do not come within the context of the provision.
See Sec. 11, Art. XII, which provides that "Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."

⭐ C & M Timber Corporation v. Alcala, supra:

Thus, the Supreme Court, quoting Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190 SCRA 673, declared:

"Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. They merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interest so requires. They are not contracts within the purview of the due process clause."

C & M Timber’s 1972 forest concession was suspended by a 1983 log ban and later cancelled in favor of another company, and all petitions to reinstate it were denied up to the Office of the President. The Supreme Court held that timber licenses are privileges the State can revoke for public welfare and are not protected contracts under the due process clause.

The same principle was reiterated in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, G.R. No. 162243, November 29, 2006.

[a] See also Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC, supra., where the Supreme Court said that all radio and TV stations have franchises, and the challenged provision of the Omnibus Election Code was inserted by Congress in the exercise of this power under Sec. 11, Art. XII of the Constitution.

L. Free access to courts.

Sec. 11, Art. III:

Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies

and adequate legal assistance

shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

1. This is a social justice provision, implemented by the Rules of Court provision allowing "pauper suits."

Note the additional guarantee of "adequate legal assistance."
Read also par. 5, Sec. 5, Art. VIII.

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

M. Miranda Doctrine

Sec. 12, Art. III:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him: Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section, as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

1. Source:

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Ernesto Miranda was arrested in Phoenix, Arizona, in connection with a kidnapping and rape. He was interrogated by police for two hours without being informed of his constitutional rights. During the interrogation, Miranda confessed, and his confession was used as the primary evidence at trial and was convicted based largely on that confession. The Court held that before any custodial interrogation, suspects must be informed:

They have the right to remain silent.
Anything they say can be used against them in court.
They have the right to an attorney.oh
If they cannot afford one, an attorney will be provided.

This decision created the now-famous "Miranda warning" that law enforcement must give before questioning suspects in custody.

2. Rights are available only during custodial investigation.

The rights guaranteed in Sec. 12, Art. III, exist only in "custodial investigation" or "in-custody interrogation of accused persons" [People v. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216], which has been defined as "any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."

⭐ People v. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216:

Ramos, a PAL clerk, voluntarily offered to settle missing ticket funds and answered questions in a noncustodial administrative probe, but the trial court excluded his statements for absent Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 12, Art. III rights apply only in true custodial interrogations and ordered his voluntary administrative statements admitted.

The rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements.

⭐ People v. de la Cruz, G.R. No. 118866-68, September 17, 1997:

Rodolfo de la Cruz was convicted of murdering Teodorico Laroya Jr. and his children based mainly on an extrajudicial confession allegedly signed in the presence of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The interrogation began before De la Cruz was provided counsel. The Court stressed that custodial investigation starts once questioning is directed at a particular suspect already in custody, not merely during general inquiries.

De la Torre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102786, August 14, 1998:

It was reiterated that the Miranda rights apply only from the moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information from the accused.

De la Torre was identified in a MERALCO-theft line-up without being read his Sec. 12, Art. III rights because no questions were put to him. The Supreme Court held that Miranda-type warnings apply only when police start questioning an in-custody suspect, reversed his conviction, and acquitted him for reasonable doubt.

People v. Baloloy, G.R. No. 140740, April 12, 2002:

Thus, it was held that this guarantee does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admitted having committed the offense.
Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect before he was placed under custodial investigation.
In this case, the narration before the Barangay Captain prior to custodial investigation was admissible in evidence, but not the admissions made before Judge Dicon, inasmuch as the questioning by the judge was done after the suspect had been arrested and such questioning already constituted custodial investigation.

[a] R.A. 7438 and the "invitation rule."

Under R.A. 7438, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999:

Thus, it was held that from the time Del Rosario was "invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation.
Because he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers, and because the prosecution failed to establish that Del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions were inadmissible against him.

Joselito Del Rosario was “invited” by police to answer questions about a fatal robbery and made admissions without being informed of his right to remain silent or have counsel. The Supreme Court held that under R.A. 7438 and the Constitution, custodial investigation rights begin at the point of invitation, so his unwarned statements were inadmissible and required his acquittal.

People v. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000:

The Supreme Court held that custodial investigation began when the accused Ordono and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess, and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information from them.

Ordono and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol station and answered police questions that drew out confessions without being informed of their right to silence or counsel. The Supreme Court held that under R.A. 7438 custodial-investigation rights attach at the first question aimed at eliciting admissions, so unwarned statements must be excluded and cannot support a conviction.

People v. Lugod, G.R. No. 136253, February 21, 2001:

It was held that the accused should have been entitled to the Miranda rights, because even assuming that he was not yet under interrogation at the time he was brought to the police station, his confession was elicited by a police officer who promised to help him if he told the truth.
Furthermore, when he allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, the atmosphere was highly intimidating and not conducive to a spontaneous response as the whole police force and nearly 100 townspeople escorted him there. Not having the benefit of counsel and not having been informed of his rights, the confession is inadmissible.

Lugod was handcuffed, promised assistance, questioned without warnings, and forced to identify the body under escort by police and townspeople. The Supreme Court held that his right to Miranda-type warnings attached once officers began eliciting his confession, making the statements inadmissible and requiring his acquittal.

People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001:

When the accused was brought to the station and made to sign the confiscation (of the marijuana) report, he was already under custodial investigation.

Pasudag was brought to the police station, questioned about marijuana plants found in his garden, and made to sign a confiscation report without Miranda warnings or counsel. The Supreme Court held that signing the report during station questioning constituted custodial investigation, requiring Miranda rights, and reversed his conviction.

[b] Police Line-up.

A police line-up is not considered a part of any custodial inquest, because it is conducted before that stage of investigation is reached [People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999].

People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999

Bravo was placed in a station line-up where an eyewitness picked him out as a robber without any police questioning or Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court ruled that line-ups precede custodial interrogation, so Section 12 rights do not apply and the identification evidence stands.

People v. Amestuzo, G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001:

Reiterates this rule, because in a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory stage, and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.

In February 1991, Bagas was arrested on suspicion of taking part in a violent home invasion and was brought alone before the complainants for an out-of-court identification at the police station without the benefit of counsel after a co-accused, under police pressure, pointed him out. The Supreme Court held that a police line-up is still part of the investigatory stage and does not trigger the right to counsel, yet the one-on-one “show-up” was unduly suggestive and, coupled with Bagas’s corroborated alibi, created reasonable doubt warranting his acquittal.

People v. Piedad, G.R. No. 131923, December 5, 2002:

It was held that the right to counsel accrues only after an investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and commences an interrogation aimed at a particular subject who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would now propound questions.

The accused were taken into custody on suspicion of murder and shown one by one to eyewitnesses in a police line-up at the station without a lawyer present during the investigatory phase. The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel under the Constitution only arises once police questioning stops being a general fact-gathering inquiry and becomes an accusatory interrogation of a specific suspect, so the line-up in the investigatory stage did not violate that right.

People v. Dagpin, G.R. No. 149560, June 10, 2004:

Thus, where three eyewitnesses identified the accused at the police station as the person who shot the victim at the scene of the crime, the accused cannot claim that he was deprived of his constitutional rights even if he was without counsel at the time, because he was not yet then under custodial investigation.

Three eyewitnesses at the police station identified Quirico Dagpin in a one-on-one “show-up” line-up—without counsel present—shortly after he was held on suspicion of fatally shooting Nilo Caermare, even though he had not yet been subjected to formal custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court held that because the line-up occurred during the investigatory stage and before any accusatory questioning of a specific suspect, Dagpin’s right to counsel was not infringed.

[i] People v. Escordial, G.R. Nos. 138934-35, January 16, 2002:

However, where the accused, having become the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, it was held that when the out-of-court identification was conducted by the police, the accused was already under custodial investigation.

[ii] An out-of-court identification may be made:

in a "show-up" (where the accused is brought face to face with the witness for identification), or
in a "police line-up" (where the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose).
During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution", necessitating the presence of counsel for the accused.
This is because the result of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the fate of the accused and reduce the trial to a mere formality."
Thus, any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up or in a show-up after the start of custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence against him.

People v. Escordial, G.R. Nos. 138934-35, January 16, 2002

After a December 27 1996 robbery-rape in Bacolod, Anthony Escordial was identified in a Pontevedra show-up and Bacolod line-ups without counsel or Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court held that any uncounseled show-up or line-up following custodial investigation is inadmissible, reversed his conviction, and acquitted him for reasonable doubt.

[c] Investigations not considered custodial interrogation.

Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175:

A person under normal audit investigation is not under custodial investigation, because an audit examiner can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the rule.

Ernesto Navallo, a school collecting and disbursing officer, was found short of public funds during a routine audit and signed the audit examiner’s report without a lawyer present. The Supreme Court held that a normal audit investigation is not a custodial interrogation by law enforcement, so Navallo’s right to counsel under the Constitution was not triggered.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Sumilang, 271 SCRA 316:

Because the Court Administrator is not a law enforcement officer, an investigation conducted by him does not constitute custodial investigation within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee.

Judge Augusto Sumilang and several court employees were subjected to an on-the-spot audit and administrative investigation by the Office of the Court Administrator, during which they were questioned and required to sign affidavits without the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court ruled that because the Court Administrator is not a law enforcement officer, such administrative probes do not constitute custodial interrogation and therefore do not trigger the constitutional right to counsel.

Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 137473, August 02, 2001:

An investigation conducted by the Civil Service Commission involving fake eligibility is not custodial investigation.

Remolona, accused of using falsified eligibility documents, was summoned by the Civil Service Commission for an administrative inquiry and questioned without counsel present. The Supreme Court ruled that a CSC investigation is purely administrative—not a custodial interrogation by law enforcement—so the constitutional right to counsel did not apply.

[i] Carlos Tanengge v. People, G.R. No. 179458, June 26, 2013:

An administrative inquiry conducted by the employer in connection with an irregularity/anomaly allegedly committed by an employee is not custodial investigation; thus, a written statement given by the employee during such inquiry is admissible in evidence.

Carlos Tanengge, a Metrobank branch manager accused of orchestrating irregular loans uncovered in an internal audit, was summoned by the bank’s internal affairs unit—alongside two police officers—and asked to sign a written statement about the anomaly without a lawyer present. The Supreme Court held that such an employer-led administrative inquiry is not a custodial interrogation by law enforcement, so the right to counsel did not attach and the statement was admissible in evidence.

People v. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001:

Where, after an audit, the accused was summoned to appear before the Assistant Accountant of MetroBank and, in the course of the interview, accused admitted having issued the subject cashier's checks without any legitimate transaction, the written confession was held admissible in evidence inasmuch as the interview did not constitute custodial investigation.

Abelardo Salonga was summoned by Metrobank’s assistant accountant following an internal audit of missing cashier’s checks, and during the interview without a lawyer present he admitted issuing the checks without any legitimate transaction. The Supreme Court held that this administrative inquiry was not a custodial investigation by law enforcement, so his written confession was admissible in evidence.

[ii] Ladiana v. People, G.R. No. 144293, December 24, 2002:

It was held that the counter-affidavit submitted by the respondent during preliminary investigation is admissible in evidence, because preliminary investigation is not part of custodial investigation.
The interrogation by the police, if any, would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court or in the public prosecutor's office.

Josue R. Ladiana, a police officer charged with homicide, filed a counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation before the Sandiganbayan—without a lawyer present—in which he admitted shooting the victim and claimed self-defense. The Supreme Court held that a preliminary investigation is not a custodial interrogation by law enforcement, so the right to counsel had not yet attached and his admission was admissible.

People v. Manzano, G.R. No. 86555, November 16, 1993:

It was held that when an arrested person signs a booking sheet and an arrest report at the police station, he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance.
The booking sheet is no more than a record of arrest and a statement on how the arrest was made. It is simply a police report, and it has no probative value as an extrajudicial statement of the person being detained.
The signing by the accused of the booking sheet and the arrest report is not a part of custodial investigation.

Augusto Manzano was arrested in a buy-bust operation for allegedly selling marijuana and was asked to sign a booking sheet and arrest report at the station without a lawyer present. The Supreme Court ruled that those documents are merely records of arrest and not formal police questioning, so signing them does not trigger the right to counsel and cannot be used as a confession.

[iii] ⭐ People v. Endino, G.R. No. 133026, February 20, 2001:

The Supreme Court ruled that the admission of the videotaped confession is proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen.
Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to solicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. There was no showing that the interview was coerced or against his will.
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions.

Gerry Galgarin, arrested for the murder of Dennis Aquino, voluntarily confessed on live TV to stabbing Aquino and implicating Edward Endino. The Supreme Court ruled that this public, non-police interview was not a custodial interrogation and was properly admitted, but reminded courts to scrutinize televised confessions closely.

[iv] Spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement officers, but given in an ordinary manner where the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense, are admissible.

People v. Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004

Eric Guillermo was arrested after brutally killing and dismembering his employer, and before any formal police questioning or custodial investigation he voluntarily told a security guard and later television reporters in ordinary conversations that he had committed the crime and even described how he did it. The Supreme Court ruled that such spontaneous admissions, made without elicitation by law enforcement officers, do not amount to custodial interrogation and are therefore admissible in evidence despite the absence of counsel.

Benjamin Jesalva v. People, G.R. No. 187725, January 19, 2011

Jesalva voluntarily went to the station, told police without being questioned that his passenger jumped from his vehicle, and pointed out the crime scene. The Supreme Court held that unsolicited, spontaneous statements are not custodial interrogation, so no Miranda warnings were required and his conviction was affirmed.

[d] The rights guaranteed by this provision refer to testimonial compulsion only.

People v. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615

A ten-year-old pupil saw Ms. Aguinaldo stabbed, later identified Paynor in a police lineup and in court, and Paynor was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial compulsion, not to non-testimonial physical identifications, and therefore upheld the conviction.

3. What rights are available.

The rights under the Miranda Doctrine which a person under custodial investigation is entitled to are:

To remain silent
To competent and independent counsel [preferably of his own choice] at all stages of the investigation
To be informed of such rights
Rights cannot be waived except in writing and signed by the person in the presence of his counsel
No torture, force, etc., which vitiates the free will shall be used
Secret detention places, etc., are prohibited
Confessions/admissions obtained in violation of rights are inadmissible in evidence.

[a] To remain silent

If the suspect refuses to give a statement, no adverse inference shall be made from his refusal to answer questions.

[b] To competent and independent counsel [preferably of his own choice] at all stages of the investigation

People v. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261

Usman Hassan, a 15-year-old pushcart cargador accused of stabbing Ramon Pichel Jr., was arrested and then brought alone into a police-arranged confrontation with the sole eyewitness at a funeral parlor without being allowed any legal counsel. The Supreme Court held that denying him competent, independent counsel—preferably of his own choice—at the critical identification stage violated his constitutional right to counsel at all stages of the investigation and warranted his acquittal.

;

People v. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47

Guillermo Layuso, a carpenter accused of robbing and killing a maid during a home invasion, was arrested and gave a detailed extrajudicial confession in the presence of a court-appointed lawyer. The Supreme Court held that his right to competent and independent counsel at all stages was met by the lawyer’s actual presence during the confession, making the statement admissible and affirming his conviction (with the death penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua).

If he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided (by the Government) with one.

[i] The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.

⭐ Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642:

The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent.
At that point, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions from the lips of the person undergoing investigation.

Christopher Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy and identified in a police line-up where he was confronted by the complainant without counsel present before any formal questioning. The Supreme Court ruled his right to counsel had not yet attached because no custodial interrogation occurred at the line-up stage, but stressed that counsel must be provided once officers begin eliciting admissions.

[ia] The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

People v. Enanoria, 209 SCRA 577;

Alfredo Enanoria, accused of kidnapping for ransom with murder, voluntarily gave detailed out-of-court statements at the hospital, police station, and Criminal Investigation Service office while assisted by a court-appointed lawyer he had chosen. The Supreme Court held that his right to competent and independent counsel at all investigative stages was honored by the lawyer’s presence—so long as counsel does not prevent the accused from freely telling the truth—making his statements admissible.

People v. Continente, G.R. No. 100801, August 25, 2000

Donato B. Continente and Juanito T. Itaas, arrested for the April 1989 ambush that killed U.S. Col. James N. Rowe and wounded his driver, were each informed of their right to counsel, waived that right in writing before lawyers they chose, and then gave detailed extrajudicial confessions during the CIS investigation. The Supreme Court held that providing competent, independent counsel at every stage—so long as the lawyer does not prevent the accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth—satisfied the constitutional guarantee and rendered their confessions admissible.

Indeed, as an officer of the Court, it is an attorney's duty, first and foremost, to seek the truth. However, counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The duty of the lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time.

People v. Sayaboc, G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004

Benjamin Sayaboc was charged with murder and gave an extrajudicial confession in the presence of a court-appointed lawyer who stayed silent and made no meaningful effort to advise him or protect his rights during custodial questioning. The Supreme Court ruled that an accused is entitled to competent, independent, and proactive counsel—who must explain the nature of the questions, halt the interrogation if necessary, and ensure the suspect knows and can invoke the right to remain silent—and held Sayaboc’s confession inadmissible because his lawyer failed in this duty.

People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 145176, March 30, 2004:

Thus, where the lawyer merely affixed his signature to the confession as "saksi", or as witness, and he testified that he had not assisted the accused when the latter was investigated by the police, the extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.

In People v. Peralta, the accused were charged with qualified theft after Ulysses Garcia signed extrajudicial confessions at the police station that bore only the signature of his lawyer as a witness and did not reflect any assistance during questioning. The Supreme Court held that because counsel had merely attested as a witness and did not provide actual legal assistance, the confessions violated the accused’s right to competent and independent counsel and were inadmissible in evidence.

[ib] When the accused is brought to the police station only to be identified by a witness, technically, he is not yet under custodial investigation.

People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1

Glenn Hatton, accused of murder, was brought to the police station solely for an eyewitness to view and identify him—without any questioning by officers or legal counsel present. The Supreme Court held that such a mere identification procedure is not a custodial investigation and thus does not trigger the right to counsel.

People v. Buntan, 221 SCRA 421:

Thus, inasmuch as all that the police investigator did was to show the suspect the victim's sister and the latter's sworn statement identifying him as one of the two suspects in the killing, and the police had not started questioning, interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect, the right to counsel may not yet be validly invoked.

Police officers brought Buntan to the station to stand before the victim’s sister and showed him her sworn statement identifying him as one of the two suspects, but they asked him no questions and did not seek a confession. The Supreme Court held that because no custodial interrogation or formal questioning had begun, the right to counsel had not yet attached and thus could not be validly invoked at that stage.

⭐ People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262:

However, where, while being conducted to the police station on board the police jeep, the accused made an extrajudicial confession that he had killed the victim — inasmuch as the uncounselled confession was the sole basis of the judgment of conviction, it was held that the trial court committed a reversible error.
While on board the police jeep, the accused was deemed to have been already under custodial investigation, and should have been informed of his rights.

Ramon Bolanos was convicted of murder by the trial court based mainly on his oral admission made inside a police vehicle, where he allegedly confessed to killing the victim while already under custody. The Supreme Court acquitted him, ruling that the confession was inadmissible since it was obtained without counsel during custodial investigation, in violation of his rights.

[ic] The right to counsel is not required in a police line-up, inasmuch as police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest.

Neither may this right be invoked when the suspect is given a paraffin test, as he is not yet under custodial investigation

⭐ People v. de Guzman, 224 SCRA 93;

Victor Nuñez, Jr. was identified as one of the gunmen in the 1989 ambush in Cebu City that killed Major Antonio Carteciano and two others, and he claimed that his constitutional rights were violated when he was subjected to a paraffin test and police lineup without counsel. The Supreme Court held that his Miranda rights were not violated since the right to counsel applies only during custodial interrogation intended to elicit admissions, not during physical examinations or pre-investigation lineups, and thus affirmed his conviction.

People v. Lamsing, 248 SCRA 471:

Rene Lamsing was arrested by police four days after a security guard’s killing and, without counsel present, was brought to the station for a lineup where eyewitnesses identified him as one of the assailants. The Supreme Court held that police line-ups, like merely photographing or paraffin testing a suspect, occur during the investigatory stage—not custodial interrogation—and therefore do not require the right to counsel or Miranda warnings.

The suspect is likewise not entitled to the Miranda rights when he is merely photographed or paraffin-tested.

[id] People v. Ordono, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000:

But it was held that a custodial investigation commenced when the accused Ordono and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess, and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information from them.
At that point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically attached to them.
When, because of the non-availability of practicing lawyers in that remote town, no counsel could be provided, the police should have already desisted from continuing with the interrogation, even if the accused gave consent to the investigation. The presence of the parish priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol, as well as the relatives of the accused, did not cure in any way the absence of a lawyer during the investigation.
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the accused's parents, older brothers or sisters, spouse, the Mayor, Municipal Judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by the accused may be present, R.A. 7438 does not propose that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute of counsel without any condition. It is explicitly provided that before the above-mentioned persons can appear, two conditions must be met, namely:
[a] counsel of the accused is absent; and
[b] a valid waiver had been executed.
In the absence of a valid waiver, none of the above-named persons can stand in lieu of counsel.

[ii] The modifier "competent and independent" in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to assure the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

The desired role of lawyer in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning.
If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.

People v. Suela, G.R. Nos. 133570-71, January 15, 2002

Nerio and Edgar Suela, along with Edgardo Batocan, were accused of robbery with homicide. While in police custody, each voluntarily offered an extrajudicial confession at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines office, accompanied by court-appointed counsel. The lawyers present—particularly Atty. Sansano for the Suela brothers—never fully explained the nature, potential penalties, or practical impact of waiving the right to remain silent and to have counsel. Instead, they provided only cursory, perfunctory advice, remaining passive during the interrogation process. The Supreme Court found that this fell short of the “competent and independent” assistance mandated by Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and thus the confessions were not made with an informed, voluntary waiver of rights.

To be competent and independent, it is only required for the lawyer to be "willing to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights"

People v. Bagnate, G.R. Nos. 133685-86, May 20, 2004

Amado Bagnate was taken into custody for the murder of his grandmother and the rape-homicide of her niece, and during the investigation he was informed of his rights in the Bicol dialect and opted for the police-provided counsel, Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, who privately explained, translated, and reviewed each question and the written confession before Bagnate signed it. The Supreme Court held that Brotamonte’s assistance was “competent and independent” because he actively safeguarded Bagnate’s constitutional rights rather than merely reciting them, making the confession admissible even though the lawyer did not advise on the possible death penalty.

People v. Porio, G.R. No. 117202, February 13, 2002

Deorito Porio was accused of raping and strangling 11-year-old Riza Cleodoro and, during custodial interrogation, was informed in Tagalog of his rights and privately assisted by Atty. Juanito Atienza—who translated each question and fully explained Porio’s constitutional guarantees—before Porio signed a written confession. The Supreme Court ruled that Atienza’s thorough, protective guidance met the Constitution’s “competent and independent” standard—going beyond a mere recital of rights—and therefore upheld the confession’s admissibility.

[iia] People v. Lucero, 244 SCRA 425:

Thus, the Court held that the petitioner was denied the right to counsel where the lawyer, not counsel of choice, arrived at the CIS headquarters around 9pm, the second night of appellant's detention, talked to the appellant about his rights, left the appellant in the custody of CIS agents during the actual interrogation, and then came back the next day for examination and signature of the statement of the appellant.

Alejandro Lucero was detained by the CIS on suspicion of robbery with homicide where the lawyer assigned—who was not his counsel of choice—only arrived around 9:00 p.m. on the second night, explained his rights, then left him with investigators during the interrogation and returned only the next day to review and sign his statement. The Supreme Court held that this attendance fell short of the Constitution’s “competent and independent” standard, denying him effective counsel and requiring reversal of his conviction.

People v. Morial, G.R. No. 129295, August 15, 2001:

A similar conclusion was reached where the lawyer left after about 30 minutes from the start of the investigation with instructions that before the accused signs an extrajudicial statement, it should be shown to him first.

The accused was provided counsel by Atty. Tobias Aguilar during his custodial interrogation for robbery with homicide, but the lawyer left about thirty minutes into the questioning—leaving instructions that any prepared statement be shown to him before signing and only returned later to review and witness the confession. The Supreme Court ruled that this discontinuous assistance fell short of the Constitution’s demand for competent and independent counsel, rendering the extrajudicial confession inadmissible.

People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999:

The mere pro forma appointment of a counsel de officio who fails to genuinely protect the interest of the accused merits disapprobation.

Rufino Bermas, accused of raping his daughter, was arraigned without private counsel and was successively assigned three court-appointed lawyers who either withdrew, failed to prepare, or otherwise neglected to defend him during critical stages of his case. The Supreme Court held that these mere pro forma appointments, which fell far short of genuinely safeguarding the accused’s rights, violated the Constitution’s guarantee of competent and independent counsel and ordered the case remanded for a new trial.

[iib] Not independent counsel.

People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 565:

The Supreme Court stressed that the Constitution requires that the counsel be independent.
Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney, whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
As legal officer of the municipality, it is seriously doubted whether a municipal attorney can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interest.

Aurelio Bandula was arrested after plantation guards identified him in a lineup and he signed a confession before the municipal attorney without counsel at the start of interrogation. The Supreme Court ruled that only an independent lawyer can validly assist during custodial questioning, threw out the confession, and acquitted him.

People v. Januario, 267 SCRA 608:

It was held that there was a violation of this provision where the counsel who assisted the accused in the custodial investigation conducted by the NBI was an applicant for employment with the NBI, as he, in fact, joined the NBI a few months later.

Rene Januario and Efren Canape were detained by the NBI for carnapping and homicide and during their custodial interrogation were assisted by Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was then applying for—and a few months later joined—the NBI rather than a truly independent lawyer. The Supreme Court held that Saunar could not be considered independent counsel as the Constitution requires, making the confessions inadmissible and warranting the appellants’ acquittal.

People v. Espanola, infra.

The Supreme Court declared that the City Legal Officer was not an independent counsel within the purview of the constitutional provision.
See also People v. Labtan, G.R. No. 127497, December 8, 1999.

Orlando Labtan and his co-accused Henry Feliciano and Jonelto Labtan were held for highway robbery and robbery with homicide, and during their custodial interrogation they signed a three-page extrajudicial confession in the presence of Atty. Pepito Chavez—a court-appointed counsel de officio who was regularly paid by the police, arrived late, merely recited their rights, and then notarized the statement.
The Supreme Court held that Chavez’s perfunctory, pro forma involvement and close ties to law enforcement fell short of the Constitution’s demand for competent and independent counsel, rendering the confession inadmissible and reversing their convictions.

People v. Velarde, G.R. No. 139933, July 18, 2002

Neither can the Mayor be considered an independent counsel, because as Mayor his duties were inconsistent with his responsibilities to the suspect.

Jorge Velarde was arrested on drug possession charges and, during his custodial interrogation, the police brought in the municipal mayor—who also happened to be a lawyer—to explain Velarde’s right to remain silent and to counsel, and to witness his written statement. The Supreme Court held that the mayor could not qualify as an independent counsel because his official duties and loyalties as mayor were inherently inconsistent with the obligation to act solely in the accused’s best interests.

People v. Taliman, G.R. No. 109143, October 11, 2000

Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayan, and Amado B. Belano were detained for the murder of a caretaker and, during their custodial interrogation, were “assisted” by Nicolas V. Pardo—then serving as municipal mayor—who explained their rights and witnessed their extra-judicial confessions. The Supreme Court held that Pardo’s official duties as mayor conflicted with the need for truly independent counsel, rendering him neither competent nor independent under the Constitution and invalidating the confessions.

[iic] People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117629, December 4, 1997:

However, the mere fact that the lawyer was a retired member of the Judge Advocate's Office does not cast any doubt on his impartiality in assisting the accused during custodial investigation.

[iii] The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.

People v. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450

Elias Barasina was arrested after witnesses saw him shoot City Fiscal Mayo and he confessed in writing with the municipal attorney present. The Supreme Court held that “preferably of his own choice” allows—but does not require—exclusive choice of counsel, affirmed the conviction, and warned that only a clear conflict or explicit objection would bar appointed counsel.

People v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 128287, February 2, 1999:

Thus, it was held that the right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personally hire his own counsel.
The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation, or appointed by the court upon petition by said person or by someone on his behalf.

Rizal Espiritu voluntarily surrendered to the police on suspicion of murder and, with Atty. Mangallay standing by—who had been retained by Espiritu’s uncle rather than hired directly by Espiritu—he gave and signed an Ilocano confession during custodial questioning. The Supreme Court held that this satisfied the Constitution’s requirement for competent and independent counsel because the lawyer was properly engaged on Espiritu’s behalf and actively safeguarded his rights, rendering the confession admissible.

[iiia] While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel — or where his preferred lawyer is not available — is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one.

A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel's appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer

People v. Jerez, G.R. No. 114385, January 19, 1998

Efren Jerez was accused of robbery with double homicide and signed an extrajudicial confession in the presence of Atty. Augusto Schneider—appointed as his counsel after his chosen lawyer was unavailable—and before the municipal mayor, following a full explanation of his rights. The Supreme Court held that the appointment of counsel de officio satisfied the constitutional guarantee of competent and independent counsel even though the accused did not personally hire him, rendering the confession admissible.

People v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 113684, January 25, 2000

Armando Gallardo and his co-accused gave written confessions in Ilocano during custodial interrogation, assisted by Atty. Rolando Velasco—engaged to translate and safeguard their rights though not personally retained by them—and signed before the investigating magistrate. The Court ruled that the right to counsel is fulfilled when a lawyer is engaged by anyone on the accused’s behalf rather than personally hired, upholding the admissibility of their confessions.

People v. Continente, G.R. No. 100801, August 25, 2000

Donato B. Continente and Juanito T. Itaas were charged with murder and frustrated murder in the ambush killing of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe and executed waivers and confessions during interrogation in the presence of court-appointed counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed that the Constitution does not require the accused to personally hire counsel—appointment or engagement by another suffices to satisfy the right to competent and independent counsel—thus upholding the validity of their confessions.

[iiib] People v. Alberto, G.R. No. 132374, August 22, 2002:

Thus, where the accused was not asked whether he wishes or can afford to retain his own lawyer, but was merely told that Atty. Cimafranca was a lawyer and asked if he needed his services, it was clear that he was not made aware that he could choose his own lawyer other than the one assigned by the police.’

[iv] Confession obtained after charges had already been filed.

People v. Espanola, G.R. No. 119308, April 18, 1997:

The policemen brought accused Paquingan to the Prosecutor's Office as the accused manifested his desire to confess. But when the notes were transcribed, accused refused to sign, and only the lawyers who assisted him signed the confession.
It appeared, however, that when the Prosecutor took the confession, an information for rape with homicide had already been filed against Paquingan and his co-accused. Although Paquingan was no longer under custodial investigation when he gave his confession because charges had already been filed against him, nonetheless, the Supreme Court said that the right to counsel still applies in certain pre-trial proceedings that are considered "critical stages" in the criminal process.
Custodial interrogation before or after charges have been filed, and non-custodial interrogation after the accused has been formally charged, are considered "critical pre-trial stages" in the criminal process.

After an information charging rape with homicide had been filed, the accused were brought to the City Prosecutor’s Office to confess but were assisted only by the City Legal Officer—who had not been chosen by them and whose duties to the city compromised his independence—and the confession notes were signed by the lawyers when the accused refused to sign. The Supreme Court held that this arrangement failed the Constitution’s requirement for competent and independent counsel during a critical pretrial stage, making the confession invalid.

[c] To be informed of such rights

[i] People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289:

The Supreme Court said that this contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.

Nelia Nicandro was arrested for selling marijuana and, before custodial questioning, the police merely recited her right to remain silent and to counsel without explaining what those rights meant. The Supreme Court held that informing a suspect requires a meaningful transmission of information—not just a ceremonial recital of abstract constitutional principles.

People v. Cañeja, 208 SCRA 842:

The Supreme Court, reiterating the foregoing, said that making the accused read his constitutional rights is simply not enough.
The prosecution must show that the accused understood what he read, and that he understood the consequences of his waiver.

The accused was made to read a Miranda-style warning before confessing. The Supreme Court reiterated that simply having a suspect read his rights is not enough; the prosecution must prove the suspect actually understood those rights and the consequences of waiving them.

⭐ People v. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541:

It was held that the right to be informed carries with it the correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed.
Since it is comprehension sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation.

Jaime Agustin was arrested without a warrant and gave an admission after only a perfunctory warning and assistance by a non-independent lawyer speaking a language he barely understood. The Supreme Court acquitted him, ruling that investigators must fully explain rights in terms the accused can understand and secure a proper written waiver before any statement is admissible.

See also: People v. Manriquez, G.R. No. 122510, March 17, 2000

Heracleo Manriquez and Gregorio Canoy were arrested for murdering two Metrodiscom agents, were duly informed of their rights, voluntarily waived them in writing with a Public Assistance Office lawyer’s help, and then executed extra-judicial confessions. The Supreme Court ruled that such written waivers, made in the presence of counsel after being informed of their rights, satisfied the Constitution’s requirement to be informed and upheld the admissibility of their confessions.

People v. Samolde, G.R. No. 128551, July 31, 2000.

Ramil Samolde was charged with killing a police corporal and signed an extrajudicial confession following only a brief, formulaic recitation of his rights. The Supreme Court held that his confession was inadmissible because he was not adequately informed of his right to remain silent and to have counsel—underscoring that rote recitals do not satisfy the constitutional mandate for meaningful warnings.

[ii] People v. Sayaboc, G.R. No. 147201, January 15, 2004:

The Court said that the right to be informed should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of his rights.
More so, when the suspect is like Sayaboc, who had an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.

Benjamin Sayaboc, who had only a fourth-grade education and had been held by police for two days on another matter, was brought before the prosecutor, read his rights, and then confessed. The Supreme Court declared that informing a suspect must give him a real opportunity to consider the effects and consequences of waiving his rights—especially when he is poorly educated, unfamiliar with the area, and under prolonged police control—and invalidated confessions obtained without such meaningful explanation.

[d] Rights cannot be waived except in writing and signed by the person in the presence of his counsel.

[i] Sec. 2(d), R.A. 7438, provides that any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation shall be:

in writing and
signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or, in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him;

otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.

[e] No torture, force, etc., which vitiates the free will shall be used.

[i] Where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion, duress, or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against the alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim—all these should be considered factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.

People v. Bagnate, G.R. Nos. 133685-86, May 20, 2004

[f] Secret detention places, etc., are prohibited.

Secret detention places
Solitary
Incommunicado
or other similar forms of detention

[g] Confessions/admissions obtained in violation of rights are inadmissible in evidence.

[i] There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this section, namely:

coerced confessions, the product of third-degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2; and
uncounselled statements given without the benefit of the Miranda warning, which are the subject of paragraph 1.

People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, May 02, 2002

Jorge Vallejo was arrested for drug possession and signed a written confession in custody under circumstances that left doubt about whether he was fully informed of his rights. The Supreme Court held that any statement obtained without clear proof of an informed, voluntary waiver is inadmissible and upheld the conviction on DNA evidence instead of the tainted confession.

[ii] Note that the alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused during custodial investigation is relevant and material only where an extrajudicial confession or admission from the accused becomes the basis of conviction.

National Bureau of Investigation v. Judge Ramon Reyes, A.M.-MTJ-97-1120, February 21, 2000

The NBI initiated administrative discipline against Judge Reyes based on a witness statement allegedly secured through bribery. The Court ruled that information procured by improper means—such as bribery or coercion—cannot serve as a valid foundation for any judicial or quasi-judicial decision.

[iii] ⭐ People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262:

While being conducted to the police station on board the police jeep, the accused made an extrajudicial confession that he had killed the victim.
Inasmuch as this uncounselled confession was the sole basis of the judgment of conviction, the lower court committed a reversible error.
While on board the police jeep, the accused was already under custodial investigation and should have been informed of his rights.

⭐ People v. de la Cruz, 224 SCRA 506:

Where appellant, after having been apprehended but without the assistance of counsel, volunteered information that he had killed his wife and even led the authorities to the place where he allegedly buried the deceased (which yielded eight bones after the police had dug the site), it was held that the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is inadmissible for failure to comply with the constitutional requirements.

Carlos de la Cruz was charged with rape and homicide after allegedly assaulting a minor and later killing her mother, but his confession to the murder was obtained without legal counsel during custodial investigation. The Supreme Court ruled that the confession and resulting evidence were inadmissible under Miranda Rights, leading to his acquittal for homicide but affirming his conviction for rape.

People v. Bonola, G.R. No. 116394, June 19, 1997:

It was held that the 1973 Constitution did not distinguish between verbal and non-verbal confessions; as long as the confession is uncounselled, it is inadmissible in evidence.
What is sought to be avoided by the rule is "the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him."

Bonola gave both verbal and non-verbal confessions during custodial interrogation without benefit of counsel or proper warnings. The Supreme Court held that under the 1973 Constitution any uncounselled confession—regardless of form—is inadmissible to prevent extracting the very evidence used to convict the accused.

People v. Bernardino, 193 SCRA 44:

It was held that the verbal admission made by the accused that he sold marijuana to Joson is inadmissible in evidence because the accused had not been properly informed of the Miranda rights.

Bernardino verbally admitted selling marijuana but was never properly informed of his Miranda rights before making the statement. The Court declared that such uncounselled admissions are inadmissible in evidence.

People v. Morada, G.R. No. 129723, May 19, 1999:

The Supreme Court held that the verbal confession of the accused to Barangay Captain Manimbao was made in the course of custodial investigation.
Accordingly, the confession was inadmissible in evidence.

Morada confessed verbally to a barangay captain during custodial investigation without receiving any warning or access to counsel. The Supreme Court ruled that any admission made in custody without proper Miranda-type warnings is inadmissible.

People v. Samolde, G.R. No. 128551, July 31, 2000:

Even as the extrajudicial confession was in writing and signed by counsel, because the accused was not given the Miranda warnings [i.e., informed of his right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him, and that he is entitled to the assistance of counsel], the confession was held inadmissible in evidence.

Samolde signed a written confession witnessed by counsel but was never told of his right to remain silent or to have a lawyer before questioning. The Court held that without those fundamental warnings, even a written, signed confession cannot be admitted in evidence.

[iv] ⚡ People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997:

But the Supreme Court held that the voluntary but uncounselled confession of the accused to the Mayor and to the media was admissible in evidence.
In this case, it was noted that it was the accused who freely, spontaneously, and voluntarily sought the Mayor for a private meeting, and the Mayor did not know that the accused was going to confess his guilt.
The accused talked with the Mayor as a confidant, not as a law enforcement officer.
The confession made by the accused to the news reporters was likewise free of undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed the accused; they were not acting under the direction and control of the police.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime.

Pablito Andan was accused of raping and killing a student, and although he was illegally interrogated by the police without counsel, he later voluntarily confessed to the mayor and to media reporters, even reenacting the crime. The Supreme Court ruled that his confessions to the police were inadmissible for violating his Miranda rights, but those made spontaneously to the mayor and the media were valid and admissible, thus sustaining his conviction.

Confessions to the police: Inadmissible.

These were made during custodial investigation without being informed of his rights and without counsel, violating Section 12 of Article III.

Confession to the mayor: Admissible.

It was a spontaneous and voluntary admission, not the result of police interrogation, and the mayor did not act as a law enforcement interrogator.

Confessions to media: Admissible.

Statements given to reporters were voluntary, not made during custodial interrogation, and thus outside the protection of the constitutional rule.

People v. Domantay, G.R. No. 130612, May 11, 1999:

The Supreme Court said that oral confessions made to newsmen are not covered by Sec. 12, Art. III.
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relationship between a private individual and another individual. Rather, it governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are addressed primarily to the State and its agents.
As to the requirement that the extrajudicial confession must be corroborated by other evidence, the Court said that there was the corpus delicti which corroborated the extrajudicial confession.

Domantay gave an oral confession of murder to newspaper reporters who broadcast his statements without any police or government agent present. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution’s Miranda-type safeguards apply only to custodial interrogation by state actors, so private confessions fall outside Section 12, Article III, and may be admitted if corroborated by evidence such as the corpus delicti.

[v] People v. Ordono, supra:

Likewise, the taped interview taken by the DZNL radio announcer, offered as part of the testimony of the said announcer, where admissions were made by the accused who even expressed remorse for having committed the crime, was admitted in evidence. On the strength of such testimony, the accused were convicted.

People v. Abulencia, G.R. No. 138403, August 22, 2001:

The confession made by the accused in a taped radio interview over Radio Bombo was held admissible in evidence, as "it was not shown that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear."

Abulencia confessed to killing his wife during a live, taped radio interview with a civilian reporter over Radio Bombo. The Court ruled the confession admissible because the reporter was not acting under police direction and there was no showing that Abulencia spoke out of fear or coercion.

[vi] People v. Maingan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2008:

Similarly, the Court held that when the accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of January 2, 2001, he was already a suspect in the fire that destroyed several houses and killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr.
Thus, the confession of appellant given to the Barangay Chairman, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag, is inadmissible in evidence.
However, the testimony of Mercedita Mendoza, a neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr., on the same confession, is admissible in evidence and is not covered by the exclusionary rule.

Maingan, already under suspicion for a deadly fire, was brought to the barangay hall where he confessed to the Barangay Chairman and handed over a lighter found in her bag. The Supreme Court held that this admission, made during a custodial setting without Miranda warnings, was inadmissible, although a neighbor’s later testimony about the confession was allowable since it was not part of the excluded interrogation.

[vii] People v. Suela, G.R. Nos. 133570-71, January 15, 2002:

The letter containing incriminatory statements was written when the accused was no longer under custodial investigation and, in open court, the accused admitted that he wrote it. The exclusionary rule will not apply to spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities.

[viii] Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, June 25, 2008:

It was held that an amicable settlement does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or admission, but is a contract between the parties within the parameters of their mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Infractions of the Miranda rights render inadmissible only "the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation."
Aquino cannot later claim that the amicable settlement is inadmissible in evidence for violating her Miranda rights.

Aquino and Paiste entered into a written amicable settlement to resolve a property dispute outside any police custody or interrogation. The Court held that such a settlement is a contract—not an extrajudicial confession or admission—and thus is not subject to exclusion even if no Miranda-type warnings were given.

3. Rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence

⭐ People v. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216

The Supreme Court said, in fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence:

Before the case is filed in Court (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police:

the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel; and to be informed thereof,
not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and
to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected and inadmissible.

After the case is filed in Court:

to refuse to be a witness;
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination; and
while testifying, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is being prosecuted.

4. Applicability.

The Miranda doctrine was first institutionalized in the 1973 Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973.
The rights guaranteed therein are to be given only prospective effect.

⭐ Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4

Clemente Magototo’s November 1972 confession was admitted at trial despite no counsel or warnings, leading him to challenge its admissibility under the 1973 Constitution’s Section 20, Article IV. The Supreme Court ruled that the right to counsel and silence must be applied prospectively from January 17, 1973, so confessions given before that date remain admissible.

5. Waiver.

[a] Must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel [Sec. 12(1), Art. III].

See People v. Tunday, 157 SCRA 529;

Three men stole a truck in Tondo and Lawre confessed under disputed conditions without a written waiver or lawyer present. The Court held that waivers of counsel must be written and made before counsel, struck the confession but upheld Lawre’s conviction on his unexplained possession of the stolen vehicle.

People v. Quijano, 197 SCRA 761.

Four men in Carcar, Cebu brutally murdered and beheaded Abundio Baring and confessed in writing with their lawyers present, leading to their conviction for murder. The Supreme Court ruled that their written extrajudicial confessions were valid because they were voluntary and executed in the presence of counsel, thereby upholding the conviction.

But note the provisions of R.A. 7438.

Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation.

(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.

(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.

[b] No retroactive effect.

The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel and to remain silent is not to be given any legal effect was initially a judge-made one, and was first announced on April 26, 1983, in Morales v. Ponce Enrile.

Horacio Morales Jr. and Antonio Moncupa Jr. were held without counsel under a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order during the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and challenged their uncounselled waivers of the rights to remain silent and to have counsel. The Supreme Court first announced that any waiver of those rights given without counsel is void, but it expressly limited the rule’s application to waivers made on or after its April 26, 1983 promulgation, denying any retroactive effect.

and reiterated on March 20, 1985, in ⭐ People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465.

Francisco Galit was arrested and tortured by investigators until he signed a confession and reenacted a crime of robbery with homicide, without the benefit of counsel and without being properly informed of his rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the confession and reenactment were inadmissible for violating his Miranda rights, and since no other credible evidence linked him to the crime, he was acquitted.

While this doctrine eventually became part of Sec. 12(1), Art. III, the requirements and restrictions therein have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to April 26, 1983, the date of promulgation of Morales.

Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222

Jose Filoteo Jr. contended that his waiver of the right to counsel during a custodial investigation was invalid under the new Constitution’s “competent and independent” requirement. The Court ruled that the prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid, informed waiver and that the presumption of regular official duty cannot outweigh the presumption of innocence, underscoring that waivers must be voluntarily and knowledgeably made.

[c] Burden of proof.

The burden of proving that there was valid waiver rests on the prosecution.
The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence.
People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516;

Jara waived his right to remain silent and to have counsel during custodial questioning and gave an extrajudicial confession without any proof that he understood or freely waived those rights. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution must produce strongly convincing evidence to prove a valid, knowing waiver, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

People v. Taruc, 157 SCRA 178.

Taruc’s confession was taken in custody without clear proof that he was informed of his Miranda-type rights or that he voluntarily waived them. The Court ruled that the presumption of regular performance by officers cannot replace the prosecution’s burden to prove a valid waiver, so an uninformed or unproved waiver invalidates any confession.

People v. Paule, 261 SCRA 649:

Thus, where the police officer could not state positively whether the lawyer assisting the accused provided him with effective counsel during the crucial aspects of the investigation because the police officer went out of the investigation room and heard only snatches of the conversation between the lawyer and the accused — and the lawyer was not presented as witness during the trial — the Supreme Court held that the confession given by the accused was not admissible in evidence.

Paule signed an extrajudicial confession while his court-appointed lawyer was present, but the investigating officer could not confirm that the lawyer actually advised him because he only heard fragments of their conversation and the lawyer never testified. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of proof that Paule knowingly and freely waived his rights, the prosecution failed its burden and the confession was inadmissible.

[d] What may be waived

The right to remain silent and the right to counsel, but not the right to be informed of these rights.

6. Guidelines for Arresting/Investigating Officers.

⭐ People v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999:

The Supreme Court laid down the guidelines and duties of arresting, detaining, inviting or investigating officers or his companions, as follows:

The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. Every other warning, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person.
He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him.
He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice.
He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the Court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf.
That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made.
The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means, e.g., by telephone, radio, letter or messenger, with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by anyone of his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished.
He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, and ensure that he understood the same.
In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insists on his waiver and chooses to speak.
The person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with a warning that once he makes such indication the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has already begun.
The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements.
He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Larry Mahinay was arrested for the rape-murder of a 12-year-old. He confessed at police headquarters after being informed in Tagalog of his rights and signing a written waiver with a lawyer present. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and formally spelled out stringent guidelines officers must follow during arrest and custodial interrogation to protect suspects from coercion.

7. Exclusionary Rule.

Confession or admission obtained in violation of Sec. 12 and Sec. 17, Art. III, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

[a] A confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a person acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the commission of a crime.

But before it can be admitted in evidence, the Constitution demands strict compliance with the requirements of Secs. 12 and 17, Art. III, because a confession of guilt constitutes formidable evidence against the accused, on the principle that no one will knowingly, freely and deliberately admit authorship of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience, particularly where the facts given could only have been known by the accused.
People v. Fabro, G.R. No. 95089, August 11, 1997:

A strike organizer in Olongapo City was killed in April 1987, and Nicomedes Fabro was arrested and signed a written statement in the presence of counsel after being informed of his rights. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires confessions to be written and executed before counsel, found Fabro’s waiver valid, and affirmed his conviction.

[i] It is immaterial where the confession was obtained.

People v. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432:

Thus, where the confession was given by the accused to NBI agents who visited him in a Hongkong prison, the confession was still declared inadmissible in evidence.

Juan Gomez was detained in a Hong Kong prison when NBI agents visited him and obtained his confession without first informing him of his right to remain silent or to have counsel. The Supreme Court ruled that it does not matter where a confession is taken—failure to observe those constitutional warnings renders it inadmissible in evidence.

[ii] On the other hand, any allegation of force, duress, undue influence or other forms of involuntariness in exacting such confession must be proved by clear, convincing and competent evidence by the defense. Otherwise, the confession's full probative value may be used to demonstrate the guilt of the accused.

See also People v. Eglipa, 174 SCRA 1;

Guillermo Eglipa was charged with murder after he signed two extrajudicial confessions taken by police—one at the Bacoor station and another at Camp Crame—without counsel and amid allegations of physical coercion. The Supreme Court ruled that it is immaterial where a confession is obtained; because Eglipa substantiated his claim of duress with clear and convincing evidence, the statements were inadmissible and his conviction was overturned.

People v. Basay, 219 SCRA 404.

Teodoro Basay, accused of multiple murder, gave a written confession during custodial interrogation by military and police officers without being informed of his rights or afforded counsel. The Court held that the place of confession does not affect its admissibility and that only clear, convincing, and competent proof of force, duress, or undue influence can exclude it—proof Basay failed to offer—so his confession retained full probative value.

[b] Fruit of the poisonous tree.

People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293:

The Court declared that we have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree", a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated Nardone v. U.S. According to this rule, once the primary source ("the tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence ("the fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible.
The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence, because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Thus, in this case, the uncounselled admission being inadmissible, the pillow and the T-shirt with alleged bloodstains — being evidence derived from the uncounselled confession — would likewise be inadmissible.

Arnel Alicando was investigated for rape with homicide and, without counsel present, gave an uncounselled admission that led police to seize a bloodstained pillow and T-shirt from his home. The Supreme Court held that under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” rule, the uncounselled confession is inadmissible and any evidence—like the pillow and T-shirt—derived from it must likewise be excluded.

[c] Receipt of seized property inadmissible.

People v. de Guzman, 194 SCRA 601:

The Receipt of Seized Property signed by the accused without the assistance of counsel and with the accused not having been first informed of his constitutional rights is totally inadmissible in evidence.

De Guzman signed a Receipt of Seized Property without counsel and without being informed of his right to remain silent or to have a lawyer. The Supreme Court ruled that such a receipt is an uncounselled admission and therefore totally inadmissible in evidence.

People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182:

Thus, where the accused were ordered to sign their baggage boxes by Customs agents, the admissions (signatures) were held to be inadmissible in evidence.

Customs agents ordered Wong Chuen Ming and the other accused to sign their baggage boxes during inspection without advising them of their rights or providing counsel. The Court held that those signatures were uncounselled admissions and must be excluded from evidence.

People v. Saturnina Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997:

Where the suspect was made to sign a bond paper which was used to wrap the marijuana sticks before the same were submitted to the laboratory for examination, the Supreme Court held that this was in the nature of an uncounselled confession and therefore inadmissible in evidence.

Salazar was forced to sign bond paper used to wrap seized marijuana sticks before laboratory examination, and she had no lawyer or rights warning. The Supreme Court declared that this signature was an uncounselled confession and thus inadmissible in evidence.

⭐ People v. de Lara, 236 SCRA 291:

It was held that despite the valid warrantless arrest and search, as a result of a buy-bust operation, nonetheless, where the accused, insisting that he would like to wait for counsel, was made to sign the photocopy of the marked P20-bill, Receipt of Property Seized, and the Booking and Information Sheet, without assistance of counsel, there was clearly a violation of Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Constitution.

Armando de Lara was arrested in a buy-bust operation and convicted of selling marijuana, but he claimed that his rights were violated when police forced him to sign documents during custodial investigation without counsel. The Supreme Court ruled that while those documents were inadmissible for violating his Miranda rights, his conviction still stood based on independent evidence, although his penalty was reduced in light of RA 7659.

Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 109242, January 26, 1999:

Similarly, where, during the investigation conducted by the NBI, the petitioner and his co-accused were made to sign on the envelopes seized from them (subject of the mail theft), the Supreme Court said that these signatures were actually evidence of admission contemplated in Secs. 12 and 17, Art. III, and they should be excluded.

During an NBI mail‐theft investigation, Marcelo and his co‐accused were compelled to sign the seized envelopes without counsel or Miranda‐type warnings. The Supreme Court held that those signatures constituted admissions under the Constitution’s protections and must be excluded.

See also ⭐ Gutang v. People, G.R. No. 135406, July 11, 2000;

David Gutang was arrested after a search warrant raid in his residence yielded drug paraphernalia and marijuana, and he later tested positive for shabu along with his companions. The Supreme Court ruled that while his uncounselled signatures on the Receipts of Property Seized were inadmissible as violative of his Miranda rights, the urine samples and laboratory results were valid evidence, thus affirming his conviction for drug use and possession. The right to counsel attaches only when interrogation begins to elicit testimonial admissions. The taking of urine samples is a mechanical act involving physical evidence, not testimonial compulsion.

People v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 146277, June 20, 2002; and

Gabriel Casimiro was arrested on drug charges and, during the custodial inventory, was required to sign a Receipt of Seized Property without being informed of his right to remain silent or to have counsel. The Supreme Court held that such a signature is an uncounselled admission and must be excluded from evidence.

People v. Benny Go, G.R. No. 144639, September 12, 2003.

Benny Go signed a form acknowledging the seizure of items from his home immediately after his arrest, again without any Miranda-type warning or access to a lawyer. The Court ruled that this signature, like any confession or admission obtained without counsel and proper rights advisement, is inadmissible in evidence.

[i] People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784:

However, although the accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialled the P10 bills that the police found tucked in his waist, it was held that neither his right against self-incrimination nor his rights guaranteed by the Miranda doctrine was violated, because his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime, the subject of the prosecution being his act of selling marijuana cigarettes.

The accused was arrested for selling marijuana cigarettes and, without a lawyer present, was asked to initial P10 bills that police found tucked in his waist. The Supreme Court held that initialling those bills did not violate his right against self-incrimination or his Miranda rights because possession of the marked money was not the crime charged and did not amount to an admission.

People v. Morico, 246 SCRA 214:

Likewise, it was held that the signing of the Booking Sheet and the Arrest Report without the benefit of counsel does not violate the Constitution because it is not an admission of guilt.

Morico signed the booking sheet and arrest report at the police station without counsel. The Court ruled that those signatures are not admissions of guilt and therefore do not infringe the constitutional safeguards against coerced confessions

[ii] Thus, when Sec. 12, Art. III, is not complied with during custodial investigation, only evidence on the confession or admission of the accused are covered by the exclusionary rule.

Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011

Customs and NBI officers seized over 31 kilograms of shabu in chocolate boxes from Hong Kong tourists during a custodial investigation in which the suspects were not read their Miranda-type rights. The High Court clarified that violations of the right to counsel and silence exclude only extrajudicial confessions, not other evidence, so the seized drugs remained admissible

[d] Re-enactment of the crime.

⭐ People v. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36:

Not being clear from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by the accused, he had been informed of his constitutional rights, and that he had validly waived such rights before proceeding with the demonstration, the Supreme Court declined to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to the re-enactment.

Rowena Capcap was raped and murdered in Taguig, and accused Ernesto Luvendino was apprehended, made to re-enact the crime without counsel, and later gave a written confession that he signed before the Fiscal in the presence of his mother and chosen lawyer. The Supreme Court ruled that while the re-enactment was inadmissible for violating Miranda rights, the extrajudicial confession was admissible because it was voluntarily ratified before counsel and made prior to the effectivity of the stricter Morales-Galit rule requiring counsel-assisted waivers.

[e] Res gestae.

People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111:

The declaration of the accused acknowledging guilt made to the police desk officer after the crime was committed may be given in evidence against him by the police officer to whom the admission was made, as part of the res gestae.

Chito Dy shot a tourist and upon arriving at the police sub-station immediately told the desk officer, “I’m the one who did it.” The Supreme Court held that such spontaneous declarations made right after the crime form part of the res gestae and are admissible when testified to by the officer who heard them.

[f] Waiver of the exclusionary rule.

For failure of the accused to object to the offer in evidence, the uncounselled confession was admitted in evidence.
People v. Samus, G.R. Nos. 135957-58, September 17, 2002

Guillermo Samus gave a written confession during custodial interrogation without counsel but never objected when it was offered at trial. The Court ruled that uncounselled confessions are inadmissible in principle, yet Samus’s failure to make a timely objection amounted to a waiver, allowing the confession into evidence.

People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 142932, May 29, 2002

Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez admitted their roles in a robbery-with-homicide case during custodial questioning without being informed of their rights or given a lawyer. The Supreme Court held that admissions made in custody without proper warnings are presumptively inadmissible, but they were deemed waived and admitted because the defense did not raise timely objections.

N. Right to Bail

Sec. 13, Art. III:
All persons, except those charged

with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua

when evidence of guilt is strong,

shall, before conviction,

be bailable by sufficient sureties,

or be released on recognizance

as may be provided by law.

The right to bail shall not be impaired

even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

Excessive bail shall not be required.

1. Definition

Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as may be required [Rule 114, Sec. 1, Rules of Court].
The right to bail emanates from the right to be presumed innocent.

2. When right may be invoked; by whom

The right to bail emanates from the right to be presumed innocent.
It is accorded to a person in custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under specific circumstances.

People v. Fitzgerald, G.R. No. 149723, October 27, 2006

Victor Keith Fitzgerald was convicted in 1996 for inducing a 13-year-old into child prostitution under R.A. No. 7610 and sentenced to over eight years in prison, with multiple petitions for bail denied due to strong evidence of guilt and risk of flight or reoffense. The Supreme Court held that under the presumption of innocence and Rule 114, bail cannot be granted for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence is strong and statutory grounds are unmet, annulling the CA’s bail order and ordering Fitzgerald’s arrest.

Any person under detention, even if no formal charges have yet been filed, can invoke the right to bail.

Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634;

Haydee Herras Teehankee was held as a political detainee without any formal charge and her petition for bail under Executive Order 65 was denied by the People’s Court judges despite the Solicitor General’s recommendation. The Supreme Court ruled that the presumption of innocence and Article III, Section 1(16) extend to all persons in custody, set aside the denial orders, and ordered a hearing for bail with proper notice

People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522

Five defendants were charged with murder, and during the regular trial the judge granted them bail despite the prosecution’s objection that it had not yet presented all its material witnesses. The Supreme Court voided the bail orders, ruling that in capital offenses the prosecution must be given a fair chance to present all its evidence and the court must summarize that evidence before deciding if guilt is not strong, otherwise the grant of bail violates procedural due process.

However, it is a basic principle that the right to bail can be availed of only by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty, and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.

Cortes v. Judge Catral, infra.

Cortes accused Judge Catral of abusing his authority by mishandling his nephew’s cases and ignoring proper raffle and notice procedures. The Supreme Court affirmed that the right to bail is available only to those in custody, and petitions for bail by persons not yet deprived of liberty are premature.

See Rule 114, Rules of Court which provides, among others, that "any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held."

[a] Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217:

Where the petitioners were charged with rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder, the Court ruled that based on the doctrine enunciated in People v. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against the petitioners must be read as charging simple rebellion only; hence the petitioners are entitled to bail before final conviction as a matter of right.

Senator Enrile and others were arrested for rebellion complexed with murder but no bail was set or recommended, prompting a habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court ruled that the information must be read as simple rebellion, which is bailable, and ordered that bail be granted as a matter of right.

People v. Judge Donato, 198 SCRA 130:

It was held that the right to bail cannot be denied one who is charged with rebellion, a bailable offense.

Salas, charged with rebellion after its penalty was reduced to prisión mayor by EO 187, was granted bail by the RTC, prompting a certiorari petition by the People. The Supreme Court held that rebellion is a bailable offense and that the right to bail cannot be denied, upholding the bail grants.

Al-Ghoul v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126859, September 01, 2001:

Since the penalty for illegal possession of firearms had been reduced to less than reclusion perpetua, the petitioners were deemed entitled to bail as a matter of right before their conviction by the trial court.

Six foreigners charged with illegal firearms and explosives under PD 1866 faced reclusion perpetua until RA 8294 reduced their penalty below that threshold. The Supreme Court held that they are entitled to bail as a matter of right under the new law and remanded for a prompt bail hearing.

[b] Lavides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, February 1, 2000:

The Supreme Court held that the trial court was in error when the latter required the arraignment of the accused as a prerequisite to the approval of the bail bond.
In the cases when bail is authorized, it should be granted before arraignment, otherwise, the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.
Furthermore, the court would be assured of the presence of the accused at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceeding.

Lavides secured bail for child abuse but faced a court order making arraignment a condition to approve his bond. The Supreme Court ruled that bail must be granted before arraignment and struck down the requirement, preserving the accused’s right to challenge the charges.

3. Exceptions

[a] When charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua (or higher) and evidence of guilt is strong.

Carpio v. Judge Maglalang, 196 SCRA 41:

The Supreme Court said that where the accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, it is the duty of the judge to determine if evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of deciding whether bail may be granted or not

Escaño, charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua, admitted involvement in the ambush but secured bail after a hearing despite strong evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that bail must be denied in such cases and that judges must judge the strength of the evidence before granting bail.

People v. Fortes and Fortes v. Judge Guan, 223 SCRA 619:

It was held that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor a matter of discretion on the part of the court; an application for bail must be denied.

Fortes, sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the trial court, sought bail pending appeal. The Supreme Court held that bail is unavailable to someone already convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, so his application was denied.

People v. Reyes, 212 SCRA 402:

The Supreme Court held that where a person has been convicted by the trial court and sentenced to the penalty of imprisonment for 22 years, the penalty imposed is classified as reclusion perpetua; and while the case is on appeal, bail may be denied, because the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong.

Reyes was convicted for issuing large-scale bouncing checks punishable by reclusion perpetua and sought bail during appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that because the offense carried reclusion perpetua and the evidence was strong, his bail must be denied.

[b] Traditionally, the right to bail is not available to the military.

Comendador v. de Villa, 200 SCRA 80:

It was held that traditionally, the right to bail has not been recognized and is not available to the military, as an exception to the Bill of Rights.

Comendador, a soldier under arrest for court-martial charges, asked the Supreme Court to grant bail on Bill of Rights grounds. The Court refused, reaffirming that soldiers have no right to bail before a military trial to protect order and discipline.

Arula v. Espino, 28 SCRA 540:

This much was suggested, where the Court observed that "the right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist."

Arula filed a frustrated murder complaint in the civil court, but the army convened a general court-martial and took custody of the accused first. The Supreme Court upheld the court-martial’s exclusive jurisdiction and noted that military justice dispenses with bail in favor of expedited trials.

The denial of the right to bail to the military does not violate the equal protection clause because there is substantial distinction between the military and civilians.

4. Duty of the Court when accused is charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher.

A hearing on the motion for bail must be conducted by the judge to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
Whether the motion is resolved in summary proceedings or in the course of regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present all the evidence that it may wish to introduce on the probable guilt of the accused before the court resolves the motion for bail.
Even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence, or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing, or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused.
Baylon v. Judge Sison, 243 SCRA 284;

Prosecutor Baylon charged Judge Sison with granting bail to double murder suspects without proper notice or a hearing to test the prosecution’s evidence. The Supreme Court held that bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua requires a hearing on the strength of guilt and sanctioned the judge for bypassing this duty.

Marallag v. Judge Cloribel, A.M. No. 00-1529-RTJ, April 09, 2002

Marallag charged Judge Cloribel with granting bail for murder without letting the prosecution present evidence or probing the strength of its case. The Supreme Court ruled that bail for reclusion perpetua crimes demands a hearing on probable guilt and reprimanded the judge for ignoring this requirement.

[a] Tucay v. Judge Domagas, 242 SCRA 110:

The Court found the Judge to have violated the Rules of Court, because although the Provincial Prosecutor interposed no objection to the petition for bail filed by the accused, it was still incumbent upon the Judge to set the petition for hearing and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application.

Judge Domagas granted bail to a murder suspect the same day the petition was filed and without any hearing to test the strength of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that bail in cases punishable by reclusion perpetua requires an actual hearing on probable guilt and sanctioned the judge for bypassing this duty.

Delos Santos-Reyes v. Judge Montesa, 247 SCRA 85:

The Court sanctioned the Judge who, after examining the records of the cases forwarded to him by the prosecution, and after finding the existence of probable cause, instead of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, ex mero motu granted bail to the accused despite the absence (because of prior withdrawal) of a petition for bail; and worse, the lack of hearing wherein the prosecution could have been accorded the right to present evidence showing that the evidence of guilt was strong.

Judge Montesa granted bail to a murder suspect on his own without any petition or hearing for the prosecution to test the evidence. The Supreme Court held that such ex mero motu grants violate due process and sanctioned the judge accordingly.

Buzon v. Judge Velasco, 253 SCRA 601:

The Court reiterated the rule that bail is not a matter of right in cases where the offense for which the accused stands charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.
While it is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused.
At the hearing, the court should assure that the prosecution is afforded the opportunity to adduce evidence relevant to the factual issue, with the applicant having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
Without a hearing, the judge could not possibly assess the weight of the evidence against the accused before granting the latter's application for bail.

Judge Velasco admitted a murder suspect to bail without any hearing, even after the prosecution moved to cancel it on grounds of strong evidence. The Supreme Court held that bail in reclusion perpetua cases demands a hearing on the strength of the evidence and sanctioned the judge for ignoring this requirement.

Basco v. Judge Rapatalo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, March 5, 1997:

The Supreme Court reiterated that in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

Judge Rapatalo granted bail in a murder case solely on a prosecutor’s marginal note without ever holding a hearing to test the strength of the evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that any bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher requires an actual hearing on probable guilt and reprimanded the judge for ignoring this mandatory procedure.

See also People v. Manes, G.R. No. 122737, February 17, 1999;

The Manes brothers charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua filed for bail but never obtained a hearing on the prosecution’s evidence and did not press their petition. The Supreme Court ruled that bail in reclusion perpetua cases is discretionary only after a hearing to test evidence strength and deemed their right to bail waived, affirming their convictions.

Tabao v. Judge Espina, A.M. RTJ-96-1347, June 29, 1999;

Judge Espina admitted a suspect to bail in a reclusion perpetua case without a hearing to assess the prosecution’s evidence and then rushed to acquit before the defense rested. The Supreme Court ruled that bail in capital offenses requires a mandatory hearing to test probable guilt and dismissed the judge for gross misconduct.

Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Fiores, A.M. RTJ-99-1498.

Judge Fiores admitted a rape suspect to bail punishable by reclusion perpetua without any hearing to assess the prosecution’s evidence of guilt. The Supreme Court held that any bail grant in capital offenses requires a mandatory hearing on the strength of evidence and reprimanded and fined the judge for gross ignorance.

[b] The hearing on a petition for bail need not at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him.

When bail is a matter of right, the accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment.
Even when the charge is a capital offense, if the court finds that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence of guilt is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even before arraignment.
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

Serapio surrendered after a Sandiganbayan warrant for plunder and filed for bail two months before his scheduled arraignment, but the trial court kept postponing his hearing. The Supreme Court ruled that bail hearings need not wait for arraignment and ordered the court to decide his petition immediately.

Lavides v. Court of Appeals, infra:

The accused filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash, and the Court said that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.

[c] The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution.

People v. Judge Cabral, G.R. No. 131909, February 18, 1999

The trial court granted bail in a rape case solely on the note that evidence was “not strong” and omitted key prosecution proof and expert testimony. The Supreme Court held that any order on bail in capital offenses must contain a comprehensive summary of the prosecution’s evidence and voided the defective bail order.

The assessment of the evidence presented during a bail hearing is intended only for the purpose of granting or denying an application for the provisional release of the accused.
Not being a final assessment, courts tend to be liberal in their appreciation of evidence. But it is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course.
People v. Palarca, G.R. No. 146020, May 29, 2002.

Palarca secured bail after the court preliminarily found the evidence against him not strong, then was convicted at trial of rape punishable by reclusion perpetua. The Supreme Court ruled that bail hearing assessments are merely provisional and do not limit the court’s final judgment on guilt.

5. Bail is either a matter of right, or at the judge's discretion, or it may be denied

[Rule 114, Rules of Court].

[a] Bail, a matter of right.

All persons in custody shall:

before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,

be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule [Sec. 4, Rule 114].

[b] Bail, when discretionary.

Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.

The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years but not more than twenty years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

that the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
that the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
that the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;
that the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime [Sec. 5, Rule 114].

[i] However, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least he must be asked for his recommendation, because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account a number of factors such as the applicant's character and reputation, forfeiture of other bonds, etc.

Cortes v. Judge Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997

Flaviano Cortes charged Judge Catral with granting and cutting bail in murder and related cases without notifying the prosecutor or holding any hearing. The Supreme Court ruled that discretionary bail demands prosecutorial notice and a hearing with a summary of evidence, fined Catral ₱20,000, and warned him against future lapses.

Taborite v. Sollesta, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1388, August 12, 2003,

This was reiterated that granting bail in non-bailable offenses without a hearing is gross ignorance of the law, and the judge was subjected to a fine of P20,000.00.

The Taborite family challenged Judge Sollesta for granting bail to a murder suspect without notifying the prosecutor or holding a proper hearing. The Supreme Court confirmed that discretionary bail in capital offenses requires prosecutorial notice and a hearing to weigh evidence, and fined Sollesta ₱120,000 for gross ignorance of the law.

[c] When bail shall be denied.

When the accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher and evidence of guilt is strong, then bail shall be denied, as it is neither a matter of right or of discretion.
Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 155.

Padilla was convicted for illegal possession of firearms punishable by reclusion perpetua and had his bail bond cancelled after the Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence. The Supreme Court ruled that when an accused faces an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail is neither a matter of right nor discretion and must be denied.

Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817:

Thus, where Senator Antonio Trillanes, charged with coup d'état, sought to be allowed to attend senate sessions and to convene his staff, resource persons and guests and to attend to his official functions as senator, the Supreme Court denied the petition.
The petitioner's contention that he is not a flight risk is irrelevant as it is only material in ascertaining the amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of bail. In this case, where the offense charged is a non-bailable offense, what is controlling is the determination by the trial court that the evidence of his guilt is strong.
It is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security, and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights limited than those of the public.
The presumption of innocence does not carry with it full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Trillanes, charged with coup d’état and held without bail after a finding of strong evidence, asked to attend Senate sessions and conduct official business from detention but was denied by the courts. The Supreme Court affirmed that non-bailable offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua with strong evidence of guilt bar any such provisional liberties and must be denied.

[i] Where the accused is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right nor a matter of discretion; an application for bail must be denied.

People v. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619.

Fortes was convicted of an offense carrying reclusion perpetua and sought bail while his appeal was pending. The Supreme Court held that bail must be denied to someone serving reclusion perpetua because it is neither a right nor a discretionary privilege.

People v. Reyes, 212 SCRA 402:

Likewise, the Supreme Court held that where a person has been convicted by the trial court and sentenced to the penalty of imprisonment for 22 years, the penalty imposed is classified as reclusion perpetua, and while the case is on appeal, bail shall be denied because the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong.

Reyes was sentenced to 22 years, equivalent to reclusion perpetua, and sought bail pending his appeal. The Supreme Court denied bail, reaffirming that strong evidence in a reclusion perpetua case precludes any provisional liberty.

Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 281

It was held that the principle denying bail to an accused charged with a capital offense where evidence of guilt is strong, applies with equal force to the appellant who, though convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense.

Obosa was originally charged with murder but convicted of homicide, posted bail pending appeal, and had his bail cancelled by the Court of Appeals due to the capital nature of the original charge and strong evidence against him. The Supreme Court affirmed denial of bail, ruling that the constitutional and procedural bar on bail for capital offenses with strong evidence extends to such appellants.

6. Standards for fixing bail.

In Sec. 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court, among the factors to be considered by the judge in fixing bail are:

the financial ability of the accused,
the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the penalty for the offense charged,
the character and reputation of the accused,
his age and health,
the weight of the evidence against him,
the probability of his appearing at the trial,
the forfeiture of other bonds by him,
the fact that he was a fugitive from justice when arrested, and
the pendency of other cases in which he is under bond.

See de la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1;

Mayor de la Camara was charged with multiple murder and frustrated murder and had bail set at over ₱1.1 million despite his limited means. The Supreme Court held that bail must only ensure appearance and reduced his bail to reasonable amounts.

Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312.

Villaseñor faced assault with murder charges and bail was set at ₱60,000 with conditions on sureties before he sought a reduction. The Supreme Court ruled that the bail amount and conditions were fair under Rule 114, Sec. 6 and upheld the trial court’s decision.

Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra.

The bail of P5.5-million recommended by the Solicitor General for the provisional liberty of the accused who had already been convicted by the trial court in an estafa case, was held to be excessive, as bail is not intended to assume the civil liability of the accused.

7. Right to bail and right to travel abroad.

See Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, supra.;

Silverio v. Court of Appeals, supra.;

Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez, supra.

8. Right to bail and extradition.

Government of the U.S. v. Judge Puruganan and Mark Jimenez, G.R. No. 148571, December 17, 2002:

The Supreme Court denied with finality Mark Jimenez's motion for reconsideration of the court's earlier decision to declare null and void the order of Judge Puruganan granting bail to Mark Jimenez.
The court said that, as suggested by the use of the word "conviction", the constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt".
It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case of extradition where the presumption of innocence is not an issue. That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case.
To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
Accordingly, it was held that after a potential extraditee has been arrested and placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing that:

once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

Marc Jimenez was granted ₱1,000,000 bail by the RTC while facing extradition to the U.S. for multiple federal offenses. The Supreme Court held that Philippine constitutional bail rights do not extend to extradition proceedings, nullified his bail order, and ruled that bail is available only in exceptional circumstances.

[a] Government of HongKong v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007:

This ruling in Puruganan was modified, where the Court said that it cannot ignore the modern trend in public international law which places a primacy on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty, its principles are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community.
This Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are part of the law of the land.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.

Juan Antonio Muñoz was held over two years under an extradition request from Hong Kong, won a ₱750,000 cash bail order from RTC Branch 8, and faced a Rule 65 petition to cancel it. The Supreme Court held that bail in extradition may be granted upon clear and convincing proof of no flight risk and special humanitarian circumstances and remanded the case for application of this standard.

[i] Consistent with the separate opinion of Chief Justice Puno in Puruganan, a new standard, "clear and convincing evidence", should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.

The standard is lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt, but higher than preponderance of evidence.
The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

9. Waiver of the right to bail.

The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived.
It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
People v. Judge Donato, 198 SCRA 130.

[a] People v. Manes, G.R. No. 122737, February 17, 1999:

The failure of the accused to call the attention of the trial court to the unresolved petition for bail is deemed a waiver of the right to bail.
Furthermore, the conviction of the accused renders the petition for bail moot and academic.

10. Bail and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The right to bail is not impaired by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus [Sec. 13, Art. III].

O. Constitutional Rights of the Accused.

Sec. 14, Art. III:

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.

However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused, provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Criminal Due Process
Presumption of Innocence
Right to be heard by himself and counsel.
Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Right to speedy, impartial and public trial.
Right to meet witnesses face to face.
Right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence.

1. Criminal Due Process

[a] Due Process

Mejia v. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457:

The Supreme Court enumerated the ingredients of due process as applied to criminal proceedings, as follows:

The accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction;
The accused is proceeded against under the orderly processes of law;
The accused has been given notice and the opportunity to be heard; and
The judgment rendered was within the authority of a constitutional law.

Aurora Mejia, a branch clerk of court, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for soliciting and receiving money from litigants in exchange for promising favorable court decisions, and she challenged the conviction on constitutional and procedural due process grounds. The Supreme Court upheld her conviction, ruling that she was afforded full criminal due process as she was informed of the charges, tried before a competent court, given the opportunity to defend herself, and convicted based on credible evidence under a valid law.

[b] Unreasonable delay in resolving complaint.

Roque v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999:

It was held that the failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve a complaint that had been pending for six years clearly violates the constitutional command for the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints and the right of the petitioner to due process of law and to speedy trial. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint.

Felicidad Roque and Prudencio Mabanglo faced graft complaints before the Ombudsman that remained unresolved for nearly six years before informations were filed in court. The Supreme Court ruled that this inordinate and unjustified delay violated their constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases, warranting outright dismissal of the complaints.

Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108595, May 18, 1999, and in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70:

A similar ruling was made in, where it was held that the unreasonable delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan violated the due process clause.

Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108595, May 18, 1999

Jose C. Go was charged with graft in 1985, but the preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman took more than six years before the case was filed in court. The Supreme Court ruled that this inordinate and unjustified delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases, and dismissed the case.

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70

A graft complaint against Francisco S. Tatad lay dormant for years and, despite being ready for resolution in 1982, was acted upon by the Tanodbayan only in 1985, leading to the filing of criminal cases after an almost three-year delay. The Supreme Court ruled that this inordinate and politically tainted delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases, and dismissed all charges.

[i] Santiago v. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214:

However, although the offense was allegedly committed on or before October 17, 1988 and the information was filed only on May 9, 1991, and an amended information filed on December 8, 1992, the delay did not constitute a denial of due process, because there was continuing investigation, snarled only because of the complexity of the issues involved.

Miriam Defensor Santiago was charged with graft for allegedly approving the legalization of 32 unqualified aliens, and she argued that the delay from the alleged offense in 1988 to the filing of informations in 1991–1992 violated her right to speedy disposition of cases. The Supreme Court ruled that the delay was justified due to the complexity and continuous nature of the investigation, thus no violation occurred, but ordered the consolidation of the 32 amended informations into a single charge.

Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 559:

It was found that the six-year delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation was caused by petitioner's own acts, not by inaction of the prosecution. Accordingly, there was no violation of the petitioner's right to due process of law or of his right to speedy disposition of the case.

Complaints for graft were filed against Salvador P. Socrates in 1986, but the filing of informations occurred only in 1992 after multiple interruptions in the preliminary investigation, many of which were due to his own motions and actions. The Supreme Court ruled there was no unreasonable delay since the postponements were attributable to the petitioner, not to prosecutorial inaction, and thus his rights to due process and speedy disposition were not violated.

[c] Impartial court or tribunal.

A critical component of due process of law is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
In order to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove such bias by clear and convincing evidence.

Webb v. People, G.R. No. 127262, July 24, 1997:

In this case, the petitioners failed to adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that the respondent judge was motivated by malice or bad faith when she issued the assailed rulings.

The accused in the Vizconde massacre case sought the inhibition of the trial judge, alleging bias based on her remarks to the media, adverse rulings, and certain trial conduct. The Supreme Court ruled that their right to an impartial tribunal was not violated because no clear and convincing extrinsic evidence of bias was shown, and adverse rulings alone do not establish partiality.

[i] Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998:

The Supreme Court, reiterating its ruling in Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, declared that the cross-examination of the accused and the witnesses by the trial court indicated bias, and thus violated due process.

Imelda R. Marcos was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for allegedly entering into a lease agreement grossly disadvantageous to the government, but the proceedings were marred by informal, unrecorded deliberations excluding some members of the Special Division and involving a non-member. The Supreme Court ruled that these irregularities violated her right to due process and to be heard by an impartial, collegial tribunal, voiding the conviction and ordering her acquittal.

[ii] But where the questions propounded by the court are merely for clarification, to clear up dubious points and elicit relevant evidence, such questioning will not constitute bias.

People v. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213

Robert Castillo was convicted of murder after eyewitnesses testified that he stabbed Antonio Dometita without warning, and he claimed on appeal that the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses showed bias against him. The Supreme Court ruled there was no violation of his right to an impartial tribunal because the judge’s questions were merely clarificatory, no prejudice was shown, and the conviction was supported by credible evidence.

Cosep v. People, 290 SCRA 378

Tomas Cosep was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for allegedly withholding ₱500 from a contractor’s payment, and he claimed the justices’ active questioning during trial showed bias. The Supreme Court ruled there was no breach of his right to an impartial tribunal because the questions were merely clarificatory, but acquitted him on reasonable doubt due to the prosecution’s failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

People v. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761

Joeral Galleno was convicted of statutory rape of a five-year-old girl, and on appeal claimed the trial judge’s active questioning during his testimony showed bias and denied him an impartial trial. The Supreme Court ruled there was no breach of impartiality because the judge’s questions were merely clarificatory, not indicative of bias, and upheld the conviction based on credible evidence.

People v. Herida, G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001:

Thus, where the trial court intensively questioned the witnesses and the accused (approximately 43% of the questions asked of the prosecution witnesses and the accused were propounded by the judge), it was held that the questioning was necessary.
Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points overlooked by counsel.

Julio Herida was convicted of murder for participating in the fatal assault on Herlito Delara and claimed on appeal that the trial judge’s extensive questioning of witnesses showed bias and denied him an impartial trial. The Supreme Court ruled there was no breach of impartiality because the judge’s questions were clarificatory and applied equally to both sides, and affirmed the conviction with modifications to the damages awarded.

See also People v. Medenilla, G.R. No. 131638-39, March 26, 2001

In the prosecution of Loreto Medenilla for drug offenses, her counsel anchored the defense on a supposed Supreme Court circular requiring both qualitative and quantitative drug testing, which turned out to be non-existent. The Supreme Court ruled that this act violated the lawyer’s duty of candor and undermined the integrity of the tribunal, finding him guilty of contempt and imposing a fine.

[d] Right to a hearing.

Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998, and in Concepcion v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131728, March 9, 1998:

The Supreme Court held that the accused were denied due process of law when the trial court convicted them (after having declared that they had waived their right to present evidence), but it was shown that there were deviations from the regular course of trial, e.g.:

petitioners were not directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor dates set for that purpose,
petitioners were not given an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence nor dates set for that purpose, and
petitioners had not admitted the offense charged in the information which would have justified any modification in the order of the trial.

Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998 and Concepcion v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131728, March 9, 1998

Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura Concepcion were convicted of rape after the trial court, focusing only on the complainant’s affidavit of desistance, skipped a full trial and did not allow them to present evidence. The Supreme Court voided the conviction, ruling that this violated their constitutional right to due process and to a hearing, and remanded the case for proper trial before a different judge.

Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123792, March 8, 1999:

It was held that the re-opening of a case without giving the accused the opportunity to introduce controverting evidence is an error and a denial of due process of law.

After both sides in Miriam Defensor Santiago’s graft case agreed on stipulated facts and rested, the Sandiganbayan reopened the case to hear a prosecution witness on matters outside the agreed issues, without giving her a chance to rebut. The Supreme Court ruled this violated her constitutional right to due process and to a hearing, annulled the reopening order, and directed the Sandiganbayan to decide the case promptly.

[e] Deposition of witnesses abroad.

People v. Hubert Webb, G.R. No. 132577, August 17, 1999:

The Supreme Court said that there was no denial of due process where the trial court refused to grant the petition of Webb to take the deposition of witnesses residing abroad, considering that the testimony of the witnesses would be merely corroborative, the defense had already presented 57 witnesses and 464 documentary exhibits, and the trial court had already admitted the exhibits on which the said witnesses would have testified.

Hubert Webb sought to take depositions of five U.S.-based witnesses before Philippine consular officers to support his alibi in the Vizconde massacre case, but the trial court denied the request, finding it unauthorized under criminal procedure and unnecessary. The Supreme Court ruled there was no grave abuse of discretion because the proposed testimonies were merely cumulative, Webb had already fully presented his defense, and the trial court acted within its discretion in disallowing the depositions.

[f] Plunder Law.

Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001:

R.A. 7080 (Plunder Law), as amended by R.A. 7659, was challenged on the following grounds:

it is vague;
it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and
it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.

All of which are purportedly violations of the right of the accused to due process of law and to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him.
The Court ruled that every legislative measure is presumed constitutional, and the petitioner failed to discharge the burden to overcome the presumption of constitutionality:

The law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of the violation. Sec. 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity.
Sec. 4 does not circumvent the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt the number of acts sufficient to form a combination or a series which would constitute a pattern involving an amount no less than P50 million.
The legislative declaration in R.A. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is malum in se. If the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se even if punished under special laws, particularly because in plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

Former President Joseph Estrada challenged the constitutionality of the Plunder Law, claiming it was vague, lowered the standard of proof, and removed the requirement of criminal intent. The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling that it clearly defines the offense, maintains the proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt standard, requires intent, and validly penalizes large-scale corruption.

[g] Plea of guilt to a capital offense.

People v. Sta. Teresa, G.R. No. 130663, March 20, 2001:

The Court enumerated the stringent constitutional standards impelled by the due process clause whenever the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, viz:

The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences thereof;
The prosecution shall be required to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
The accused must be asked if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires.

After initially pleading not guilty to raping his 12-year-old daughter, Angeles Sta. Teresa changed his plea to guilty mid-trial, leading the court to impose the death penalty without fully complying with the safeguards for pleas of guilt in capital cases. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court failed to conduct a proper searching inquiry, require full prosecution evidence, and allow the defense to present its case, thus violating due process and necessitating a remand for further proceedings.

People v. Ostia, G.R. No. 131804, February 26, 2003:

The Supreme Court said that the procedure is mandatory, and a judge who fails to observe with fealty the said rule commits grave abuse of discretion.
The Court has cautioned trial judges to proceed with meticulous care whenever the imposable penalty for the crime charged is death.

Roberto Ostia pleaded guilty to murder after initially being charged with rape with homicide, but the trial court failed to conduct the full searching inquiry required for pleas to capital offenses. The Supreme Court held the plea was improvident yet affirmed his conviction for murder based on independent evidence, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua, and awarded both civil indemnity and moral damages

[h] The State and the offended party are entitled to due process.

The State, and more so, the offended party, is also entitled to due process of law.

Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274:

The judgment of acquittal was vacated upon a finding by the Supreme Court that there was bias and partiality on the part of the judge and the prosecutor.

Former Senator Aquino and an alleged assailant were probed by an Agrava Board whose testimony was central to murder charges before the Sandiganbayan, but respondents successfully excluded their own statements and secured an acquittal under questionable impartiality. The Supreme Court found bias by the tribunal and prosecutor, vacated the acquittal, and remanded the case for a fair retrial.

Merciales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002:

It was held that the petitioner (mother of the victim in a rape with homicide case) was denied due process when the public prosecutor, who was under legal obligation to pursue the action on her behalf, reneged on that obligation and refused to perform his sworn duty.

After the prosecution repeatedly refused to present available witnesses in a rape-homicide trial, the RTC granted defense demurrer and dismissed the case, a decision affirmed by the CA. The Supreme Court held that the victim’s mother was deprived of due process, reversed the dismissal, and remanded for full presentation of the prosecution’s evidence.

People v. Verra, G.R. No. 134732, May 29, 2002:

But, it was held that the People could not claim that it was denied due process, because there was a public prosecutor who represented it at every stage of the proceedings—from arraignment to promulgation of the dismissal order—to protect its interest.

Verra’s murder case was dismissed when the sole prosecution witness executed desistance, and despite later offers of testimony by others, the CA reinstated the dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the People had full prosecutorial representation at every stage, so no constitutional due process violation occurred.

2. Presumption of Innocence

[a] Every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into account.

The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
People v. Austria, 195 SCRA 700.

On August 10, 1975, Tomas Azuelo was found murdered in a sugarcane field and the prosecution relied solely on circumstantial links and confessions to charge Eduardo Austria, Pablo Austria, and Jaime de la Torre. The Supreme Court held that the evidence failed to overcome the presumption of innocence because it did not form an unbroken chain proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore acquitted the accused.

Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392:

Thus, the provision of an election statute which disqualified from running for public office any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State "provided that the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", was declared unconstitutional for being violative of the presumption of innocence clause.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 disqualified candidates for public office if charged with certain crimes against the State, treating the mere filing of charges as prima facie evidence of disloyalty. The Supreme Court struck down this portion as unconstitutional for violating the presumption of innocence, holding that an accusation alone cannot justify disqualification without a final conviction.

People v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 129691, June 29, 1999:

Likewise, it was held that the acquittal of the accused is inevitable if inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt.

[b] The presumption of innocence was held not to have been overcome by prosecution evidence:

People v. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122:

where the victim had difficulty in identifying the accused not only during the hospital confrontation but also in open court; or

People v. Tapeda, 244 SCRA 339:

where the prosecution failed to present the alleged poseur-buyer, because without the testimony of the latter, there is no convincing evidence that the accused was a marijuana peddler and not merely a victim of instigation; or

Layug v. Sandiganbayan, 245 SCRA 123:

or where the testimony of the prosecution witnesses is marred by inconsistencies.

[c] The presumption that official duty was regularly performed cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.

If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, and the other consistent with guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
People v. Martos, 211 SCRA 805.

People v. Briones, 266 SCRA 254:

Thus, the fact that SPO1 Alilio was presumed to have regularly performed his official duty was held insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence, as it was inconceivable that the accused would still sell shabu to SPO1 Alilio when the accused knew Alilio to be the police officer who earlier arrested his friend, Ormos, for allegedly selling shabu.

[i] But where it is not the sole basis for conviction, the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions may prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.

People v. Acuram, 209 SCRA 281.

[d] The constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is some logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.

People v. Burton, 268 SCRA 531, citing Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63.

In such a case the burden of proof is thus shifted to the possessor of the dangerous drug to explain the absence of animus possidendi.

This is reiterated in People v. Balluda, G.R. No. 114198, November 19, 1999.

[i] In order that this constitutional presumption may be overcome in a prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven:

that the transaction or sale took place;
that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and
that the buyer and seller are identified.

x x x To comply with the second element, it is imperative that the integrity of the corpus delicti be preserved, and the chain of custody requirement, as provided in R.A. 9165, performs this function for it ensures that there are no unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence.

[ia] People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 186498, March 26, 2010:

The seizure and custody of the drugs remain valid despite failure to comply with the chain of custody procedure, if:

the non-compliance is attended by justifiable grounds; and
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

However, in this case, not only did the prosecution fail to present any justifiable ground for non-compliance, but there is a gaping hole in the chain of custody. The length of time that lapsed from the seizure of the items until they were given to the investigating officer for marking took all of 3-1/2 hours, despite the fact that De Guzman’s house was walking distance from the police station. Moreover, it took more time before the items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory, without any explanation on who had custody in the meantime.

[e] This constitutional presumption may be overcome by contrary presumptions based on the experience of human conduct, such as unexplained flight which may lead to an inference of guilt, or the inability of an accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him which is considered prima facie evidence of misappropriation.

[i] Madarang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112314, March 28, 2001, and in Agullo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001:

However, it was held that the prima facie presumption of accountability does not shatter the presumption of innocence which the petitioner enjoys, because even if prima facie evidence arises, certain facts still have to be proved, and the Sandiganbayan must be satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. And this finding must rest upon the strength of the prosecution’s own evidence, not on the weakness, deficiency or absence of evidence for the defense.

Monteverde v. People, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002:

It was held that the presumption that the possessor of a forged or falsified document is the author of the forgery or falsification will not prevail over the presumption of innocence.

[f] Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005:

The constitutionality of R.A. 1379 (Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property) was challenged because it is vague, violates the presumption of innocence and the right against self-incrimination, and breaches the authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
It was held that the law is not vague, because it defines with sufficient particularity “unlawfully acquired property,” and provides a definition of what is legitimately acquired property. Neither is the presumption of innocence violated by Sec. 2 thereof, which states that property acquired by a public officer during his incumbency in an amount which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property shall be prima facie presumed to have been unlawfully acquired.
The Court held that under the principle of presumption of innocence, it is merely required that the State establish a prima facie case, after which the burden of proof is shifted to the accused.

[g] Circumstantial evidence.

People v. Bato, G.R. No. 113804, January 16, 1998:

The Supreme Court held that in order that circumstantial evidence may warrant conviction, the following requisites must concur:

there is more than one circumstance;
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Thus, where the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence gleaned from the sole testimony of the son of the deceased, the prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading, beyond reasonable doubt, to the guilt of the accused and, therefore, cannot overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence.

[h] Equipoise rule.

The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence adduced by the parties are evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
Corpus v. People, 194 SCRA 73

[i] The right to presumption of innocence can be invoked only by an individual accused of a criminal offense; a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the same.

Feeder International Line v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 84

3. Right to be heard by himself and counsel.

The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned.
It is more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections.
It means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause of the defense and acts accordingly.
Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, and not simply a perfunctory representation.
People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999.

Estrada v. Badoy, A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC, January 16, 2003:

The Supreme Court said that a PAO lawyer is considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution since he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused.

[a] The right to counsel during the trial is not subject to waiver.

Flores v. Ruiz, 90 SCRA 428.

Because "even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”
People v. Holgado, 86 Phil. 752.

People v. Santociles, G.R. No. 109149, December 21, 1999:

Thus, the conviction of the accused in the lower court was set aside and the case remanded for new trial, as the accused was represented by someone who was not a member of the Philippine Bar.

People v. Agbayani, G.R. No. 122770, January 16, 1998:

But the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial court advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and such presumption can be overcome only by an affirmative showing to the contrary.

[b] People v. Magsi, 124 SCRA 64:

The decision of conviction was set aside where it appeared that there was merely a pro forma appointment of a counsel de officio who did not exert his best efforts for the protection of the accused.

People v. Malunsing, 63 SCRA 493:

Where the accused manifested that he had lost confidence in his counsel de officio and wanted to retain a counsel de parte, but the court still appointed the same lawyer as counsel de officio, and proceeded with the trial, there was deemed a denial of this constitutional guarantee.

People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325:

Likewise, where the accused, a Cantonese, could not understand English, Pilipino, or any Philippine dialect, it was held that he was denied the right to counsel because although he was provided with one, he could not understand or communicate with his counsel concerning his defense.

[c] Although the right to counsel is not indispensable to due process of law, there are instances when the Constitution and/or the laws provide that the same may not be waived.

Thus, the accused cannot waive the right during the trial, and no valid waiver of the right to remain silent or to counsel can be made by a person under custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel.
Feeder International Line v. Court of Appeals, supra.

However, while the right to be represented by counsel during the trial is absolute, the option of the accused to hire one of his own choice is limited.
Such option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules of Court, or to prejudice the equally important rights of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.
People v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, June 20, 1997.

[d] An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under custodial investigation rather than one who is accused in criminal prosecution.

And even if the application of the concept were to be extended to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.

Amion v. Judge Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, January 22, 1999:

Thus, there is no denial of the right to counsel where the counsel de officio was appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as possible under the continuous trial system

. This is reiterated in People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001.

[e] The long-standing rule is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer, except when the negligence or incompetence of counsel is deemed so gross as to have prejudiced the constitutional right of the accused to be heard.

Andrada v. People, G.R. No. 135222, March 4, 2005.

U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74:

Thus, the case was remanded for new trial when counsel for the accused inadvertently substituted a plea of guilty for an earlier plea of not guilty, thus resulting in the precipitate conviction of his client.

Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 456:

The dismissed appeal from a conviction for estafa was reinstated after it was shown that the failure to file the appellant's brief on time was due to the sheer irresponsibility on the part of appellant's counsel.

De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 103276, April 11, 1996:

The case was remanded for reception of evidence after counsel filed a demurrer to the evidence notwithstanding that his motion for leave of court was denied, thus precluding the accused to present his evidence.

Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111682, February 6, 1997:

A new trial was ordered after a showing that counsel for the accused abandoned the accused without explanation.

People v. Bascuguin, G.R. No. 144404, September 4, 2001:

It was held that the counsel de officio's haste in proceeding with the arraignment falls short of the standard mandated by the rules of effective and adequate counselling.

4. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

[a] Rationale.

People v. Valdesancho, G.R. No. 137051-52, May 30, 2001, reiterated in People v. Monteron, G.R. No. 130709, March 06, 2002:

The Supreme Court said that the reasons for this guarantee, as explained in U.S. v. Karlsen, are:

To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to prepare for his defense;
To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
To inform the Court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction.

[i] People v. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653:

The conviction of the accused who was a deaf-mute was reversed by the Supreme Court because no one who knew how to communicate with the accused was utilized by the trial court during the entire proceedings.

People v. Parazo, G.R. No. 121176, July 8, 1999:

Similarly, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court was vacated where there was no showing that the accused, a deaf-mute, was aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of the appellant.

See also People v. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144;
People v. Montes, 122 SCRA 409.

[ii] Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter.

If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until he recovers his faculties.

People v. Alcalde, G.R. Nos. 139225-26, May 29, 2002:

To arraign the accused while he is in a state of insanity will violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

[b] Requisites.

In order that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him may not be violated, the information must state:

NDA-NTP

the name of the accused,
the designation given to the offense by statute,
a statement of the acts or omission so complained of as constituting the offense,
the name of the offended party,
the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense, and
the place where the offense had been committed.

People v. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121502, July 10, 1998:

The information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that the accused can prepare for and undertake his defense.
One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more persons is conspiracy. Where no such allegation is made in the information, the court's finding of conspiracy violates the constitutional requirement.

People v. Tabion, G.R. No. 132715, October 20, 1999:

Every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information, because the accused is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense charged.

[i] People v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 126714, March 22, 1999:

But it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time when the offense was committed, except when time is a material ingredient of the offense.
The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit.

This rule was reiterated in People v. Alba, G.R. Nos. 131858-59, April 15, 1999 and in People v. Flores, Jr., G.R. No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002, where it was held that the exact date the rape was committed is not an element of the crime.

[ii] Due process requires that the acts or omissions constitutive of the offense must be stated in the information to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him.

People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463;
People v. Bolatete, G.R. No. 127570, February 25, 1999.

The nature and the cause of the accusation must be reasonably stated in the information.
People v. Ambray, G.R. No. 127177, February 25, 1999.

People v. Puertollano, G.R. No. 122423, June 17, 1999:

Where the information (for rape) failed to allege the victim's exact age, it was held that the imposition of the death penalty was not warranted, considering that for the imposition of the death penalty the special qualifying circumstance of the victim's age and her relationship to the offender must be alleged.

People v. Bonghanoy, G.R. No. 124097, June 17, 1999:

Likewise, because the information failed to allege the relationship between the accused and the victim, the death penalty was not imposed.

People v. De la Cuesta, G.R. No. 126134, March 2, 1999.

[iii] The description, not the designation, of the offense controls.

Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 184;

The petitioner was charged under R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(b), for soliciting a benefit in connection with an official “transaction,” but no valid government contract or transaction existed. The Supreme Court held that the factual description of demanding and receiving money to dismiss an estafa complaint matched the crime of direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. It therefore recharacterized the offense as direct bribery, despite the graft label in the information. This underscores that when there’s a variance between the label and the acts proved, the description controls.

Santos v. People, 181 SCRA 487;

Santos was charged with estafa for allegedly misappropriating a client’s Ford Escort under a dubious deed of sale. The Court determined that the essence of the acts—unauthorized taking and detention of property—constituted qualified theft under Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code, not estafa. Despite the designation in the information, it reclassified the offense to qualified theft to align punishment with the factual description. This decision reaffirms that the true nature of the offense lies in the proven facts, not in the statutory label.

Pecho v. People, 262 SCRA 918.

A customs officer was indicted under R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e), for releasing containers misdeclared as farm tools, but the information’s narrative detailed forgery and submission of false shipping documents. The Supreme Court found the graft designation mismatched the factual description, which instead comprised the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents under the RPC. Applying the rule that the description controls, it modified the conviction to reflect the offense proved by the record. This ensures the accused is liable only for the crime the evidence establishes, irrespective of the initial misdesignation.

The accused can be convicted only of the crime alleged or necessarily included in the allegations in the information .
People v. Legaspi, 246 SCRA 206

People v. Paglinawan, G.R. No. 123094, January 31, 2000:

Thus, where during the trial for murder, it was shown that the mother and the brother of the victim were also injured during the same incident, it was held that the accused-appellant could not be convicted of the said injuries because they were not properly charged in the information.

[iv] People v. De Vera, G.R. Nos. 121462-63, June 9, 1999:

While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of the complex crime constitutive of the various crimes in the two informations.
To do so would violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him.

[v] The fundamental test to determine the adequacy of the averments in an information is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime.

People v. Robert Balao, G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011.

[c] Void for Vagueness Rule.

The accused is also denied the right to be informed of the charge against him, and to due process as well, where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished.
In such a case, the law is deemed void.
See Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001.

[i] Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371:

The petitioner argued that Sec. 5 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act — which penalizes any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of the President who intervenes in any business or contract with the Government — is void for being vague.
The Supreme Court said that the term "intervene" should be understood in its ordinary acceptance, which is "to come between." The challenged provision is not vague.

[d] Waiver.

Concededly, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him may not be waived, but the defense may waive the right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of "not guilty."
People v. Bryan Ferdinand Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002.

Dy and Garcia, charged with rape and acts of lasciviousness, refused to plead at arraignment claiming lack of accusal information, prompting the court to enter not guilty pleas for them. The Supreme Court held their non-waivable right to be informed was upheld since they actively participated in trial, and their waiver of plea allowed the court’s not guilty plea to stand, affirming their convictions.

The right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy.
Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives.
As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed.
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information
People v. Flores, Jr., G.R. No. 128823-24, December 27, 2002

[i] However, it is altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense cannot hold hostage the court by such refusal.

Thus, in this case, it was held that there was substantive compliance with this right when the counsel of the accused received a copy of the Prosecutor's resolution sustaining the charge for rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The failure to read the information to the accused was a procedural infirmity that was eventually non-prejudicial to the accused. Not only did they receive a copy of the information, they likewise participated in the trial, cross-examined the complainant and her witnesses, and presented their own witnesses to deny the charges against them.
The conduct of the defense, particularly their participation in the trial, clearly indicates that they were fully aware of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.

[ii] Failure to object to the multiple offenses alleged in the criminal information during the arraignment is deemed a waiver of the right.

Abalos v. People, G.R. No. 136994, September 17, 2002.

Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, May 18, 2004:

Thus, the Supreme Court said that the accused may be convicted of as many offenses charged in the information and proved during the trial, where he fails to object to such duplicitous information during the arraignment.

[iii] People v. Palarca, G.R. No. 146020, May 29, 2002:

An information which lacks certain material allegations (in this case, rape through force and intimidation) may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency is cured by competent evidence presented therein.

[e] Political Offense Doctrine.

People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 541 (1956):

Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as 'common' offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty"

Amado V. Hernandez was charged with rebellion complexed with common crimes after participating in an armed political uprising. The Supreme Court ruled that violent acts committed to further a genuine political struggle are subsumed under the political offense of rebellion, barring separate punishment for those acts.

[i] Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder.

Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crimes.
No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the institution of the criminal charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor.

[ii] But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.

Saturnino Ocampo v. Hon. Ephrem Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014:

Thus, the Court said that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged by the defense; the proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence.
It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petition for certiorari.

5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial.

[a] Speedy trial.

A trial free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
But justice and fairness, not speed, are the objectives.
See Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247;

Acebedo’s trial was delayed over six years, and when the judge dismissed it for lack of a speedy trial, he later tried to reinstate it. The Supreme Court held that such a dismissal is an acquittal and cannot be reconsidered.

Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745

Martin spent over a year and a half under arrest before formal court-martial charges were filed post-discharge. The Supreme Court ruled that speedy-trial rights run from formal charging, and that military law exceptions allow his continued prosecution.

Accused is entitled to dismissal, equivalent to acquittal, if trial is unreasonably delayed.

[i] The right to speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and postponements arising from illness, medical attention, body operations, etc.

Speedy trial means one that can be had as soon after indictment is filed as the prosecution can, with reasonable diligence, prepare for trial.
While accused persons do have rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights.
People v. Ginez, 197 SCRA 481.

In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements or scheduled hearings of the case. What offends the right are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time.

People v. Tampal, 244 SCRA 202:

In this case, the hearing was only postponed twice and for a period of less than two months; thus, there was no violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial.

The right to speedy trial is violated only:

when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried .

De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499;

De la Rosa repeatedly postponed his bouncing-check trial and then triggered a dismissal by claiming a speedy-trial violation when the prosecution sought a brief continuance. The Supreme Court ruled those self-caused delays did not violate the speedy-trial guarantee, affirmed that dismissal does not bar a new prosecution, and upheld the complainant’s right to appeal.

Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131483, October 26, 1999.

Tai Lim’s drug-case trial was postponed 11 times over more than a year for valid logistical and procedural reasons before he filed to dismiss for a speedy-trial breach. The Supreme Court held that none of those postponements were vexatious, capricious, or oppressive, and thus no speedy-trial violation occurred.

[ia] The different interests of the defendant which the right to speedy trial are designed to protect are:

to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration;
to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and
to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.

But the right to speedy trial cannot be invoked where to sustain the same would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution
In essence, the right to a speedy trial does not preclude the people's equally important right to public justice.
Uy v. Hon. Adriano, G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006.

[ii] Dacanay v. People, 240 SCRA 490:

A separate trial is consonant with the right of the accused to a speedy trial.
In this case, it has been eight years since the information was filed, and the case has yet to be tried. The long delay has clearly prejudiced the petitioner who is more than 73 years old. The inconvenience and expense on the part of the government resulting from separate trial cannot be given preference over the right to a speedy trial.

[iii] See Republic Act No. 8493 [The Speedy Trial Act], which provides, among others, that the arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30 days from filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.

Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least 15 days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within 30 days from arraignment as fixed by the court. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

[iiia] R.A. 8493 is a means of enforcing the right of the accused to a speedy trial.

The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay.
If he does not do this, he must be held, in law, to have waived the privilege.
Uy v. Hon. Adriano, G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006.

[iv] The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law.

One's right to speedy disposition of his case must, therefore, be asserted.
Due to the failure of the petitioner to assert this right, he is considered to have waived it.
Barcelona v. Lim, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014.

[b] Impartial trial.

The accused is entitled to the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge."

People v. Opida, 142 SCRA 295:

The judgment of conviction was reversed upon showing that the trial judge was biased because of the appearance and criminal record of the accused.

Imelda Romualdez Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, supra, reiterating Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, supra:

The cross-examination of the accused and the witnesses by the court constituted bias and partiality.

People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 120282, April 20, 1998:

But the impartiality of the judge cannot be assailed on the ground that he propounded clarificatory questions to the accused

People v. Vaynaco, G.R. No. 126286, March 22, 1999:

Indeed, trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in asking questions as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth. This is not only the right but the duty of the judge who feels the need to elicit information to the end that justice will be served.

[i] Go v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 397:

The Supreme Court said that the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although required for the benefit of litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have erected when they adopted our Constitution.

[ii] People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January 25, 1999:

The Supreme Court, citing People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, rejected the appellant's contention that he was denied the right to an impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of the accused to a fair trial.

[c] Public trial.

This is intended to prevent possible abuses which may be committed against the accused.
The rule is not absolute.
See Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143.

Judge Garcia and all parties agreed to hold a criminal trial in chambers for comfort, prompting Domingo to argue the public was shut out. The Supreme Court held that the public trial guarantee is not absolute and may be waived by parties, so long as no concealed proceedings occur and attendance remains open.

[i] An accused has a right to a public trial, but it is a right that belongs to him more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance.

A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago.
A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
Re: Request for Live TV Coverage of the Trial of former President Joseph Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001.

Broadcasters and the Secretary of Justice sought live media coverage of former President Estrada’s plunder trial, but the Supreme Court held that live broadcast could compromise his right to a fair and impartial trial. The Court refused live coverage, affirmed that public trial requires open court doors rather than live telecasts, and authorized recordings for historical and appellate record only.

6. Right to meet witnesses face to face.

Right to cross-examine complainant and witnesses.
The testimony of a witness who has not submitted himself to cross-examination is not admissible in evidence.
The affidavits of witnesses who are not presented during the trial — and thus, are not subjected to cross-examination — are inadmissible because they are hearsay
People v. Quidato, G.R. No. 117401, October 1, 1998;

Quidato’s conviction rested on co-accused affidavits never subjected to cross-examination, violating his right to confront witnesses. The Supreme Court held such hearsay affidavits inadmissible and reversed his conviction.

Cariago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143561, June 6, 2001.

Cariaga’s conviction leaned on an absent witness’s affidavit admitted without real effort to compel his presence. The Court ruled that absent-witness affidavits are hearsay unless strict unavailability and cross-examination opportunities are proven, but upheld the conviction on other live testimony.

People v. Monje, G.R. No. 146689, September 27, 2002:

Thus, the Supreme Court said that to administer by final judgment the dreaded lethal injection on the basis of circumstantial evidence consisting mainly of the testimony of a witness who failed and refused to return to court and submit to cross-examination four times is judicial tyranny of the highest order
But the right to cross-examine witnesses may be waived.

[a] People v. Lacbanes, G.R. No. 88684, March 20, 1997:

It was held that the failure to present as witness the poseur-buyer in a prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, is not fatal to the prosecution's case, because what is required is merely proof of the consummation of the sale transaction, and in this case, the entire transaction was witnessed by Pfc. Rosales who testified on the same.

People v. Tapeda, 244 SCRA 339:

Distinguish this case where the Supreme Court said that the failure of the prosecution to present as witness the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation was fatal to the prosecution's case, because without the testimony of the latter there is no convincing evidence that the accused was a marijuana peddler and not simply the victim of instigation.

7. Right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence.

[a] A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.

Caamic v. Galapon, 237 SCRA 390

Judge Galapon issued a subpoena to Caamic despite her being neither party nor witness, then threatened contempt when she refused. The Supreme Court held this act a grave abuse of discretion, defined proper subpoena use under Rule 21, and admonished the judge.

In this jurisdiction, there are two kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum.

Subpoena ad testificandum

used to compel a person to testify

Subpoena duces tecum

used to compel the production of books, records, things, or documents therein specified

Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present:

the books, documents, or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and
such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness)

Roco v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005.

Roco’s request to subpoena Cal’s officers and corporate records was denied after he failed to prove the documents’ materiality to his defense against bouncing checks. The Court upheld that subpoenas duces tecum must meet the tests of prima facie relevance and definiteness and must not be used to delay the trial.

[b] People v. Chua, G.R. No. 128280, April 4, 2001:

The Court reiterated what, in U.S. v. Ramirez, it declared as the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence, as follows:

the evidence is really material;
accused is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such evidence;
the evidence will be available at the time desired; and
no similar evidence can be obtained.

Chua was tried for illegal recruitment and estafa after allegedly collecting unauthorized placement fees, and the prosecution sought subpoenas to secure witness testimony and records. The Supreme Court held that courts must follow the four U.S. v. Ramirez requisites before compelling attendance and production of evidence and upheld the trial court’s orders.

8. Trial in absentia.

The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could, in the past, be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape.

People v. Agbulos, 222 SCRA 196.

Agbulos failed to show up for promulgation of his armed robbery verdict despite proper notice, prompting the RTC to convict him in absentia. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, ruling that Rule 120, Section 6 authorizes judgment in absentia when an accused is duly notified yet remains absent.

Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizes the promulgation of judgment in absentia in view of the failure of the accused to appear despite notice.

This is intended to obviate the situation where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment.
People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140285, September 27, 2006.

Wilfred N. Chiok, charged with estafa for misusing Rufina Chua’s ₱9.56 M investment, skipped two promulgation hearings and had his bail cancelled by the RTC. The Supreme Court held that Rule 120 authorizes conviction in absentia and requires bail cancellation and arrest when the accused fails to appear, reversing the CA’s injunction.

Trial in absentia is mandatory upon the court whenever the accused has been arraigned, notified of date/s of hearing, and his absence is unjustified.

See Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1;

De la Vega jumped bail after arraignment and notice in a murder trial, and the RTC wrongly paused his case, preserving his defense rights until recapture. The Supreme Court held that once arraigned and notified, an accused’s unjustified absence waives his trial rights and mandates continuation of trial in absentia.

People v. Judge Salas, 143 SCRA 163;

Abong escaped after improperly bailing himself out and the RTC halted his homicide trial pending recapture. The Supreme Court ruled that under Sec. 19, Art. IV, once arraigned and notified, an accused’s unjustified absence forfeits his right to delay, and trial must go on in absentia.

Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546.

Ninoy Aquino Jr. rejected Military Commission No. 2’s proceedings and sought to block his trial by insisting on his presence. The Supreme Court held that under Sec. 19, Art. IV, trial—even before a military tribunal—is permitted in absentia once the accused is arraigned, notified, and his presence is waived or unjustifiably withheld.

[a] Waiver of appearance or trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of the right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused.

People v. Macaraeg, 141 SCRA 37.

Even after the accused has waived further appearance during the trial, he can be ordered arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to appear for purposes of identification.

Carredo v. People, 183 SCRA 273.

[b] Thus, the presence of the accused is mandatory:

during arraignment and plea;
during trial, for identification; and
during promulgation of sentence, unless for a light offense wherein the accused may appear by counsel or a representative.

[c] An accused who escapes from confinement, or jumps bail, or flees to a foreign country, loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief from the court, including the right to appeal his conviction.

People v. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79.

One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-appearance during the trial.
Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation can be made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation of judgment is served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
People v. Acabal, G.R. No. 103604-05, September 23, 1993.

[d] Under Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.

The accused on bail who fails to present himself during promulgation of judgment loses his standing in court. Without any standing in court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief.
x x x Sec. 6, Rule 120, does not take away substantive rights; it merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented. x x x Like an appeal, a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege.
As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in the manner provided by law; the party filing such a motion must strictly comply with the requisites laid down by the Rules.
Reynaldo Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 183152, January 21, 2015.

Jaylo, Valenzona, and Habalo were convicted of homicide in a 1990 buy-bust and failed to appear for their 2007 judgment promulgation despite notice, leading to an in-absentia verdict, bail cancellation, and arrest warrants. The Supreme Court held that under Sec. 6, Rule 120, their unjustified absence forfeited their statutory remedies and affirmed the lower court’s orders.

P. Habeas Corpus

Sec. 15, Art. III:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended

except in cases of invasion or rebellion

when public safety requires it.

1. Definition of a writ of habeas corpus

Writ of habeas corpus

A writ issued by a court directed to a person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf.

2. When available

Habeas corpus restores the liberty of an individual subjected to physical restraint.
The high prerogative of the writ was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and is the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
It secures to the prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.
Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding:

there has been deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of the person;
the court has no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
an excessive penalty has been imposed, since such sentence is void as to the excess.

Feria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122954, February 15, 2000;

Norberto Feria, convicted of robbery with homicide, sought release via habeas corpus after the case records, including the judgment, were lost in a fire, claiming his detention was illegal without the written decision. The Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling that loss of records after conviction does not nullify the judgment or justify release, and that the proper remedy is reconstitution of the records.

Reiterated in In Re: Reynaldo de Villa, G.R. No. 158802, November 17, 2004.

Retired General Reynaldo de Villa sought release via habeas corpus after the trial court cancelled his bail and ordered his recommitment in a pending criminal case for arbitrary detention. The Supreme Court denied the petition, ruling that habeas corpus does not apply when detention is under a lawful court order in a case within the court’s jurisdiction, and that procedural errors must be addressed through ordinary remedies.

It may also extend to cases by which rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Tijing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001.

Spouses Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing sought a writ of habeas corpus to recover their missing son, claiming that the boy known as John Thomas Lopez in Angelita Diamante’s custody was in fact their child, and presented evidence of Angelita’s inability to bear children, Tomas Lopez’s sterility, and the child’s resemblance to Bienvenida. The Supreme Court ruled that habeas corpus is a proper remedy in child custody disputes and, finding the evidence sufficient to establish the child’s identity, reinstated the RTC’s order returning custody to the Tijings.

[a] Illustrative cases

Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil. 851:

The writ was issued on the ground that moral restraint was being exerted by the employer to prevent the housemaid from leaving.

Alcantara v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 749:

A person detained during the Japanese Occupation for an offense of political complexion could demand his release on habeas corpus after the legitimate government was restored.

Alcantara was convicted under a Baguio division of the Court of Appeals during Japanese Occupation and served an indeterminate sentence after the war. The Supreme Court denied his habeas corpus petition, ruling that de facto judicial acts remain valid when they lack political complexion.

Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420:

The right was accorded a person sentenced to a longer penalty than was subsequently meted out to another person convicted of the same offense.
It may also be availed of in case of unlawful denial of bail.

Gumabon and four co-accused were serving reclusion perpetua for rebellion with murder when the Supreme Court later limited rebellion to prisión mayor. The Court granted their habeas corpus petition, ruling that they must be released once they exceeded the lawful maximum term under the Hernandez decision.

Ordonez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152:

The Supreme Court granted the writ in favor of two persons convicted by the military court and condemned to die by musketry, in view of the ruling in Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, that:
Civilians who have been convicted by military courts and who have been serving (but not yet completed) their sentences of imprisonment, may be given the option either to complete service of their sentence or be tried anew by the civil courts; and upon conviction, they should be credited in the service of their sentence for the full period of their previous imprisonment; upon acquittal, they should be set free."

Paquinto and Cabangunay, civilians whose martial-law convictions were later nullified, remained imprisoned without fresh charges or records. The Supreme Court granted their habeas corpus petition, ordering their release as their detention lacked any lawful basis.

[b] Limitations

The writ will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.
The ultimate purpose of the writ is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.
It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he was detained.
Even if the detention is, at its inception, illegal, supervening events, such as the issuance of a judicial process, may prevent the discharge of the detained person
Jackson v. Macalino, G.R. No. 139255, November 24, 2003.

Jackson was detained for carrying cancelled U.S. passports and ordered deported, but he filed for habeas corpus before his appeal was resolved. The Supreme Court ruled that habeas corpus does not apply when detention rests on valid judicial or quasi‐judicial orders.

Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468:

The Court observed that the petitioner was under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had, in fact, voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on April 25, 2001, upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.

Serapio was arrested for alleged plunder after the Ombudsman’s investigation and held under a Sandiganbayan warrant. The Supreme Court denied his habeas corpus petition, holding that a valid warrant from a competent tribunal precludes relief by writ.

Tung Chin Hui v. Commissioner Rodriguez, G.R. No. 141938, April 2, 2001:

Where the petitioner had already been charged and ordered deported by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, petitioner’s confinement cannot be considered illegal and there is no justification for the writ.

After using a cancelled passport, Tung Chin Hui was detained under a summary deportation order by the Bureau of Immigration. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision that his detention was lawful and denied his petition for habeas corpus.

Magno v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 229:

Where the person detained applied for and was released on bail, the petition for habeas corpus became moot and academic insofar as it questioned the legality of the arrest and detention.

Magno challenged his arrest by habeas corpus but was released on bail before the petition was resolved. The Supreme Court held that his petition was moot since he was no longer detained.

Ilusorio v. Bildner, G.R. No. 139789, May 12, 2000:

Neither can marital rights, including living in a conjugal dwelling, be enforced by the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus.

Erlinda Ilusorio filed for habeas corpus to force her husband to live with her, alleging unlawful custodial control by others. The Supreme Court ruled that habeas corpus cannot enforce marital consortium or personal obligations, dismissing the petition.

[i] Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464:

The fact that the preliminary investigation was invalid and that the offense had already prescribed do not constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
The remedy is to file a motion to quash the warrant of arrest, or to file a motion to quash the information based on prescription.

Paredes challenged his detention on the basis of an allegedly flawed preliminary investigation and prescription of the offense. The Supreme Court held that habeas corpus cannot address such procedural or substantive defenses once a valid warrant exists, directing him to other remedies

[ii] SPO2 Geronimo Manalo v. PNP Chief Oscar Calderon, G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007:

Restrictive custody and monitoring of movement or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. A petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully.

SPO2 Geronimo Manalo and several PNP-RSOG officers were implicated in an election-day arson that killed two officials, so the PNP placed them under restrictive custody and monitored their movements pending investigation. The Supreme Court ruled that such internal disciplinary measures did not amount to illegal detention and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

[c] Desaparecidos (disappeared persons)

Dizon v. Eduardo, 158 SCRA 470:

Because the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued could not be found, there was no relief granted by the Court, except to refer the matter to the Commission on Human Rights.
The Court ruled that in case of doubt as to whether detainees had been actually released, the burden of proof rests upon the officers who detained them and who claim to have effected the release.

Eduardo Dizon and Isabel Ramos were arrested without warrants during Martial Law and allegedly released by the military, but their families claimed the release documents were forged and the two remained missing. The Supreme Court found the military’s account unconvincing, ruled that respondents failed to prove actual release, and referred the case to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation into the suspected enforced disappearance.

[d] Sentence already served under amended law

Angeles v. Director of New Bilibid Prison, 240 SCRA 49:

The Court declared that all courts of competent jurisdiction may entertain petitions for habeas corpus to consider the release of petitioners convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, provided they have served the maximum term of the applicable penalties newly prescribed by R.A. 7659.
Formalities shall be construed liberally.
In this case, however, since petitioner had served only the minimum of the prescribed penalty, he was not entitled to be released on a petition for habeas corpus.

Rolando Angeles, convicted of selling 0.13 grams of shabu and sentenced to life imprisonment, sought release via habeas corpus after R.A. 7659 retroactively reduced the penalty for his offense to prisión correccional, arguing he had served the minimum of the new range. The Supreme Court denied the petition as premature, ruling that habeas corpus applies only when the maximum of the amended penalty has been served, and that Angeles’ possible release must be processed through the Board of Pardons and Parole

[e] Conditional pardon and lost judicial records

In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709:

The petition was denied because with the cancellation of the conditional pardon, the petitioner would still have to serve his prison term up to November 2, 2000.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged to be illegal or unlawful.

Wilfredo Torres, previously convicted of estafa and conditionally pardoned, was recommitted to prison after being charged with new offenses, prompting his family to file a habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court ruled that the President’s decision to revoke the pardon and order recommitment is an executive act beyond judicial scrutiny, thus rendering the detention lawful.

Feria v. Court of Appeals, supra:

Likewise, it was held that the loss of the judicial records of the case, after 12 years of detention in the service of the sentence imposed for conviction of murder, will not entitle the convict to be released on a writ of habeas corpus. The proper remedy is reconstitution of judicial records.

3. Procedure

There is need to comply with the writ;
Disobedience thereof constitutes contempt of court.
Contado v. Tan, 160 SCRA 404

Three men were arrested during martial law, tortured, and disappeared under suspicious circumstances, prompting their families to file a habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondents’ failure to produce the detainees and their false claims of release constituted contempt of court, affirming the writ’s role in protecting liberty and ordering further criminal prosecution.

4. Grounds for suspension; duration of suspension; congressional authority; Supreme Court power of review; application of suspension; effect of martial law on privilege

Sec. 18, Art. VII:

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, (the President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus...

Within forty-eight hours from the suspension... the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it…

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from filing…

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension... any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released."

5. Suspension of privilege does not suspend right to bail

Sec. 13, Art. III

The right to bail shall not be impaired

even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

Q. Speedy Disposition of Cases

Sec. 16, Art. III:

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of cases

before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

1. Relation to other rights

Relate this to:

the right of the accused to speedy trial [Sec. 14, Art. III], and
to periods for decision for courts [Sec. 15, Art. VIII] and

All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

for the Constitutional Commissions [Sec. 7, Art. IX-A].

Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

However, this right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
Thus, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 722.

Over 1,700 overseas workers filed labor claims against their recruiters and employers, but the resolution of their cases was delayed for years due to procedural complexities and fragmented filings. The Supreme Court ruled that although delays occurred, they were not unreasonable given the case’s scale, and thus did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases.

2. Scope of violation

Like the right to a speedy trial, this right is violated only:

when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120281-83, October 1, 1999, citing Socrates v. Sandiganbayan:

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient.

Mayor Jejomar Binay was charged with graft years after the initial complaint, prompting him to claim that the delay violated his right to a speedy disposition of cases. The Supreme Court ruled that the delay was justified due to the complexity and volume of evidence, and thus did not constitute a constitutional violation.

Sambang v. General Court Martial PRO-Region 6, G.R. No. 140188, August 3, 2000:

Thus, the Supreme Court said that although it was unfortunate that it took about 8 years before the trial of the case was resumed, there was no delay amounting to a violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of cases, considering that the delay was not attributable to the prosecution.

SPO1 Porferio Sumbang Jr. was charged with double murder and experienced nearly eight years of delay in his court-martial trial due to institutional changes and reorganization. The Supreme Court ruled that the delay was not vexatious or oppressive and that Sumbang’s failure to assert his right earlier meant there was no violation of his right to a speedy disposition of the case.

[a] But unlike the right to a speedy trial, this constitutional privilege applies not only during the trial stage but also when the case has already been submitted for decision

Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2002.

Licaros was charged with graft, but the Ombudsman took eight years to complete the preliminary investigation without offering any valid justification. The Supreme Court ruled that this inordinate delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases and ordered the dismissal of the charges.

3. Test for violation

Tilendo v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165975, September 13, 2007:

The Supreme Court said that the concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible.
A simple mathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient.
In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors must be considered:

the length of the delay;
the reasons for the delay;
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
the prejudice caused by the delay.

Payakan G. Tilendo was charged with malversation and graft after a multi-year investigation into the misuse of public funds for a college construction project, which he claimed violated his right to a speedy disposition of cases. The Supreme Court ruled that the delay was justified and not oppressive, especially since Tilendo failed to assert his right earlier and the proceedings followed proper investigative procedures.

4. Delay by the Ombudsman

Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999:

The Supreme Court held that consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public officials.
The failure of the said office to resolve a complaint that had been pending for six years is clearly violative of this mandate and the public officer’s right.
In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the complaint.

Roque and Mabanglo were charged with graft in 1991, but the Ombudsman took nearly six years to resolve the complaints and file charges, prompting them to seek judicial relief. The Supreme Court ruled that the delay violated their right to a speedy disposition of cases and ordered the dismissal of the complaints

A similar ruling was made in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 139571-72, March 28, 2001;

Roger Abardo was charged with falsification of public documents in 1991, but his case remained unresolved for over a decade due to prolonged reinvestigation and prosecutorial inaction. The Supreme Court ruled that this delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases and ordered the dismissal of the charges.

Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108595, May 18, 1999; and

Elpidio Cervantes was charged with graft more than six years after a complaint was filed against him, despite his early denial of involvement and submission of an affidavit. The Supreme Court ruled that the prolonged delay violated his right to a speedy disposition of cases and ordered the dismissal of the charges.

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70.

[a] Guiani v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 146897-917, August 6, 2002:

It was held that the period of time which elapsed in the conduct of preliminary investigation was warranted by the sequence of events.
Considering the complexity of the transaction involved, the fact that the 41 respondents were required to file counter-affidavits, and that most respondents moved for extension of time, it appeared that the petitioners impliedly acquiesced in the delay.

Officials of the ARMM were charged with graft after a COA audit revealed serious irregularities in infrastructure projects, but the preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman took nearly six years. The Supreme Court ruled that the delay was justified due to the complexity of the case and the petitioners’ own requests for extensions, and thus did not violate their right to a speedy disposition of cases.

5. Coverage extends to all citizens

Abadia v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 676:

It was held that this right extends to all citizens, including those in the military, and covers the period before, during, and after the trial, affording broader protection than Sec. 14(2), Art. III, which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the writ of habeas corpus and stated that the absence of a time limit within which the Chief of Staff or reviewing authority may approve or disapprove the order of dismissal on the ground of prescription may be subject to abuse.

Lt. Col. Malajacan was detained for over three years in connection with a coup attempt, even after all charges against him were dismissed by the military tribunal. The Supreme Court ruled that the prolonged inaction violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases and affirmed the order for his release.

6. Assertion of right

Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 703:

The Supreme Court said that while this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition of cases quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party’s individual rights should not work against and preclude the people’s equally important right to public justice.
In this case, the failure of the petitioner to assert his right seasonably was interpreted as a waiver of such right.

Francisco Guerrero was charged with triple homicide in 1971, but after trial concluded in 1979, the case languished for over a decade without judgment due to missing transcripts and court reassignments. The Supreme Court ruled that although the Constitution protects the right to speedy disposition even after trial, Guerrero’s failure to assert this right earlier meant it was not violated, and the case should proceed to resolution.

Dimayacyac v. Judge Roxas, G.R. No. 136264, May 28, 2004:

Thus, because the petitioners had failed seasonably to assert their constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases, the Court ruled that they were deemed to have waived their right.

Atty. Dimayacyac was recharged with falsification of public documents two years after his original case was quashed, and he claimed this delay violated his right to a speedy disposition of cases. The Supreme Court held that the delay was not oppressive or unjustified, especially since he failed to assert the right earlier, and allowed the trial to proceed.

Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158018, May 20, 2004

Jaime Bernat’s graft case remained undecided for over eight years after being submitted for decision, due to missing transcripts and court reorganization. The Supreme Court ruled that the delay did not violate his right to a speedy disposition of cases because he failed to assert the right earlier and the delay was not unjustified.

7. Application in administrative cases

Roquero v. The Chancellor of UP Manila, G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010:

The Supreme Court ruled that this constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings, but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
In fact, the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service states that the failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within the given period shall be considered a waiver thereof.
In this case, it took the prosecution almost 5 years to file its formal offer of evidence.

Capt. Roquero was administratively charged with misconduct in 1995, but the decision to dismiss him was rendered only in 2002—six years after the case was submitted for resolution. The Supreme Court ruled that this delay violated his right to a speedy disposition of cases and annulled the administrative decision against him.

R. Self-Incrimination

Sec. 17, Art. III

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

1. Availability

The right is available not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other government proceedings, including civil actions and administrative or legislative investigations.
It may be claimed not only by the accused but also by any witness to whom a question calling for an incriminating answer is addressed.

[a] Rule.

As a rule, it may be invoked only when and as the question calling for an incriminating answer is asked, since the witness has no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the question to be put to him.
This is true, however, only of an ordinary witness.

[b] In a criminal prosecution, the accused may not be compelled to take the witness stand, on the reasonable assumption that the purpose of the interrogation will be to incriminate him.

Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663.

Roger Chavez, an accused in a qualified theft case, was compelled by the trial court to testify for the prosecution, despite his objections and invocation of his right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court ruled that this violated his constitutional privilege, rendering his conviction void and entitling him to release via habeas corpus.

⭐ Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 345:

The same principle shall apply to the respondent in an administrative proceeding where the respondent may be subjected to sanctions of a penal character, such as the cancellation of his license to practice medicine or the forfeiture of property.

Arsenio Pascual was charged in a medical-malpractice administrative proceeding and sought to block the Board from calling him to testify first, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination because he risked losing his license. The Supreme Court affirmed that no medical board can compel a practitioner to give self-incriminating testimony in a quasi-criminal administrative hearing.

Cabal v. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1064

Gen. Manuel Cabal was charged with contempt for refusing to testify in an administrative investigation into unexplained wealth, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court ruled that since the forfeiture proceedings were quasi-criminal, Cabal could not be compelled to testify, and the contempt charge was invalid.

2. Scope

The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but testimonial compulsion only.
The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of his guilt.

Alih v. Castro.

Rizal Alih and others were arrested following a military raid and were subjected to fingerprinting, photographing, and paraffin testing, which they claimed violated their right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court held that these procedures did not constitute testimonial compulsion and thus did not violate the right, but it invalidated the warrantless search and excluded the seized items from evidence.

It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but object evidence.
What is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant, and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
People v. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167.

Jose Malimit was convicted of robbery with homicide after being seen fleeing the crime scene and later revealing the location of the victim’s wallet during custodial investigation without being informed of his rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial compulsion, so the physical evidence was admissible despite procedural lapses.

[a] People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, December 9, 1999:

Thus, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received in evidence.
Hair samples taken from the accused may be admitted in evidence against him.

Delfin Rondero was convicted of rape with homicide after circumstantial evidence—including bloodied clothing, matching hair strands, and eyewitness testimony—linked him to the brutal killing of nine-year-old Mylene Doria, though he claimed his rights were violated when hair samples were taken during custodial investigation. The Supreme Court ruled that the right against self-incrimination protects only against testimonial compulsion, not physical evidence like hair samples, which were admissible despite being obtained without counsel.

People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, May 9, 2002 and in People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004:

Evidence involving deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is likewise admissible and was utilized to affirm the death sentence on the accused found guilty of child-rape with homicide.

Gerrico Vallejo was convicted of raping and killing a nine-year-old girl after circumstantial evidence and DNA analysis linked him to the crime, alongside confessions made during custodial investigation with counsel. The Supreme Court ruled that the right against self-incrimination does not apply to physical evidence like DNA, and upheld the admissibility of both the forensic results and the confessions.

People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004

Joel Yatar was convicted of raping and killing his niece after DNA analysis of semen found in the victim matched his genetic profile, and witnesses placed him at the crime scene. The Supreme Court ruled that DNA evidence is physical and non-testimonial, so its collection and use did not violate his right against self-incrimination.

[b] A person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, and paraffin testing, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.

People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 27, 2000:

Where immediately after the incident, the policemen took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, it was held that there was no violation.

Radel Gallarde was convicted of homicide after circumstantial evidence linked him to the death of a 10-year-old girl, and he challenged the admissibility of photographs taken during police custody without counsel. The Supreme Court ruled that the right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial compulsion, so the photographs were admissible as non-testimonial evidence.

In fact, the accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

U.S. v. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145:

A person charged with rape was ordered examined for gonorrhea, which might have been transmitted to the victim.

Tan Teng was convicted of sexually assaulting a minor and objected to the use of medical evidence showing he had gonorrhea, claiming it violated his right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court ruled that the privilege applies only to testimonial compulsion and not to physical evidence obtained from the body, thus affirming the admissibility of the scientific findings.

⭐ Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62:

A woman accused of adultery was subjected to medical examination to determine if she was pregnant.

Villaflor, accused of adultery, was ordered to undergo a medical exam for pregnancy and was jailed for contempt when she refused, citing her right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court ruled that the privilege against self-incrimination covers only forced testimony and does not bar a noninvasive physical inspection of the body.

⭐ People v. Tranca, 35 SCRA 455:

The accused was made to undergo ultra-violet ray examination to determine the presence of fluorescent powder dusted on the money used in a buy-bust operation.

In a Makati buy-bust on May 7, 1991, police used a P100 bill dusted with fluorescent powder to catch Carlos Tranca selling shabu and subjected him to an ultraviolet examination revealing powder residues. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, ruling that the self-incrimination clause bars only forced testimony and does not prohibit the use of physical evidence obtained by UV testing

[c] The prohibition extends to the compulsion for the production of documents, papers, and chattels that may be used as evidence against the witness, except where the State has a right to inspect the same, such as the books of accounts of corporations, under the police or taxing power.

Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122:

Thus, the Supreme Court said that the demand of the PCGG that the petitioners — lawyers and co-accused — would be excluded from the case if they revealed the identity of their clients and submitted the documents related to the suspected transactions, violated the right of the petitioners against self-incrimination.
They did not have to wait until they were called to testify; they could raise the objection because they were not merely witnesses — they were parties in the case for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth.

Lawyers from the ACCRA Law Firm were included as defendants in a case involving alleged ill-gotten wealth and were pressured to disclose the identities of their clients, which they refused, citing attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court ruled that under circumstances where revealing client identities could lead to self-incrimination, such information is protected and cannot be compelled.

Almonte v. Vasquez, supra:

However, it was held that where the subpoena duces tecum is directed to government officials required to produce official documents/public records which are in their possession or custody, then there is no violation of the right against self-incrimination.

[d] Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil 570:

The privilege also protects the accused against any attempt to compel him to furnish a specimen of his handwriting in connection with a prosecution for falsification.

Francisco Beltran was ordered to write dictated text for handwriting comparison in a falsification investigation, but he refused, citing his right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court ruled that compelling a person to create evidence through handwriting is a testimonial act and violates the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

3. Immunity

The immunity granted to the witness may be either transactional immunity or use and fruit immunity.

Transactional immunity

such as that which may be granted by the Commission on Human Rights to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, which makes the witness immune from criminal prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates [Sec. 18(8), Art. XIII];

Transactional immunity wipes out the possibility of prosecution for the offense entirely.

Use and fruit immunity

which prohibits the use of the witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.

Use and fruit immunity only blocks your compelled testimony and its direct results from being used against you, but does not prevent prosecution based on independent evidence.

Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274

Military officers accused as accessories in the Aquino-Galman killings were compelled under P.D. 1886 to testify before the Agrava Fact-Finding Board, and the prosecution later sought to use those testimonies in their criminal trial. The Supreme Court ruled that such compelled statements were inadmissible under the constitutional right against self-incrimination and the use immunity provided by P.D. 1886, even without prior invocation of the privilege.The Court classified P.D. 1886 as a use immunity statute—barring the use of compelled testimony and its fruits, but not prohibiting prosecution based on independent evidence.

[a] Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783:

It was held that these immunity statutes are not a bonanza from government.
Those given this privilege paid a high price for it — the surrender of their right to remain silent.
These laws should, therefore, be given a liberal interpretation.

Mapa and Vergara, accused in a graft case, entered into agreements with the PCGG granting them transactional immunity in exchange for cooperating as witnesses in the U.S. RICO case against the Marcoses, but were not ultimately called to testify. The Supreme Court ruled that their cooperation satisfied the immunity agreement and, consistent with the protection against self-incrimination, barred further prosecution in the Sandiganbayan case. It ruled that Section 5 of E.O. No. 14, as amended, grants transactional immunity to friendly witnesses who provide information necessary to prove unlawful acquisition of property, and that such immunity is not contingent on actual testimony in court if the witness has fulfilled the agreement to cooperate.

4. Waiver

The right against self-incrimination may be waived, either directly or by a failure to invoke it, provided the waiver is certain, unequivocal, and intelligently made.
Thus, the accused who takes the witness stand voluntarily and offers testimony in his behalf may be cross-examined and asked incriminating questions on any matter he testified to on direct examination.

[a] People v. Judge Ayson, supra:

The Supreme Court said, in fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence:

Before the case is filed in Court (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police:

the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel; and to be informed thereof,
not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and
to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected and inadmissible.

After the case is filed in Court:

to refuse to be a witness;
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination; and
while testifying, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is being prosecuted.

S. Non-detention by Reason of Political Beliefs or Aspirations

Sec. 18(1), Art. III:

No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs or aspirations.

T. Involuntary Servitude

Sec. 18(2), Art. III:

No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist

except as a punishment for a crime

whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

1. Slavery under the Revised Penal Code

Reinforced by Art. 272, Revised Penal Code, which provides: “The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding ₱10,000 shall be imposed upon anyone who shall purchase, sell, kidnap, or detain a human being for the purpose of enslaving him.”
See Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil 851.

Estelita Flores, an illiterate and impoverished young woman, was brought from Capiz to Manila by a maid recruiter and kept in the house of an employment agency owner, who refused to let her leave unless she first repaid ₱83.85 advanced for her travel expenses. The Supreme Court ruled that this constituted an unlawful restraint of liberty amounting to involuntary servitude, holding that no debt or business interest can justify curtailing a person’s fundamental freedom of movement and choice of residence.

2. Exceptions

PSN-PRP

Punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted.
Service in defense of the State

Sec. 4, Art. II
See People v. Zosa, 38 O.G. 1676.

Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa, both Filipino citizens aged twenty, refused to register for compulsory military service under the National Defense Law despite being duly notified, claiming personal and family reasons for noncompliance. The Supreme Court upheld their conviction, ruling that compulsory military service is constitutionally valid as part of the State’s duty to defend itself, and that requiring citizens to serve does not constitute involuntary servitude.

Naval [merchant marine] enlistment.

See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 75.

Four seamen who had signed shipping articles for a voyage left their vessel mid-journey, were arrested under federal statutes, jailed until the ship was ready to sail, and then forcibly returned on board against their will, later refusing to work. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statutes and their detention, ruling that the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude was never intended to apply to seamen’s contracts, which have historically been treated as exceptional and may lawfully involve a temporary surrender of personal liberty during the voyage

Posse comitatus.

empowers authorities to call citizens to maintain public order
See ⭐ U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil 245.

On June 1, 1914, Iloilo’s prosecutor charged Silvestre Pompeya under a municipal ordinance requiring certain residents to assist in patrol duties, and Pompeya demurred as violative of his liberty under the Organic Act. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, ruling the ordinance was a proper exercise of police power embodying posse comitatus and that the complaint itself failed to allege facts showing Pompeya fell within the ordinance’s scope.

Return-to-work order in industries affected with public interest.

See Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills, 45 O.G. Supp. No. 9, p. 147.

The Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas struck against Gotamco Saw Mill, but the Court of Industrial Relations ordered them to return to work under a temporary wage agreement while the dispute was pending, which the union later challenged as unconstitutional involuntary servitude. The Supreme Court upheld the order, ruling that Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 was valid because workers voluntarily enter employment contracts with the implied condition to comply with such return-to-work directives when public interest requires, thus negating any claim of involuntary servitude

Patria potestas

Art. 311, Civil Code.

The father and mother jointly exercise parental authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Children are obliged to obey their parents so long as they are under parental power, and to observe respect and reverence toward them always.

Recognized natural and adopted children who are under the age of majority are under the parental authority of the father or mother recognizing or adopting them, and are under the same obligation stated in the preceding paragraph.

Natural children by legal fiction are under the joint authority of the father and mother, as provided in the first paragraph of this article

3. RH Law

Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014:

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude.

First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Sec. 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono service. Except for PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
Furthermore, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17, as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render the service, pro bono or otherwise.

U. Prohibited Punishments

Sec. 19, Art. III:

(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

1. Mere severity does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.

People v. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 299.

Rosauro Dionisio was convicted of violating Republic Act No. 3063 for unlawfully arranging and collecting horse race bets without authorization, and was sentenced to one month of imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld the penalty, ruling that fines or imprisonment of this nature do not constitute cruel or unusual punishment, as the constitutional ban applies only to penalties that are inhuman, barbarous, or shock the conscience.

To violate the constitutional guarantee, the penalty must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.
People v. Estolsta, 93 Phil 647.

Alberto Estoista was convicted of illegal possession of his father’s rifle after using it to hunt on the family plantation, accidentally shooting a laborer, and was sentenced under Republic Act No. 4, which prescribes imprisonment of five to ten years for such offense. The Supreme Court upheld the law’s constitutionality, ruling that a five-year prison term for possessing firearms is not cruel or unusual punishment because it is neither barbarous nor grossly disproportionate to the offense, given the public safety concerns the statute seeks to address

Lim v. People, G.R. No. 149276, September 27, 2002:

Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or degrading unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive or wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution.
Thus, while P.D. 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed under Art. 315, par. 2(d) without increasing the amounts corresponding to the new penalties, it does not violate the constitutional injunction against excessive punishment.
The fact that the decree did not increase the amounts only proves that the amount is immaterial. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks.

Spouses Jovencio and Teresita Lim were charged with estafa for issuing postdated checks worth over ₱365,000 that were dishonored, and they challenged the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 818, which increased penalties for estafa involving bouncing checks, claiming it imposed cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment. The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling that the penalty of reclusion perpetua or up to 30 years’ imprisonment was not cruel or unusual because severity alone does not make a punishment unconstitutional, and the increase served a legitimate purpose of deterring offenses that undermine commerce and public confidence in negotiable instruments.

[a] del Rosario v. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521:

Penalties for violation of the Generics Act ranging from a fine of ₱2,000 (for 2nd conviction) to not less than ₱10,000 (for 4th conviction) and suspension of license to practice profession for one year or longer do not constitute cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment.

Officers of the Philippine Medical Association challenged provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 and its implementing rules, arguing among other things that the law’s graduated penalties—including fines and suspension of a physician’s license—constituted cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that such sanctions are valid regulatory measures, not cruel or unusual punishment, as they are comparable to professional discipline imposed on lawyers and judges and are necessary to ensure compliance with the law.

⭐ People v. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90:

The indeterminable period of imprisonment prescribed as a penalty in Sec. 32, R.A. 4670 [Magna Carta for Public School Teachers] does not make it a cruel or unusual punishment.
However, because it has neither a maximum nor a minimum duration, it gives the court wide latitude of discretion, without the benefit of a sufficient standard, and is unconstitutional for being an invalid delegation of legislative power.

Section 32 of R.A. 4670 imposed an alternative but unlimited imprisonment term on school officials, prompting them to challenge its constitutionality. The Supreme Court held that while indefinite imprisonment is not per se cruel, vesting courts with unlimited sentencing discretion is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, so the imprisonment penalty was struck down.

Lim v. People, G.R. No. 149276, September 27, 2002:

P.D. 818, the decree increasing the penalty for estafa committed through the issuance of bouncing checks, is constitutional; it is not cruel, degrading, nor inhuman punishment.

2. The death penalty is not a cruel or unusual punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil 741;

Fred M. Harden was ordered jailed indefinitely for contempt of court after failing to comply with directives to return over ₱1 million and deposit mining shares in connection with a civil case involving conjugal partnership assets. The Supreme Court denied his habeas corpus petition, ruling that the penalty was neither cruel nor unusual, citing Ex parte Kemmler to affirm that punishments are cruel only when they involve torture or lingering death, and that even the death penalty is not considered cruel under the constitutional meaning.

People v. Camano, 115 SCRA 688

Filomeno Camano was convicted of robbery with homicide and sentenced to death after evidence showed he and his co‑accused robbed a store and killed its owner. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the death penalty, ruling that capital punishment is not per se cruel or unusual under the Constitution when imposed for grave offenses like robbery with homicide.

It is an exercise of the State’s power “to secure society against the threatened and actual evil. ”

[a] ⭐ People v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682:

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) against the challenge that there are no compelling reasons for the enactment of the same.
The Court also rejected the contention that the death penalty is cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment, and said that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia, did not categorically rule on such issue.

What was in issue was the arbitrariness pervading the procedure by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury.
While the U.S. Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not eliminate, personal biases, prejudices, and discriminatory acts.

Leo Echegaray was convicted of repeatedly raping his ten‑year‑old stepdaughter and sentenced to death under Republic Act No. 7659, which mandates capital punishment when the offender is a parent or common‑law spouse of the victim’s parent. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and penalty, rejecting the claim that the death sentence is cruel, degrading, or inhuman, and clarifying that Furman v. Georgia did not categorically outlaw the death penalty but struck down statutes only because of the arbitrary and standardless manner in which sentencing discretion was exercised

This ruling was reaffirmed in People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 130607, November 17, 1999.

Rustico Rivera was convicted of qualified rape for sexually assaulting his 10‑year‑old daughter, with the crime attended by the special qualifying circumstances of minority and parental relationship, and was sentenced to death under Republic Act No. 7659. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and penalty, holding that the law prescribing the death sentence in such cases is constitutional and that capital punishment, when imposed for grave offenses, does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment under the Constitution.

People v. Baway, G.R. No. 130406, January 22, 2001:

The Court added that the issue of whether the death penalty should remain in our penal laws is a question for the legislature, not the courts.

Ruel Baway was convicted of qualified rape for assaulting a store helper at knifepoint, inflicting multiple injuries, and was originally sentenced to death by the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed his guilt but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua, reiterating that the death penalty is not per se cruel or unusual punishment and that whether it should remain in the penal laws is a policy question for the legislature, not the court

[b] Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459:

Where a mechanical failure in the electric chair prevented the execution of the convict, and another execution date was scheduled, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the convict’s plea that he was being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment — as there was no intent to inflict unnecessary pain.

Willie Francis was convicted of murder in Louisiana, strapped into the electric chair, and subjected to a shock that failed to kill him due to a mechanical malfunction, after which the state issued a new warrant for his execution. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the second execution, ruling that it did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because the failure was an unforeseeable accident with no intent to inflict unnecessary pain, and the method itself was not inherently inhumane

[c] ⭐ Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999:

The Supreme Court said that the suspension of the execution of the death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power, not a usurpation of presidential power of reprieve.
Congress can also amend R.A. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment.

Leo Echegaray, a death row convict, sought to delay his execution while Congress considered proposals to repeal or amend the death penalty law, and the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order to suspend the execution. The Court ruled that suspending the execution was a legitimate exercise of judicial power to control and supervise the enforcement of its decisions, and not a usurpation of the President’s constitutional power to grant reprieves.

[i] Pagdayawon v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 154569, September 23, 2002:

But the mere pendency in Congress of a bill seeking the repeal of R.A. 7659 should not per se warrant the issuance of a TRO to stay a death sentence that has become final.

Thirty death row inmates petitioned to stop the execution of their final death sentences, arguing that Congress might repeal the laws authorizing capital punishment and seeking a re‑examination of those statutes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the mere pendency of a bill to repeal R.A. 7659 is speculative and does not justify issuing a temporary restraining order to stay a final death sentence, and reaffirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty laws

[d] Plea of guilt in capital offenses.

When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense:

The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused’s full comprehension of its consequences.
The prosecution must present evidence to prove guilt and degree of culpability, and
The accused must be allowed to present evidence if he so desires.

See People v. Sta. Teresa, G.R. No. 130633, March 20, 2001;

People v. Galas, G.R. Nos. 139413-15, March 20, 2001.

Endrico Galas was charged with three counts of raping his 15‑year‑old daughter and, after initially pleading not guilty, changed his plea to guilty in one case without being fully informed that the death penalty could still be imposed. The Supreme Court held that his plea was improvident because the trial court failed to conduct the required searching inquiry and explain the consequences in capital offenses, but nonetheless affirmed his conviction for simple rape based on the prosecution’s evidence, reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua due to insufficient proof of the victim’s age.

Because these standards were not complied with, the cases were remanded in:

People v. Aranzado, G.R. Nos. 132442-44, September 21, 2001, and

People v. Benavidez, G.R. Nos. 142372-74, September 17, 2002.

Bernardino Aranzado was charged with three counts of raping his 12‑year‑old daughter, initially pleaded not guilty, then changed his plea to guilty in all cases, after which the trial court imposed the death penalty without fully complying with the procedural safeguards for pleas in capital offenses. The Supreme Court set aside the convictions and remanded the cases, ruling that the trial court failed to conduct the required searching inquiry and to ask the accused if he wished to present evidence, both of which are mandatory to ensure a voluntary and fully informed plea of guilt in capital cases.

People v. Principe, G.R. No. 135862, May 02, 2002:

On the other hand, the conviction was affirmed, because even disregarding the improvident plea, other evidence (extrajudicial confession, testimony in court, testimony of other witnesses) was sufficient.

Rafael Principe pleaded guilty to raping and killing his 6‑year‑old niece, but the trial court failed to fully comply with the required searching inquiry for pleas in capital offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence, holding that even disregarding the improvident plea, his extrajudicial confession, in‑court testimony, and corroborating witness accounts were sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

3 Automatic review in death penalty cases shall proceed even in the absence of the accused, considering that “nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision must be as error-free as possible”.

People v. Palabrica, G.R. No. 129285, May 7, 2001

The automatic review includes an appeal of the less serious crime not punished by death but arising out of the same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion.

Roberto Palabrica was convicted of murder for fatally stabbing Vic Jun Silvano and sentenced to death, with the case elevated for automatic review despite his escape from custody. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and clarified that automatic review in death penalty cases also covers any lesser offenses arising from the same incident or committed by the accused on the same occasion. There is no reason to delay affirming a conviction when the evidence warrants it, since the review’s purpose is to ensure the trial court’s decision is error‑free, whether the outcome favors or goes against the accused.

People v. Panganiban.

Mario Panganiban was convicted of three counts of raping his daughter, with the trial court imposing the death penalty in two cases and reclusion perpetua in the third. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and clarified that in death penalty cases, automatic review also includes any lesser offenses arising from the same incident or decided in the same judgment, even without a separate notice of appeal.

V. Non-imprisonment for Debt

Sec. 20, Art. III:

"No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

1. Cases

Serafin v. Lindayag, 67 SCRA 166:

Where a judge issued a warrant of arrest on the strength of a criminal complaint charging the accused with willful non-payment of debt, the Supreme Court annulled the warrant.

Sura v. Martin, 26 SCRA 286:

The trial court ordered the arrest of the defendant for failure, owing to his insolvency, to pay past and present support. The Supreme Court held that the arrest was invalid.

Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323:

While the debtor cannot be imprisoned for failure to pay his debt, he can be validly punished in a criminal action if he contracted his debt through fraud, as his responsibility arises not from the contract of loan, but from the commission of the crime.

Arceta v. Judge Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004:

In a relatively recent challenge to the constitutionality of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court said that even the thesis of petitioner that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the law constitutionally infirm deserves scant consideration.
As stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities.

People v. Judge Nitafan, 207 SCRA 726, reiterated in Tiomico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122539, March 4, 1999:

The Supreme Court ruled that B.P. 115 (Trust Receipts Law) is a valid exercise of the police power and does not violate this provision, because the law does not seek to enforce a loan but to punish dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of another.
Violation of a trust receipt agreement is punishable as estafa which is not an offense against property, but against public order.

W. Double Jeopardy

Sec. 21, Art. III:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,

conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar

to another prosecution for the same act.

1. Requisites:

CCP-ACD

Valid complaint or information.
Filed before a competent court.
To which the defendant had pleaded.
Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

[a] Valid complaint or information.

Double jeopardy does not attach in preliminary investigation.
Icasiano v. Sandiganbayan, 209 SCRA 377.

Judge Icasiano tried to quash a graft information by treating earlier administrative and Ombudsman proceedings as criminal trials. The Court held that only a prior valid information in a court of competent jurisdiction—and not preliminary or administrative probes—can invoke double jeopardy, and it restored the information.

[b] Filed before a competent court.

See People v. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154;

Parulan’s bounced‐check and estafa charges were dismissed for lack of venue in Pampanga. The Court ruled that as transitory offenses any essential act there conferred jurisdiction, restored the informations, and sent the cases back for trial.

Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 702.

Coup plotters prosecuted by a military tribunal were recharged in the Sandiganbayan. The Court held that only a prior trial in a court competent over rebellion can bar a second prosecution, and since the military body lacked such power, no double jeopardy arose.

People v. Puno, 208 SCRA 550:

Where the six criminal informations were erroneously filed with the City Court of Lucena (which did not have jurisdiction, as the proper court was the CFI of Quezon), even if the accused had already been arraigned, no double jeopardy will attach in the subsequent prosecution before the CFI of Quezon.

Cudia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110815, January 16, 1998:

The same principle was applied where the first information was filed in the RTC of Angeles City but jurisdiction was with the RTC of Pampanga inasmuch as the offense was committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga.

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667:

Accordingly, when it becomes manifest before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the first charge shall be dismissed to pave the way for the filing of the proper offense.
The dismissal of the first case will not give rise to double jeopardy inasmuch as, in this case, it is clear that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to try the offense of rape.

Cunanan v. Arceo, 242 SCRA 88:

Where the criminal case was dismissed by the RTC so that the appropriate information may be filed before the Sandiganbayan which had jurisdiction, the defense of double jeopardy cannot be availed of by the petitioner.

[c] To which the defendant had pleaded.

Flores v. Joven, G.R. No. 129874, December 27, 2002:

Thus, because private respondent Navarro had not yet been arraigned, double jeopardy may not be validly invoked.

[i] The grant of a motion to quash, filed before the accused makes his plea, can be appealed by the prosecution because the accused has not yet been placed in jeopardy [Sec. 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court].
People v. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 1119:

The Court ruled that when the accused, after pleading guilty, testified to prove mitigating circumstances, the testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty.

[d] Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

[i] People v. Judge Pineda, G.R. No. 44205, February 11, 1993:

The Supreme Court ruled that a prior conviction, or acquittal, or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused is still required before the first jeopardy can be pleaded to abate a second prosecution.

People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 586:

The Supreme Court said:
"The more untenable aspect of the position of the appellant is that when he invoked the defense of double jeopardy, what could have been the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even begun x x x the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case, or the same has been terminated without his consent."

People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 SCRA 637:

Thus, the implication that prior conviction or acquittal in the first case, as long as the accused had entered his plea therein, is not required in order that the accused may move to quash a second prosecution for the same offense on the ground of double jeopardy, is now modified by Pineda.

[ii] People v. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246:

There is no double jeopardy where the accused was sentenced on plea-bargaining approved by the court but without the consent of the fiscal.

Gorion v. Regional Trial Court of Cebu, 213 SCRA 138:

Neither will double jeopardy attach where the criminal case was mistakenly dismissed by the court during a hearing that had already been earlier cancelled and removed from the court calendar for that day.

Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, supra:

The re-taking of testimony, made necessary because the transcript of stenographic notes was incomplete and a new judge had taken over the case, does not give rise to double jeopardy.

Teodoro v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 603:

Withdrawal of the appeal lies in the sound discretion of the Court.
Thus, where the motion of the petitioner to withdraw his appeal from the decision of the MTC (which imposed only a fine as penalty) was denied, his payment of the fine did not make the decision of the MTC final and executory.
Accordingly, petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy by the decision of the RTC.

[iii] Cuizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128540, April 15, 1998:

The promulgation of only one part of the decision, i.e., the modified civil indemnity liability, is not a bar to the promulgation of the other part, the imposition of the criminal accountability, and does not constitute a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy

[iv] Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014:

A judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable and immediately executory upon its promulgation .
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the "humanity of the laws and a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen when brought in an unequal contest with the State."

Philippine Savings Bank v. Spouses Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005:

The State, with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.

[v] Dismissal of Action.

The dismissal of the action may either be a permanent dismissal or a provisional dismissal.

A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to:

the termination of the case on the merits, resulting in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused;
the dismissal of the case because of the prosecution's failure to prosecute; or
the dismissal thereof on the ground of unreasonable delay in the proceedings in violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial.
In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is dismissal without prejudice to reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final, or to the subsequent filing of a new information within the periods allowed under the Revised Penal Code or the Revised Rules of Court.

Condrada v. People, G.R. No. 141646, February 28, 2003

Paulin v. Judge Gimenez, 217 SCRA 386:

Thus, the dismissal of an action on procedural grounds, not being an acquittal, does not give rise to double jeopardy.

The Paulins had their grave threats case dismissed prematurely on procedural grounds. The Supreme Court held that such a dismissal is not an acquittal and remanded the case without running afoul of double jeopardy.

People v. Judge Vergara, 221 SCRA 560:

But where the dismissal was made at the instance of the Provincial Fiscal, because on reinvestigation it was shown that the complainants were the real aggressors and the accused acted only in self-defense, the dismissal was made without the consent of the accused.
Express consent has been defined as that which is directly given, either viva voce or in writing, a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.

After the Rubites were vindicated by reinvestigation, their cases were dismissed by the fiscal without their express consent but then refilled. The Supreme Court ruled the original dismissals were final, invoked double jeopardy, and barred the new prosecutions.

Tupaz v. Judge Ulep, G.R. No. 127777, October 1, 1999:

Likewise, the reinstatement of the information, after the court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution without asking for the consent of the accused, gives rise to double jeopardy.

Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54:

Consent of the accused to the dismissal cannot be implied or presumed; it must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused's conformity.
When the dismissal is made at the instance of the accused, there is no double jeopardy.

Joel Caes’s drug and firearm cases were provisionally dismissed in November 1983 “with the accused’s conformity” but later revived ex parte without his knowledge. The Supreme Court held that his express consent to dismissal ended jeopardy and voided any subsequent reinstatement.

People v. Quizada, 160 SCRA 516;

Quizada’s defamation charges were quashed for procedural defects despite her alleged insults. The Supreme Court ruled that such quashings are not acquittals and allowed the fiscal’s information to proceed.

Sta. Rita v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 484;
de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, supra;
People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238,

except:

[va] When the ground for the motion to dismiss is insufficiency of evidence.

People v. City Court of Silay, 74 SCRA 248

Thus, the grant of a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to an acquittal, and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
Sanvicente v. People, G.R. No. 132081, November 28, 2002;
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140633, February 4, 2002;
People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281.

COMELEC v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 501:

Where the denial of the demurrer to evidence is appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter orders the dismissal of the criminal case, the dismissal is a decision on the merits of the case which amounts to an acquittal of the accused.
Thus, the court is bound by the dictum that whatever error may have been committed in effecting the dismissal of the case, this cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.

People v. Verra, G.R. No. 134732, May 29, 2002:

It was held that while the accused joined the prosecution in praying for the dismissal of the case, double jeopardy will still attach since the basis for the dismissal was the insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution.
In view of private complainant's desistance and her testimony that other witnesses have turned hostile and are also no longer interested in prosecuting this case, the prosecution clearly lacks the evidence to support the charge.

[vb] When the proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to speedy trial.

Esmena v. Pogoy, 102 SCRA 861.

People v. Gines, supra:

But where the motion to dismiss made at the instance of the accused, although invoking the right to speedy trial, was ruled not to have given rise to double jeopardy — because the postponement sought did not constitute unreasonable delay.

See also:

People v. Tampal, supra;
People v. Leviste, supra;
Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, supra;
Almario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127772, March 22, 2001.

[vi] Revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed.

Sec. 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides a time-bar of:

two (2) years within which the State may revive criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party, if the offense charged is penalized by more than six (6) years imprisonment; and
one (1) year if the penalty imposable does not exceed six (6) years imprisonment or a fine in whatever amount.

This rule took effect on December 1, 2000, and must be applied prospectively in order to prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
People v. Panfilo Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003.

[vii] Appeal by the prosecution.

The rule on double jeopardy prohibits the State from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case.
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court.

People v. Court of Appeals and Maquiling, G.R. No. 128986, June 21, 1999;
People v. Court of Appeals and Tangan, G.R. No. 102612, February 13, 2001;
Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014.

People v. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 137953-58, March 11, 2002:

An appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal, or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict, would place the latter in double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy provides three related protections:

against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;
against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and
against multiple punishments for the same offense.

[viia] People v. Perlita J. Tria-Tirona, G.R. No. 130106, July 15, 2006:

The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed, because double jeopardy would have set in.
The only exception is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.

[viib] People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264:

But where the prosecution is denied due process, such denial results in loss or lack of jurisdiction, and thus, appeal may be allowed.

People v. Alberto, G.R. No. 132374, August 22, 2002:

This was reiterated where the Supreme Court said that a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its day in court; it is a dismissal without due process and therefore, null and void.

People v. Judge Tac-an, G.R. No. 148000, February 27, 2003:

It was held that the court acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed the case merely because none of the witnesses notified by the trial court appeared during the pre-trial.

[viic] Accordingly, no double jeopardy will attach:

Gorion v. RTC of Cebu, 213 SCRA 138:

where the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case; or

People v. Gomez, 20 SCRA 293:

where the dismissal of an information or complaint is purely capricious or devoid of reason; or

Portugal v. Reantaso, 167 SCRA 712:

where there is lack of proper notice or opportunity to be heard.

Likewise, the prosecution can appeal if:

People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249:

the accused has waived or is estopped from invoking his right against double jeopardy; or

People v. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289:

when the dismissal or acquittal is made with grave abuse of discretion; or

Galman v. Sandiganbayan, supra:

where there is a finding of a mistrial; or

People v. Dante Tan, G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010:

where the trial was a sham.

People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012:

The Court was categorical in declaring that a re-examination of the evidence without a finding of a mistrial will violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.

[viid] Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 575:

Appeal from the order of dismissal by the lower court is likewise not foreclosed by the rule on double jeopardy where the order of dismissal was issued before arraignment.

[viie] Summerville General Merchandising v. Hon. Antonio Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No. 16374, August 7, 2007:

Similarly, as held, double jeopardy will not set in when the order granting the withdrawal of the information was issued with grave abuse of discretion, because then the accused was not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case.

[viii] Discharge of Co-Accused.

The discharge from the information of a co-accused who is to be utilized as a government witness must be considered solid for purposes of determining whether a second prohibited jeopardy would attach upon reinstatement as a co-accused.

Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. v. Son, 209 SCRA 329:

Thus, petitioner, having been acquitted of the charge of qualified theft, could not be subsequently reinstated as a co-accused in the same information without a prohibited second jeopardy arising under the circumstances, absent satisfactory proof that he had refused or failed to testify against his co-accused.

[ix] In Argel v. Judge Pascua, A.M. No. RTJ-94-1131, August 20, 2001, where the judge amended her decision of acquittal (which had already been promulgated) because she had earlier overlooked the testimony of an eyewitness, it was held that the amended decision is null and void for violating the right against double jeopardy.

2. Crimes Covered

With the presence of the requisites, the accused cannot be prosecuted anew:

for an identical offense, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the original complaint or information.

People v. Sarabia, G.R. No. 142024, July 20, 2001
See also Perez v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 236;
Mallari v. People, 168 SCRA 422.

[a] Jose Jesus Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014:

the Supreme Court declared as void and unconstitutional:

[ii] Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4[c](2) of R.A. 10175 and R.A. 9775 (Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009) also constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.

[b] Isabelo Braza v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013:

There is no double jeopardy if the subsequent information charges the accused with a different offense, even if it arises from the same act or set of acts.
Prosecution for the same act is not proscribed; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense.

[c] Lamera v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186:

Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries punished under Art. 365, RPC is not identical with violation of Art. 275, RPC, for abandonment of one's victim.

3. Under the second sentence of Sec. 21, Art. III, when an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

See People v. Judge Relova, 148 SCRA 292.

4. Doctrine of Supervening Event

The accused may still be prosecuted for another offense if a subsequent development changes the character of the first indictment under which he may have already been charged or convicted.
Thus, under Section 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the original complaint or information when:

The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission;
The facts constituting the graver offense arose or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information; or
The plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal or the offended party.

See People v. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246.

X. Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

Sec. 22, Art. III:

No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

1. Ex Post Facto Law

[a] Kinds

PAC-ERP

Every law that makes criminal an action done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such action;
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed;
Every law that changes punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender;
Every law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
Every law which deprives persons accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of a proclamation of amnesty.

[b] Characteristics

CRP

It refers to criminal matters;
It is retroactive in application; and
It works to the prejudice of the accused.

[c] Some cases

Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383:

The amendatory law to R.A. 3019 imposing suspension pendente lite of public officers accused of offenses involving fraudulent use of public funds was held not to be an ex post facto law, because the suspension was not punitive, but merely preventive.

Bayot was suspended under a 1982 amendment to R.A. 3019 while appealing convictions for estafa, and he claimed the amendment was unfairly retroactive. The Supreme Court ruled the suspension was preventive, not punitive, and upheld it as not ex post facto.

People v. Ferrer, 43 SCRA 381:

The Anti-Subversion Act was held not to be an ex post facto law, because the prohibition applied only to acts committed "after the approval of the Act."

Co and Tayag were accused of joining the Communist Party under R.A. 1700, which the trial court struck down as punitive and retroactive. The Supreme Court restored the charges, ruling the law targets future subversive conduct and does not punish by legislative fiat.

People v. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241:

The Supreme Court ruled that the provision of B.P. 195, amending Sec. 11, R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), which would increase from 10 to 15 years the prescriptive period for the offenses punished therein, cannot be given retroactive effect, as it would then be an ex post facto law.

Paredes’s alleged graft claim based on a 1976 free-patent application prescribed after 10 years, and could not be revived by a 1982 law extending the limitation period. The Supreme Court affirmed quash of the information as applying the proper non-retroactive prescription rule.

Wright v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 341:

It was held that the retroactive application of the Treaty of Extradition (between the Philippines and Australia) does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws, because the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute; it merely provided for the extradition of persons wanted for offenses already committed at the time the treaty was ratified.

Australia sought Wright’s extradition under a treaty effective in 1990 but covering crimes committed earlier. The Supreme Court held the Treaty is not an ex post facto law and upheld the extradition order.

Sesbreno v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 270 SCRA 360:

It was held that the imposition of back taxes on the property of the petitioner does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

Sesbreño’s property was found undervalued in 1989, prompting retroactive assessment and back taxes for 1981–1987 on excess floor area. The Court ruled these fiscal adjustments are not ex post facto laws and upheld the back-tax assessment.

Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999:

It was held that R.A. 8249, which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, is not an ex post facto law, because it is not a penal law. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations, or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
R.A. 8249 is clearly a procedural statute, i.e., one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. The contention that the right of the accused to a two-tiered appeal under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by R.A. 8249 has been rejected by the Court several times, considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law.

Lacson’s transfer to RTC was overtaken by RA 8249’s retroactive expansion of Sandiganbayan jurisdiction while his case was pending. The Court held procedural changes do not constitute ex post facto laws and upheld Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction under the new statute.

People v. Judge Nitafan, G.R. Nos. 107964-66, February 1, 1999:

It was held that the judge cannot, motu proprio, initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismiss a criminal information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latter's right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy. Every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by the Supreme Court, and lower courts may not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action. Since neither the private respondent nor the Solicitor General challenged the validity of Central Bank Circular No. 960, it was error for the lower court to declare the same ex post facto.

Judge Nitafan on his own ordered Marcos’s cases dismissed for ex post facto application of Circular 960 and for double jeopardy without any motion from the defense. The Supreme Court held that lower courts cannot declare a law void or dismiss cases motu proprio and set aside the dismissal orders.

Fajardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128508, February 1, 1999:

The Court held that P.D. 1990 is not ex post facto, because like the Probation Law that it amends, it is not penal in character, and it applies only to an accused who has been convicted after the effectivity of the P.D.

Fajardo appealed his 1988 conviction for bouncing checks and later sought probation under the Probation Law as it stood at his offense date in 1981. The Supreme Court ruled that the 1985 amendment barring probation for appellants was procedural, not ex post facto, and upheld his disqualification.

2. Bill of Attainder

[a] Defined

It is a legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial.

[b] Characteristics

It substitutes legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt.
Thus, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial that it becomes a bill of attainder.

People v. Ferrer, supra:

The Supreme Court held that the Anti-Subversion Act is not a bill of attainder, because it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment; what it does is simply declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes.

Political Law Review: Bill of Rights

1. Definition.

[a] Civil Rights.

[b] Political Rights.

2. Interregnum Doctrine.

1. Origin.

2. Definition.

3. Who are Protected.

4. Meaning of Life, Liberty, and Property.

[a] Life.

[b] Liberty.

[c] Property.

[i] Public Office.

[ii] Mining License.

[iii] Firearm License.

[iv] Suspension from Office.

5. Aspects of Due Process.

[a] Substantive.

[b] Procedural

[i] An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.

[ii] Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.

[iii] The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard.

[iv] Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

6. Publication as part of due process.

7. Appeal and due process.

8. Preliminary Investigation and Due Process

9. Administrative Due Process

1. Meaning; persons protected.

2. Scope of Equality.

[a] Economic.

[b] Political.

[c] Social.

3. Valid Classification.

[a] Substantial distinctions which make for real differences.

[b] Germane to the Purpose of the Law

[c] Not Limited to Existing Conditions Only

[d] Must Apply Equally to All Members of the Same Class

1. Basis; Scope of the Protection

2. Some Procedural Rules

3. Only a Judge May Validly Issue a Warrant

4. Requisites of a Valid Warrant

[a] Probable Cause.

[b] Determination of Probable Cause Personally by a Judge.

[i] Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest

[ii] Issuance of a Search Warrant

[c] After examination, under oath or affirmation, of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

[d] Particularity of Description

[i] General Warrants

[ii] Warrant of Arrest

[iii] Search Warrant

5. Properties Subject to Seizure (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Rules of Court):

6. Conduct of the Search

7. Warrantless Arrests [Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court]

[a] When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence.

[b] When an offense had just been committed and there is probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or of other circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed the offense.

[c] When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

[d] When the right is voluntarily waived, then the illegality of the arrest may no longer be invoked to effect the release of the person arrested.

8. Warrantless Searches.

[a] When the right is voluntarily waived.

[b] When there is valid reason to "stop-and-frisk".

[c] Where the search (and seizure) is an incident to a lawful arrest.

[d] Search of Vessels and Aircraft

[e] Search of Moving Vehicles

[f] Inspection of Buildings and Other Premises for the Enforcement of Fire, Sanitary, and Building Regulations

[g] Where prohibited articles are in plain view.

[h] Search and seizure under exigent and emergency circumstances.

9. Exclusionary Rule.

1. Inviolability. Exceptions:

2. The guarantee includes within the mantle of its protection tangible, as well as intangible, objects.

3. The right may be invoked against the wife

4. Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures made by private individuals.

5. Exclusionary Rule.

1. Scope.

2. Aspects:

[a] Freedom from censorship or prior restraint.

[b] Freedom from Subsequent Punishment

[i] Libel.

[ii] Obscenity.

[iii] Criticism of Official Conduct.

[iv] Right of Students to Free Speech in School Premises