Political Law Review: Citizenship


 VII. CITIZENSHIP

A. General Principles


1. Defined

Membership in a political community 

which is personal and more or less permanent in character.

[a] Distinguished from nationality.


  • Nationality is membership in any class or form of political community. 

    • Thus, nationals may be:

      • citizens — if members of a democratic community or 

      • subjects — if members of a monarchical community 

  • Nationality does not necessarily include the right or privilege of exercising civil or political rights.

2. Usual modes of acquiring citizenship

BNM

  1. By birth

    1. jus sanguinis

      • right of blood

      • determined by the nationality of one or both parents, regardless of place of birth.

    2. jus soli

      • right of the soil

      • determined by place of birth, regardless of parents’ nationality

  2. By naturalization

  3. By marriage

3. Modes (by birth) applied in the Philippines

[a] Before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution


[i] Jus sanguinis.

  • All inhabitants of the islands who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, and residing in the islands who did not declare their intention of preserving Spanish nationality between said date and October 11, 1900, were declared citizens of the Philippines [Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902; Sec. 2, Jones Law of 1916], and their children born after April 11, 1899.

[ii] Jus soli.

  • As held in Roa v. Collector of Customs, 25 Phil. 315, which was uniformly followed until abandoned in Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249; but applied again in Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52, until abandoned with finality in Teotimo Rodriguez Tio Tiam v. Republic, 101 Phil. 195.

  • Those declared as Filipino citizens by the courts are recognized as such today, not because of the application of the jus soli doctrine, but principally because of the doctrine of res judicata.


Roa v. Collector of Customs, 25 Phil. 315

Tranquilino Roa, born in the Philippines to a Chinese father and Filipina mother, was denied reentry after studying in China on the ground that he was a Chinese subject, despite his birth and domicile in the Islands. The Supreme Court ruled that he was a Philippine citizen by virtue of jus soli, his mother’s reacquired nationality after his father’s death, and his election of such citizenship, and thus entitled to enter and reside in the country.

Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249

Jose Tan Chong (born 1915) and Lam Swee Sang (born 1900), both born in the Philippines to a Chinese father and Filipino mother, were initially recognized as citizens under the jus soli principle but the government asserted that citizenship followed the father’s nationality under the laws at their birth. The Supreme Court ruled that jus soli was never part of Philippine law, applied Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, and held that neither was a citizen by birth since their fathers were not Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899.

Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil. 52

Alejandro D. Uy, born in the Philippines in 1912 to a Chinese father and Filipino mother, was elected mayor but challenged as ineligible on the ground of alien citizenship after the jus soli doctrine had been abandoned. The Supreme Court ruled that because Uy was already recognized as a citizen under jus soli before the 1935 Constitution, and had long exercised the rights of citizenship with government acknowledgment, he remained a Filipino citizen and was eligible for office.

Teotimo Rodriguez Tio Tiam v. Republic, 101 Phil. 195

Teotimo Rodriguez Tio Tiam, born in Cebu in 1904 to Chinese parents, was declared a Filipino citizen by the trial court under the jus soli doctrine, but the Government appealed after that doctrine was abandoned in Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor (1947). The Supreme Court ruled that jus soli no longer applied and he was not a citizen by birth, but granted him citizenship through naturalization since he met all legal qualifications.


[b] After the adoption of the 1935 Constitution

  • Only the jus sanguinis doctrine.

4. Natural-born citizens

  • Sec. 2, Art. IV:

    • Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. 

    • Those who elect Philippine citizenship shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

5. Marriage by Filipino to an alien

  • Sec. 4, Art. IV:

    • Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.

6. Policy against dual allegiance

  • Sec. 5, Art. IV:

    • Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

[a] Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630:


  • The Court clarified the "dual citizenship" disqualification in Sec. 40, Local Government Code, and reconciled the same with Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution on "dual allegiance."

  • Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that "dual citizenship" as a disqualification must refer to citizens with "dual allegiance."

  • Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under the disqualification. 

Eduardo Manzano, born in the U.S. to Filipino parents, held both U.S. and Philippine citizenship by birth and was challenged for disqualification as Makati vice mayor on the ground of “dual citizenship.” The Supreme Court ruled that the law’s disqualification refers to dual allegiance, not mere dual citizenship, and that Manzano effectively elected Philippine citizenship and renounced U.S. citizenship when he filed his certificate of candidacy.


  • This ruling is reiterated in ⭐ Valles v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, born in Australia to a Filipino father and Australian mother, was repeatedly challenged for allegedly being an Australian citizen and thus disqualified from running for governor under the “dual citizenship” rule. The Supreme Court ruled that the law’s disqualification refers to dual allegiance, not mere dual citizenship, and that Lopez’s renunciation of Australian citizenship and filing of her certificate of candidacy effectively removed any disqualification.


[i] For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.

  • The filing of a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as dual citizen. 

  • This is so because in the certificate of candidacy one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance to the same

  • Such declaration under oath operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

  • ⭐Mercado v. Manzano, supra; 

  • ⭐Valles v. COMELEC, supra.

[ii] However, this doctrine in Valles and Mercado that the filing of a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship does not apply to one who, after having reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, runs for public office.

  • Lopez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008:

    • To comply with the provisions of Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. 9225, it is necessary that the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

Eusebio Lopez, a former Filipino who became a naturalized American and later re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, ran for barangay chairman without executing the law’s required sworn renunciation of his U.S. citizenship. The Supreme Court ruled he was disqualified because R.A. No. 9225 explicitly mandates that dual citizens seeking elective office must personally and under oath renounce all foreign citizenship at the time of filing their certificate of candidacy.


  • Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008:

    • In Mercado, the disqualification was sought under another law, Sec. 40 (d) of the Local Government Code, in which the Court defined the term "dual citizenship" vis-Γ -vis the concept of "dual allegiance." 

    • At the time the case was decided, R.A. 9225 was not yet enacted by Congress.

Nestor Jacot, a natural-born Filipino who became a naturalized U.S. citizen and later reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, ran for vice mayor of Catarman, Camiguin without executing the law’s required sworn renunciation of his U.S. citizenship before filing his certificate of candidacy. The Supreme Court ruled he was disqualified because the oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy oath are not the same as the explicit renunciation mandated by law, and his case involved dual allegiance arising from a voluntary act, not mere dual citizenship by birth.


[b] Calilung v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007:

  • The constitutionality of R.A. 9225 (An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, amending for the purpose, Com. Act No. 63) was challenged for allegedly violating Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution.

  • It was claimed that Sec. 2 allows all Filipinos, whether natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship; while Sec. 3 allows former natural-born citizens to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.

  • In upholding the validity of R.A. 9225, the Court said that the intent of the legislature is to do away with the provision in C.A. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries

  • It allows dual citizenship; but on its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.

  • By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.

  • Plainly, Sec. 3 stays clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifts the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of R.A. 9225.

[i] Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and it is not a self-executing provision.

  • The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. 

  • In Secs. 2 and 3 of R.A. 9225, the legislature was not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.

  • Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance; thus, it would be premature for the judiciary to rule on issues pertaining to it.

  • It should be noted that ⭐Mercado v. Manzano did not set the parameters of dual allegiance, but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.

Petitioner challenged Republic Act No. 9225 for allegedly enabling dual allegiance by allowing Filipinos who acquire foreign citizenship to retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship through an oath. The Supreme Court ruled that dual allegiance must be defined and addressed by legislation, and without such a law, the Court cannot adjudicate the issue.



7. Attack on one's citizenship

  • An attack may be made only through a direct, not a collateral, proceeding.

  • Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692

Petitioners contested Jose Ong, Jr.’s citizenship and residency, claiming he was not qualified to serve as a representative due to his Chinese lineage and alleged lack of Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court ruled that Ong was a natural-born Filipino and affirmed the HRET’s exclusive authority, finding no grave abuse of discretion in its decision.


8. Res judicata in cases involving citizenship

  • The doctrine of res judicata does not ordinarily apply to questions of citizenship. 

  • It does so only when:

    1. a person's citizenship is resolved by a court or an administrative body as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing;

    2. with the active participation of the Solicitor General or his representative; and

    3. the finding on his citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

  • Then the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding [Board of Commissioners, CID v. de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853, citing Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, 19 SCRA 186].


Board of Commissioners, CID v. de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853

William Gatchalian’s citizenship was challenged decades after his admission to the Philippines, based on a 1962 exclusion order that was later reversed in 1973. The Supreme Court held that res judicata does not apply to citizenship determinations unless strict conditions are met, and affirmed Gatchalian’s status as a Filipino citizen.


Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, 19 SCRA 186

Zita Ngo Burca, a Chinese citizen married to a Filipino, petitioned for judicial recognition of her citizenship without undergoing formal naturalization. The Supreme Court ruled that citizenship must be acquired through a proper judicial proceeding and cannot be conclusively settled by informal declarations, thus res judicata does not apply to such determinations.


[a] Secretary Raul Gonzalez v. Michael Pennisi, G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010:

  • Even as the Supreme Court reiterated the above principle and said that the issuance by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) of the certificate of registration as Filipino never attained finality, judicial review of the BID decision is permitted if the court believes that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship.

Michael Alfio Pennisi was recognized as a Filipino citizen based on documentary evidence of his mother’s citizenship, but the DOJ later revoked this recognition and ordered his deportation. The Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not apply to citizenship determinations unless strict conditions are met, and upheld the appellate court’s finding that Pennisi had sufficiently proven his Filipino citizenship.



B. Citizens of the Philippines


  1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this [1987] Constitution.

  2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

  3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority

  4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.


1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this [1987] Constitution.


[a] Re: 1935 Constitution

  1. children born after April 11, 1899

  2. children below 21 and residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization, as well as children born subsequent to naturalization

  3. foreign women married to Filipino citizens before or after November 30, 1938 who might themselves be lawfully naturalized

  4. those benefited by the Roa doctrine applying the jus soli.

  5. Caram provision: Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption of 1935 Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Islands

  6. those who elected Philippine citizenship


[i] Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902; Sec. 2, Jones Law of 1916 [including children born after April 11, 1899].

  • The 1902 Philippine Organic Act, also known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, established Philippine citizenship for Spanish subjects who were residents of the Islands on April 11, 1899, and their descendants.

  • The Jones Law of 1916 conferred a form of Philippine citizenship on inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, and their children born after that date, with exceptions for those who elected to retain Spanish allegiance or became citizens of another country.l


[ia]Valles v. COMELEC, supra.:

  • The Supreme Court made reference to these organic acts and declared that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, who was born in Australia to parents Telesforo Ybasco (a Filipino) and Theresa Marquez (an Australian) on May 16, 1934, before the 1935 Constitution took effect, was a Filipino citizen.

  • Under these organic acts, inhabitants of the islands who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, who did not opt in writing to retain Spanish nationality between April 11, 1899 to October 11, 1900 — including their children — were deemed citizens of the Philippines. 

  • Rosalind's father was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, and under the principle of jus sanguinis, Rosalind followed the citizenship of her father.


[ib]Maria Jeanette Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004:

  • A similar conclusion was reached in, on the controversy surrounding the citizenship of Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), presidential candidate.

  • The issue of whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen would depend on whether his father, Allan F. Poe, was himself a Filipino citizen, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of FPJ prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.

  • The Court took note of the fact that Lorenzo Pou (father of Allan F. Poe), who died in 1954 at 84 years old, would have been born sometime in 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule.

  • San Carlos, Pangasinan — his place of residence upon his death in 1954 — in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill of 1902 effected.

  • That Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (father of FPJ). 

  • The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ first saw light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.


Fernando Poe Jr. claimed natural-born Filipino status despite challenges to his father’s nationality and his alleged illegitimacy, presenting archival proof of his grandfather’s Filipinization. The Supreme Court ruled that Poe is natural-born by virtue of his father’s Filipino citizenship under the 1902 Filipinization and that legitimacy does not affect that status.



[ii] Act No. 2927 [March 26, 1920], then C.A. 473, on naturalization [including children below 21 and residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization, as well as children born subsequent to naturalization].


[iii] Foreign women married to Filipino citizens before or after November 30, 1938 [effectivity of C.A. 473] who might themselves be lawfully naturalized [in view of the Supreme Court interpretation of Sec. 15, C.A. 473, in ⭐Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292].


Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese national, married a Filipino after overstaying her visitor visa and faced deportation. The Supreme Court held that C.A. 473 Sec. 15 makes her a citizen by marriage, granted her injunction, and barred deportation. Section 15 grants automatic citizenship to a foreign spouse of a Filipino—no separate naturalization needed—so long as she meets no disqualifications.


[iv] Those benefited by the Roa doctrine applying the jus soli.

  • The Roa doctrine established that children born in the Philippines to alien parents acquired Philippine citizenship under the jus soli principle.


[v] Caram provision: Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this [1935] Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Islands.


[va] Chiongbian v. de Leon:

  • The Supreme Court held that the right acquired by virtue of this provision is transmissible.


[vi] Those who elected Philippine citizenship.


[b] Re: 1973 Constitution

  • Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines

  • Provision is prospective in application; to benefit only those born on or after January 17, 1973 [date of effectivity of 1973 Constitution].


2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.


[a] This provision is to be given only prospective application, consistent with the above-cited provision of the 1973 Constitution.


3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.


[a] Procedure for election.

  • Election is expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any official authorized to administer oaths

  • Statement to be filed with the nearest Civil Registry

  • The statement is to be accompanied with the Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines [Sec. 1, C.A. 625].


[b] When to elect.

  • Within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority [Opinion, Secretary of Justice, s. 1948]; except when there is a justifiable reason for the delay.


[i] Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice, 5 SCRA 110:

  • The Supreme Court ruled that there was justifiable reason for the delay because the party thought all along that he was already a Filipino citizen.

Cuenco filed an affidavit in 1951 renouncing his Chinese nationality and claiming Philippine citizenship based on his mother, but he failed to prove her status and waited over seven years after turning twenty-one. The Supreme Court ruled both proof of maternal citizenship and timely election are mandatory, reversed the lower court, and dismissed his petition.


In Re: Florencio Mallare 59 SCRA 45:

  • The Supreme Court enunciated the doctrine of implied election.

    • deemed to have elected Philippine citizenship through their conduct, even without a formal written declaration.

Florencio Mallari, admitted to the bar in 1962, faced disbarment when a 1968 investigation revealed his father, Esteban Mallari, was registered as Chinese; the Court revoked Mallari’s license and denied reconsideration in 1969. Mallari produced baptismal records of his grandmother Ana Mallari and evidence of his father Esteban’s voting and candidacy. The Supreme Court held that citizenship may be implied by conduct plus maternal descent and restored Mallari’s right to practice law.


Co v. HRET, supra.:

  • The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the HRET that the exercise of the right of suffrage and participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.


[ii] ⭐In Re: Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999:

  • But where Ching, having been born on April 11, 1964, was already 35 years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. 625 on June 15, 1999, or over 14 years after he had reached the age of majority.

  • By any reasonable yardstick, Ching's election was clearly beyond the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. 

  • All his mentioned acts cannot vest in him citizenship, as the law gives the requirement for election of Filipino citizenship which Ching did not comply with.


Vicente Ching, son of a Filipino mother and Chinese father, waited 14 years after turning 21 to elect Philippine citizenship under Commonwealth Act 625. The Supreme Court held his belated election invalid and reaffirmed that citizenship election must occur within a reasonable time after majority.


[c] The right is available to the child as long as his mother was a Filipino citizen at the time of her marriage to the alien:

  • even if by reason of such marriage she lost her Philippine citizenship (Cu v. Republic, 89 Phil. 473); and 

  • even if the mother was not a citizen of the Philippines at birth [Opinion, Sec. of Justice, s. 1948].


[d] The right to elect Philippine citizenship is an inchoate right; during his minority, the child is an alien (⭐Villahermosa v. Commissioner of Immigration, 80 Phil. 541).


Delfin Co, a minor born to a Filipina mother and Chinese father, entered clandestinely from China and his mother’s later repatriation did not extend citizenship to him as he had not elected upon majority. The Supreme Court held that minor children must elect citizenship after reaching majority and that later status changes do not bar deportation.


[e] The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children.


  • Republic v. Chule Lim, G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004:

    • It was held that respondent, who was concededly an illegitimate child considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married, is not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements.

    • Being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent became a Filipino upon birth

    • This notwithstanding, records show that the respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of electing Philippine citizenship.


Chule Lim successfully corrected her birth record to reflect her true surname, parental status, and Filipino citizenship after proving her parents never married. The Court held that election requirements apply only to legitimate children and that an illegitimate child is Filipino at birth through the mother.


  • [i] Serra v. Republic, 91 Phil. 914:

    • Indeed, it was held that if the child is illegitimate, he follows the status and citizenship of his only known parent, the mother.


The petitioner, born out of wedlock to a Filipino mother and foreign father, was challenged on his citizenship. The Court ruled that an illegitimate child automatically derives his mother’s nationality and need not elect Philippine citizenship.



4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.



C. Naturalization


  • The act of formally adopting a foreigner 

into the political body of a nation 

by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.

[Record, Senate, 12th Congress, June 4–5, 2001].


1. Modes of naturalization


[a] Direct

  • Citizenship is acquired by individual through: 

    1. judicial or administrative proceedings;

    2. Special act of legislature;

    3. Collective change of nationality, as a result of cession or subjugation; or

    4. In some cases, by adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the State where they are born.


[b] Derivative

  • Citizenship conferred on:

    1. Wife of naturalized husband;

    2. Minor children of naturalized person; or

    3. Alien woman upon marriage to a national.


2. Doctrine of indelible allegiance

  • An individual may be compelled by municipal law to retain his original nationality even if he has already renounced or forfeited it under the laws of the second State whose nationality he has acquired.


[a] An example is Commonwealth Act No. 63 which provides that one of the modes of losing Philippine citizenship is by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or the laws of a foreign country

  • But under the same law, a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in this manner when the Philippines is at war with any country.


3. Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship

  • A petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from judicial naturalization under C.A. 473, as amended.

    • Judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship

      • the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen.

    • Judicial naturalization under C.A. 473, as amended.

      • the petitioner acknowledges that he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements under C.A. 473 

  • Republic v. Azucena Saavedra Batugas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013.

Azucena Batugas, born in the Philippines to Chinese parents and married to a Filipino citizen, pursued judicial naturalization under CA 473 after her derivative application was denied and proved her education, business, family unity, and lawful occupation. The Supreme Court ruled that judicial declaration differs from naturalization, affirmed her compliance with CA 473, denied the OSG’s petition, and upheld her grant of Philippine citizenship.



4. Direct naturalization under Philippine laws

  • Under current and existing laws, there are three (3) ways by which an alien may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:

    1. Judicial naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended;

    2. Administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139; and

    3. Legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress, bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.


5. Naturalization under C.A. 473


[a] Qualifications

21-10,5-GOSE


  1. Not less than 21 years of age on the date of the hearing of the petition;

  2. Resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than 10 years; may be reduced to 5 years if he: GIM-TB

    1. honorably held office in Government

    2. established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines, 

    3. married to a Filipino woman, 

    4. been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines (in a public or private school not established for the exclusive instruction of persons of a particular nationality or race) or in any of the branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two years, or 

    5. born in the Philippines;

  3. Good moral character; believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted government as well as the community in which he is living;

  4. Own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than ₱5,000.00, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation;

  5. Speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal Philippine languages;

  6. Enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the public or private schools recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization.


[i] Republic v. Huang Te Fu, G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015:

  • The Supreme Court said that the applicant's non-inclusion in the payroll — assuming he was indeed employed by his parents — suggests an intent to evade taxes or to conceal the true nature of his employment and the amount of his salary or income. 

  • It is concealment of the truth; an attempt to circumvent with impunity the tax laws, labor laws relative to the employment of aliens, and other laws that would otherwise regulate respondent's actions during his stay in this country.

Huang Te Fu, a Taiwanese national married to a Filipina, petitioned for Philippine naturalization after claiming to manage his parents’ zipper business but admitted he was not listed on its payroll. The Supreme Court ruled that his concealment of income and dishonest declarations showed he failed to prove a known lucrative trade and good moral character, and dismissed his petition.



[b] Disqualifications


ODPC-MNWN


Those —

  1. Opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;

  2. Defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;

  3. Polygamists or believers in polygamy;

  4. Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

  5. Suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease;

  6. Who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;

  7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;

  8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.


[c] Procedure

DPPR-HPHO

  1. Filing of declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of the petition with the Office of the Solicitor General. 

  2. Filing of the petition, accompanied by the affidavit of two credible persons, citizens of the Philippines, who personally know the petitioner, as character witnesses.

  3. Publication of the petition. 

  4. Actual residence in the Philippines during the entire proceedings.

  5. Hearing of the petition.

  6. Promulgation of the decision.

  7. Hearing after two years. 

  8. Oath-taking and issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization.


[i] Filing of declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of the petition with the Office of the Solicitor General


  • The following are exempt from filing declaration of intention: BR-30E-WC

  1. Born in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education in public or private schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality.

  2. Resided in the Philippines for 30 years or more before the filing of the petition, and enrolled his children in elementary and high schools recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality.

  3. Widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines and dies before he is actually naturalized.


[ii] Filing of the petition, accompanied by the affidavit of two credible persons, citizens of the Philippines, who personally know the petitioner, as character witnesses.


[iia] Republic v. Li Ching Chung, G.R. No. 197450, March 20, 2013:

  • If a foreigner seeking the grant of Philippine citizenship does not comply with the period within which to file his petition, the action should be dismissed. 

  • The opportunity given to a foreigner to become a citizen is a mere privilege, and the absence of one requirement is fatal to the petition.


[iii] Publication of the petition

  • Under Sec. 9, Revised Naturalization Law, in order that there be a valid publication, the following requisites must concur:

    1. the petition and notice of hearing must be published;

    2. the publication must be made once a week for three consecutive weeks; and

    3. the publication must be in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in the province where the applicant resides.


  • In addition, copies of the petition and notice of hearing must be posted in the office of the Clerk of Court or in the building where the office is located [Republic v. Hamilton Tan Keh, G.R. No. 144742, November 11, 2004]. 


Tan Keh’s petition for naturalization was duly published in 1994 and posted, and though the original hearing date fell within the election blackout, the court reset it to June 9, 1995 without republication once the OSG raised the objection. The Supreme Court held that the original publication met all jurisdictional requirements and that no new publication was needed when all parties knew the rescheduled date, affirming his grant of citizenship.


  • The same notice must also indicate, among others, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce at the trial [Republic v. Michael Hong, G.R. No. 168877, March 23, 2006].


Hong’s petition for naturalization was published and posted, but his notice of hearing failed to list the names of his proposed witnesses. The Supreme Court held that a notice missing required particulars is not a valid publication and dismissed his petition.


[iiia] Gan Tsitung v. Republic, 122 Phil. 805; 

Gan Tsitung’s naturalization grant was overturned when it was shown that his petition and notice were never posted at the court, despite newspaper publication. The Court held that publication plus posting is strictly jurisdictional, and non-compliance nullifies the proceedings.


Po Yo Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400:


Po Yo Bi’s grant of citizenship was nullified after he failed to post his petition and notice at the court, even though they were published in print. The Supreme Court affirmed that both publication and posting are mandatory jurisdictional steps and their omission voids the naturalization process.


  • Publication is a jurisdictional requirement

  • Non-compliance is fatal for it impairs the very root or foundation of the authority to decide the case, regardless of whether the one to blame is the clerk of court or the petitioner or his counsel.


[iiib] Sy v. Republic, 154 Phil. 673:

  • This rule applies equally to the determination of the sufficiency of the contents of the notice of hearing and of the petition itself, because an incomplete notice or petition, even if published, is no publication at all.

  • Thus, it was held that the copy of the petition to be posted and published should be a textual or verbatim restatement of the petition filed.


Sy’s naturalization was invalidated because he published only a summary of his petition instead of a verbatim copy. The Court held that strict compliance with the verbatim-publication requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.


[iiic] Ong Chia v. Republic, G.R. No. 127240, March 27, 2000:

  • In the same vein, the failure to state all the required details in the notice of hearing, like the names of applicant's witnesses, constitutes a fatal defect

  • The publication of the affidavit of such witnesses did not cure the omission of their names in the notice of hearing. 

  • It is a settled rule that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.


Ong Chia arrived in the Philippines as a child, built a family and business, and filed for naturalization in 1989 but omitted his pseudonym and former homes from the published notice of hearing. The Court affirmed denial of citizenship, ruling that any omission in the required publication is fatal and cannot be cured by annexed documents.


[iiid] Republic v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012:

  • The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. 

  • Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 

  • The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law. 

  • Thus, bare general assertions cannot discharge this burden required of an applicant for naturalization.


Kerry Lao Ong, born and raised in Cebu to Chinese parents, filed for naturalization in 1996 claiming business income but failed to describe or document his trade and offered only general assertions. The Court denied his petition, holding that an applicant must show a documented, known business yielding an appreciable income margin over expenses without counting a spouse’s earnings.




[iv] Actual residence in the Philippines during the entire proceedings.


[v] Hearing of the petition.


[vi] Promulgation of the decision.

  • Order of Naturalization. 

    • A declaration that the petitioner has met all statutory qualifications.

    • A directive for the petitioner to take the Oath of Allegiance before a duly authorized official.

    • Any other conditions or requirements mandated by law (e.g., renunciation of foreign citizenship if the law requires it, except in cases of dual citizenship authorized by the Philippines).


[vii] Hearing after two years

  • At this hearing, the applicant shall show that during the two-year probation period, applicant has: LLCC

    1. not left the Philippines;

    2. dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession

    3. not been convicted of any offense or violation of rules; and

    4. not committed an act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government-announced policies.


[viii] Oath-taking and issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization.

  • ⭐Republic v. de la Rosa, 232 SCRA 785, and companion cases:

    • The Supreme Court noted several irregularities which punctuated the petition and the proceedings in the application for naturalization of Juan C. Frivaldo, viz:

      1. the petition lacked several allegations required by Secs. 2 and 6 of the Naturalization Law; 

      2. the petition and the order for hearing were not published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation; 

      3. the petition was not supported by affidavits of two credible witnesses vouching for the good moral character of the petitioner; 

      4. the actual hearing of the petition was held earlier than the scheduled date of hearing;

      5. the petition was heard within 6 months from the last publication; 

      6. the petitioner was allowed to take the oath of allegiance before finality of the judgment, and without observing the two-year probationary period.

Juan Frivaldo’s petition to reacquire citizenship was procedurally defective—he skipped required publications, postings, affidavits, and RA 530’s probation—yet was wrongly granted by the RTC. The Supreme Court voided his naturalization, emphasizing that any failure to meet mandatory steps renders citizenship null.



[d] Effects of Naturalization


[i] Vests citizenship on wife if she herself may be lawfully naturalized (as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, supra).


[ia] ⭐Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration:

  • The Court said that the alien wife of the naturalized Filipino need not go through the formal process of naturalization in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. All she has to do is to file before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation a petition for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). 

  • At the hearing on the petition, she does not have to prove that she possesses all the qualifications for naturalization; she only has to show that she does not labor under any of the disqualifications. 

  • Upon the grant of the petition for cancellation of the ACR, she may then take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and thus become a citizen of the Philippines.


[ii] Minor children born in the Philippines before naturalization shall be considered citizens of the Philippines.


[iii] Minor child born outside the Philippines who was residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization shall be considered a Filipino citizen.


[iv] Minor child born outside the Philippines before parents’ naturalization shall be considered Filipino citizens only during minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines.


[v] Child born outside the Philippines after parent’s naturalization shall be considered a Filipino, provided that he registers as such before any Philippine consulate within one year after attaining majority age, and takes his oath of allegiance.


Child’s Birthplace

Timing of Birth

Residency Requirement

Citizenship Status

Philippines

Before parents’ naturalization

Not required

Considered Filipino citizen

Outside Philippines

Before parents’ naturalization

Residing in PH at time of naturalization

Considered Filipino citizen

Outside Philippines

Before parents’ naturalization

Must begin permanent residency in PH to retain citizenship after minority

Filipino citizen only during minority unless permanently residing in PH

Outside Philippines

After parents’ naturalization

Must register within 1 year after majority and take oath

Considered Filipino citizen upon compliance


[e] Denaturalization


[i] Grounds

FRIMD


[ia] Naturalization certificate is obtained fraudulently or illegally

  • ⭐Republic v. Li Yao, 214 SCRA 748:

    • The Supreme Court declared that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Availment of a tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his lack of good moral character.

William Li Yao’s 1950 naturalization, though followed by RA 530’s probation and oath, was later found to be procured through misrepresentation and tax evasion. The Supreme Court upheld cancellation under Section 18(a), stressing that citizenship secured by fraud is void.



[ib] If, within five (5) years, he returns to his native country or to some foreign country and establishes residence there; provided, that one-year stay in the native country, or two-year stay in a foreign country shall be prima facie evidence of intent to take up residence in the same.


[ic] Petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention.


[id] Minor children failed to graduate through the fault of the parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school.


[ie] Allowed himself to be used as a dummy.

  • Republic v. Guy, 115 SCRA 244:

    • Although the misconduct was committed after the two-year probationary period, conviction of perjury and rape was held to be valid ground for denaturalization.


[ii] Effects of denaturalization

  • If the ground for denaturalization affects the intrinsic validity of the proceedings, the denaturalization shall divest the wife and children of their derivative naturalization. 

  • But if the ground was personal to the denaturalized Filipino, his wife and children shall retain their Philippine citizenship.


6. Naturalization by Direct Legislative Action

  • This is discretionary on Congress; usually conferred on an alien who has made outstanding contributions to the country.


7. Administrative Naturalization [R.A. 9139]

  • The "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000" grants Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born and residing in the Philippines.

Aspect

C.A. 473 

R.A. 9139 

Nature of Law

Judicial process for naturalization

Administrative process for naturalization

Coverage

All classes of aliens

Only native-born aliens, who lived in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos


  • So v. Republic, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007:

    • The Supreme Court declared that C.A. 473 and R.A. 9139 are separate and distinct laws

    • The former covers aliens regardless of class, while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos, who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to Filipino customs and traditions.

    • The intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical, and more encouraging

    • There is nothing in the law from which it can be inferred that C.A. 473 is intended to be annexed to or repealed by R.A. 9139. 

    • What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native-born aliens. 

    • The only implication is that a native-born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.


Edison So, a China-born resident of Manila, sought citizenship via judicial naturalization under C.A. 473 and secured initial court approvals before the Court of Appeals reversed for procedural defects. The Supreme Court ruled that C.A. 473 and R.A. 9139 establish two distinct naturalization modes—judicial and administrative—and confirmed that So’s petition must meet C.A. 473’s stricter criteria.



[a] Special Committee on Naturalization

  • Composed of the:

    1. Solicitor General, as Chairman

    2. Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his representative, and 

    3. National Security Adviser, as members. 


  • This Committee has the power to approve, deny, or reject applications for naturalization under this Act.


[b] Qualifications

  • Applicant must: 18-B-GOSE-M

    1. be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;

    2. not be less than 18 years of age at the time of filing of his/her petition;

    3. be of good moral character and believe in the underlying principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the Philippines in his/her relations with the duly constituted government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;

    4. have received his/her primary and secondary education in any public school or private educational institution duly recognized by the Department of Education, where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum, and where enrollment is not limited to any race or nationality; provided that should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;

    5. have a known trade, business, profession, or lawful occupation from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and that of his/her family; provided that this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;

    6. be able to read, write, and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines; and

    7. have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipino people.


Comparison


Aspect

C.A. 473 (Revised Naturalization Law)

R.A. 9139 (Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000)

Age Requirement

At least 21 years old on the date of hearing of the petition.

At least 18 years old at the time of filing of petition.

Residency Requirement

10 years continuous residence in the Philippines.

May be reduced to 5 years if the applicant:

- Honorably held government office

- Established a new industry or useful invention

- Married a Filipino woman

- Engaged as a teacher (≥2 years)

- Born in the Philippines.

Applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth.

Moral Character

Must be of good moral character; believes in the Constitution; proper and irreproachable conduct during entire period of residence.

Must be of good moral character; believes in the Constitution; proper and irreproachable conduct during entire residence.

Property / Occupation Requirement

Must own real estate worth at least ₱5,000 OR have a known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.

Must have a known trade, business, profession, or lawful occupation sufficient for support of self and family.


Exception: college degree holders disqualified from practicing profession due to citizenship.

Language Requirement

Must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any principal Philippine language.

Must be able to read, write, and speak Filipino or any Philippine dialect.

Education Requirement (self & children)

Must have enrolled minor children in public or private schools recognized by the government where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught during the required residence period.

Must have completed primary and secondary education in schools recognized by DepEd where Philippine history, government, and civics are taught; enrollment must not be exclusive to any race/nationality.


If with minor children of school age → they must also be enrolled in similar schools.

Integration with Filipinos

No explicit requirement of integration, but moral character and language abilities imply adaptation.

Must have mingled with Filipinos and shown a sincere desire to embrace Filipino customs, traditions, and ideals.


[c] Disqualifications

  • The same as those provided in C.A. 473.


[d] Procedure


  1. Filing with the Special Committee on Naturalization of a petition (see Sec. 5, R.A. 9139, for contents of the petition).

  2. Publication of pertinent portions of the petition once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, with copies thereof posted in any public or conspicuous area.

  3. Copies also furnished to the Department of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, the civil registrar of petitioner’s place of residence, and the National Bureau of Investigation, which shall post copies of the petition in any public or conspicuous areas in their buildings, offices, and premises.

  4. Within 30 days, the NBI shall submit to the Committee a report stating whether or not petitioner has any derogatory record on file or any such relevant and material information which might be adverse to petitioner’s application for citizenship.

  5. Committee shall, within 60 days from receipt of the report, consider and review all information received pertaining to the petition. If the Committee receives any information adverse to the petition, the Committee shall allow the petitioner to answer, explain, or refute the information.

  6. Committee shall then approve or deny the petition. 

    • Within 30 days from approval of the petition, applicant shall pay to the Committee a fee of P100,000, then take the oath of allegiance, and a certificate of naturalization shall issue.

  7. Within 5 days after the applicant has taken his oath of allegiance, the Bureau of Immigration shall forward a copy of the oath to the proper local civil registrar, and thereafter cancel petitioner’s alien certificate of registration.

[e] Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children

  • After the approval of the petition for administrative naturalization and cancellation of the applicant’s alien certificate of registration, the applicant’s lawful alien wife and minor children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the Committee, subject to the payment of the required fees. 

  • But if the applicant is a married woman, the approval of her petition for administrative naturalization shall not benefit her alien husband, although her minor children may still avail of the right to seek the cancellation of their alien certificate of registration.


[f] Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization

  • The Special Committee on Naturalization may cancel certificates of naturalization issued under this Act in the following cases:

    1. if the naturalized person or his duly authorized representative made any false statement or misrepresentation, or committed any violation of law, rules, and regulations in connection with the petition, or if he obtains Philippine citizenship fraudulently or illegally;

    2. if, within five years, he shall establish permanent residence in a foreign country, provided that remaining for more than one year in his country of origin or two years in any foreign country shall be prima facie evidence of intent to permanently reside therein;

    3. if he allowed himself, his wife, or his child with acquired citizenship to be used as a dummy;

    4. if he, his wife, or his child with acquired citizenship commits any act inimical to national security.


D. Loss and Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship (C.A. 63)


1. Loss of Citizenship

  1. By naturalization in a foreign country

  2. By express renunciation of citizenship

  3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining 21 years of age

  4. By rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country

  5. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization

  6. By having been declared by competent authority a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.


[a] By naturalization in a foreign country

  • See⭐ Frivaldo v. Comelec, 174 SCRA 245.


Frivaldo, a proclaimed governor of Sorsogon in 1988, had naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1983 and never completed a formal repatriation to the Philippines. The Supreme Court ruled he did not regain Filipino citizenship, dismissed his petition, declared him ineligible, and ordered his removal.


[i] However, this is modified by R.A. 9225, entitled An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent (which took effect September 17, 2003), which declares the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.


[ii] Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:


“I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.” [Sec. 3, R.A. 9225]


[iii] Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath [Sec. 3, R.A. 9225].


[iv] The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted, below 18 years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines [Sec. 4, R.A. 9225].


[v] Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:


[va] Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Sec. 1, Art. V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing laws.


[vb] Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.


[vb1] Eusebio Eugenio Lopez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008, reiterated in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008:

  • It was held that a Filipino-American, or any dual citizen, cannot run for elective public office in the Philippines unless he personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy

  • The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy is not sufficient; Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. 9225 categorically requires the individual to state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship, failing which, he is disqualified from running for an elective position. 

  • The fact that he may have won the elections, took his oath, and began discharging the functions of the office cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. 

  • The doctrine laid down in ⭐Valles v. COMELEC, supra, and ⭐Mercado v. Manzano, supra, does not apply.


[vb2] Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. 

  • Casan Macode Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013:

    • If after he had renounced his foreign citizenship, he should still use his foreign passport, he is not divested of his Filipino citizenship which he acquired by taking the oath of allegiance. 

    • However, by representing himself as a foreign citizen, he voluntarily and effectively reverted to his status as a dual citizen. Such reversion is not retroactive; it takes place the moment he represents himself as a foreign citizen by using his foreign passport. 

    • As a dual citizen, he is qualified to vote, but by express disqualification under Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he is not qualified to run for a local elective office.

Rommel Arnado took the Philippine Oath of Allegiance and renounced U.S. citizenship but then used his U.S. passport before filing his candidacy, prompting a disqualification challenge. The Supreme Court held that such use recanted his renunciation, reverting him to dual citizen status and barring him under Section 40(d), annulled his proclamation, and declared Maquiling the rightful winner.


[vc] Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office; Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath.


[vd] Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.


[ve] The right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

  1. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

  2. are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country of which they are naturalized citizens [Sec. 5, R.A. 9225].


[b] By express renunciation of citizenship.


  • Board of Immigration Commissioners v. Go Callano, 25 SCRA 890:

    • It was held that express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference or implication


Go Callano and his brothers, born to a Filipino mother, were admitted as citizens by consular and inquiry proceedings but later ordered deported on grounds of inferred renunciation. The Supreme Court held that citizenship cannot be lost by implication from long residence abroad or paternal recognition and requires an explicit renunciation.



  • Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1:

    • It was held that Labo lost Filipino citizenship because he expressly renounced allegiance to the Philippines when he applied for Australian citizenship.

Labo became an Australian citizen by oath explicitly renouncing all other allegiance and then used his foreign passport upon returning. The Court held that this clear, express renunciation caused him to lose his Filipino citizenship and disqualified him from holding public office.



[i]Valles v. COMELEC, supra:

  • It was held that the fact that private respondent was born in Australia does not mean that she is not a Filipino.  

  • If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most she can also claim Australian citizenship, resulting in her having dual citizenship. 

  • That she was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration do not constitute effective renunciation, and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. 

  • For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, it must be express.


[ii] Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA 364:

  • But see where obtention of a Portuguese passport and signing of commercial documents as a Portuguese were construed as renunciation of Philippine citizenship.


[c] By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining 21 years of age; Provided, however, that a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country.


[i] This should likewise be considered modified by R.A. 9225.

[ii] The proviso that a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in this manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country may be considered as an application of the principle of indelible allegiance.


[d] By rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country;

  • Provided, that the rendering of service to, or acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:

    1. The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or

    2. The said foreign country maintains armed forces in Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines.


[e] By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization.


[f] By having been declared by competent authority a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.



2. Reacquisition of Citizenship

  1. By taking the oath of allegiance required of former natural-born Philippine citizens who may have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their acquisition of the citizenship of a foreign country

  2. By naturalization, provided that the applicant possesses none of the disqualifications prescribed for naturalization.

  3. By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corps, provided that a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the marital status.

  4. By direct act of Congress.


[a] Under R.A. 9225, by taking the oath of allegiance required of former natural-born Philippine citizens who may have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their acquisition of the citizenship of a foreign country.


[b] By naturalization, provided that the applicant possesses none of the disqualifications prescribed for naturalization.


[i]Republic v. Judge de la Rosa, supra

  • The naturalization proceeding was so full of procedural flaws that the decision granting Filipino citizenship to Governor Juan Frivaldo was deemed a nullity.


[c] By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corps, provided that a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination of the marital status.


[i] See P.D. 725, which allows repatriation of former natural-born Filipino citizens who lost Filipino citizenship.


[ia]Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Lee v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727

  • The Supreme Court held that P.D. 725 was not repealed by President Aquino's Memorandum of March 27, 1986, and, thus, was a valid mode for the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by Sorsogon Governor Juan Frivaldo.


[ib]Angat v. Republic, G.R. No. 132244, September 14, 1999:

  • The Special Committee on Naturalization created by P.D. 725, chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NICA as members, was reactivated on June 8, 1995, and it is before this Committee that a petition for repatriation is filed.


Angat, a natural-born Filipino who became a U.S. citizen, sought to restore his Philippine citizenship in the RTC and was declared repatriated in 1996 before the OSG challenged the court’s power. The Supreme Court ruled the RTC lacked jurisdiction, revoked its orders, and held that repatriation must be done administratively before the Special Committee under P.D. 725.



[ii] When repatriation takes effect. 

  • Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727:

    • It was held that repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of filing of his application on August 17, 1994.


  • Altarejos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163256, November 10, 2004:

    • The same principle was applied. 

    • Petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati only after six years, or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. 

    • He completed all the requirements for repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections. 

    • But because his repatriation retroacted to December 17, 1997, he was deemed qualified to run for mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections.


Altarejos took his repatriation oath on December 17, 1997 but only registered his certificate in early 2004 after filing his candidacy. The Court ruled his repatriation retroacted to the 1997 oath date, confirming his Filipino citizenship and eligibility for the 2004 mayoral race.



[iii] Effect of repatriation. 


  • Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001:

    • The Supreme Court ruled that the act of repatriation allows the person to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

    • Thus, respondent Cruz, a former natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship when he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps, was deemed to have recovered his natural-born status when he reacquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation.

Teodoro Cruz lost his Philippine citizenship by serving and naturalizing in the U.S. Marines but later took an oath under RA 2630 to repatriate. The Supreme Court held that repatriation restores his natural-born status, making him eligible as a natural-born Filipino for Congressional office.



[iv] Repatriation under R.A. 8171 (lapsed into law on October 23, 1995). 

  • The law governs the repatriation of Filipino women who may have lost Filipino citizenship by reason of marriage to aliens, as well as the repatriation of former natural-born Filipino citizens who lost Filipino citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, including their minor children, provided the applicant is not a person:

    1. opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;

    2. defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the predominance of his ideas;

    3. convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; or

    4. suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease.


  • Repatriation is effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper Civil Registry and in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.


[iva] Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006:

  • Joevanie Tabasa, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, acquired American citizenship through derivative naturalization when, still a minor, his father became a naturalized citizen of the United States. 

  • On October 3, 1995, he was admitted to the Philippines as a "balikbayan", but within a year, he was charged by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), because it appeared that the US Department of Justice had revoked his passport and he was the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest for possession of firearms and one count of sexual battery.

  • Finding him an undocumented and undesirable alien, the BID ordered his deportation. After learning of the BID order, he then immediately executed an Affidavit of Repatriation and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

  • On the issue of whether he validly reacquired Philippine citizenship, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The privilege of R.A. 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity and to their minor children.

  • This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under R.A. 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children. 

  • Thus, to claim the benefit of R.A. 8171, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from the parents. Tabasa is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under R.A. 8171.


Joevanie Tabasa, born Filipino but naturalized American as a child, faced deportation and then tried to repatriate under R.A. 8171 by taking an oath of allegiance. The Supreme Court ruled that the law’s repatriation privilege covers only minor children of repatriating parents and therefore denied his petition.



[d] By direct act of Congress.

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