[a] The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten percentum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three percentum of the registered voters thereof [Sec. 32, Art. VI].

[i] In compliance with the constitutional mandate, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6735 [approved by President Aquino on August 4, 1989], known as an Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum.

[ia] Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose.
There are three systems of initiative, namely:

Initiative on the Constitution – refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Initiative on statutes – refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation.
Initiative on local legislation – refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance.

Indirect initiative is the exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or a local legislative body for action [Sec. 2, R.A. 6735].

Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes:

Referendum on statutes – refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress.
Referendum on local laws – refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution, or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies [Sec. 2(c), R.A. 6735].

[ib] Prohibited measures: The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:

No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate.
Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which is specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after their effectivity [Sec. 10, R.A. 6735].

[ic] Local Initiative:

Not less than 2,000 registered voters in case of autonomous regions, 1,000 in case of provinces and cities, 100 in case of municipalities, and 50 in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment of any law, ordinance, or resolution [Sec. 13, R.A. 6735].

Autonomous Regions — 2,000
Provinces and Cities — 1,000
Municipalities — 100
Barangays — 50

[ic1] Limitations on Local Initiative:

The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to enact.
If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative.

B. Congress

1. Composition

[Sec. 1, Art. VI]:

A Senate and a House of Representatives.

2. Bicameralism vs. Unicameralism.

Bicameralism refers to a legislature divided into two separate chambers:

Lower House
Upper House

Unicameralism means a single legislative body handles all lawmaking duties.

C. The Senate

1. Composition

[Sec. 2, Art. VI]:

Twenty-four Senators elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

2. Qualifications of Senator

[Sec. 3, Art. VI]:

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Natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
On the day of the election, at least 35 years of age.
Able to read and write.
A registered voter.
A resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

3. Term of Office

[Sec. 4, Art. VI]:

Six years, commencing at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election.

[a] Limitation:

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which elected.

D. House of Representatives

1. Composition

[Sec. 5(1) and (2), Art. VI]:

Not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law, consisting of:

District representatives

elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area.

Party-list representatives

who shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives, elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

Sectoral representatives.

For three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

[i] Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation [Sec. 7, Art. XVIII, 1987].

Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259:

These appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

President Corazon Aquino appointed Teresita Quintos-Deles and three others as sectoral reps, but their oath-taking was blocked by a dispute over whether their seats needed confirmation. The Court held that sectoral representatives fall under the officers whose appointments require the Commission on Appointments’ consent and dismissed the petition.

2. Apportionment of legislative districts.

[Sec. 5(3) and (4), Art. VI]:

The question of the validity of an apportionment law is a justiciable question.

Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1.

Macias and others showed that RA 3040 assigned legislative seats in ways that clearly mismatched province populations, violating the constitutional command for equal representation. The Court held that the Constitution requires districts to be apportioned “as nearly as may be” according to inhabitants, and RA 3040’s evident inequalities violated this equal representation mandate, rendering the law void.

[a] Apportionment shall be made in accordance with the number of respective inhabitants [among provinces, cities, and Metro Manila area], on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. But:

Each city with not less than 250,000 inhabitants shall be entitled to at least one representative; and
Each province, irrespective of number of inhabitants, is entitled to at least one representative.

[i] Victorino Aldaba v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010:

A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the "immediately following election."
In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.

Malolos reached a population of 250,000 in the 2007 census and sought immediate recognition as its own legislative district in the same election cycle. The Supreme Court held that under the Ordinance, a city only gains a new district in the election immediately following the census that first shows it has met the 250,000-person threshold. This timing rule preserves the stability of electoral preparations by fixing district lines before each cycle.

[ii] Benigno Simeon Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010:

The constitutional provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on the one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other.
For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

RA 9716 reconfigured Camarines Sur’s 1st and 2nd districts to create a fifth district of only 176,383 inhabitants. Senator Aquino III and Mayor Robredo claim every new district must meet a 250,000-person constitutional minimum. The Court held that the 250,000 threshold applies solely to cities, not provinces, dismissed the petition, and upheld RA 9716 as valid exercise of legislative reapportionment. Population is only one factor, and in Camarines Sur’s reshuffle, legislators balanced dialects, territorial cohesion, natural divisions, and area balance.

[b] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. This is intended to prevent gerrymandering.

Gerrymandering is the creation of representative districts out of separate points of territory in order to favor a candidate.

[c] Congress to make reapportionment of legislative districts within three years following the return of every census.

[i] Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995:

The Court held that the Constitution does not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law other than a general apportionment law.
In fact, in Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106, it ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law.
To hold that reapportionment can be made only through a general law would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
That intolerable situation would deprive the people in the new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Sovereignty cannot admit of subtraction; it is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Republic Act No. 7854 converted Makati into a highly urbanized city and created two legislative districts. On the issue whether Congress violated the constitutional requirement for general reapportionment by creating a new legislative district through a special law (RA 7854), despite the absence of a general reapportionment law within three years of the census, the Supreme Court ruled that while a general reapportionment law is constitutionally required, Congress may still validly create or adjust districts through special laws, especially when justified by population growth.

[ii] Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995:

It was held that while concededly the conversion of Biliran into a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 districts of Leyte, the issue involves reapportionment of legislative districts, and petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress.
This Court cannot itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want.

Following the conversion of Biliran into a regular province, COMELEC attempted to rebalance Leyte’s legislative districts by transferring municipalities between them through Resolution No. 2736. Montejo sought to transfer Tolosa municipality to balance voter numbers under the equal protection principle.The Supreme Court ruled that such reapportionment is a legislative function reserved for Congress and declared COMELEC’s resolution void for exceeding its authority.

[iii] Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008:

The Supreme Court ruled that Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts; nothing in Sec. 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts.
The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively in Congress.
Accordingly, Sec. 19, Art. VI of R.A. 9054, granting the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Sec. 5, Art. VI, and Sec. 20, Art. X, as well as Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

The ARMM Regional Assembly created the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan from Maguindanao’s first district. COMELEC then issued resolutions defining the district as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. Petitioners challenged the resolutions arguing the ARMM Assembly lacked power to create provinces or districts and that only Congress can do so. The Court held that only Congress can create legislative districts. The Supreme Court declared Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 unconstitutional insofar as it grants the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities.

3. Qualifications

[Sec. 6, Art. VI]

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Natural-born Filipino citizen
On the day of the election, at least 25 years of age
Able to read and write
Except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected
Except the party-list representatives, a resident thereof for not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

[a] Imelda Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300:

The Court upheld the qualification of Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos (IRM), despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only seven months, because of the following:

A minor follows the domicile of his parents; Tacloban became IRM's domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte.
Domicile of origin is lost only when there is:

actual removal or change of domicile,
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose;

in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

The wife does not automatically gain the husband's domicile because the term "residence" in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when IRM married Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her candidacy for Representative of Leyte’s First District, but her certificate stated only seven months of residency, prompting a disqualification petition. Marcos argued that her domicile had always been Tacloban and that the seven-month entry was an honest mistake. The Supreme Court ruled that “residence” under the Constitution means “domicile,” and Marcos had maintained her domicile in Tacloban City despite living elsewhere. Her candidacy was upheld, and the COMELEC was directed to proclaim her as the elected representative.

[b] Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400:

It was held that Agapito Aquino failed to prove that he had established not just residence but domicile of choice in Makati.
In his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, he indicated that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, for 52 years; he was a registered voter of the same district; his birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac, as birthplace.
Thus, his domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac; and his bare assertion of transfer of domicile from Tarlac to Makati is hardly supported by the facts of the case.

Agapito Aquino ran for Representative of Makati’s Second District but was challenged for failing to meet the one-year residency requirement, having previously declared only ten months of residence. The Supreme Court ruled that “residence” means “domicile,” and Aquino failed to show he had genuinely transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati.

[c] Coquilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner had not been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar, for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.
Although Oras was his domicile of origin, petitioner lost the same when he became a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy.
From then on, until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines.

Teodulo Coquilla, a former U.S. citizen who reacquired Philippine citizenship in November 10, 2000, ran for mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and claimed two years of residency. The Supreme Court ruled that he failed to meet the one-year residency requirement because his legal domicile in the Philippines was only restored upon repatriation. His certificate of candidacy was cancelled for making a false material representation regarding his qualifications.

Caasi v. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229:

It was held that immigration to the US by virtue of the acquisition of a "green card" constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

Merito Miguel was elected mayor of Bolinao despite holding a U.S. green card, which petitioners argued made him a permanent resident abroad and disqualified him from running. Miguel admitted holding a U.S. green card but claimed it was for convenience to visit his children and undergo medical checkups, asserting his permanent residence was in Bolinao. The Supreme Court ruled that his green card and immigration application proved he had abandoned his Philippine domicile and failed to waive his foreign residency status before filing his candidacy. As a result, Miguel was disqualified from holding public office, and his election was annulled.

4. Term of Office [Sec. 7, Art. VI]

Three years, commencing at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election.
Limitation: Shall not serve for more than three consecutive terms.

5. The Party-List System [R.A. 7941 (The Party-List System Act)]

The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.

[a] Definition of Terms

[i] Party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

[ii] Political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. (Mamamayang Liberal Party)
It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region. (Ako Bicol)

[iii] Sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the following sectors: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers and professionals, whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. (Gabriela Women’s Party, Kabataan, Duterte Youth)

[iv] Sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

[v] Coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Makabayan Bloc)

[b] Registration; Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System

Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than 90 days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations.
Any party, organization or coalition already registered with the COMELEC need not register anew, but shall file with the COMELEC not later than 90 days before the election a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.

[i] Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013:

The Supreme Court formulated new parameters to guide the COMELEC in determining who may participate in the May 13, 2013 and subsequent elections:

[ia] Three different groups may participate in the party-list system, namely:

national parties or organizations;
regional parties or organizations; and
sectoral parties or organizations.

[ib] National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized or under-represented" sector.

[ic] Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections.

A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

[id] Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and under-represented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies."

It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

The sectors that are "marginalized and under-represented" include:

labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.

The sectors that lack "well-defined constituencies" include:

professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

[ie] A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and under-represented" must belong to the "marginalized and under-represented" sector they represent.

Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined constituencies" either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.

The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona fide members of such parties or organizations.

[if] National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

COMELEC disqualified numerous party-list groups from the 2013 elections for allegedly failing to represent marginalized sectors, prompting a consolidated challenge before the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that the Party-List System is open to national, regional, and sectoral parties, and is not limited to those representing the marginalized and underrepresented. It remanded the petitions to COMELEC for reevaluation under the newly clarified standards.

[c] Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.

The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon a verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional, or sectoral party, organization, or coalition on any of the following grounds:

RVF-RVU-CFF

it is a religious sect or denomination, organization, or association organized for religious purposes;
it advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
it is a foreign party or organization;
it is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members, or indirectly through third parties, for partisan election purposes;
it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to elections;
it declares untruthful statements in its petition;
it has ceased to exist for at least one year; and
it fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."

[i] Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010:

The word "or" in No. (8) above is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.
Thus, the plain, clear, and unmistakable language of the law provides for two separate reasons for delisting a party-list group, namely:

that it failed to participate in the last two preceding elections, and
that it failed to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it was registered.

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. was delisted by COMELEC for failing to meet vote and participation thresholds in prior elections under the Party-List System. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 outlines two separate grounds for delisting—non-participation and failure to obtain 2% of votes—which must not be combined. It reinstated PGBI’s registration since PGBI participated in the 2004 elections but did not run in 2007.

This ruling effectively abandons Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association, also known as MINERO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177548, May 10, 2007, which erroneously held that a party-list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the votes cast.

MINERO won under 2% in 2001 and skipped 2004, prompting COMELEC to remove it under Section 6(8). The Supreme Court affirmed that non-participation equates to a vote-shortfall, upholding MINERO’s delisting.

[ii] Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010:

Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.
The LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transgendered individuals) is a sector that can be represented in the party-list system even if it is not specifically enumerated in the law.
The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and R.A. 7941.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party applied for party-list accreditation but was denied by COMELEC on moral and religious grounds, claiming the group promoted immorality. The Supreme Court ruled that such denial violated constitutional protections, affirming that the Party-List System is inclusive and not limited to sectors enumerated in RA 7941. It directed COMELEC to accredit Ang Ladlad, emphasizing that government decisions must be based on secular and legal standards, not religious beliefs.

[iii] Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013:

The COMELEC may, motu proprio, cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to elections.

ANAD’s registration as a party-list group was cancelled by COMELEC for failing to represent marginalized sectors, submitting only three nominees, and not filing its 2007 election expenditure report. The Supreme Court upheld the cancellation, ruling that COMELEC acted within its authority and did not violate due process, especially since ANAD had already been given a hearing.

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013

But where a party-list group was not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of the said party-list group in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organization's qualifications as a party-list group for the 2013 elections, thus denying the party-list group the opportunity to answer this issue squarely, it was held that the party-list group was denied due process.

Senior Citizens Party-List was disqualified by COMELEC for entering into a term-sharing agreement among its nominees, which was later prohibited by Resolution No. 9366. The Supreme Court ruled that the disqualification was invalid because the agreement was never implemented and the party-list group was denied due process. The party-list organization was not properly informed that its 2010 term-sharing agreement among nominees would be used as a basis for disqualification and cancellation of its registration.

[iv] The Supreme Court has recognized, on several occasions, the power of the COMELEC to cancel a political party's registration.

Bello v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010:

The Court confirmed that a complaint for the cancellation of a party-list registration, aside from a petition for the disqualification of the party-list nominee, provides a "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" against a party-list organization alleged to have failed to comply with Sec. 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 to submit documentary evidence to prove that they belong to a marginalized and under-represented sector.

Ang Galing Pinoy nominated Mikey Arroyo as its party-list representative for marginalized sectors, but failed to submit required documents proving sectoral affiliation under COMELEC Resolution No. 8807. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners should have pursued available remedies—either disqualification of the nominee or cancellation of the party-list registration—before filing for mandamus. It dismissed the petitions and affirmed that jurisdiction over Arroyo’s qualifications now rests with the HRET.

ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011:

Likewise, the Court declared that the power of the COMELEC not only to register political parties but also to cancel their registration emanates from no less than Sec. 2 (5), Art. IX-C of the Constitution.

Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; x x x. Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

Melanio Mauricio filed a petition to cancel ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party-List’s registration, alleging it was a front for the religious group Ang Dating Daan, after it was proclaimed a winner. COMELEC en banc ordered a hearing on the cancellation petition. The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC retains jurisdiction to cancel a party-list group’s registration even after its proclamation, and that reinstating the petition with a hearing was proper to uphold due process.

[v] Abang Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013:

Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future performance.
There is no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the party-list system still need to comply with the track record requirement.
Nowhere in R.A. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration must submit evidence to show track record as a group.

Abang Lingkod, a party-list group for farmers and fisherfolk, was disqualified by COMELEC for allegedly submitting fake evidence of sectoral advocacy and lacking a track record. The Supreme Court ruled that while due process was observed, COMELEC gravely abused its discretion by requiring a track record, which is no longer mandated under the revised standards in Atong Paglaum. It reinstated Abang Lingkod’s registration and ordered its proclamation based on the votes it received. Sectoral organizations need only show that their principal advocacy pertains to the sector they represent—not a history of activities.

[d] Nomination of Party-List Representatives

Each registered party, organization, or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than 45 days before the election a list of names, not less than five, from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one list only.
Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list.

The list shall not include:

any candidate for any elective office or
a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.

No change shall be allowed after the list shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee:

dies,
withdraws in writing his nomination, or
becomes incapacitated.

In such case, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

[i] Cocofed-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013:

Sec. 8, R.A. 7941 expressly requires a party-list group to submit a list containing at least five qualified nominees. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the cancellation of the party’s registration.
The requirement of submission of a list of five nominees is primarily a statutory requirement for the registration of party-list groups, and the submission of this list is part of the registered party's continuing compliance with the law to maintain its registration.
A party-list group's previous registration with the COMELEC confers no vested right for the maintenance of its registration. The party must prove not only its continued possession of the requisite qualifications but equally, its compliance with the basic requirements of the law.

COCOFED, a party-list group for coconut farmers, was disqualified by COMELEC for failing to submit the required five nominees before the 2013 elections. The Supreme Court upheld the cancellation, ruling that the submission of five nominees is a mandatory legal requirement that ensures transparency and informs voters. COCOFED’s late compliance and excuses did not justify exemption.

[e] Qualifications of Party-List Nominees

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Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
At least 25 years of age on the day of the election
Able to read and write
A registered voter
A resident of the Philippines for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election
A bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election

For the youth sector:

Must be at least 25 years of age but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election
Any youth representative who attains the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term

[i] Milagros Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010:

R.A. 7941 covers all youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
A nominee for the youth sector must be at least 25, but not more than 30, years of age on the day of the election.

Emmanuel Joel Villanueva was challenged for representing the youth sector despite being over 30 years old and for switching to another sector less than six months before the 2007 elections. The Supreme Court ruled that both actions violated Sections 9 and 15 of the Party-List System Act, and that qualifications for public office are continuing and subject to challenge throughout the term. Villanueva was declared ineligible to hold office as a party-list representative for CIBAC.

[f] Manner of Voting

Every voter shall be entitled to two votes:

A vote for the candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district; and
A vote for the party, organization, or coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives.

Provided, that a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted.

In the May 2025 midterm polls, the Duterte Youth received 2,338,564 votes which entitled the group to three seats in the House of Representatives. However, it was not proclaimed. On August 2025, the Comelec has canceled the registration of the Duterte Youth for "misrepresentation" of the youth sector.

[i] Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007:

The Supreme Court held that the Commission on Elections has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, citing Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern as complemented by the policy of full disclosure and transparency in government.

Bantay Republic Act and others challenged COMELEC for accrediting party-list groups without vetting their nominees and keeping nominee names secret before election day. The Supreme Court held that withholding those names violated the people’s right to information under the Constitution, granted mandamus relief, and ordered COMELEC to immediately disclose all party-list nominees prior to the elections.

[g] Number of Party-List Representatives

The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to representation in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections; and
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each.
Provided, that those garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

[i] Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000:

The Supreme Court reversed the COMELEC ruling that the 38 respondent parties, coalitions, and organizations were each entitled to a party-list seat despite their failure to obtain at least 2% each of the national vote in the 1998 party-list election.
The Court said that the Constitution and R.A. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters: 20-2-3-P

20% allocation – The combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives.
2% threshold – Only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House.
Three-seat limit – Each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats (one qualifying and two additional).
Proportional representation – The additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes.

In the 1998 elections, COMELEC proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives to fill the 20% quota, even though many groups failed to meet the 2% vote threshold. The Supreme Court ruled that the 20% allocation is a ceiling, not a mandatory target, and that the 2% threshold and three-seat limit under RA 7941 are valid and binding. It nullified COMELEC’s proclamations and clarified that seat allocation must follow proportional representation based on actual votes received.

[ia] Partido ng Manggagawa (PM) and Butil Farmers Party (Butil) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164702, March 15, 2006:

Petitioners party-list groups sought the immediate proclamation by the COMELEC of their respective second nominee, claiming that they were entitled to one (1) additional seat in the House of Representatives based on the number of votes they obtained and on the formula used by the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani.
The Court held that the formula used in the landmark case of Veterans Federation Party, which is:

Additional seats = Votes cast for Qualified PartyVotes cast for First Party Allotted Seats for First Party

shall be followed.

Ang Bagong Bayani merely reiterated this formula for computing the additional seats which a party-list group shall be entitled to.

PM and BUTIL challenged COMELEC’s use of a simplified formula to allocate party-list seats in the 2004 elections, arguing it contradicted the Supreme Court’s established formula in Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC. The Court ruled that COMELEC must follow the Veterans formula for proportional representation but found that, even under this formula, PM and BUTIL were not entitled to additional seats. It denied the petition but reaffirmed that the allocation of party-list seats must strictly adhere to the formula ensuring proportionality.

First Party Seat Allocation:

Identify the party with the highest number of votes.
Compute its percentage of the total party-list votes.
If it gets:

≥6% → 3 seats
≥4% but <6% → 2 seats
≥2% but <4% → 1 seat

Additional Seats for Other Qualified Parties:

Use the formula.
Round down to the nearest whole number.
Only parties with ≥2% are eligible for additional seats.

[ib] Ang Bagong Bayani - OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001:

The Supreme Court said that even if major political parties are allowed by the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and under-represented.
The following guidelines should be followed in order that a political party registered under the party-list system may be entitled to a seat in the House of Representatives:

MC-RD-AC-MC

must represent marginalized and under-represented sectors;
major political parties must comply with this statutory policy;
Ang Bagong Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (as a party) must be subject to the express constitutional prohibition against religious sects;
the party must not be disqualified under R.A. 7941;
the party must not be an adjunct of an entity or project funded by the government;
the party and its nominees must comply with the requirements of the law;
the nominee must also represent a marginalized or under-represented sector; and
the nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation.

Ang Bagong Bayani challenged the accreditation of several party-list groups, arguing that many did not represent marginalized sectors and violated the intent of the Party-List System. The Supreme Court ruled that only groups genuinely representing marginalized and underrepresented sectors may participate, and votes for disqualified groups must be excluded from the total count to uphold the 2% threshold. It directed COMELEC to strictly apply the eight-point guideline and reaffirmed the proportional seat allocation formula to preserve the integrity of the system.

[ii] BANAT (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009:

Abandoned the formula adopted in Veterans Federation Party in the matter of the allocation of additional seats to party-list groups, even as it also explained that the requirement in Bagong Bayani that the nominees must represent a marginalized or under-represented sector does not mean that the nominee must wallow in poverty.

[iia] In this case, the Court prescribed the procedure to be followed in the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Sec. 11, R.A. 7941, viz:

The parties, organizations and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the election.
The parties, organizations and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
Those garnering sufficient number of votes according to the ranking in paragraph 1 shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all additional seats are allocated.
Each party, organization or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three seats.

[iib] In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included, because they have already been allocated, at one seat each to every two percenter.

Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System less the guaranteed seats.
There shall be two steps in the second round of allocation:

First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, which is the difference between the maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of the two percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and the remaining available seats corresponds to the party's share in the remaining available seats.
Second, assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed.

BANAT and others challenged COMELEC’s use of the Veterans formula in allocating party-list seats, arguing it prevented the full 20% representation mandated by the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that while the 20% is a ceiling, the 2% threshold for additional seats was unconstitutional because it blocked full seat allocation, and it introduced a new proportional formula to distribute all available seats. The Court also clarified that major political parties may participate only through sectoral wings and reaffirmed the three-seat cap.

Personal Notes on Computation based on BANAT v. COMELEC

Compute Total Party-List Seats

Use this formula:

Partylist Representative0.20 = Number of District Representatives0.80

Partylist Representative = Number of District Representatives0.80 0.20

Allocate Guaranteed Seats

Rank all parties from highest to lowest based on total votes.
Any party receiving at least 2% of the total party-list votes gets 1 guaranteed seat.

Allocate Additional Seats (Two-Step Process)

Proportional Allocation

Compute each party’s percentage of total party-list votes

Vote Percentage= Votes of PartyTotal Party-List Votes

Multiply this percentage by the number of remaining seats

Additional Seats= Vote Percentage Total PartyList Seats -Guaranteed Seats

Round down to the nearest whole number.
No party may receive more than 3 seats total.

Fill Remaining Seats

If seats remain unallocated after Step 1, assign 1 seat each to the next highest-ranked parties (based on vote count) until all seats are filled.

Example:

If there are 200 district representatives in Congress, 50 seats are available for party-list representatives.

50 = 2000.80 0.20

Suppose 10 party-list groups each received at least 2% of the total party-list votes, each of these 10 groups gets 1 guaranteed seat. 40 seats shall remain for allocation.

40 =50-10

If Party A received 6% of the total votes, Party A now has 1 guaranteed seat and 2 additional seats.

2.4 = 0.06 (50-10)

If Party B received 3.5% of the total votes, Party B now has 1 guaranteed seat and 1 additional seat.

1.4 = 0.035 (50-10)

If Party C received 2% of the total votes, Party C has 1 guaranteed seat only.

0.8 = 0.02(50-10)

[h] Choosing Party-List Representatives.

Party-list representatives are proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in the list.

[i] Effect of Change of Affiliation.

Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; provided that if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.

[j] Vacancy.

In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization or coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.

[k] Term of Office; Rights.

Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years, and shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.

E. Election [Sec. 8-9, Art. VI]

1. Regular

Unless otherwise provided by law, on the second Monday of May [Sec. 8, Art. VI].

2. Special

To fill a vacancy, but elected member shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term [Sec. 9, Art. VI].
See R.A. 6645. An Act Prescribing the Manner of Filing a Vacancy in the Congress of the Philippines.

Senate: Vacancy must occur at least 18 months before the next regular election.
House of Representatives: Vacancy must occur at least 1 year before the next regular election.
COMELEC can only act upon receiving a formal resolution from either chamber of Congress, or an official communication from the Senate President or House Speaker if Congress is in recess.
The special election must be held between 45 and 90 days from the date of the resolution or communication, unless a general election is scheduled within that period—in which case, the special election is held simultaneously.

Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337.

Petitioners Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada and Romeo B. Igot filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to call a special election to fill twelve vacancies in the Interim Batasan Pambansa, invoking Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which mandates a special election if a vacancy arises 18 months or more before a regular election. The Supreme Court ruled that the provision applies only to the regular Batasang Pambansa and that calling a special election would require appropriation of public funds, a power exclusive to the legislative body, which cannot be compelled by mandamus.

F. Salaries [Sec. 10, Art. VI]

[Sec. 10, Art. VI].

The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.

Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300; Ligot v. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823.

In 1964, Congress passed a law increasing the salaries of Senators and Representatives. PHILCONSA challenged its implementation in 1965, arguing it violated the constitutional rule that salary increases must only take effect after the full term of all approving members has expired. The Supreme Court ruled that the increase could not be implemented until December 30, 1969, when the terms of all Senators and Representatives who approved the law would have ended. The Court emphasized that both chambers must be treated as a single legislative body for this purpose, and any premature disbursement was unconstitutional.

G. Privileges [Sec. 11, Art. VI]

1. Freedom from Arrest

[Sec. 11, Art. VI].

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session."

[a] This is reinforced by Art. 145, Revised Penal Code (Violation of Parliamentary Immunity), which provides:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force, intimidation, threats or fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly from attending the meetings of the Assembly or of any of its committees or subcommittees or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall, while the Assembly is in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.

[b] People v. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875, February 3, 2000:

The Supreme Court denied the motion of Congressman Jalosjos that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee hearings despite his having been convicted by the trial court of a non-bailable offense.
The denial was premised on the following:

Membership in Congress does not exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense, i.e., it is the injury to the public, not the injury to the complainant, which state action in criminal law seeks to redress.
It would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune from arrest during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same.
Accused-appellant is provided with an office at the House of Representatives with a full complement of staff, as well as an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, where he attends to his constituents; he has, therefore, been discharging his mandate as member of the House of Representatives, and being a detainee, he should not even be allowed by the prison authorities to perform these acts.

Congressman Romeo Jalosjos, convicted of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness, sought to attend legislative sessions while detained, arguing that his reelection reflected the sovereign will of his constituents and that denying him participation in Congress violated their right to representation. The Supreme Court ruled that legislative immunity from arrest does not apply to felonies punishable by more than six years of imprisonment and that reelection does not exempt a person from lawful detention.

[c] Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008:

A similar ruling was made in this case.
Petitioner Antonio Trillanes sought from the Makati RTC leave to attend Senate sessions and to convene his staff, resource persons, and guests and to attend to his official functions as Senator.
He anchored his motion on his right to be presumed innocent, and claimed that the Jalosjos ruling should not be applied to him, because he is a mere detention prisoner and is not charged with a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Makati RTC denied the motion.
Elevating the matter, the Supreme Court denied Trillanes’ petition on the ground that Sec. 13, Art. III of the Constitution explicitly provides that crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua are non-bailable.
The Court further said that the presumption of innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Senator Antonio Trillanes IV, while detained for coup d’état charges, sought permission to attend Senate sessions and perform legislative duties, arguing that his election justified such privileges. The Supreme Court ruled that detention for a non-bailable offense overrides any claim to legislative immunity or special treatment, and that election does not exempt a person from lawful arrest and confinement.

2. Privilege of Speech and of Debate

No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

[a] Note that the member of Congress may be held to account for such speech or debate by the House to which he belongs.

See Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr. was suspended by the House of Representatives for fifteen months after delivering a privilege speech accusing the President of corruption, which he refused to substantiate. The Supreme Court ruled that while legislators are immune from being questioned outside Congress for speeches made in session, they are still subject to discipline by their own chamber. Parliamentary immunity does not prevent Congress from punishing disorderly conduct within its own proceedings.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876.

Congressman Bartolome Cabangbang published an open letter accusing military officers of being involved in political schemes. The officers of the Armed Forces and intelligence agencies, filed a civil action for damages The Supreme Court ruled that the letter was not protected by the constitutional privilege of speech and debate because it was published outside of Congress and not in the performance of official legislative duties. However, the Court held that the statements were not sufficiently defamatory to justify damages, affirming the dismissal of the case.

H. Disqualifications [Sec. 13, Art. VI]

1. Incompatible Office
[Sec. 13, Art. VI].

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries during his term without forfeiting his seat.

[a] Forfeiture of the seat in Congress shall be automatic upon the member's assumption of such other office deemed incompatible with his seat in Congress.

See ⭐Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431

Governor Homobono Adaza was elected to the Batasan Pambansa in 1984 and sought to retain his gubernatorial post despite assuming legislative office. He argued that the parliamentary system allowed dual office-holding, as practiced in countries like France and the UK. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution prohibits holding both positions simultaneously and that assuming an incompatible office automatically forfeits his governorship. The Court upheld Vice-Governor Pacana’s succession as lawful and dismissed Adaza’s petition.

However, no forfeiture shall take place if the member of Congress holds the other government office in an ex officio capacity, e.g., membership in the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines by the Chairman, Committee on Education, in the Senate.

[b] Dante Liban v. Senator Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011:

The petitioners challenged the continued incumbency of Senator Richard Gordon as Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), saying that it constituted a violation of this constitutional provision.
In the July 15, 2009 Decision, the Court declared several provisions of R.A. 95, the charter of PNRC, as unconstitutional, and thus ruled that there was no constitutional violation, inasmuch as the PNRC was not a government agency or instrumentality.

[i] This decision was, however, reversed in the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration. There, the Court said that the PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State (so as not to lose its character of neutrality as well as independence), nor strictly as a private corporation (since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State). Based on this, the sui generis status of PNRC is now sufficiently established, and R.A. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety.

[ii] Because the PNRC is not a government subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, nor a government-owned or controlled corporation, there can be no prohibition against Senator Richard Gordon concurrently holding the position of Chairman of PNRC.

Petitioners claimed that Senator Richard Gordon forfeited his Senate seat by accepting the Chairmanship of the Philippine National Red Cross, arguing it was a government-controlled entity. The Supreme Court initially ruled that the PNRC was a private corporation created by special law, which violated the constitutional ban on creating private corporations by special legislation. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court ruled that the PNRC is a sui generis organization—not a government office or private corporation. Thus, Gordon’s dual role did not violate the constitutional prohibition on incompatible offices.

2. Forbidden Office

[Sec. 13, Art. VI].

Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
The ban against appointment to the office created or the emoluments thereof increased shall, however, last only for the duration of the term for which the member of Congress was elected.

I. Other Inhibitions

[Sec. 14, Art. VI].

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial or other administrative bodies.

Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.

He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

1. What is prohibited is “personally” appearing as counsel.

2. Upon assumption of office, must make a full disclosure of financial and business interests. Shall notify House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors [Sec. 12, Art. VI].

J. Sessions

1. Regular Session

Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays.” (Sec. 15, Art. VI)

2. Special Session

The President may call a special session at any time. (Sec. 15, Art. VI)
A special session may be called by the President at any time, usually to consider legislative measures which the President may designate in his call.

3. Joint Sessions

[a] Voting separately:

PPVSA

Choosing the President (Sec. 4, Art. VII)
Determine President's disability (Sec. 11, Art. VII)
Confirming nomination of the Vice President (Sec. 9, Art. VII)
Declaring the existence of a state of war (Sec. 23, Art. VI)
Proposing constitutional amendments (Sec. 1, Art. XVII)

[b] Voting jointly:

To revoke or extend proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or placing the Philippines under martial law (Sec. 18, Art. VII).

4. Adjournment

Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. (Sec. 16[5], Art. VI)

K. Officers

[Sec. 16(1), Art. VI].

The Senate shall elect its President, and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

L. Quorum

[Sec. 16(2), Art. VI].

A majority of each House, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may determine.

Quorum — any number sufficient to transact business

1. Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17:

The authority for the principle that the basis in determining the existence of a quorum in the Senate shall be the total number of Senators who are in the country and within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate.

Senate President Jose Avelino walked out of a session with nine other senators to prevent a privilege speech and subsequent investigation against him. The remaining twelve senators continued the session and elected Senator Mariano Cuenco as Acting Senate President. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition challenging Cuenco’s election, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over internal Senate affairs. On the motion for reconsideration, however, it assumed jurisdiction and ruled that the twelve members were sufficient to constitute a quorum, being a majority of twenty-three, not twenty-four, since one senator was then in the United States and therefore outside the coercive jurisdiction of the smaller number of members.

2. Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998:

The Supreme Court declared that the question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly, especially when a quorum is obviously present, for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Petitioners challenged the approval of a conference committee report in the House of Representatives, alleging procedural violations and lack of quorum. The Supreme Court ruled that the session complied with established parliamentary practices, and that quorum had been validly confirmed through roll call. It emphasized that quorum cannot be repeatedly questioned to obstruct legislative business once its presence is established.

M. Rules of Proceedings

[Sec. 16(3), Art. VI].

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings.
Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58

Felizardo Pacete challenged the recall of his judicial appointment by the Commission on Appointments after it had previously confirmed him. The Supreme Court ruled that the CA has the constitutional authority to adopt and follow its own rules of proceedings, including the power to recall a confirmation. The Court declined to interfere, emphasizing that such internal matters are not subject to judicial review unless they violate the Constitution.

N. Discipline of Members

[Sec. 16(3), Art. VI].

Each House may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend (for not more than sixty days) or expel a member.
Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863:

The Supreme Court said that the determination of the acts which constitute disorderly behavior is within the full discretionary authority of the House concerned, and the Court will not review such determination, the same being a political question.

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr. was suspended by the House of Representatives for fifteen months after delivering a privilege speech accusing the President of corruption, which he refused to substantiate. The Supreme Court ruled that while legislators are immune from being questioned outside Congress for speeches made in session, they are still subject to discipline by their own chamber. The Court affirmed that parliamentary immunity does not prevent Congress from punishing disorderly conduct within its own proceeding

1. Different from the suspension in R.A. 3019

The suspension contemplated in the Constitution is different from the suspension prescribed in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019).

The latter is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive measure and is not imposed upon the petitioner for misbehavior as a member of Congress.

Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118364, August 10, 1995

Ceferino Paredes, Jr., a former provincial governor who was later elected as a member of Congress, was charged with falsification of public documents and was preventively suspended by the Sandiganbayan under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court ruled that such preventive suspension is valid and distinct from the disciplinary suspension imposed by Congress under the Constitution. The Court explained that the suspension under R.A. 3019 is not a punishment but a precautionary measure to ensure fair proceedings.

Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001:

The Supreme Court clarified this ruling saying that Sec. 13, R.A. 3019 (where it appears to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue the order of suspension upon a determination of the validity of the criminal information filed before it) does not state that the public officer should be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts charged.
Furthermore, the order of suspension provided in R.A. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks.
Neither does the order of suspension encroach upon the power of Congress.
The doctrine of separation of powers, by itself, is not deemed to have effectively excluded the members of Congress from R.A. 3019 or its sanctions.

Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago was preventively suspended by the Sandiganbayan under R.A. 3019 while facing graft charges related to her prior role as Commissioner of Immigration. The Supreme Court ruled that this statutory suspension is distinct from the disciplinary suspension under the Constitution, as it is a procedural safeguard and not a penalty for legislative misconduct.

O. Records and Books of Accounts

[Sec. 20, Art. VI]

Preserved and open to the public in accordance with law.
Books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit (COA), which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each member.

P. Legislative Journal and the Congressional Record

[Sec. 16(4), Art. VI].

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

1. Legislative Journal

Matters which, under the Constitution, are to be entered in the Journal:

Yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill;
Veto message of the President;
Yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President; and
Yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of members present.

Journals — record of what is done and past in a legislative assembly.

They are useful not only for authenticating the proceedings but also for the interpretation of laws through a study of the debates held thereon.
The publication of the journals is in line with the right to information on matters of public concern as guaranteed in Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution.

2. Enrolled Bill Theory

An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated by the proper officers of each, and approved by the President.
The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
The Court is bound under the doctrine of separation of powers by the contents of a duly authenticated measure of the legislature.

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1

Petitioners challenged a congressional resolution proposing a constitutional amendment, arguing that the required three-fourths vote was not met due to the exclusion of certain members. The Supreme Court ruled that the enrolled resolution, duly signed and authenticated, is conclusive proof of its due enactment and content.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Petitioners challenged the passage of Sin Tax law, claiming that House rules were violated during its approval and that a quorum was not properly established. The Supreme Court ruled that internal legislative procedures are not subject to judicial review unless they violate constitutional provisions or private rights, and upheld the validity of the law under the enrolled bill doctrine.

Casco [Phil.] Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347

If a mistake was made in the printing of the bill before it was certified by Congress and approved by the President, the remedy is amendment or corrective legislation, not a judicial decree.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. sought a refund of margin fees paid for importing urea and formaldehyde, claiming these were exempt under Republic Act No. 2609. The Supreme Court ruled that the exemption applied only to the finished product “urea formaldehyde” as stated in the enrolled bill, and that courts cannot correct alleged printing errors in legislation. It emphasized that the proper remedy for such errors is amendment or corrective legislation, not judicial action.

3. Journal Entry vs. Enrolled Bill

Enrolled bill prevails, except as to matters which, under the Constitution, must be entered in the Journal.

Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714

House Bill No. 9266, defining the powers and duties of the Vice-Mayor of Manila, was passed by Congress but the version signed into law as Republic Act No. 4065 did not include the substantial amendments approved by the Senate. The Supreme Court ruled that although the enrolled bill is usually conclusive proof of enactment, this presumption can be overturned when there is clear and undisputed evidence that the bill signed by the President was not the one passed by Congress.

Morales v. Subido, 26 SCRA 150

Enrique Morales challenged the validity of Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, claiming that a key phrase approved by Congress was omitted during the bill’s final printing. The Supreme Court ruled that the enrolled bill, authenticated by legislative officers and approved by the President, is conclusive and cannot be altered by judicial inquiry, even if a mistake occurred during engrossment.

4. The Congressional Record

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

Q. Electoral Tribunals

[Sec. 17, Art. VI].

1. Composition

Three Supreme Court justices designated by the Chief Justice, and six members of the house concerned chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The Senior Justice shall be its Chairman.

3 Supreme Court justices

selected by the Chief Justice
Senior Justice serves as the Chairman

6 members of the concerned House

chosen based on proportional representation
from political parties under the party-list system

[a] HRET as an Independent and Non-Partisan Body*

The HRET was created as a non-partisan court.
It must be independent of Congress and devoid of partisan influence and consideration.
“Disloyalty to the party” and “breach of party discipline” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member.
HRET members enjoy security of tenure; their membership may not be terminated except for a just cause such as:

the expiration of congressional term,
death,
resignation from the political party,
formal affiliation with another political party, or
removal for other valid causes.

Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792

Dr. Emigdio Bondoc challenged the removal of Congressman Juanito Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal after Camasura cast a decisive vote in Bondoc’s favor in an election protest. The Supreme Court ruled that the House’s action violated the independence of the Electoral Tribunal and was an unconstitutional interference with its judicial function. It nullified the removal, reinstated Camasura, and ordered the immediate promulgation of the decision favoring Bondoc.

See also Tanada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101.

Senator Tañada and Congressman Macapagal challenged the appointment of two majority party senators to the Senate Electoral Tribunal, arguing that the minority party was constitutionally entitled to nominate three members. The Supreme Court ruled that the Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body whose composition must reflect proportional party representation, and that the Senate violated this mandate by allowing the majority party to fill seats reserved for the minority.

[b] Disqualification of Electoral Tribunal Members*

On the disqualification of the senator-members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because an election contest is filed against them, see Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651, where the Supreme Court held that it cannot order the disqualification of the Senators-members of the Electoral Tribunal simply because they were themselves respondents in the electoral protest, considering the specific mandate of the Constitution and inasmuch as all the elected Senators were actually named as respondents.

Petitioners sought the disqualification of all senator-members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal in an election contest, proposing that only the Supreme Court justices decide the case. The Supreme Court ruled that the Tribunal must function with both its judicial and legislative members as mandated by the Constitution, and that internal rule changes cannot override this structure.

[c] Recourse of Party-List Representatives*

Pimentel v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002:

The Supreme Court said that even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and Commission on Appointments, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with the Court.
Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and Commission on Appointments can the party-list representatives seek recourse from this Court through judicial review.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before the petitioners may bring the case to Court.

Petitioners challenged the exclusion of party-list representatives from the House Electoral Tribunal and Commission on Appointments, claiming it violated the constitutional requirement of proportional representation. The Supreme Court ruled that the House has the authority to elect members to these bodies and that party-list groups must first participate in the nomination process before seeking judicial relief. It dismissed the petitions for being premature and lacking a concrete constitutional violation.

2. Power

The Electoral Tribunals of the Houses of Congress shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.

[a] Jurisdiction*

Sampayan v. Daza, 213 SCRA 807

Involving a petition filed directly with the Supreme Court to disqualify Congressman Raul Daza for being allegedly a green card holder and a permanent resident of the United States, the Court held that it is without jurisdiction, as it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of its members.
Furthermore, the case is moot and academic, because Daza’s term of office as member of Congress expired on June 30, 1992.
The proper remedy should have been:

a petition filed with the Commission on Elections to cancel Daza’s certificate of candidacy, or
a quo warranto case filed with the HRET within ten days from Daza’s proclamation.

Petitioners sought to disqualify Congressman Raul Daza for allegedly being a U.S. permanent resident during his term in office. The Supreme Court ruled that the case was moot since Daza’s term had ended and that jurisdiction over such disputes lies exclusively with the House Electoral Tribunal.

[i] Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400

But the HRET may assume jurisdiction only after the winning candidate (who is a party to the election controversy) shall have been duly proclaimed, has taken his oath of office, and has assumed the functions of the office, because it is only then that he is said to be a member of the House.

Agapito Aquino was disqualified by the COMELEC after the 1995 elections after the elections but before his proclamation for failing to meet the one-year residency requirement to run for Representative of Makati’s Second District. The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC retains jurisdiction over disqualification cases until the candidate is proclaimed, takes the oath, and assumes office—only then does jurisdiction shift to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007:

Thus, the Court said that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the election contest relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato challenged the proclamation of Renato Unico as Representative of Camarines Norte, alleging manifest errors in the canvassing process and sought relief from the COMELEC. The Supreme Court held that once Unico was proclaimed, took his oath, and assumed office, jurisdiction over any contest regarding his election, returns, or qualifications belonged exclusively to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

See also Guerrero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137004, July 20, 2000.

Arnold Guerrero challenged the candidacy of Rodolfo Fariñas, alleging improper substitution and failure to file a valid certificate of candidacy. The Supreme Court ruled that once Fariñas was proclaimed, took his oath, and assumed office, jurisdiction over any contest regarding his qualifications belonged exclusively to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

[b] Jurisdiction over party-list nominees*

Walden Bello and Loretta Ann Rosales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010:

The HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office.
They are, after all, for all intents and purposes, “elected members” of the House of Representatives.

Petitioners challenged the qualifications of Juan Miguel Arroyo as a party-list nominee, alleging he did not represent the marginalized sector and failed to meet legal requirements. The Supreme Court ruled that after Arroyo was proclaimed, took his oath, and assumed office, jurisdiction over his qualifications belonged solely to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

[c] Limitations*

Renald Vilando v. HRET, G.R. No. 192147, August 23, 2011:

But the power of HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of the naturalization of respondent’s father, in the pursuit of disqualifying Rep. Limkaichong.
To rule otherwise would be an impermissible collateral attack on the citizenship of respondent’s father.

Petitioners challenged the eligibility of Jocelyn Limkaichong to serve in Congress, alleging she was not a natural-born Filipino and alleged that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen, claiming her father’s naturalization was invalid and her mother had lost Filipino citizenship upon marriage. The Supreme Court ruled that while the HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over the qualifications of House members, it cannot invalidate a parent’s naturalization through a collateral attack, as such matters must be addressed in proper denaturalization proceedings initiated by the State.

[d] Judicial Review*

The Electoral Tribunal is independent of the Houses of Congress, and its decisions may be reviewed by the Supreme Court only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court .

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139

Jose Angara challenged the Electoral Commission’s jurisdiction to hear an election protest against him, arguing that his confirmation by the National Assembly rendered the protest moot. The Supreme Court ruled that it has the power of judicial review to determine the constitutional boundaries of all government bodies, including the Electoral Commission, and found that the Commission acted within its authority.

Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil 429

Gerardo Morrero contested the eligibility of Juan Bocar to serve in the National Assembly, claiming Bocar was underage at the time of election. The Supreme Court ruled that the Electoral Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over such election contests and that its decisions are beyond judicial review unless there is a clear denial of due process. It dismissed Morrero’s petition, affirming the Commission’s authority and the finality of its decision.

Pena v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 123037, March 21, 1997

Teodoro Peña challenged the election of Alfredo Abueg Jr. through a protest before the HRET, alleging widespread fraud but failing to specify the affected precincts or substantiate his claims. The Supreme Court held that judicial review of electoral tribunal decisions is only warranted upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, which was absent in this case.

R. Commission on Appointments

[Sec. 18, Art. VI].

1. Composition

The Senate President, as ex officio Chairman, 12 Senators, and 12 Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The Chairman shall not vote except in case of a tie.

Senate President
12 Senators
12 Members of the House of Representatives

Daza v. Singzon, 180 SCRA 496

Rep. Raul Daza was removed from the Commission on Appointments after a political realignment in the House of Representatives, and replaced by Rep. Luis Singson from the newly formed LDP. The Supreme Court ruled that the House may revise its CA representation to reflect permanent changes in political party strength, and that such action is subject to judicial review when legality—not discretion—is questioned.

Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377

Anna Dominique Coseteng, the sole KAIBA party representative, challenged the House’s selection of Commission on Appointments members, arguing it violated the constitutional rule of proportional representation. The Supreme Court ruled that the House’s allocation of CA seats was valid and that Coseteng’s party, KAIBA, with only one member (less than 1% of the House), was not entitled to a seat in the CA under the proportional representation formula.

Cunanan v. Tan, 5 SCRA 1

Carlos Cunanan’s ad interim appointment was rejected by a reconstituted Commission on Appointments formed through a temporary political coalition in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that such reorganization was unconstitutional, as the Commission’s composition must reflect only permanent changes in party representation to preserve its independence and stability. It invalidated the rejection and upheld Cunanan’s right to the office.

[a] Minimum Party Representation*

Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789:

The Supreme Court held that a political party must have at least two elected senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments.
Thus, where there are two or more political parties represented in the Senate, a political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission on Appointments.
It is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission; what the Constitution requires is that there must be at least a majority of the entire membership.

Minority senators challenged the election of Senators Romulo and Tañada to the Commission on Appointments, arguing that their inclusion violated the constitutional rule of proportional representation. The Supreme Court ruled that a political party must have at least two elected senators to constitutionally claim one seat in the Commission, and that rounding up fractional entitlements unlawfully distorts representation. It further clarified that electing twelve senators to the Commission is not mandatory, as long as a majority of its total membership is constituted

[b] Composition*

Senator Franklin Drilon v. Speaker Jose de Venecia, G.R. No. 180055, July 31, 2009:

The Liberal Party officials challenged the composition of the House of Representatives contingent to the Commission on Appointments, because the party was not represented therein.

Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal v. Senate President Manuel Villar, G.R. No. 183055, July 31, 2009:

The cases were eventually consolidated because it involved a similar issue, i.e., representation of Senator Madrigal’s PDP-Laban in the Senate contingent to the Commission on Appointments.

[i] During the pendency of the case, the House of Representatives elected Representative Alfonso Umali, Jr., as member of the House contingent to the Commission on Appointments. With this election, the petitioners in G.R. No. 180055 decided to withdraw their petition for having become moot and academic, and the Court granted the withdrawal.

[ii] The Supreme Court dismissed the Senator Madrigal petition in G.R. No. 183055, because under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it is necessary that prior recourse be made to the appropriate House of Congress before the petition may be brought to Court, consistent with the ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002. Furthermore, resolution of the issues raised in the petition would entail the determination of party affiliations of a number of senators named in the petition. This determination involves a question of fact which the Court does not resolve.

The Liberal Party and Senator Ana Madrigal challenged the composition of the Commission on Appointments, alleging that their parties were denied constitutionally mandated representation despite having sufficient numbers. The Supreme Court ruled that while proportional representation is required, each chamber of Congress has the prerogative to elect its CA members, and parties must first seek redress within their respective Houses before invoking judicial review. It dismissed both petitions.

2. Powers

The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of Congress from their submission.
The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of its members.
The Commission shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members.

Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549

Petitioners challenged the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Customs, arguing it was unconstitutional without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court ruled that under the 1987 Constitution, only appointments explicitly listed in Section 16, Article VII require CA confirmation, and the Commissioner of Customs is not among them.

Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259

Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by the President as a sectoral representative in the House, but her assumption of office was blocked pending confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court ruled that such appointments, made under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, require confirmation by the CA because they fall within the category of appointments vested in the President.

Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 169

President Corazon Aquino appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as Chair of the Commission on Human Rights without submitting her appointment to the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court ruled that the CHR Chair is not among the officials whose appointments require CA confirmation under the Constitution, and that both the President and CA cannot expand the scope of confirmation beyond what is expressly provided.

[a] The Commission on Appointments is independent of the two Houses of Congress; its employees are not, technically, employees of Congress.

It has the power to promulgate its own rules of proceedings.
Pacete v. Secretary, Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58

Felizardo Pacete’s ad interim appointment as municipal judge was unanimously confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, but later challenged by a single senator’s unacted motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court ruled that the CA’s power to revoke a confirmation must be exercised by majority vote, and that a lone member’s motion without approval cannot invalidate a confirmed appointment. It upheld Pacete’s appointment and reinforced the constitutional limits on the CA’s powers.

S. Powers of Congress

General [plenary] legislative power.
Power of Appropriation
Power of Taxation
Power of Legislative Investigation
Question Hour
War Powers
Power to Act as Board of Canvassers in Election of President
Power to Call a Special Election for President and Vice President
Power to Judge President's Physical Fitness to Discharge the Functions of the Presidency
Power to Revoke or Extend Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus or Declaration of Martial Law
Power to Concur in Presidential Amnesties
Power to Concur in Treaties or International Agreements
Power to Confirm Certain Appointments/Nominations Made by the President
Power of Impeachment
Power Relative to Natural Resources
Power to Propose Amendments to the Constitution

1. General [plenary] legislative power.

[Sec. 1, Art. VI].

Legislative power is the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws.

[a] Limitations

[i] Substantive

[ia] Express

BATCT

Bill of Rights [Art. III];

Congress cannot pass any law that violates fundamental rights such as due process, equal protection, freedom of speech, religion, or assembly.
Example: A law criminalizing peaceful protests would violate freedom of expression and assembly.

On appropriations [Secs. 25 and 29 (1) & (2), Art. VI];

Money may be spent only through appropriations made by law.
Public funds can be used only for public purposes.
The President may not increase any item in the appropriations law.

On taxation [Secs. 28 and 29 (3), Art. VI; Sec. 4 (3), Art. XIV];

Taxes must be uniform and equitable.
Congress must evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Religious, charitable, and educational institutions enjoy certain tax exemptions.
Public money or property cannot be used for the benefit of any religion.

On constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [Sec. 30, Art. VI];

The legislature cannot pass a law that limits the SC’s power to review constitutional or jurisdictional issues.

No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be passed [Sec. 31, Art. VI].

To preserve the republican and democratic nature of the government — everyone is equal before the law; there are no “dukes,” “lords,” or “princes.”

[ib] Implied

Non-delegation of powers; and

Delegata potestas non potest delegari (What has been delegated cannot be further delegated.
Exceptions: Congress may delegate

To the people (through initiative and referendum, Art. VI, Sec. 32);
To the President, limited rule-making powers (e.g., tariff powers under Sec. 28[2], Art. VI);
To administrative agencies, the authority to fill in the details of a law (through implementing rules and regulations);
To local governments, the power to enact ordinances (under the principle of local autonomy).

Prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws.

One Congress cannot limit the powers of future Congresses. Legislative power is continuing and plenary.

[ii] Procedural

Only one subject, to be expressed in the title thereof
Three readings on separate days.

[iia] Only one subject, to be expressed in the title thereof [Sec. 26, Art. VI].

Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Commission, 151 SCRA 208

Valentin Tio challenged the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987, which created the Videogram Regulatory Board and imposed a 30% tax on videogram sales, arguing it was a rider, oppressive, and an unlawful restraint of trade. The Supreme Court upheld the decree, ruling that the tax provision was germane to the regulatory purpose of the law and that taxation is a valid exercise of police power to address piracy, protect public welfare, and generate revenue.

Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479

The Philippine Constitution Association challenged Republic Act No. 3836 for granting retirement gratuities to members and officers of Congress, arguing that the law’s title failed to disclose this benefit. The Supreme Court ruled that the provision was unconstitutional because it violated the constitutional requirement that a bill’s title must clearly express its subject, rendering the retirement benefits for legislators void.

Lidasan v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 496

Republic Act No. 4790 created the Municipality of Dianaton in Lanao del Sur but included barrios from Cotabato province without indicating this in the title of the law. The Supreme Court ruled the Act unconstitutional for violating the requirement that a bill’s subject must be clearly expressed in its title, as the misleading title failed to inform legislators and the public of its full territorial impact.

Chiongbian v. Orbos, supra

It was held that the title is not required to be an index of the contents of the bill.
It is sufficient compliance if the title:

expresses the general subject, and
all the provisions of the statute are germane to that subject.

Following the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, President Corazon Aquino reorganized remaining administrative regions through Executive Order No. 429, transferring provinces and cities to new regions. The Supreme Court ruled that the subject of the law was fairly expressed in its title and that sufficient standards for the exercise of executive discretion were implied from existing laws

Mariano v. COMELEC, supra

It was held that the creation of an additional legislative district need not be expressly stated in the title of the bill.

Republic Act No. 7854 converted Makati into a highly urbanized city and included a provision for an additional legislative district. Since the creation of additional legislative districts is relevant to the conversion of Makati into a city, the provision was deemed valid and the petitions were dismissed for lack of merit.

Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, supra

The Court said that a law having a single, general subject indicated in its title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how adverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject.

Republic Act No. 8180, titled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes,” was enacted to liberalize the oil industry in the Philippines. Petitioner Francisco Tatad challenged the constitutionality of a provision imposing different tariff rates on crude and refined petroleum imports, arguing that the provision was not germane to the law’s title. The Court found that the tariff provision was related to the goal of deregulating the oil industry and thus did not violate the one subject rule.

Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999:

R.A. 8249 which “defines” the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but allegedly “expands” said jurisdiction, does not violate the one-title-one-subject requirement.
The expansion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments.
The requirement that every bill must have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.

Petitioners were charged with multiple counts of murder in connection with the Kuratong Baleleng incident. The Sandiganbayan initially declined jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7975. Congress then passed R.A. No. 8249, which removed the word “principal” and applied the change retroactively. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8249, ruling that its title sufficiently expressed the general subject and all provisions were germane, thus complying with the one subject rule.

Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003:

The Supreme Court said that Sec. 14 of R.A. 9006, which repealed Sec. 67 but left intact Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a rider, because a rider is a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
The title and objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It need not be expressed in the title, because the title is not required to be a complete index of its contents.

Petitioners challenged Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67 previously required elective officials to be considered resigned upon filing a certificate of candidacy for a different position. The Supreme Court held that the title of R.A. No. 9006 was broad enough to encompass the repeal of Section 67, which was deemed germane to the law’s objective of fair election practices.

Benjamin Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001:

Relative to the validity of R.A. 8806, which created the City of Sorsogon by merging the municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, the Supreme Court said that it is well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does not require Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect.
The bill may contain any number of provisions as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Henry Giron v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013.

Petitioner Henry Giron challenged Sections 12 and 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), arguing that their inclusion violated the constitutional requirement that a bill must embrace only one subject expressed in its title. The Supreme Court upheld the law’s validity, ruling that the title was broad enough to cover provisions on candidate substitution and repeal of prior election laws, and that these were germane to the Act’s objective of promoting fair election practices

Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014:

The Court agreed with the petitioners that the RH Law is principally a population control measure.
However, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control population growth.
The “one subject-one title” rule expresses the principle that the title of the law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the enacted legislation.

Petitioners challenged the RH Law for allegedly violating the constitutional one subject/one title rule by concealing its population control objectives. The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling that “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are closely related and both support the law’s overarching goal of sustainable human development, thus satisfying constitutional requirements.

[iib] Three readings on separate days.

Printed copies of the bill in its final form must be distributed to Members three (3) days before its passage, except when the President certifies to its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon last reading, no amendment shall be allowed, and the vote thereon must be taken immediately with yeas and nays entered in the Journal [Sec. 26, Art. VI].

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra

It was held that the presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
The “unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except” clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence.
To construe the “except” clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the “unless” clause would not only violate the rules of grammar, it would also negate the very premise of the “except” clause, i.e., the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency.
This interpretation is also supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 (Expanded VAT Law), arguing that the Senate passed its own version (S.B. No. 1630) without following the required three readings on separate days and without distributing printed copies in final form. The law was passed by the Senate on second and third readings on the same day. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the legislative process, ruling that the President’s certification of urgency dispenses with both requirements.

[b] Legislative Process

[i] Requirements as to bills

[ia] Only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof.

[ib] Appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives [Sec. 24, Art. VI].

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.:

It was held that R.A. 7716 (Expanded VAT Law) did not violate this provision. It is important to emphasize that it is not the law, but the bill, which is required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, because the bill may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole.
As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute, not just the bill, must be substantially the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only "to concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments". It would violate the coequality of legislative power of the Senate.
The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
This was reiterated in the Supreme Court Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, October 30, 1995.

Petitioners claimed that the Senate passed its own version (S.B. No. 1630) instead of amending the House version (H.B. No. 11197), thereby violating the origination clause for revenue bills. The Supreme Court ruled that it is the bill—not the final law—that must originate in the House. The Senate may propose substantial amendments, including complete substitutions, as long as the legislative process begins with a House bill.

Alvarez v. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695:

R.A. 7720 converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent, component city, was declared valid, even if it was Senate Bill No. 1243 which was passed by the Senate, because H.B. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first.
Furthermore, H.B. 8817 was already approved on third reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on S.B. 1243.
The filing of a substitute bill in the Senate in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

Republic Act No. 7720, which converted Santiago into a city, was challenged for allegedly violating the constitutional rule that bills of local application must originate in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court upheld the law and found that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House before SB No. 1243 was introduced in the Senate, and that the Senate acted only after receiving the House bill.

[ii] Procedure

No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency [Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI].

[iia] Arroyo, et al. v. De Venecia, et al., G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997:

The Supreme Court noted that the challenge to the validity of the enactment of R.A. 8240 (amending certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes”) was premised on alleged violations of internal rules of procedure of the House of Representatives rather than of constitutional requirements.
Decided cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of constitutional requirements or the rights of private individuals.
In its Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in the same case [June 26, 1998], the Supreme Court ruled that it is well settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with the internal rules of the House.

Republic Act No. 8240 was challenged for allegedly being passed in violation of the House’s internal rules, particularly regarding quorum and voting procedures. The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling that legislative acts will not be invalidated for non-compliance with internal rules unless a constitutional provision is violated.

Osmeña v. Pendatun, supra.,

It was held that rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
Furthermore, parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

Congressman Sergio Osmeña was suspended by the House of Representatives for disorderly conduct following a privilege speech. He claimed that the House had breached its own internal rules by acting after other businesses had intervened.. The Supreme Court ruled that parliamentary rules are procedural and not subject to judicial review, affirming the legislature’s exclusive authority over its internal proceeding

[iib] Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.

The Supreme Court declared that the Presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing and distribution but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
It is within the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill.
And if the Committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as “an amendment in the nature of a substitute,” so long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the Committee.
In the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, October 30, 1995, the Court adverted to its opinion in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, that the jurisdiction of the Conference Committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the House versions of the bill.
It may propose an entirely new provision.

Petitioners challenged the Expanded VAT Law, arguing that the Bicameral Conference Committee met in executive session without public access and inserted provisions not found in either the House or Senate versions of the bill. The Supreme Court ruled that the committee may introduce changes germane to the bill’s subject. It ruled that the committee’s report, once approved by both chambers, cures any procedural irregularities and reflects valid legislative action.

[iii] Approval of bills

The bill becomes a law in any of the following:

When the President approves the same and signs it.
When Congress overrides the Presidential veto.
When the President fails to act upon the bill for thirty days from receipt thereof, the bill shall become a law as if he had signed it. [Sec. 27 (1), Art. VI].

[iiia] When the President approves the same and signs it.

[iiib] When Congress overrides the Presidential veto.

If the President disapproves the bill, he shall return the same, with his objections thereto contained in his Veto Message, to the House of origin [which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal].
The veto is overridden upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of the House of origin and the other House. [Yeas and nays entered in the Journal of each House.]

[iiib1] No pocket veto.

The "pocket veto" is an implied form of veto wherein the President does not act on a bill within the 30-day period prescribed by the Constitution. If Congress adjourns before the expiration of the period, the bill does not become law. However, this is not explicitly recognized under Philippine law.

[iiib2] Partial veto.

As a rule, a partial veto is invalid.
It is allowed only for particular items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill [Sec. 27 (2), Art. VI].

See Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486.

The President vetoed specific conditions in the Appropriations Act that restricted the use of funds for operating television stations in Luzon, while approving the related funding items. The Supreme Court ruled that such a partial veto was unconstitutional because the President cannot veto a condition attached to an appropriation item without also vetoing the item itself, rendering the restriction valid and enforceable.

See also Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, on “item veto”.

Senators challenged the President’s veto of Section 55 and Section 16 in the 1989 and 1990 Appropriations Acts, arguing that these were provisions—not items—and thus beyond the scope of the President’s item veto power. The Supreme Court upheld the veto, ruling that the President may veto distinct and severable parts of an appropriations bill—even if labeled as provisions—when they function as inappropriate legislative measures or general law insertions unrelated to specific appropriations.

Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133:

The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the veto made by President Aquino of appropriations intended for the adjustment of pensions of retired justices [pursuant to A.M. 91-8-225-CAJ under R.A. 910, as amended by R.A. 1797].
This is not an item veto.
The President cannot veto part of an item in an appropriation bill while approving the remaining portion of the item.
Furthermore, the President cannot set aside a judgment of the Supreme Court; neither can the veto power be exercised as a means of repealing R.A. 1797.
The veto also impairs the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, and deprives retired justices of the right to a pension vested under R.A. 1797.

President Corazon Aquino vetoed provisions in the 1992 General Appropriations Act that funded adjusted pensions for retired Justices, arguing they undermined the government’s compensation standardization policy. The Supreme Court declared the veto unconstitutional. It held that the President may only veto specific “items” in an appropriation bill, not general “provisions” that do not involve a specific appropriation of funds.

[iiib3] Legislative veto.

A congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute.
It is a form of legislative control in the implementation of particular executive action.
The form may either be:

Negative – subjecting the executive action to disapproval by Congress; or
Affirmative – requiring approval of the executive action by Congress.

A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of separation of powers.

Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, April 19, 1994:

On the issue of whether Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Funds” in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, General Appropriations Act of 1994, which requires prior approval of Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of legislative veto.
Instead, it ruled that any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval for executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Thus, since Special Provision No. 2 is an “inappropriate” provision, the President properly vetoed the same.

President Fidel Ramos vetoed several special provisions in the 1994 General Appropriations Act, including those that required prior congressional approval for executive actions and those that prohibited the use of funds for specific military equipment.. The Supreme Court ruled that the President may validly veto inappropriate provisions that do not relate specifically to an appropriation item. The Court emphasized that Congress cannot indirectly legislate control over executive functions through conditions in an appropriations law, as this violates the separation of powers.

[iiic] When the President fails to act upon the bill for thirty days from receipt thereof, the bill shall become a law as if he had signed it [Sec. 27 (1), Art. VI].

[iv] Effectivity of laws

[Art. 2, Civil Code].

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Tañada v. Tuvera, supra., and Executive Order No. 200, June 18, 1987.

Petitioners challenged the validity of several presidential decrees and executive issuances that were enforced without being published, arguing this violated the public’s right to due process and information. The Supreme Court ruled that all laws and regulations of general application must be published in full in the Official Gazette before they can take effect. Publication is a constitutional requirement for enforceability regardless of whether a different effectivity date is stated.

2. Power of Appropriation

The spending power, called the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President.
While it is the President who proposes the budget, still, the final say on the matter of appropriation is lodged in Congress.

Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra

The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law.

Congress enacted the 1994 budget law with provisions allowing legislators to identify priority projects for funding under the Countrywide Development Fund. The Supreme Court ruled that this did not violate the separation of powers, as the power of appropriation includes specifying projects, and legislators’ role in project identification is merely recommendatory.

[a] Need for appropriation

[Sec. 29 (1), Art. VI]

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

[i] Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) v. Commission on Audit (COA), G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the COA disallowing the payment by petitioner of healthcare maintenance allowance of ₱5,000.00 to covered TESDA employees for the year 2003.
On TESDA's reliance on Sec. 34 of the 2003 GAA, the Court held that such reliance was misplaced.
The provision was neither a source of right nor an authority to hastily fund any or all personnel benefits without the appropriation made by law. The provision of the GAA was not self-executory; the execution of the GAA was still subject to a program of expenditure to be approved by the President.
It is important that the release of funds be duly authorized, identified, or sanctioned to avert putting the legitimate programs, projects, and activities of the Government in fiscal jeopardy.

TESDA disbursed a ₱5,000 healthcare allowance to its employees based on internal administrative orders and general provisions of the GAA, which COA later disallowed for lack of legal appropriation. The Supreme Court affirmed the disallowance, holding that no public funds may be spent without a specific appropriation made by law, as required by the Constitution. The Court emphasized that Section 34 of the GAA was not self-executory and did not authorize the grant of new benefits without a specific appropriation.

[ii] COMELEC v. Judge Quijano-Padilla and Photokina Marketing, G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002:

The Supreme Court said that the existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable requisites to, or conditions sine qua non for, the execution of government contracts.
The import of the constitutional requirement for an appropriation is to require the various agencies to limit their expenditure within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.
In this case, since the bid of Photokina (₱6.588B) was way beyond the amount appropriated by law (₱1B) or funds certified to be available (₱1.2B), there is no way the COMELEC should enter into the contract.
The Bids and Awards Committee of the COMELEC should have rejected the bid of Photokina for being excessive.

COMELEC awarded a voter registration project to Photokina despite the bid exceeding the funds appropriated by Congress. The Supreme Court ruled that mandamus does not lie to enforce contractual obligations, especially when the contract is not perfected or is void for lack of appropriation.It emphasized that government contracts must be backed by sufficient appropriation and availability of funds.

[iii] Maria Carolina Araullo v. Benigno Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

The Supreme Court said that DAP did not violate this constitutional provision.
DAP was merely a program of the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury; otherwise, an appropriation law would have been required.
Funds which were already appropriated were merely being realigned through the DAP.

[iiia] However, such realignment must be made only "within their respective offices."

Thus, no cross-border transfers or augmentations may be allowed.
Under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies

[iiib] Furthermore, transfers "within their respective offices" contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA.

Under the DAP, even if some projects were within the Executive Department, these projects were non-existent insofar as the GAA was concerned, because there were no funds actually appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent because they were not provided for in the GAA.
As such, these transfers were unconstitutional.

The Executive implemented the DAP to accelerate spending by reallocating savings and unobligated funds to various projects, some of which lacked specific appropriations. The Supreme Court ruled that certain acts under the DAP were unconstitutional, specifically the cross-border transfers of savings to offices outside the Executive, and the use of savings to fund projects not covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). The Court clarified that while the President may augment items in the Executive’s budget using savings, such augmentation must be limited to existing items in the GAA and within the Executive Branch.

[b] Appropriation law, defined

A statute the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the Treasury.

[i] Greco Antonius Beda Belgica v. Hon. Paquito Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 11, 2013

Petitioners assailed Sec. 8 of P.D. 910 and Sec. 12 of P.D. 1869 (as amended by P.D. 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriation measures since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury.
The main purpose of P.D. 910 is the creation of the Energy Development Board, and Sec. 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto.

On the other hand, Sec. 12 of P.D. 1869 is not a valid appropriation law because the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose, which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.

Rejecting the petitioners' contention, the Supreme Court said that "an appropriation made by law" in contemplation of Sec. 29 (1), Art. VI of the Constitution, exists when a provision of law:

sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money; an
allocates the same for a particular public purpose.

These two minimum designations of amount-and-purpose stem from the very definition of "appropriation," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists.

There is no provision in the Constitution that prescribes any particular form of words or religious recital in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that "it be made by law."
An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed.

In the same case (Belgica), the Supreme Court found it appropriate to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot properly be deemed as a legal appropriation because it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.

These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement, and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law.
Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since in its truest sense, it only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate, in violation of the non-delegability principle.

Petitioners questioned the legality of Executive discretionary funds, arguing that the Malampaya Fund and Presidential Social Fund lacked specific legislative authorization for their use. The Supreme Court ruled that the provisions governing the use of the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund constituted undue delegation of legislative power. It held that these funds lacked a “primary and specific” purpose authorizing the release of money from the National Treasury, violating Article VI, Section 29(1) of the Constitution.

[c] Classification

[i] General appropriation law

passed annually, intended to provide for the financial operations of the entire government during one fiscal period.

[ii] Special appropriation law

designed for a specific purpose.

[d] Implied (extra-constitutional) limitations on appropriation measures

[i] Appropriation must be devoted to a public purpose.

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 110 Phil 331.

The government allocated ₱85,000 for the construction of roads within a private subdivision owned by a sitting senator, even though the roads were not yet donated to the public at the time of the appropriation. The Supreme Court ruled the appropriation unconstitutional, declaring that public funds cannot be used for private benefit and must be devoted exclusively to a public purpose.

[ii] The sum authorized to be released must be determinate, or at least determinable.

Guingona v. Carague, 273 Phil 443 (1999):

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service under the 1990 General Appropriations Act.
According to the Court, the legislative intent in R.A. 4860, Sec. 31, P.D. 1177, and P.D. 1967, is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes, and other normal banking charges on the loans, credit, indebtedness when they become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises.
Although the decrees do not state the specific amounts to be paid, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.
The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes, and other normal banking charges when they shall become due.
No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books in the Treasury.

Petitioners challenged the automatic debt service appropriations in the 1990 budget, arguing they lacked definite amounts and violated constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court ruled that while the appropriations did not state exact figures, they were determinable from official records and thus constitutionally valid.

[e] Constitutional limitations on special appropriation measures

[i] Must specify the public purpose for which the sum is intended.

[ii] Must be supported by funds actually available as certified to by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein. [Sec. 25(4), Art. VI]

[f] Constitutional Rules on General Appropriations Law

[Sec. 25, Art. VI]

IFRP-TSDA

Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.
The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
No provision or enactment shall be embraced unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein.
Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
Prohibition against transfer of appropriations.
Prohibition against appropriations for sectarian benefit
Discretionary funds.
Automatic reappropriation

[i] Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.

[ii] The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

[iii] No provision or enactment shall be embraced unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein.

Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
This is intended to prevent riders, or irrelevant provisions included in the bill to ensure its approval.

Rider — provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.

Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 520.

The petitioner challenged paragraph 11 of the “Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines” in Republic Act No. 1600, which imposed service limitations on reserve officers, arguing it was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed, ruling that the provision was a “rider” unrelated to the general appropriations purpose of the law and therefore violated the constitutional requirement that every bill must embrace only one subject expressed in its title.

[iv] Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

This is intended to prevent sub rosa appropriation by Congress.

Sub rosa appropriation — appropriation in which the public is unable to ascertain the purposes and exact amounts because these were agreed upon among the members only.

[v] Prohibition against transfer of appropriations.

[Sec. 25 (5). Art. VI]

No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriation law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 209

See on the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of P.D. 1177.

Petitioners challenged the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, which allowed the President to transfer funds across departments and agencies without limitations, arguing it violated constitutional safeguards on appropriations. The Supreme Court declared the provision unconstitutional for disregarding the requirement that fund transfers must be limited to augmenting items from savings within the same office, amounting to an undue delegation of legislative power and undermining fiscal accountability.

[va] Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra:

On the constitutionality of a Special Provision in the 1994 GAA which allows a member of Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category, the Supreme Court, said that the members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of savings in the allotments for their operational expenses, because they are in the best position to do so, being knowledgeable of the savings available in some items of the operational expenses, and which items need augmentation.
However, it is the Senate President or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment.
Hence, the special provision adverted to is not unconstitutional.
In the same case, the Supreme Court upheld the Presidential veto of a provision (in the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, 1994 GAA) which authorized the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund, on the ground that under Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI, such right must and can be exercised only by the President of the Philippines.

Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of certain special provisions and presidential vetoes in the 1994 budget law, including a clause limiting road maintenance contracts. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the road maintenance provision as constitutionally appropriate and affirmed the President’s veto of other provisions that improperly attempted to legislate policy through the budget.

[vb] Resolution on the Motions for Reconsideration in Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015:

The dispositive portion of the Court's July 1, 2014 Decision was modified, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court Partially Grants the petitions for certiorari and prohibition, and DECLARES the following acts under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and of the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts; and
The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive.

The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Act."

In the same Resolution on the Motions for Reconsideration [Araullo, February 3, 2015], the Court said that certain declarations in the July 1, 2014 Decision are MODIFIED in order to clarify certain matters and dispel further uncertainty.
These modifications include the following:

The Court clarified that Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code, refers to the President's authority to "suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act."

When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds, savings are not automatically generated until it has been established that such funds or appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been completed, discontinued or abandoned. x x x
Thus, the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments remains unconstitutional.
Also withdrawals of unobligated allotments pursuant to National Budget Circular No. 541 which shortened the availability of appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays, and those which were transferred to programs, activities or projects that were not determined to be deficient, are still constitutionally infirm and invalid.

The reversion to the General Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations, which include savings, pursuant to Section 28, Chapter 4, Book IV of the Administrative Code, does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights and the Office of the Ombudsman. x x x

On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with Section 25(5) of Article VI, because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA, for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations.
Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP, although augmentations under the DAP made by the Executive within its department shall remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5), Article VI, are complied with.

The Court asserted that its decision did not declare the en masse invalidation of the 116 DAP-funded projects, as the Court itself recognized the encouraging effects of the DAP on the country's economy and acknowledged its laudable purposes, especially those directed towards infrastructure development and efficient delivery of basic services.

x x x The Court agreed with respondents that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an item; that what is required is for Congress to create items to comply with the line-item veto of the President.
x x x An "item" pertains to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation; it must be an item characterized by singular correspondence, meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item".
Accordingly, the "item" referred to in Section 25(5), Article VI, is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriations law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class.
x x x This interpretation allows a degree of flexibility to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.
But this interpretation is subject to the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings.

The Court reiterated its finding that unprogrammed funds may only be used if aggregate revenue targets are first exceeded, but clarified that the release of unprogrammed funds need not only occur at the end of the fiscal year.

The Court noted that the special provision in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs requires the DBM to submit quarterly reports stating the details of the use and releases from the unprogrammed funds.
It was noted, however, that this conclusion is a statutory, not a constitutional interpretation of an ambiguous phrase, and thus should be given only prospective effect.

The presumption of good faith stands.

In this respect, the Court noted that "the proper tribunals can make 'concrete findings of good faith in their favor' only after a full hearing of all the parties in any given case, and such a hearing can begin to proceed only after according all the presumptions, particularly that of good faith, by initially requiring the complainants, plaintiffs or accusers to first establish their complaints or charges before the respondent authors, proponents and implementors of DAP.
The Court stressed that the ascertainment of good faith, or lack of it, and the determination of whether or not due diligence and prudence were exercised, are questions of fact.
The want of good faith is thus better determined by tribunals other than this Court, which is not a trier of facts.
The Court also clarified the language it used insofar as those subject to the consequences of the operation of the Operative Fact Doctrine, by removing "proponents and implementors" and leaving only "authors" within the ambit of its coverage.

The programs, activities, projects under DAP remain valid under the Operative Fact Doctrine.

As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law carries with it the illegality of its effects.
However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply.

[vi] Prohibition against appropriations for sectarian benefit

[Sec. 29(2), Art. VI]

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary, as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 SCRA 201

Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, head of the Philippine Independent Church, challenged the issuance of commemorative stamps for a Catholic event, claiming it violated the constitutional ban on public funding for religious purposes. The Supreme Court found that the stamps were not issued to benefit the Roman Catholic Church but to promote the Philippines internationally by highlighting Manila as the host of a global event. The Court emphasized that incidental religious associations do not render a government act unconstitutional if the primary purpose is secular and legitimate.

Garces v. Estenzo, 104 SCRA 510

The Barangay Council of Valencia used privately raised funds to acquire a religious image and organize a traditional fiesta, prompting claims of unconstitutional sectarian support. The Supreme Court held that no public money was used and the activity did not favor any religion. It found that the image was acquired using private funds, and the celebration of the fiesta was a socio-religious tradition, not a state endorsement of religion.

Manosca v. Court of Appeals, supra:

The expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Manalo, founder of Iglesia ni Cristo, was deemed not violative of the provision.
The Supreme Court said that the attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true, but such peculiar advantage still remains merely incidental and secondary in nature.

The government expropriated land declared as the birthsite of Felix Manalo for historical commemoration, prompting objections that it favored a religious sect. The Supreme Court upheld the expropriation, ruling that the act served a secular public purpose and did not violate the constitutional ban on appropriations for sectarian benefit.

[vii] Discretionary funds.

[Sec. 25 (6), Art. VI]

Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

This provision was deemed necessary in view of many abuses committed in the past, where discretionary funds were spent for personal purposes, or for unnecessary or excessive public purposes.

[viii] Automatic reappropriation

[Sec. 25 (7), Art. VI]

"If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress."

[g] Impoundment

The refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress.
It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type
Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra.

Petitioners challenged the President’s vetoes and conditions imposed on specific items in the 1994 General Appropriations Act, arguing that they amounted to unauthorized impoundment of funds and intrusion into legislative authority. The Supreme Court ruled that while the President may veto inappropriate provisions, he cannot withhold or realign appropriated funds without constitutional or legal basis.

This power of the President is derived from Sec. 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987 on suspension.

[i] Araullo v. Aquino III, supra

The Court said there was no instance of executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the President's power to refuse to spend appropriations, or to retain or deduct appropriations, for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the General Appropriations Act, unless there will be an unmanageable government budget deficit (which did not happen, in this case).
What was involved in DAP was not impoundment, but transfer of funds.

Petitioners argued that the DAP involved executive impoundment by withholding funds appropriated by Congress, violating constitutional budgetary rules. The Supreme Court ruled that no impoundment occurred, as the DAP did not involve refusal to release appropriated funds but rather the reallocation of unobligated savings.

[h] Appropriation Reserves

Sec. 37 of the Administrative Code authorizes the Budget Secretary to establish reserves against appropriations to provide for contingencies and emergencies which may arise during the year.
This is merely expenditure deferral, not suspension, since the agencies concerned can still draw on the reserves if the fiscal outlook improves.

[i] The Pork Barrel System

Greco Antonius Beda Belgica v. Hon. Paquito Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 11, 2013:
In reference to its local concept and legal history, the Supreme Court, defined the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that governs the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.
It involves two kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

Congressional Pork Barrel – a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund's utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices.
Presidential Pork Barrel – a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. (In this case, the Court limits the use of the term to the Malampaya Funds and the President’s Social Fund.)

[ia] Recent History

The Congressional Pork Barrel was revived after the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, in the form of the Mindanao Development Fund and the Visayas Development Fund.
The clamor of the Luzon legislators for a similar fund prompted the creation of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF), which was integrated into the 1990 GAA.
In 1999, the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of congressional initiatives (CIs):

the "Food Security Program Fund,"
the "Lingap Para sa Mahirap Program Fund," and
the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund."

In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. Every GAA from then on carried PDAF articles.

In the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles, "The identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency, but as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the priority list x x x."
When, in July 2013, the NBI started its probe into allegations that the government had been defrauded of some ₱10 billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of legislators and various government agencies for scores of "ghost projects," and spurred by the findings of the COA and the explosive exposés on the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged in Court seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System."

[ii] Arguments Raised by Respondents

One of the arguments raised by the respondents in this case was that the principles of res judicata and stare decisis should bar the relitigation of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System," in light of the Supreme Court decisions in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra., and in Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012.

[iia] The Philconsa and LAMP Cases*

It will be remembered that in the Philconsa case, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a Special Provision in the 1994 GAA which allowed a member of Congress to propose and identify the projects to be funded by the CDF, and to realign his allocation for operating expenses to any expense category.

In that case, the Court rejected the contention of the petitioners that this power was an encroachment by the legislature into the domain of the executive. The challenged provision was not invalidated.

In the LAMP case, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA, but for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.

[iib] Rejection of Arguments*

Res Judicata

The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the petitions were barred by res judicata, because clearly, there was no identity in subject matter.
Philconsa and LAMP respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and the 2004 PDAF Article, while the instant cases call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System."

Stare Decisis

The stare decisis contention was likewise rejected, because Philconsa was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which countervail against stare decisis.
As for LAMP, the case was dismissed on a procedural technicality, and has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases.

[iii] The Congressional Pork Barrel in the 2013 PDAF Article

[iiia] The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of separation of powers and is, thus, unconstitutional.

The Article, as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enforcement authority in the implementation and enforcement of the budget—such as in the areas of project identification, fund release, and fund realignment, unrelated to congressional oversight—violates the principle of separation of powers.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision that empowers Congress or any of its members to intervene and assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution is unconstitutional.
x x x That this authority is treated as merely recommendatory does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law."
Thus, the Court must abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory. x x x
Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.

[iiib] The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability of legislative power and is, thus, unconstitutional.

Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate:

how much from such fund would go to
a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.

As these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation, as described in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 62 Phil. 912 (1936), and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
Thus, this Court declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature, as unconstitutional.

[iiic] The 2013 PDAF Article deprives the President of the exercise of his prerogative of item-veto, impairs the system of checks and balances, and is, thus, unconstitutional.

To ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item-veto, an appropriation bill must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
An item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence, meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."
x x x Appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes necessitate the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation.
It cannot be said that the appropriation already indicates a "specific appropriation of money," and hence, without a proper line-item for the President to veto.
The President would then be faced with the predicament of:

either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or
approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes.

x x x Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given [veto] power of the President useless.

[iiid] Insofar as the post-enactment features dilute Congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.

[iiie] Insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, is deemed unconstitutional.

The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocations/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.
As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former.
Ultimately, the PDAF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

[iv] The Presidential Pork Barrel

[iva] Section 8 of P.D. 910, which provides "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President," gives the President unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used; thus, it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

x x x As it reads, the phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
x x x While the said Section 8 may pass the "completeness test," it should nevertheless be stricken down as unconstitutional because it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
x x x This notwithstanding, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting.

[ivb] Section 12 of P.D. 1869, as amended, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used:

"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"; and
"to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President."

The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority."
Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority infrastructure development projects"; hence, it leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.
In fine, it does not comply with the "sufficient standard test," and must be stricken down as unconstitutional.
x x x But all other provisions of Section 12 remain legally effective and subsisting.

[v] Final Note on SAROs and NCAs

The Court noted that where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by DBM, such issuance does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA).
x x x The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Thus, from the promulgation of this decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is permanently enjoined.
x x x Unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." Accordingly, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs, must, at the time of this decision's promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general funds.
Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even if already obligated, else the Court would sanction the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.

[va] The same pronouncement must be applied to:

the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released, meaning those merely covered by a SARO; and
funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" which were altogether declared by this Court as unconstitutional.

However, those funds shall not be reverted to the general fund, but shall remain respectively under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes

3. Power of Taxation

[a] Limitations

[i] Rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.

Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

[ii] Charitable institutions, etc., and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation [Sec. 28(3), Art. VI].

Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292

A donation of ₱10,000 was made to a Catholic parish for church construction, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed a donee’s gift tax on the amount. The Supreme Court ruled that while churches are exempt from property taxes, they are not exempt from excise taxes like gift tax.

Province of Abra v. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued sought exemption from real estate tax on church properties, and the trial judge granted it without a hearing or requiring proof of actual use. The Supreme Court ruled that tax exemptions must be strictly construed and granted only when there is clear evidence that the properties are actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes, emphasizing that exemptions are not presumed and due process must be observed.

[iii] All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties [Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV].

Abra Valley College v. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106

The government seized and sold the college’s property for unpaid real estate taxes, arguing that the building was not used exclusively for educational purposes because part of it was rented to a commercial business. The Supreme Court upheld the tax assessment, ruling that tax exemptions under the Constitution apply only when the property is used solely for educational purposes, and commercial use—even partial—disqualifies it from exemption.

[iv] Law granting tax exemption shall be passed only with the concurrence of the majority of all the members of Congress [Sec. 29(4), Art. VI].

4. Power of Legislative Investigation

[Sec. 21, Art. VI]:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

[a] On the validity of restrictions

In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, Miguel v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006:

Sec. 4(b) of Executive Order No. 1, issued by President Corazon Aquino on February 28, 1986, provides that “no member or staff of the Commission (PCGG) shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings concerning matters within its official cognizance.
This is repugnant to Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution, and is deemed repealed.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws, as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.
It even extends to:

government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or abolish.

A mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1, being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with Art. XI, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which states that “public office is a public trust,” as it goes against the grain of public accountability and places PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of the courts, Congress, and other administrative bodies.

The Senate summoned PCGG officials to testify in a legislative inquiry into alleged anomalies in government corporations, but the officials refused, invoking Section 4(b) of Executive Order No. 1, which exempted PCGG members from testifying in any proceeding concerning matters within their official cognizance. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress’s power of inquiry includes all matters related to the administration of existing laws, and no executive issuance can exempt public officials from legislative oversight. The Court also upheld the Senate’s authority to issue subpoenas and to cite non-compliant witnesses in contempt.

[i] Philcomsat Holdings Corporation v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012:

The petitioners charged the Senate with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312. They sought its nullification on the grounds that:

it did not propose any piece of legislation,
it had been hastily approved by the Senate, and
they were deprived of the right to counsel during the conduct of the legislative investigation.

The Supreme Court noted the wide latitude given to the Houses of Congress in the conduct of legislative inquiries and did not fault the Senate for approving the resolution on the very same day it was submitted.
The Court also held that the petitioners were invited as resource persons at the inquiry, and as such, they did not have the constitutional right to counsel.

Philcomsat Holdings Corporation (PHC), a government-linked entity, challenged a Senate inquiry and its resulting report, claiming procedural irregularities and violation of their right to counsel. The Supreme Court ruled that legislative inquiries are constitutionally valid, which includes matters concerning the administration of existing laws. It ruled that the right to counsel applies only during custodial investigations for criminal offenses, not during legislative inquiries where individuals appear as resource persons.

[b] Limitations

In aid of legislation.
In accordance with duly published rules of procedure.
Rights of persons appearing in, or affected by such, inquiry shall be respected.

[i] In aid of legislation.

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767:

The inquiry was held not to be in aid of legislation.

The Supreme Court declared that the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into possible violation of Sec. 5, R.A. 3019.
There appears to be no intended legislation involved.

Further, the issue to be investigated is one over which jurisdiction has been acquired by the Sandiganbayan; the issue had thus been preempted by that Court.

To allow the Committee to investigate would only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments, but if the Committee's judgment is reached before the Sandiganbayan's, the possibility that its influence may be made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted.

The SBRC's probe and inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee sought to investigate the sale of corporations linked to Benjamin Romualdez, despite the matter being under trial in the Sandiganbayan. The Supreme Court ruled that the inquiry lacked a valid legislative purpose and encroached on judicial proceedings, thus barring the Committee from compelling testimony. The Court emphasized that legislative inquiries must be tied to potential legislation and must respect constitutional boundaries, including the separation of powers and the rights of individuals.

Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007:

However, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry.
Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.
Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

The Senate Committee on Banks initiated an inquiry under P.S. Resolution No. 166, following a privilege speech alleging that Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) sold unregistered foreign securities, causing losses to Filipino investors, prompting the bank’s officers to challenge the inquiry as unconstitutional and duplicative of pending cases. The Supreme Court upheld the Senate’s authority to conduct the inquiry, affirming that legislative investigations may proceed even if related issues are pending in court. It ruled that the inquiry was clearly in aid of legislation, as the resolution and privilege speech identified gaps in existing laws and the need for remedial measures.

[ii] In accordance with duly published rules of procedure.

Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008:

One of the reasons the Supreme Court cited in granting Neri's petition for certiorari was the merit in the argument of the Office of the Solicitor General, as follows:

“The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three years for one-half of the Senate membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate are, therefore, procedurally infirm.

Romulo Neri was cited in contempt by the Senate for refusing to testify further on the NBN-ZTE deal, invoking executive privilege, and challenged the validity of the inquiry. The Court found that the Senate failed to publish its rules for the 14th Congress and did not provide Neri with advance notice of the questions, violating procedural requirements.

[iii] Rights of persons appearing in, or affected by such, inquiry shall be respected.

Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, supra

It was held that the legislative inquiry does not violate the petitioners' right to privacy.

In Miguel v. Gordon, supra, the Court said that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to the privacy of ordinary financial transactions.
Employing the rational basis relationship test laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court said that there is no infringement of the individual's right to privacy as the requirement to disclose information is for a valid purpose; in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities.

Neither does the inquiry violate the petitioners' right against self-incrimination, because the officers of Standard Chartered Bank are not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding; they are merely summoned as resource persons or as witnesses. Likewise, they will not be subjected to any penalty by reason of their testimony.

Standard Chartered Bank officials challenged a Senate inquiry into alleged securities violations, claiming it infringed on their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Senate inquiry. It ruled that the rights of persons involved were respected, noting that the right to privacy is not absolute and may yield to compelling state interests. The Court clarified that resource persons in legislative inquiries are not accused in criminal proceedings and may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination only when specific incriminating questions are asked.

[c] Power to punish contempt

Punishment of a contumacious witness may include imprisonment, for the duration of the session.
The Senate, being a continuing body, may order imprisonment for an indefinite period, but principles of due process and equal protection will have to be considered.

Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, Arnault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358.

Jean L. Arnault was imprisoned by order of the Philippine Senate after repeatedly refusing to disclose the recipient of ₱440,000 during a legislative investigation into questionable government land deals. The Supreme Court upheld the Senate’s power to punish non-members for contempt, ruling that such authority is an implied and essential function of legislative inquiry, provided the question asked is pertinent to the investigation.

[i] Miguel v. Gordon, supra

The Supreme Court underscored the indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry.
Sec. 21, Art. VI, grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to their respective committees.
Clearly, there is a direct conferral of the power to the committees.
A reasonable conclusion is that the conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.

PCGG officials refused to testify in a Senate inquiry, invoking an executive order exemption, and were cited for contempt and arrested. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress has constitutional authority to conduct inquiries and punish for contempt, and that no executive issuance can override this power.

5. Question Hour

[Sec. 22, Art. VI]

The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions but may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

[a] Distinction with power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation*

A distinction has to be made between:

the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, and
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function

Senate v. Ermita, supra.

Executive Order No. 464, which required executive officials to obtain presidential consent before appearing in congressional hearings, was challenged, arguing it obstructed legislative inquiries in aid of legislation. The Supreme Court ruled that while department heads may decline to appear during the discretionary “question hour,” they must attend inquiries in aid of legislation when summoned, as this power is constitutionally vested in Congress and essential for lawmaking.

[i] When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President, to whom, as Chief Executive, the department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty.

In such instances, Art. VI, Sec. 22, in keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers, states that Congress may only request the appearance of department heads, who may appear with the consent of the President.

[ii] However, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Sec. 21, the appearance is mandatory.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of executive privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President — on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.

[iii] Thus, the requirement for Cabinet Members to secure Presidential consent under Sec. 1 of E.O. 464, which is limited only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.

It cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary, acting for the President.

6. War Powers

[Sec. 23(1), Art. VI].

By a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, declare the existence of a state of war.

7. Power to Act as Board of Canvassers in Election of President

[Sec. 4, Art. VII]

[a] Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004:

In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of Congress, the two Houses voting separately.

Congressman Ruy Elias Lopez filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of Joint Resolution No. 1, which created a Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives to act as the National Board of Canvassers for the 2004 presidential and vice-presidential elections. He argued that the entire Congress, not a joint committee, should perform the canvassing function. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress may delegate procedural tasks to a committee as long as final canvassing authority remains with the full legislative body.

[b] Pimentel v. Joint Committee of Congress, G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004:

Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may continue to perform this constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vice-presidential election results without need of any call for a special session by the President.
The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly-elected President and Vice President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. filed a petition challenging the continued operation of the Joint Committee of Congress tasked with canvassing votes for President and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 elections. He argued that the adjournment sine die of the Twelfth Congress on June 11, 2004 terminated its legal existence, rendering the Joint Committee’s proceedings unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that the adjournment of the regular session did not terminate Congress’s existence or its non-legislative functions. It held that Congress retains its authority to act as the National Board of Canvassers until it completes its constitutional duty to canvass and proclaim the elected President and Vice-President.

8. Power to Call a Special Election for President and Vice President

[Sec. 10, Art. VII]

The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call.
The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution.
The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed.
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

9. Power to Judge President's Physical Fitness to Discharge the Functions of the Presidency

[Sec. 11, Art. VII]

Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue.
For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

10. Power to Revoke or Extend Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus or Declaration of Martial Law

[Sec. 18, Art. VII]

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

11. Power to Concur in Presidential Amnesties

[Sec. 19, Art. VII]

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Concurrence of majority of all the members of Congress.

12. Power to Concur in Treaties or International Agreements

[Sec. 21, Art. VII]

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351.

The Court reviewed the validity of an executive agreement implemented through Executive Order No. 328, which regulated imports from Japan without Senate concurrence. The Supreme Court ruled that while treaties require Senate approval, executive agreements—covering temporary or administrative matters—do not, affirming the President’s power to enter into binding international agreements without Senate concurrence.

13. Power to Confirm Certain Appointments/Nominations Made by the President

[a] Nomination made by the President in the event of a vacancy in the Office of Vice President, from among the members of Congress, confirmed by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of Congress, voting separately [Sec. 9, Art. VII].

Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

[b] Nominations made by the President under Sec. 16, Art. VII, confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

14. Power of Impeachment

[Sec. 2, Art. XI]

The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

15. Power Relative to Natural Resources

[Sec. 2, Art. XII]

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

16. Power to Propose Amendments to the Constitution

[Secs. 1 and 2, Art. XVII]

Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
A constitutional convention.

Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

Political Law Review: Legislative Department

1. Defined

2. Where vested

1. Composition

2. Bicameralism vs. Unicameralism.

1. Composition

2. Qualifications of Senator

3. Term of Office

1. Composition

2. Apportionment of legislative districts.

3. Qualifications

4. Term of Office [Sec. 7, Art. VI]

5. The Party-List System [R.A. 7941 (The Party-List System Act)]

[a] Definition of Terms

[b] Registration; Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System

[c] Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.

[d] Nomination of Party-List Representatives

[e] Qualifications of Party-List Nominees

[f] Manner of Voting

[g] Number of Party-List Representatives

[h] Choosing Party-List Representatives.

[i] Effect of Change of Affiliation.

[j] Vacancy.

[k] Term of Office; Rights.

1. Regular

2. Special

1. Freedom from Arrest

2. Privilege of Speech and of Debate

1. Incompatible Office[Sec. 13, Art. VI].

2. Forbidden Office

1. Regular Session

2. Special Session

3. Joint Sessions

[a] Voting separately:

[b] Voting jointly:

4. Adjournment

1. Different from the suspension in R.A. 3019

1. Legislative Journal

2. Enrolled Bill Theory

3. Journal Entry vs. Enrolled Bill

4. The Congressional Record

1. Composition

[a] HRET as an Independent and Non-Partisan Body*

[b] Disqualification of Electoral Tribunal Members*

[c] Recourse of Party-List Representatives*

2. Power

[a] Jurisdiction*

[b] Jurisdiction over party-list nominees*

[c] Limitations*

[d] Judicial Review*

1. Composition

[a] Minimum Party Representation*

[b] Composition*

2. Powers

1. General [plenary] legislative power.

[a] Limitations

[i] Substantive

[ii] Procedural

[b] Legislative Process

[i] Requirements as to bills

[ii] Procedure

[iii] Approval of bills

[iv] Effectivity of laws

2. Power of Appropriation

[a] Need for appropriation

[b] Appropriation law, defined

[c] Classification

[i] General appropriation law

[ii] Special appropriation law

[d] Implied (extra-constitutional) limitations on appropriation measures

[i] Appropriation must be devoted to a public purpose.

[ii] The sum authorized to be released must be determinate, or at least determinable.

[e] Constitutional limitations on special appropriation measures

[i] Must specify the public purpose for which the sum is intended.

[ii] Must be supported by funds actually available as certified to by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein. [Sec. 25(4), Art. VI]

[f] Constitutional Rules on General Appropriations Law

[i] Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.

[ii] The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

[iii] No provision or enactment shall be embraced unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein.

[iv] Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

1. Incompatible Office
[Sec. 13, Art. VI].