Political Law Review: Principles and State Policies
V. PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
A. Preamble
We, the sovereign Filipino people,
imploring the aid of Almighty God,
in order to build a just and humane society,
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony,
and secure to ourselves and our posterity,
the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace,
do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
Does not confer rights nor impose duties.
Indicates authorship of the Constitution;
Enumerates the primary aims and aspirations of the framers; and
Serves as an aid in the construction of the Constitution.
B. Republicanism
Sec. 1, Art. II:
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
Essential features
Representation.
Not direct government.
Election of representatives who in turn appoint other officers of government.
Renovation.
Entitled to renovate or replace elected officials through periodic elections which prescribes every three years for almost all elective officials and six years for the president and the vice president.
Manifestations
GRABI-SD
[a] Ours is a government of laws and not of men.
See Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, G.R. No. 14639, Mar 25, 1919:
[b] Rule of the majority.
In the election of public officers, it is the rule of the plurality which applies.
[c] Accountability of public officials.
Public office is a public trust.
[d] The existence of a Bill of Rights.
The series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights.
[e] Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws.
Congress should be able to enact measures that would address the current concerns of the people.
[f] Separation of powers.
[i] Purpose
To prevent concentration of authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of republican institutions.
To secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency.
Powers:
Inherent
contempt, legislative investigation
Expressly conferred
Necessarily implied
power to appoint includes the power to remove
Shared which results to this concept called blending of powers
Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, June 26, 1940:
[ia] La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004:
The Court restrained itself from intruding into policy matters to allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the mineral resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country.
The Judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by co-equal branches of government of their official functions. Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. The questioned provisions of R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) are not unconstitutional.
[ii] Application
Not "doctrinaire" nor with "pedantic rigor"; "not independence but interdependence."
Not doctrinaire / not pedantic rigor → not enforced in a rigid, mechanical, or overly literal way that blocks the government from functioning effectively.
Not independence but interdependence → the three branches are separate but must work together, each branch checks and complements the others.
Maceda v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993:
In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to the former's certificate of service, the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
[iii] Principle of Blending of Powers:
Instances when powers are not confined exclusively within one department but are assigned to or shared by several departments, e.g., enactment of general appropriations law.
General Appropriations Law (GAA)
Executive (President) prepares and proposes the budget.
Legislative (Congress) deliberates, approves, and enacts it.
Executive then signs and implements it.
Grant of Amnesty
Executive (President) grants amnesty.
Requires Legislative concurrence (majority approval by Congress).
[iv] Principle of Checks and Balances:
This allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments, e.g., veto power of the President as check on improvident legislation.
President’s Veto Power
The President can veto laws passed by Congress, rejecting them entirely, or use the item-veto to strike specific provisions in appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills without vetoing the entire legislation
This power restrains ill-considered or fiscally irresponsible legislation and forces Congress to reconsider or amend the content. If Congress believes the veto was unwarranted, it may override the veto with a two-thirds vote in both chambers.
Congress Overrides Veto
If both the House and Senate muster a two-thirds majority, they can override the President’s veto.
Judicial Review by the Supreme Court
The Judiciary can declare laws or executive orders unconstitutional, effectively nullifying them.
Impeachment
Congress can initiate impeachment proceedings against the President, Vice President, Supreme Court justices, and other constitutional officials.
[v] Role of the Judiciary:
The judicial power, as defined in Sec. 1, Art. VIII, "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
[va] Note that when the Court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it upholds is not its own superiority but the supremacy of the Constitution.
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139:
Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991
[vb] The first and safest criterion to determine whether a given power has been validly exercised by a particular department is whether or not the power has been constitutionally conferred upon the department claiming its exercise — since the conferment is usually done expressly.
However, even in the absence of express conferment, the exercise of the power may be justified under the doctrine of necessary implication, i.e., that the grant of an express power carries with it all other powers that may be reasonably inferred from it.
Note also that there are powers which, although not expressly conferred nor implied therefrom, are inherent or incidental, e.g., the President's power to deport undesirable aliens, which may be exercised independently of constitutional or statutory authority, because it is an "act of State."
Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989:
The Supreme Court justified the action of President Aquino in banning the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines on the basis of the President's "residual powers."
[vc] Political and justiciable questions
A purely justiciable question implies:
a given right, legally demandable and enforceable,
an act or omission violative of such right, and
a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right.
Casibang v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-38025, August 20, 1979:
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy:
The Supreme Court ruled that what the petitioners raised were justiciable questions, considering that the statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that the petitioners are assailing R.A. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the law lacks wisdom.
Tañada v. Angara:
The petition seeking the nullification of the Senate concurrence of the President's ratification of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), was held to present a justiciable controversy, because where an action is alleged to infringe the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
[vc1] The term 'political question' connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely a question of policy.
It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 1101:
Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998:
Senator Defensor-Santiago questioned the election of Senator Guingona as Minority Floor Leader, the Supreme Court said:
"It has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold — the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a co-equal branch prevent this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and the majesty of the law."
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization:
The decision of PNOC to privatize Petron and the approval of such by the Committee on Privatization, being in accordance with Proclamation No. 50, cannot be reviewed by the Courts, because such acts are an exercise of executive functions over which the Court will not pass judgment nor inquire into the wisdom thereof.
For further application of the "political question" principle, see:
Sanidad v. Comelec:
Romulo v. Yniguez, G.R. No. 71908, February 4, 1986:
But the scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by the 2nd paragraph, Sec. 1, Art. VIII, particularly the portion which vests in the judiciary the power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
[vi] Supreme Court Resolution, dated February 14, 2012
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court officials and employees as witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters from the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012.
[via] Background
The subject of this resolution are letters of Hon. Joseph Emilio Abaya, Congressman, 1st District, Cavite, and Impeachment Prosecution Panel Manager, requesting that the Public and Private Prosecutors in the Chief Justice Renato Corona Impeachment trial before the Senate be permitted to examine the rollos of certain cases, and requesting copies of the Agenda and Minutes of deliberations on certain cases.
An intervening development was the issuance by the Impeachment Court of subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum, directing SC Clerk of Court Enriqueta Vidal and Deputy Clerk of Court Felipa Anama to appear and bring with them certain documents relative to cases decided by the Court.
[via1] Compliance of Prosecution Panel
The Prosecution Panel manifested in a Compliance dated January 27, 2013, that it would present about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand documents, to be secured from both private and public offices.
The list of witnesses included justices of the Supreme Court and court officials and employees who would testify on matters, many of which are internal to the Court. However, the Impeachment Court denied the Prosecution Panel's request for the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum to Justices Villarama, Sereno, Reyes, and Velasco.
Thus, the issue of compulsory attendance of SC justices under compulsory process had become moot and academic.
[vib] Independence of the Judiciary
The doctrine of separation of powers is an essential component of our democratic and republican system of government.
The doctrine inures not by express provision of the Constitution, but as an underlying principle that constitutes the bedrock of our system of checks and balances in government.
Each branch is considered separate, co-equal, coordinate, and supreme within its own sphere, under the legal and political reality of one overarching Constitution that governs one government and one nation, for whose benefit all three separate branches must act with unity.
The Court's mandate, insofar as these constitutional principles are concerned, is to keep the different branches within the exercise of their respective assigned powers and prerogatives through the Rule of Law.
[vib1] Principle of Comity
A lesser known but no less important aspect of the principle of separation of powers — deemed written into the rules by established practice and rendered imperative by the departments' interdependence and need for cooperation among themselves — is the principle of comity, or the practice of voluntarily observing interdepartmental courtesy in undertaking their assigned constitutional duties for the harmonious working of government.
[vib2] Privilege Against Disclosure in the Judiciary
In the judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official records "create a hierarchy of rights that protect certain confidential relationships over and above the public's evidentiary need" or "right to every man's evidence." Specifically, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court prohibit the disclosure of:
The result of the raffle of cases;
The actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court's session; and
The deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before it.
The privilege against the disclosure of these kinds of information or communication is known as deliberative process privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of reaching a decision.
[vib3] Scope of the Privilege
This privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary.
Information like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential.
All the great branches of government are entitled to this treatment for their own decision- and policy-making conversations and correspondence.
But what applies to magistrates applies with equal force to court officials and employees who are privy to these deliberations.
They may likewise claim exemption when asked about this privileged information.
[vib4] Documents and Communications
The rule extends to documents and other communications which are part of or are related to the deliberative process.
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the agency must show that the document is both:
Predecisional — A document is "predecisional" if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which it relates.
In other words, communications are considered "predecisional" if they were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion.
Deliberative — A matter is "deliberative" if it reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process.
The key question is whether disclosure of the information would discourage candid discussion within the agency.
If it does, the information is deemed privileged.
[vib5] Other Grounds for Denying Access
Two other grounds may be cited for denying access to court records, as well as preventing members of the bench from being subjected to compulsory process:
Disqualification by reason of privileged communication; and
Pendency of an action or matter.
Sub judice
The rule of judicial ethics complements the rule of evidence that disqualifies public officials from testifying on information they acquire in confidence in the course of their duties.
[g] Delegation of Powers
[i] Rule
Potestas delegata non potest delegare — based on the ethical principle that delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
[ia] Jaworski v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004:
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator's and/or management contracts, it is not allowed to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.
In Lim v. Pacquing, G.R. No. 115044, January 27, 1995, the Court clarified that “since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate jai-alai, it cannot, even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor, operate jai-alai in the City of Manila.”
By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise, and not "ride on" PAGCOR's franchise if it were to legally operate online Internet gambling.
[ib] Jesus Garcia v. Hon. Ray Alan Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013:
Petitioner challenged as an undue delegation of judicial power the provision of R.A. 9262 (Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children) which authorizes Barangay officials to issue a Barangay Protection Order (BPO).
In rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court said that the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay (or in case of his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad) merely orders the perpetrator to desist from:
Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and
Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is purely executive in nature, consistent with his duty under the Local Government Code "to enforce all laws and ordinances" and "to maintain public order in the barangay."
[ii] Permissible Delegation
TE-PLA
Tariff Powers to the President
Emergency Powers to the President
Delegation to the People
Delegation to Local Government Units
Delegation to Administrative Bodies
[iia] Tariff Powers to the President
As specifically provided in Sec. 28(2), Art. VI:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
[iiat] The Tariff and Customs Code grants such stand-by powers to the President.
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter on imported crude oil, and P1.00 per liter on imported oil products, as a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority under the Tariff and Customs Code.
Philippine Interisland Shipping Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100481, January 22, 1997:
It was held that the fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When the same is delegated to the President, he may exercise it directly, e.g., issuance of Executive Order 1088, without thereby withdrawing an earlier delegation made to the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA).
However, when the President directly exercises the delegated authority, the PPA may not revise the rates fixed by the former.
[iib] Emergency Powers to the President
As provided in Sec. 23(2), Art. VI:
"In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof."
Conditions:
There must be war or other national emergency.
The delegation must be for a limited period only.
The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by the Congress.
Self-liquidating unless sooner withdrawn, in the sense that they will automatically cease upon the end of the emergency that justified their delegation.
[iib1] An example of this is R.A. 6826, approved on December 20, 1989.
The President issued National Emergency Memorandum Orders (NEMOs) in the exercise of delegated legislative powers.
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368
Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil 603
[iib2] A distinction has to be made between the President's authority to declare a "state of emergency" and to exercise emergency powers.
President's authority to declare a "state of emergency"
To the first, since Sec. 18, Art. VII, grants the President such power, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised.
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
President's exercise emergency powers
To the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately-owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest, requires a delegation from Congress.
Sec. 17, Art. XII, must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause.
The taking over of private businesses affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed in Congress.
Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII, provides that: "”The State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,”“the State” refers to Congress, not the President.
Whether the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress delegates it to the former pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
[iic] Delegation to the People
Sec. 32, Art. VI;
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
Sec. 10, Art. X;
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Sec. 2, Art. XVII;
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
Republic Act 6735
Initiative and Referendum Act
People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56:
Decided under the 1935 Constitution, the Supreme Court said that courts have sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large.
Under the 1987 Constitution, there are specific provisions where the people have reserved to themselves the function of legislation.
[iic1] Referendum vs. Plebiscite
Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose.
It may be of two classes:
Referendum on statutes — refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress.
Referendum on local law — refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution, or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Plebiscite is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.
Sec. 2 (c) and (e), Republic Act No. 6735
[iid] Delegation to Local Government Units
See: R.A. 7160
Such legislation (by local governments) is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject, of course, to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity.
People v. Vera.
This recognizes that local legislatures are more knowledgeable than the national lawmaking body on matters of purely local concern, and are in a better position to enact appropriate legislative measures thereon.
[iie] Delegation to Administrative Bodies
The power of subordinate legislation.
The point of administrative law is expediency in enforcing the law.
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No. 114714, April 21, 1995:
POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 01-94, increasing and adjusting the rates of compensation and other benefits in the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers, was held to be a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority, inasmuch as it conforms to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. 797.
Osmena v. Orbos:
It was held that there was no undue delegation of legislative power in the authority granted by legislature to the Energy Regulatory Board to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund.
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987;
Eastern Shipping v. POEA, G.R. No. 76633, October 18, 1988.
Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia:
The authority given by LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the existing authorized fare was held to be illegal for being an undue delegation of power.
[iie1] Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204829, April 8, 2014:
The Supreme Court upheld as valid the delegation (in the RH Law) by Congress to the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List.
It said that the FDA not only has the power but also the competence to evaluate, register, and cover health services and methods under R.A. 3720, as amended by R.A. 9711 [FDA Act of 2009].
[iie2] Delegation to Create Municipalities
Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965:
Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code (authorizing the President to create municipalities through executive orders) was declared unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power.
Municipality of San Narciso (Quezon) v. Mendez, G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994:
However, E.O. 353 creating the Municipal District of San Andres in 1959 was not declared unconstitutional because it was only after almost 30 years that the legality of the executive order was challenged.
Throughout its 30 years of existence, the municipal district had exercised the powers and authority of a duly created local government institution, and the State had, at various times, recognized its continued existence.
Municipality of Candihay, Bohol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116702, December 28, 1995:
Likewise, the Pelaez ruling was not applied because the municipality had been in existence for 16 years before the Pelaez ruling was promulgated, and various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence of the municipal corporation.
Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental v. Baz, Jr., G.R. No. 105748, December 2, 1996:
Not only was the Municipality of Sinacaban in existence for 16 years before the Pelaez ruling, but even the State and the Municipality of Jimenez itself had recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence (by entering into an agreement concerning common boundaries), and Sinacaban had attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd district of Misamis Occidental.
[iii] Tests for Valid Delegation
Both of the following tests are to be complied with.
Pelaez v. Auditor General
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy:
[iiia] Completeness Test
The law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except to enforce it.
See: U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1.
[iiib] Sufficient Standard Test
A sufficient standard is intended to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected.
This is intended to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the legislature to the delegate.
The standard is usually indicated in the law delegating legislative power.
See: Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra;
De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982;
Demetria v. Alba, G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987;
Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986.
[iiib1] Chiongbian v. Orbos, G.R. No. 96754, June 22, 1995:
On the challenge relative to the validity of the provision of R.A. 6734 which authorized the President to "merge", by administrative determination, the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, the Court said that the legislative standard need not be expressed; it may simply be gathered or implied.
Neither should it always be found in the law challenged, because it may be found in other statutes on the same subject.
In this case, the standard was found in R.A. 5435 on the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Department "to promote simplicity, economy and to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development."
[iiib2] Tatad v. Secretary, Department of Energy:
Even as the Supreme Court found that "R.A. 8180 contained sufficient standards for the delegation of power to the President to advance the date of full deregulation (of the oil industry)," Executive Order No. 392 constituted a misapplication of R.A. 8180, because the President rewrote the standards set forth in the law when he considered the extraneous factor of depletion of OPSF funds.
[iiib3] Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007:
The Court held that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, "to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power," and "watershed rehabilitation and management" are sufficient standards, as they provide the limitations on the Energy Regulatory Commission's power to formulate the Implementing Rules and Regulations.
C. The Incorporation Clause
Sec. 2, Art. II:
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land,
and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Read along with the…
Preamble
Secs. 7 & 8 (independent foreign policy and nuclear-free Philippines), Art. II;
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy.
In its relations with other states,
the paramount consideration shall be
national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest, and the right to self-determination.
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
and Sec. 25 (expiration of bases agreement), Art. XVIII.
Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
Renunciation of War
The historical development of the policy condemning or outlawing war in the international scene:
Covenant of the League of Nations,
which provided conditions for the right to go to war;
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928
also known as the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, ratified by 62 States, which forbade war as "an instrument of national policy";
Charter of the United Nations, Art. 2
prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State.
Doctrine of Incorporation
By virtue of this clause, our Courts have applied the rules of international law in a number of cases even if such rules had not previously been subject of statutory enactments, because these generally accepted principles of international law are automatically part of our own laws.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 O.G. 4282
Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5, 75 Phil 113.
[a] The phrase “generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states, e.g.,
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy,
sovereign immunity,
a person's right to life, liberty and due process, and
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept)
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007:
[b] Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or by incorporation.
The transformation method requires that an international law principle be transformed into domestic law through a constitutional mechanism. (treaties, Art. VII, Sec. 21 requires concurrence by the Senate.)
The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
[c] The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals or local courts are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both.
In a situation where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts.
Presumption: Municipal law was enacted with due regard to international law
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115:
The reason given by the Court was that the Retail Trade Nationalization Law was passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.
Gonzales v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963:
The reason was the application of the doctrine of separation of powers;
In Re: Garcia, August 15, 1961:
It was the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
The high tribunal also noted that courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
[d] However, as applied in most countries, the doctrine of incorporation dictates that rules of international law are given equal standing with, and are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori takes effect.
a later law repeals an earlier law
In States where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the Constitution.
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91332, July 16, 1993:
The Court had earlier made the same pronouncement when it said that the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere.
D. Civilian Supremacy
Sec. 3, Art. I:
Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State.
Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
This provision is applied and strengthened by the following Constitutional provisions:
Art. VII, Sec. 18
the Commander-in-Chief clause
Art. XVI, Sec. 5(1)
requirement that AFP members shall swear to uphold and defend the Constitution
Art. XVI, Sec. 5(2)
AFP members shall respect the people's rights in the performance of their duty
Art. XVI, Sec. 5(3)
professionalism in the armed forces; and insulation of the AFP from partisan politics
Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4)
prohibition against appointing AFP member in the active service to a civilian position
Art. XVI, Sec. 5(5)
compulsory retirement of officers without extension of service
Art. XVI, Sec. 5(6)
proportional recruitment from all provinces and cities, to avoid a regional clique in the AFP
Art. XVI, Sec. 5(7)
a three-year limit on the tour of duty of the AFP Chief of Staff, although extendible by the President in case of emergency declared by Congress
Art. XVI, Sec. 6
establishment of a police force that is civilian in character
Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. L-69401, June 23, 1987:
E. Duty of Government; People to Defend the State
Sec. 4, Art. II:
The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.
Sec. 5, Art. II:
The maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Read Secs. 4 & 5, Art. XVI (Armed Forces of the Philippines provisions).
People v. Tranquilino Lagman, G.R. No. L-45892 and People v. Primitivo De Sosa, G.R. No. L-45893, July 13, 1938:
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the two accused for violation of Sec. 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1. They had reached the age of 20 but refused to register in the military service despite being required to do so. The Court rejected the excuses offered; De Sosa said that he was fatherless and had a mother and a brother to support, while Lagman claimed that he had a father to support, had no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
Right to Bear Arms
The right to bear arms is a statutory, not a constitutional right.
The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right.
Neither does it create a vested right.
Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of police power.
The maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties.
The first real firearms law is Act No. 1780, enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 12, 1907, to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms. Thereafter, President Marcos issued P.D. 1856, which was amended by R.A. 8294.
Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right.
Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004:
F. Separation of Church and State
Sec. 6, Art. II:
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Reinforced by:
Sec. 5, Art. III
Freedom of religion clause
Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C
religious sect cannot be registered as political party
Sec. 5(2), Art. VI
no sectoral representative from the religious sector
Sec. 29(2), Art. VI
prohibition against appropriation for sectarian benefit
Exceptions:
Sec. 28(3), Art. VI:
Churches, parsonages, etc., actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
Sec. 29(2), Art. VI:
Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian benefit, except when a priest or ecclesiastic is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution or government orphanage or leprosarium.
Sec. 3(3), Art. XIV:
Optional religious instruction for public elementary and high school students.
Sec. 4(2), Art. XIV:
Filipino ownership requirement for educational institutions, except those established by religious groups and mission boards.
See discussion on FREEDOM OF RELIGION, infra.
G. Independent Foreign Policy and Nuclear-Free Philippines
Sec. 7, Art. II:
The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy.
In its relations with other states,
the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.
Sec. 8, Art. II:
The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
Refer to Sec. 2, Art. II; Sec. 25, Art. XVIII.
See also Opinion, Secretary of Justice, s. 1988,
The phrase "consistent with the national interest" is a declarative statement, and is not subject to determination by Congress or any other government body.
Bayan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000:
The petitioners questioned the validity of the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement, which allowed the entry of American troops and facilities into the country.
The Court said that its function "is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view."
Thus, in the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power.
Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002:
The Supreme Court said that these provisions, along with Sec. 2, Art. II, Sec. 21, Art. VII, and Sec. 26, Art. XVIII, betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.
However, the Court upheld the validity of the "Balikatan" exercises, which include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civil action projects such as the building of schoolhouses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.
It was held that the Visiting Forces Agreement gives legitimacy to the current "Balikatan" exercises.
Right to Self-determination
Right of a people to freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.
H. Just and Dynamic Social Order
Sec. 9, Art. II:
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation
and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services,
promote full employment,
a rising standard of living,
and an improved quality of life for all.
Read Preamble.
I. Promotion of Social Justice
Sec. 10, Art. II:
The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 726;
Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43800, July 20, 1977
Ondoy v. Ignacio, G.R. No. L-47178, May 16, 1980
Salonga v. Farrales, G.R. No. L-47088, July 10, 1981
Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 726:
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, defined social justice as follows:
“Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of the laws and the equalization of the social and economic forces of the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.”
J. Respect for Human Dignity and Human Rights
Sec. 11, Art. II:
The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Read also Secs. 17–19, Art. XIII.
Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994:
An order for the eviction of squatters and the demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderias of the private respondents located at the People's Park at North EDSA does not fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
K. Family and Youth
Sec. 12, Art. II:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution.
It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government.
Sec. 13, Art. II:
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Read also Art. XV and Art. 52, Civil Code.
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property relations during the marriage.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 263 U.S. 393
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 266 U.S. 510
Cabanas v. Pilapil, G.R. No. L-25843, July 25, 1974.
People v. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998:
R.A. 7610, which penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses, was enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to "provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse"; thus, the Court grants the victim full vindication and protection granted under the law.
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014:
14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention were filed in Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012, or the RH Law. One of the issues was whether the law violates the right of an unborn child as guaranteed under Sec. 12, Art. II, of the Constitution. The Supreme Court said no.
[a] Majority of the members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on the matter. The traditional meaning of "conception," according to reputable dictionaries, is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
[b] The framers of the Constitution also intended for (i) "conception" to refer to the moment of "fertilization," and (ii) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
[c] The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure that would allow abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word "or" in defining abortifacient in Sec. 4(a), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of the fetus inside the mother's womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it.
[d] However, the authors of the implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term "primarily." Recognizing as abortifacient only those that "primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb," Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Sec. 12, Art. II, of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under Sec. 3.01(j) of the IRR, which also uses the term "primarily," must be struck down.
[e] Sec. 7 of the RH Law, which excludes parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, is anti-family and violates Sec. 12, Art. II, of the Constitution. In addition, the portion of Sec. 23(a)(ii), which reads: "in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures," is invalid, as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is "non-surgical procedures."
[f] The Supreme Court recognized two exceptions, namely:First, a minor may receive information, as opposed to procedures, about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply because of the lack of consent.
[g] Sec. 12, Art. II, places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children, with the use of the term "primary." The right of parents in the upbringing of the youth is superior to that of the State.
[h] The provisions of Sec. 14 of the RH Law and the corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement, rather than supplant, the rights and duties of parents in the moral development of their children.
The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on January 26, 1990, and ratified the same on August 21, 1990.
The Convention defines a "child" to mean every human being below the age of 18 unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.
The Convention guarantees a child to acquire a nationality and requires the State Parties to ensure the implementation of this right, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless (J. Carpio, Dissenting Opinion, Maria Jeanette Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004).
Maria Jeanette Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
L. Fundamental Equality of Men and Women
Sec. 14, Art. II:
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Read also Sec. 14, Art. XIII.
The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.
Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997:
The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, which is guaranteed all women workers under the Constitution. While a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried may be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification" where the particular requirements of the job would demand the same, discrimination against married women cannot be adopted by the employer as a general principle.
M. Promotion of Health and Ecology
Sec. 15, Art. II:
The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
Sec. 16, Art. II:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Read also Secs. 11–13, Art. XIII.
The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the under-privileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Imbong v. Ochoa, supra:
Another issue resolved is whether the RH Law violates the people's right to health under Sec. 15, Art. II of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court said no, because the RH Law does not intend to do away with R.A. 4729 (An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices) and R.A. 5921 (An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines)—laws that prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly licensed physician.
With R.A. 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public.
[a] In fulfilling its mandate under the RH Law, the Department of Health (DOH) must observe the provisions of R.A. 4729, so that the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company, and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
[b] Meanwhile, the requirement of Sec. 8 of the RH Law that intrauterine devices and hormonal contraceptives be included in the National Drug Formulary is to be considered "mandatory" only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA). Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective."
Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 105087, July 30, 1993:
It was held that the petitioners minors had legal standing to institute the suit and had a valid cause of action in questioning the continued grant of Timber License Agreements (TLAs) for commercial logging purposes, because the cause focuses on a fundamental legal right: the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
The Court held that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution, for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
C & M Timber Corporation v. Alcala, G.R. No. 111088, June 13, 1997:
On the issue that the "total log ban" is a new policy which should be applied prospectively and not affect the rights of petitioner vested under the Timber Licensing Agreement, the Supreme Court declared that this is not a new policy but a mere reiteration of the policy of conservation and protection expressed in Sec. 16, Art. II, of the Constitution.
Hon. Ramon Jesus Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, v. Hon. Teodoro Casino, G.R. No. 207267, February 3, 2015:
The controversy started when the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC), whereby TCC undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant to supply power to the Subic Bay Industrial Park. TCC later assigned all its rights under the MOU to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy), a Philippine corporation.
In December 2008, the DENR issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the proposed coal-fired power plant. Over the next four years, DENR would issue three amendments to the ECC allowing the inclusion of additional components. In August 2011, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zambales and the Liga ng mga Barangay of Olongapo City issued separate Resolutions expressing their objection to the construction of the plant.
In July 2012, Congressman Teodoro Casino filed with the Supreme Court a petition for a Writ of Kalikasan, asserting that the power plant project would cause grave environmental damage; that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo; that the ECC was issued and the Lease and Development Agreement (LDA) entered into without prior approval of the concerned sanggunians (in violation of the Local Government Code); that the LDA was entered into without prior certification from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as required under the IPRA Law; and that all amendments to the ECC are void because DENR has no authority to decide the same in the absence of a new Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence and rendition of judgment.
[a] On the issue of whether an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) can be challenged through a Writ of Kalikasan, the Supreme Court said YES, but the party must provide a causal link or reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology of a magnitude that prejudices the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. In this case, there is only one group of allegations that can be reasonably connected to environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated in the Rules: that there was no environmental impact assessment (EIA) relative to the first and second amendments of the ECC. If true, then the implementation of the project can violate the right to a healthful and balanced ecology of the inhabitants near the vicinity of the power plant. Thus, the resolution of such issue can be resolved in a Writ of Kalikasan case.
[b] As to the claim that the issuance of the ECC violated the IPRA Law and the Local Government Code, and that the LDA likewise violated the IPRA Law, these are not within the coverage of the Writ of Kalikasan, because no reasonable connection can be made to an actual or threatened violation of the right to a healthful and balanced ecology of the magnitude contemplated in the Rules. But because of the exceptional character of the case—the looming power crisis—the Court will resolve the issues in this Writ of Kalikasan case.
[c] But the Casino Group failed to substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated in the Rules. RP Energy presented evidence to establish that the subject property will not cause damage through its Environmental Management Plan, which will ensure that the plant will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and standards.
[d] The first and second amendments to the ECC are valid. The DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an Environmental Performance Report and Management Plan (EPRMP) and a Project Description Report (PDR). Through these documents, a new Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was conducted relative to the proposed modifications. Thus, absent sufficient proof of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality, the amendments are valid.
[e] The Certificate of No Overlap (CNO) is not required prior to the issuance of an ECC. The ECC is not a license or permit which, under Sec. 59 of the IPRA Law, requires a CNO. Sec. 59 aims to forestall the implementation of a project that may impair the right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral domains, by ensuring that a project will not overlap with any ancestral domain prior to implementation. Since the issuance of the ECC does not result in the implementation of the project, there is no prior necessity to secure a CNO.
[f] But a CNO should have been secured prior to the consummation of the Lease and Development Agreement (LDA). The SBMA should have secured a CNO before entering into the LDA with RP Energy. First, because the Subic area is historically home to the Aeta community; second, the SBMA Ecology Center's assertion that the site does not overlap with an ancestral domain cannot substitute for a CNO; third, the fact that the US Armed Forces formerly used the site does not foreclose the possibility of a present or future claim of ancestral domain; and fourth, the site being classified as part of an industrial zone does not exempt it from a CNO. However, since this is the first time this Court has laid down the foregoing rule, and that SBMA and RP Energy had no deliberate intent to circumvent the IPRA Law, the LDA should remain valid.
[g] The approval of the sanggunians is not required prior to the issuance of the ECC or the consummation of the LDA. Sec. 27, in relation to Sec. 26 of the Local Government Code, requires prior approval by the sanggunian concerned before government authorities implement a project or program. The issuance of the ECC does not, by itself, result in the implementation of the project. As to the consummation of the LDA, the power to approve or disapprove projects within the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) is vested in the SBMA, and this power prevails over the local government unit's. Sec. 12(i), R.A. 7227, the law that created the SSEZ, expressly recognizes the prevalence of the powers, functions, and prerogatives of the SBMA.
N. Priority to education, science, technology, etc.
Sec. 17, Art. II:
The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture and sports, to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
Read also Sec. 2, Art. XIV.
Section 2. The State shall:
Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural rights of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;
Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools, especially to the under-privileged;
Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and
Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills.
Philippine Merchant Marine School, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112844, June 2, 1995:
The Court said that the requirement that a school must first obtain government authorization before operating is based on the State policy that educational programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and, therefore, shall at least satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and facilities, and administrative and management viability.
See discussion on Academic freedom, infra.
See also Villar v. TIP, G.R. No. L-69198, April 17, 1985;
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987.
Guingona v. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991, and Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra:
However, it was held that Sec. 5, Art. XIV, which provides for the highest budgetary priority to education, is merely directory; the hands of Congress cannot be so hamstrung as to deprive it of the power to respond to the imperatives of national interest and the attainment of other state policies and objectives.
Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004:
While it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements, the exercise of this right may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, in order to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance.
See discussion on Art. XIV.
O. Protection to labor
Sec. 18, Art. II:
The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force.
It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Read also Sec. 8, Art. III;
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-B;
The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees
Sec. 3, Art. XIII.
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
JMM Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996:
The Supreme Court said that obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As explained in Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988, in reference to the recurring problems faced by our overseas workers, "what concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just and humane.” It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands, because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty bound to provide them adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home."
Bernardo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122917, July 12, 1999:
The Supreme Court held that R.A. 7277 (Magna Carta for Disabled Persons) mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees; thus, once they have attained the status of regular workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely in charity or accommodation, but in justice for all.
P. Self-reliant and independent economic order
Sec. 19, Art. II:
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Sec. 20, Art. II:
The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
Read also Art. XII.
Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997:
It was held that the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement does not violate Sec. 19, Art. II, nor Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, because the said sections should be read and understood in relation to Secs. 1 and 13, Art. XII, which require the pursuit of a trade policy that "serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity."
The provisions of Art. II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable rights, but guidelines for legislation.
The reasons for denying cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy-making.
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998:
The Supreme Court said that although the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to intervene whenever necessary for the promotion of the general welfare, as reflected in Secs. 6 and 19, Art. XII.
This is reiterated in Pest Management Association of the Philippines v. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007:
The Court held that free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations.
It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence how such protective regulations would result in restraint of trade.
Rep. Gerardo Espina v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010:
Republic Act No. 8762 (Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000) is valid.
While Sec. 19, Art. II, requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment.
Neither does the lessening of restraints on foreigners' right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business amount to a denial of the Filipinos' right to property and to due process of law.
Q. Land Reform
Sec. 21, Art. II:
The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.
Read also Secs. 4-10, Art. XIII.
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers' organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to under-privileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.
Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated.
Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
R. Indigenous cultural communities
Sec. 22, Art. II:
The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of national unity and development.
Read also Secs. 5(2), Art. VI; Sec. 5, Art. XII; Sec. 17, Art. XIV.
Secs. 5(2), Art. VI.
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sec. 5, Art. XII.
The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
Sec. 17, Art. XIV.
The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.
S. Independent people's organizations
Sec. 23, Art. II:
The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based,
or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
Read also Secs. 15-16, Art. XIII.
The State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.
The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.
T. Communication and information in nation-building
Sec. 24, Art. II:
The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.
Read also Secs. 10-11, Art. XVI; Sec. 23, Art. XVIII.
Secs. 10-11, Art. XVI;
The State shall provide the policy environment for the full development of Filipino capability and the emergence of communication structures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy that respects the freedom of speech and of the press.
The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens.
The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed.
The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the promotion of the general welfare.
Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines.
Sec. 23, Art. XVIII.
Advertising entities affected by paragraph (2), Section 11 of Article XV1 of this Constitution shall have five years from its ratification to comply on a graduated and proportionate basis with the minimum Filipino ownership requirement therein.
U. Autonomy of local governments
Sec. 25, Art. II:
The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Read also Art. X.
League of Provinces of the Philippines v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013:
The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization"; it does not make the local governments sovereign within the State or an imperium in imperio [Basco v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991].
The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign within the State.
Administrative autonomy may involve the devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress under Art. X of the Constitution.
Limbonas v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989:
Relative to the establishment of the autonomous regional governments in Regions IX and XII, the Court distinguished between decentralization of administration and decentralization of power.
decentralization of power — abdication by the national government of governmental powers
decentralization of administration — delegation of administrative powers to the local government unit in order to broaden the base of governmental powers.
Lina v. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001:
The Supreme Court said that the basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Without meaning to detract from that policy, Congress retains control of the local government units although in a significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy.
The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall.
True, there are notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on local government units of the power to tax [Sec. 5, Art. X], which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority.
City of General Santos v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014:
The Court declared that local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and reorganize. The power is inferred from Sec. 76, Local Government Code, on organizational structure and staffing pattern, and Sec. 16, otherwise known as the general welfare clause.
In Enrique Betoy v. Board of Directors, National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 156556-57, October 4, 2011, it was held that the streamlining of organization for a more efficient system must pass the test of good faith. In General Santos, the reorganization, which included enticing employees to retire earlier than the compulsory retirement age of 65, was a valid exercise of local autonomy because it was done in good faith.
Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002:
However, even as we recognize that the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of general supervision by the President.
On the President's power of general supervision, however, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law.
The President or any of his alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.
Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
Province of Negros Occidental v. The Commissioners, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010:
Because the President exercises only the power of general supervision over local government units, the grant of additional compensation, like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits to local government officials and employees, does not require the approval of the President for validity.
V. Equal access of opportunities for public service
Sec. 26, Art. II:
The State shall guarantee equal access of opportunities for public service,
and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Read also Sec. 13, Art. VII; Secs. 1-2, Art. XIII.
Sec. 13, Art. VII
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Secs. 1-2, Art. XIII.
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
Pamatong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004:
The Supreme Court said that this provision does not bestow a right to seek the Presidency; it does not contain a judicially enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for legislative action. The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many as possible into public office. The privilege may be subjected to limitations. One such valid limitation is the provision of the Omnibus Election Code on nuisance candidates.
Maquera v. Borra, G.R. No. L-24761, September 7, 1965:
The Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional R.A. No. 4421 that required all candidates for elective public office to post a surety bond equivalent to one year's salary of the position to which he is aspiring, subject to forfeiture if he fails to get at least 10% of the votes cast except if declared winner. These property qualifications, according to the Court, are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same.
W. Honest public service and full public disclosure
Sec. 27, Art. II:
The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
Sec. 28, Art. II:
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest.
Read also Sec. 7, Art. III;
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Secs. 12 & 20, Art. VI;
The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.
Sec. 20, Art. VII;
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
Sec. 4, Art. IX-D;
The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit, and recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall submit such other reports as may be required by law.
Secs. 4-15 & 17, Art. XI;
A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
Secs. 12 & 21, Art. XII.
The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public.
See Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987
Valmonte v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989;
Garcia v. Board of Investments, G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990;
Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, G.R. No. 92541, November 13, 1991.
CASES FROM SYLLABUS
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES (Article II of the 1987 Constitution)
A. Principles
1. Sovereignty of the People and Republicanism
Pablo Ocampo v. HRET, G.R. No. 158466. June 15, 2004
In the May 14, 2001 elections, Mario "Mark Jimenez" Crespo was proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila, having received 32,097 votes, a margin of 768 over Pablo V. Ocampo, who received 31,329 votes.
Ocampo filed an electoral protest before the HRET, alleging various irregularities (misreading of votes, falsification, substitution of returns, use of spurious ballots, etc.).
Separate from the protest, the HRET, in other cases, declared Crespo ineligible for the office due to lack of residence in the district and ordered him to vacate his seat.
Ocampo then moved to implement Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, arguing that since Crespo was disqualified, the votes cast for him should not be counted, and as the second placer, Ocampo should be declared the winner.
The HRET denied Ocampo’s motion, holding that a second placer cannot be proclaimed the winner in place of a disqualified candidate, citing established jurisprudence.
Whether the second placer (Ocampo) can be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman after the disqualification of the winning candidate (Crespo) for lack of residence, even if the disqualification was declared after the election. NO.
The Supreme Court dismissed Ocampo’s petition and upheld the HRET’s ruling that the second placer cannot be proclaimed the winner.
The Court emphasized that under Section 6 of RA 6646 (1988), for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray," there must be a final judgment of disqualification before the election.
In this case, Crespo’s disqualification was declared almost two years after the election, so the votes cast for him could not be considered stray.
The Court explained the rationale: voters who cast their ballots for a candidate not yet disqualified by final judgment did so bona fide, believing the candidate was qualified. To disregard their votes after the fact would disenfranchise the majority and violate the principles of republicanism and democracy.
The doctrine reaffirmed that the second placer cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event of the disqualification of the winning candidate after the election. The law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who obtained a plurality of votes, not the next highest candidate.
“Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily give the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the elective office... To proclaim him as the duly elected representative in the stead of protestee would be anathema to the most basic precepts of republicanism and democracy as enshrined within our Constitution. In effect, we would be advocating a massive disenfranchisement of the majority of the voters...”
2. Separation of powers
In Re: Laureta and Maravilla, 148 SCRA 382 (1987) G.R. No. 68635, August 29, 1987
Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was a litigant in G.R. No. 68635, which was dismissed by the SC First Division through three minute resolutions (May 14, July 9, and Sept. 3, 1986).
Dissatisfied, she sent personal letters to four (4) Supreme Court Justices — Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano — making scurrilous accusations and dangling the threat of an investigation.
She accused them of:
Rendering an “unjust” resolution with “deliberate bad faith”.
“Railroading” the dismissal with unprecedented haste.
It appeared that her counsel, Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, encouraged and abetted his client in denigrating the members of the First Division by baselessly charging them with misconduct.
The Supreme Court found the statements “transcend the permissible bounds of propriety” and made with manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and degrade the administration of justice.
Both Maravilla-Ilustre and Laureta were required to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt.
Whether the contempt proceedings should be dismissed on the ground that the letters to the individual Justices were private in character and never meant for anybody else. NO.
Letters become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court when they relate to the performance of judicial functions.
Reliance on “privacy of communications” is misplaced:
Communications to individual Justices about their official duties are not private.
They form part of the judicial record and are subject to the Court’s collective authority.
The fact that:
The letters were not technically pleadings, or
Were sent after the main petition had been finally resolved, does not lessen the gravity of the contempt committed.
Freedom of speech and right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for acts that are contemptuous and intended to undermine the Court.
Judicial independence is essential to the separation of powers. Attempts to influence, intimidate, or degrade the Court through private communications to individual Justices — especially with threats and baseless accusations — are contemptuous acts. Such letters are part of the judicial record and fall under the Court’s collective concern, not protected by privacy or free speech guarantees.
Demetria vs Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987), G.R. No. 71977, 27 February 1987
Petitioners: Demetrio G. Demetria and several Members of the Batasang Pambansa, suing as:
Concerned citizens
Taxpayers
Legislators representing millions of constituents
Respondents: Manuel Alba (Minister of the Budget) and Victor Macalingcag (Treasurer of the Philippines).
Challenged Provision: First paragraph, Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977), which authorized:
Petitioners’ Claim:
This provision violates the Constitution by allowing illegal transfers of public funds.
It fails to specify objectives and purposes for such transfers.
It overrides constitutional safeguards on appropriations.
It unduly delegates legislative power to the Executive.
Constitutional Reference (1973 Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 16[5]; now 1987 Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25[5]):
No law shall authorize any transfer of appropriations, except that certain officials (President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, heads of Constitutional Commissions) may be authorized by law to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Whether Paragraph 1, Section 44 of P.D. 1177, authorizing the President to transfer funds between departments, is constitutional. NO.
The Supreme Court declared the first paragraph of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 null and void for being unconstitutional.
The Constitution vests the power of appropriation exclusively in the legislature. The executive may only be given limited authority to augment items in the GAA for their respective offices, and only from savings in other items of their appropriations.
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
The Court emphasized that the prohibition against transfer of appropriations is explicit and categorical. The only exception is the limited authority to augment items from savings, and only for the respective offices of the officials named in the Constitution.
The Court reiterated that a sufficient standard is required in any law delegating legislative power. This standard must map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority by defining legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected.
This requirement is intended to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the legislature to the delegate.
In this case, the law (P.D. 1177) failed to provide such a standard, allowing the President to transfer funds without the necessary limitations and safeguards.
The provision in question allowed the President to transfer funds "indiscriminately" between departments, bureaus, and offices, without regard to whether the funds to be transferred were actually savings, or whether the transfer was for the purpose of augmenting an item.
The Court found that this overstepped the limited leeway granted by the Constitution, amounting to an undue delegation of legislative power and violating the principle of separation of powers.
"The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body."
3. Delegation of powers; Test for valid delegation
Jaworski v. Pagcor, G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004
Senator Robert S. Jaworski filed a petition to nullify the “Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming” executed by PAGCOR in favor of Sports and Games Entertainment Corporation (SAGE). The agreement allowed SAGE to operate:
Sports betting stations in PAGCOR casinos
Internet gaming facilities for local and international bettors
Jaworski argued that:
PAGCOR’s legislative franchise under P.D. No. 1869 did not authorize internet gambling.
Internet gambling transcends Philippine territorial jurisdiction, violating Section 14 of P.D. 1869.
The franchise granted to PAGCOR could not be “shared” or “delegated” to SAGE.
Whether PAGCOR is authorized under P.D. No. 1869 to grant another entity (SAGE) the authority to operate internet gambling. NO.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Senator Jaworski, declaring the grant of authority to SAGE as null and void.
The Court held that PAGCOR acted beyond its authority by sharing or delegating its franchise to SAGE. PAGCOR’s legislative franchise did not include the power to grant a sub-franchise or to allow another entity to operate internet gambling under its authority.
The Court emphasized that a legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the State, which cannot be exercised at will or delegated unless expressly authorized by law.
The doctrine of delegata potestas non potest delegare (a delegated power cannot be further delegated) was applied. PAGCOR’s charter did not expressly allow it to delegate or share its franchise.
The Court cited the Del Mar case, reiterating that PAGCOR may only operate, maintain, and manage gambling activities by itself, not in association with or through other entities.
The Court further explained that SAGE must obtain its own legislative franchise from Congress to legally operate online gambling, and cannot "ride on" PAGCOR’s franchise.
"While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so... SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not 'ride on' PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.”
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922)
During the American colonial period, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2868, which authorized the Governor-General to fix the price of rice and other foodstuffs in the Philippines.
The law was passed in response to food shortages and price manipulation during World War I.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, was prosecuted for selling rice at a price higher than that fixed by the Governor-General under the authority of Act No. 2868.
Ang Tang Ho challenged the validity of the law, arguing that it constituted an undue delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General.
Whether Act No. 2868, which authorized the Governor-General to fix the price of rice and other foodstuffs, constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power. YES.
The Supreme Court declared Act No. 2868 unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. The conviction of Ang Tang Ho was reversed and he was acquitted.
The Supreme Court held that the power to fix the price of rice and other foodstuffs is essentially legislative in nature.
The law (Act No. 2868) failed to provide any standard, rule, or limitation to guide the Governor-General in exercising the power to fix prices.
"The law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except to enforce it."
In this case, the law left it entirely to the discretion of the Governor-General to determine when, how, and at what price rice and other foodstuffs should be sold, without any legislative standard or policy.
The absence of sufficient standards or limitations meant that the law was not complete and thus amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Pelaez vs Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965)
The President of the Philippines issued several executive orders creating new municipalities.
Emmanuel Pelaez, then Vice-President and a taxpayer, challenged these executive orders, arguing that the creation of municipalities is a legislative function and cannot be exercised by the President.
Pelaez contended that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, which purportedly authorized the President to create municipalities, was unconstitutional as it amounted to an undue delegation of legislative power.
The Auditor General had sanctioned the expenditures for these new municipalities, prompting Pelaez to seek judicial intervention.
Whether Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, which authorizes the President to create municipalities by executive order, constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. YES.
The Supreme Court declared the executive orders creating new municipalities null and void.
The Supreme Court held that the creation of municipal corporations is strictly a legislative function. The power to create municipalities cannot be delegated to the President, as it involves the exercise of legislative power.
The Court explained that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not provide a sufficient standard or policy to guide the President in exercising the power to create municipalities. The law failed to meet the requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power.
The Court emphasized two essential tests for valid delegation:
Completeness Test: The law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so that nothing is left to the discretion of the delegate except to implement it.
Sufficient Standard Test: The law must fix a standard to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power.
Section 68 failed both tests. It did not enunciate any policy or provide a sufficiently precise standard to avoid the dangers of unfettered discretion.
The Court further noted that the President’s power of control over executive departments does not extend to the creation of new municipal corporations, which is a power greater than mere control and is reserved for Congress.
"It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature... the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is 'strictly a legislative function'... or 'solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power'..."
The Court also observed that the executive orders were issued after Congress failed to pass the bills for the creation of the municipalities, underscoring that the President was exercising a power reserved for the legislature.
People vs. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
The case centers on Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers), which penalized certain acts against teachers with either a fine (P100–P1,000) or imprisonment, “in the discretion of the court.”
The law specified the range for the fine but did not specify any minimum or maximum duration for imprisonment.
A case was filed for violation of this law. The trial court judge (Judge Dacuycuy) ruled that the law was constitutional but that cases for its violation fell outside the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, remanding the case for preliminary investigation.
The constitutionality of the penal provision, specifically the imprisonment penalty, was challenged on the grounds that it was an undue delegation of legislative power and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Whether Section 32 of RA 4670, which provides for imprisonment “in the discretion of the court” without specifying a minimum or maximum duration, constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative power. YES.
The Supreme Court declared the imprisonment penalty under Section 32 of RA 4670 unconstitutional for being an invalid delegation of legislative power.
The Court emphasized that while the legislature may delegate to courts the discretion to fix the length of imprisonment within designated limits, it cannot leave the determination of both the minimum and maximum duration entirely to the courts.
The absence of any statutory standard or range for imprisonment gives the courts “wide latitude of discretion, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard,” which is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The Court explained that valid delegation requires the law to be complete in all its terms and conditions (completeness test) and to provide a sufficient standard to guide the delegate (sufficient standard test).
In this case, the law failed the sufficient standard test because it did not provide any parameters for the court’s discretion regarding the duration of imprisonment.
The Court also noted that the presumption of constitutionality must yield when a law clearly violates the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
“It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits will constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality has to yield.”
Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 (1919)
In October 1918, Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila, with the assistance of the Chief of Police, ordered the roundup of approximately 170 women labeled as "women of ill repute" (prostitutes) from Manila.
These women were forcibly taken from their homes at midnight, placed on steamers, and sent to Davao, Mindanao, allegedly to be employed as laborers.
The women were not charged with any crime, nor was there any judicial order for their removal or detention.
Relatives and friends of the women filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging illegal deprivation of liberty.
The respondents (Mayor Lukban and others) argued that the women were not under their custody and that the act was for the public good.
Whether the Mayor of Manila and the Chief of Police could lawfully order the forcible removal and "deportation" of the women from Manila to Davao without judicial process or legal basis. NO.
The Supreme Court held that the forcible removal and detention of the women, without any judicial order or due process, was a gross violation of their constitutional rights to liberty and due process.
The Court emphasized that the writ of habeas corpus is available to all persons who are illegally deprived of their liberty, regardless of their social status or reputation.
The act of the Mayor and the Chief of Police was condemned as an abuse of power and a violation of the fundamental principle that government officials are bound by law.
"Ours is a government of laws and not of men. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The rights of the humblest citizen must be respected by the most exalted public official."
Delegation of Powers; Test for Valid Delegation:
The Court underscored that public officials may only exercise powers expressly granted by law or necessary to carry out their official duties. Any act outside such authority, especially those affecting fundamental rights, is void.
The test for valid delegation requires that the law must provide sufficient standards to guide and limit the exercise of delegated power. In this case, there was no law or ordinance authorizing the Mayor to deport individuals without due process.
The case is a landmark affirmation of the rule of law and the limits of executive power. It established that:
No person may be deprived of liberty without due process of law.
Public officials are not above the law and must act within the bounds of their legal authority.
The writ of habeas corpus is a fundamental safeguard against arbitrary and illegal detention.
4. Incorporation Clause and Adherence to International Law
Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1952)
Boris Mejoff, an alien of Kusaian descent, was brought to the Philippines by Japanese forces during World War II as a secret operative.
After liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy by U.S. Army Counter Intelligence and later turned over to the Philippine Commonwealth Government.
The People's Court ordered his release, but the Deportation Board found him illegally in the country and referred his case to immigration authorities.
The Board of Commissioners of Immigration ordered his deportation to Russia, but repeated attempts to deport him failed as no ship or country would accept him.
Mejoff was detained for over two years while awaiting deportation, first in Cebu Provincial Jail, then in Bilibid Prison.
Mejoff filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that his prolonged detention was unlawful since no criminal charges were filed against him and deportation was not possible.
Whether a prospective deportee, against whom no criminal charges have been filed and whose deportation cannot be effected, may be indefinitely detained without bail. NO.
The Court recognized that while aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum, the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law extends to all residents, not just citizens, except enemy aliens.
The Court emphasized that prolonged and indefinite detention of a deportee, when actual deportation is not possible, is unwarranted and violates fundamental rights.
The Court invoked the Incorporation Clause of the Philippine Constitution, which states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."
The Court cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), particularly the right to liberty and protection against arbitrary detention, as part of the law of the land.
The Court held that the principles set forth in the UDHR, being part of international law, are incorporated into Philippine law and must be observed in administrative proceedings such as deportation.
The Court further ruled that bail may be granted to a prospective deportee in recognition of these rights, especially when the person is not charged with any crime and there is no reasonable prospect of actual deportation.
"It is no less true however, as impliedly stated in this Court's decision, supra, that foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no charge has been made other than that their permission to stay has expired, may not indefinitely be kept in detention. The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality."
Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)
President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 229 in 1974, requiring all motor vehicle owners in the Philippines to carry and use early warning devices (EWDs)—specifically, triangular, reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors—to be placed at least four meters away from a stalled or disabled vehicle, both in front and at the rear.
The LOI was based on the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals, which the Philippines ratified through Presidential Decree No. 207 (1973), making the Convention part of Philippine law.
The Land Transportation Commissioner was tasked to implement the LOI, including issuing rules and regulations and ensuring compliance.
Petitioner Agustin, a car owner, challenged the validity of LOI No. 229 (as amended by LOI No. 479 and implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 32), arguing that it violated due process, constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power, and was oppressive, arbitrary, and confiscatory.
Agustin claimed that his vehicle was already equipped with blinking lights, which could serve as an early warning device, and that the requirement to purchase a specific EWD was unnecessary and burdensome.
Whether the administrative rule (LOI No. 229, as amended), requiring the use of early warning devices for motor vehicles, is valid and constitutional, particularly in light of the Philippines’ adherence to the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals. YES.
Validity of the LOI and Administrative Rule:
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of LOI No. 229 (as amended), ruling that it was a proper exercise of the State’s police power to promote public safety on roads and highways.
The Court found no violation of due process, equal protection, or unlawful delegation of legislative power. The requirement was not oppressive or confiscatory, as it was based on sound policy and international standards.
Incorporation Clause and Adherence to International Law:
The Court emphasized the Incorporation Clause of the 1973 Constitution (now found in Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution), which provides that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) was applied, recognizing that the Philippines, having ratified the Vienna Convention, is bound to implement its provisions in good faith.
The Court noted that the Vienna Convention recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices, and the LOI was a direct implementation of this international commitment.
"Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways, or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic."
The Court also highlighted that the President had sufficient factual basis and statistical data to justify the issuance of the LOI, and that the measure was not arbitrary but a result of careful study.
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115 (1957)
Republic Act No. 1180 (Retail Trade Nationalization Law) was enacted, prohibiting aliens from engaging in the retail trade business in the Philippines.
Ichong, a Chinese national, along with other alien residents and affected corporations/partnerships, challenged the constitutionality of the law.
Petitioners argued that the law violated due process, equal protection, and international treaty obligations, specifically the Treaty of Amity with China and the United Nations Charter.
The Solicitor General and the Fiscal of Manila defended the law as a valid exercise of police power, necessary for national economic survival, and not in violation of any treaty or constitutional provision.
Whether Republic Act No. 1180, which nationalizes the retail trade and prohibits aliens from engaging in it, is unconstitutional for violating the Incorporation Clause and international law obligations. NO.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1180 and denied the petition. The law was declared a valid exercise of the State’s police power, and costs were awarded against the petitioner.
The Court recognized the doctrine of incorporation—that generally accepted principles of international law are part of the law of the land.
However, the Court clarified that when there is a conflict between international law (including treaties) and municipal (domestic) law, municipal law prevails in the Philippine legal system.
"The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause... In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts... The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty." — Secretary of Justice v. Lantion (2000), citing Ichong v. Hernandez
The Court further held that police power—the authority of the State to enact laws to promote public welfare—cannot be bargained away or restricted by treaty or contract. Thus, even if a treaty existed, it could not curtail the State’s power to regulate for the public good.
In Re Garcia; 2 SCRA 984 (1961)
Petitioner: Arturo Efren Garcia, a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage.
Education & Practice Abroad:
Completed Bachillerato Superior in Spain.
Admitted to the Central University of Madrid, earned the degree Licenciado en Derecho (equivalent to Bachelor of Laws).
Authorized to practice law in Spain.
Basis of Petition:
Invoked the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain.
Claimed the treaty entitled him to practice law in the Philippines without taking the bar examination.
Treaty Provision Cited:
Nationals of each country who have obtained recognition of their academic degrees may practice their professions in the other country, subject to the laws and regulations of the host country.
Key Context:
Garcia was not a Spanish national seeking to practice in the Philippines; he was a Filipino citizen seeking to practice in his own country.
Admission to the Philippine Bar is governed by the Rules of Court, which require passing the Philippine Bar Examination.
Whether Philippine courts are bound to apply international law over conflicting municipal law, in light of the Incorporation Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. NO.
The Supreme Court held that Philippine courts, as organs of municipal law, are bound by domestic statutes and rules in all circumstances, even in the face of conflicting international law.
Separation of Powers and Rule-Making Power:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the judiciary, as a co-equal branch of government, has exclusive authority over the promulgation of rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.
This power is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court and cannot be encroached upon by the legislative or executive branches.
Courts as Organs of Municipal Law:
The Court reiterated that Philippine courts are fundamentally organs of municipal (domestic) law.
As such, they are bound to apply and enforce domestic statutes and rules, even if these conflict with international law.
The doctrine of incorporation means that international law is part of the law of the land, but it does not have primacy over national statutes or the Constitution.
Incorporation Clause and International Law:
The Court clarified that while the Incorporation Clause recognizes international law as part of Philippine law, this does not mean that international law is superior to domestic law.
In cases of irreconcilable conflict, municipal law prevails, and courts must uphold domestic statutes and constitutional provisions.
"Courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances." — In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 (1961)
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court is exclusive, and the separation of powers doctrine prevents other branches from interfering with this judicial prerogative.
5. Supremacy of Civilian Authority
6. Government as protector & People as Defenders of the State
People vs. Lagman and Zosa, 66 Phil. 13 (1938)
Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa, both Filipino citizens, reached the age of 20 in 1936.
They were required by law (Commonwealth Act No. 1, the National Defense Law) to register for military service.
Both were duly notified by authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board for registration.
Despite the notices, neither Lagman nor De Sosa registered for military service.
De Sosa claimed he was fatherless and had to support his mother and young brother; Lagman claimed he had to support his father, had no military inclination, and did not wish to kill or be killed.
Whether compulsory military service under the National Defense Law violates the Constitution or is excused by personal or family circumstances. NO.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Lagman and De Sosa.
The Court held that compulsory military service is a constitutional duty of the government and its citizens.
The fact that the accused had dependents or personal objections did not excuse them from registering for military service.
The Court emphasized that the government has the right and duty to require citizens to render military service for the defense of the State.
The constitutional principle that the government is the protector of the people, and the people are defenders of the State, was reinforced.
The government may require citizens, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.
Personal or family hardships do not exempt citizens from this duty.
7. Separation of Church and State
B. Policies
1. Independent foreign policy and a nuclear-free Philippines
Bayan v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United States was signed on February 10, 1998, providing the framework for the temporary presence of U.S. military personnel in the Philippines for joint military exercises under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.
The VFA covered matters such as entry and departure of U.S. personnel, criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessels and aircraft, and tax exemptions for U.S. military property.
President Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998, and transmitted it to the Senate, which concurred by a two‑thirds vote on May 27, 1999.
Petitioners — legislators, NGOs, and citizens — challenged the VFA’s constitutionality, arguing it violated:
Section 25, Article XVIII (foreign military bases, troops, or facilities)
Section 8, Article II (nuclear‑free Philippines)
The principle of independent foreign policy under Section 7, Article II.
They claimed the VFA allowed foreign troops without sufficient safeguards, undermined sovereignty, and failed to ensure the Philippines remained free of nuclear weapons.
Whether the VFA is constitutional, particularly in light of:
The requirements of Section 25, Article XVIII on foreign military presence.
The constitutional policy of an independent foreign policy.
The constitutional ban on nuclear weapons under Section 8, Article II.
The VFA is constitutional.
On Section 25, Article XVIII:
The VFA involves the presence of foreign troops and thus falls under this provision. The requirements were met — it is a treaty, concurred in by at least two‑thirds of the Senate, and recognized as a treaty by the U.S.
On independent foreign policy:
The Court held that the conduct of foreign relations, including entering into defense agreements, is within the President’s constitutional authority as chief architect of foreign policy, subject to Senate concurrence. The VFA was a policy decision within this sphere.
On nuclear‑free Philippines:
The Court found no evidence that the VFA allows the entry of nuclear weapons. The constitutional ban remains in force, and any attempt to bring nuclear weapons into the country would be unlawful. The VFA does not repeal or amend this prohibition.
The petitions were dismissed for lack of merit; the President and Senate acted within their constitutional powers.
“We find nothing in the VFA which allows the entry of nuclear weapons into the country. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land and any provision of the VFA which is inconsistent with it is void and inoperative. The constitutional ban on nuclear weapons is absolute and covers all kinds of nuclear weapons without distinction. Thus, even without an express provision in the VFA banning nuclear weapons, the prohibition in the Constitution stands and must be complied with.”
Lim v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002
In January 2002, U.S. military personnel began arriving in Mindanao to participate with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in “Balikatan 02‑1”, a large‑scale joint military training exercise.
The exercise was framed as a mutual counter‑terrorism advising, assisting, and training activity against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), under the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) of 1999.
Petitioners (citizens, lawyers, and party‑list groups) sought to stop the deployment, claiming it was unconstitutional because:
The MDT applies only to external armed attacks, not to internal threats like the ASG.
The VFA does not authorize U.S. troops to engage in combat in the Philippines.
The Constitution prohibits foreign military bases, troops, or facilities without a treaty, and mandates an independent foreign policy and a nuclear‑free Philippines.
The Terms of Reference (TOR) for Balikatan stated that U.S. forces would not engage in combat except in self‑defense, would not establish permanent bases, and would operate jointly with AFP forces.
Whether the conduct of “Balikatan 02‑1” with U.S. troops in the Philippines is constitutional under the MDT and VFA, consistent with the constitutional mandates on independent foreign policy and a nuclear‑free Philippines.
Petition dismissed.
The Court held that:
The VFA, concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the U.S., is the controlling agreement that allows temporary visits of U.S. personnel for activities approved by the Philippine government.
“Balikatan 02‑1” falls within the allowable “activities” under the VFA, which include joint training and related military exercises; the TOR’s limits (no combat except in self‑defense, no permanent bases) keep it within constitutional bounds.
Neither the MDT nor the VFA authorizes U.S. forces to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory; any such action would be unconstitutional.
The nuclear‑free policy in Sec. 8, Art. II remains absolute; nothing in the VFA or Balikatan authorizes the entry of nuclear weapons.
The President, as chief architect of foreign policy, has discretion to enter into such defense arrangements, subject to constitutional and treaty requirements.
“We find nothing in the VFA which allows the entry of nuclear weapons into the country. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land and any provision of the VFA which is inconsistent with it is void and inoperative. The constitutional ban on nuclear weapons is absolute and covers all kinds of nuclear weapons without distinction. Thus, even without an express provision in the VFA banning nuclear weapons, the prohibition in the Constitution stands and must be complied with.”
2. A just and dynamic social order
Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872. April 13, 2004
Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President in the 2004 national elections.
The COMELEC, through Resolution No. 6558 (Jan. 17, 2004), refused to give due course to his candidacy, declaring him a nuisance candidate for lacking the capacity to wage a nationwide campaign and/or not being nominated by a political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong moved for reconsideration, claiming he had numerous national organizations, the capacity to campaign nationally and internationally, and a platform of government.
COMELEC denied his motion via Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 (Feb. 11, 2004), along with similar motions from other aspirants.
He filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the disqualification violated his constitutional right to equal access to opportunities for public service (Sec. 26, Art. II, 1987 Constitution) and limited the people’s choice of leaders.
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in disqualifying petitioner as a nuisance candidate, allegedly violating the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, which he linked to the broader aims of a just and dynamic social order.
The Supreme Court held that Sec. 26, Art. II is not self‑executing and does not create a judicially enforceable right to run for public office; it is a policy directive for legislative or executive action.
The privilege to run for public office is subject to reasonable limitations under law, such as those in Sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 on nuisance candidates.
Such limitations are valid if applied equally and without discrimination, and serve the State’s compelling interest in ensuring orderly, credible, and efficient elections.
The Court recognized the practical and financial burdens of allowing candidates without a bona fide intention or capability to run, noting that this could impair the electoral process and waste public resources.
However, the Court could not determine from the record whether COMELEC’s factual finding that Pamatong was a nuisance candidate was correct, as the evidence considered was not before it.
The case was remanded to the COMELEC for reception of further evidence, with instructions to observe due process.
“Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions.”
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940)
Maximo Calalang, a private citizen and taxpayer of Manila, filed a petition for prohibition against officials including the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, the Director of Public Works, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Mayor of Manila, and the Acting Chief of Police.
The National Traffic Commission recommended, and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications approved, a regulation prohibiting animal‑drawn vehicles from using certain busy streets in Manila (Rosario Street and part of Rizal Avenue) during specified hours for one year after the opening of the Colgante Bridge.
Calalang argued that Commonwealth Act No. 548, which authorized the Director of Public Works (with approval) to regulate traffic on national roads, was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and that the regulation infringed on personal liberty, property rights, and the constitutional mandate to promote social justice.
Whether the delegation of authority under C.A. No. 548 to regulate and control traffic on national roads was valid, and whether the prohibition on animal‑drawn vehicles violated constitutional rights, including the promotion of social justice and the general welfare.
Yes, the delegation was valid; No, the regulation did not violate constitutional rights.
The Court held that:
The law did not delegate the power to make law, but only the authority to determine facts and circumstances for executing the legislative policy of promoting safe transit and avoiding obstructions.
The regulation was a valid exercise of the State’s police power to promote public convenience, safety, and welfare, even if it incidentally restricted certain liberties or affected specific trades.
Social justice is not favoritism toward one group but the equalization of social and economic forces to promote the welfare of all, consistent with the common good.
The measure was aimed at easing traffic congestion, a legitimate public welfare objective, and thus aligned with the State’s duty to promote a just and dynamic social order.
Petition for prohibition was denied.
“Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra‑constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time‑honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about ‘the greatest good to the greatest number.’”
APCD v. PCA, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998
The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) issued Board Resolution No. 018‑93 on March 24, 1993, declaring it would no longer require licenses or permits for the establishment or operation of coconut processing plants.
Under the resolution, PCA would only register processors for monitoring production volumes and administering quality standards.
The Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) challenged the resolution, claiming it was ultra vires (beyond PCA’s powers) and violated statutes regulating the coconut industry, which required licensing to prevent overcapacity and protect the industry.
APCD argued that deregulation would lead to overproduction, cut‑throat competition, and poor‑quality products, harming both the industry and coconut farmers.
PCA defended the resolution as consistent with the government’s policy of promoting free enterprise and reducing bureaucratic red tape.
Whether the PCA had the authority to abolish the licensing system for coconut processing plants and limit itself to mere registration and monitoring, in light of its statutory mandate to regulate the coconut industry for the general welfare.
No. The Supreme Court granted the petition and declared PCA Resolution No. 018‑93 null and void.
The Court held that:
The PCA’s enabling laws (P.D. Nos. 232, 961, 1468, 1644) established a regulatory framework to promote the integrated development of the coconut industry and ensure coconut farmers benefit from it.
Licensing was the mechanism for regulation; removing it amounted to an abdication of PCA’s statutory duty.
Free enterprise under the Constitution is not absolute — the State retains the power to intervene for the common good, distributive justice, and to prevent monopolies or destructive competition.
Any change in such regulatory policy must come from Congress, not an administrative agency.
The Court emphasized that dismantling protective regulations without legislative authority undermines the goal of a just and dynamic social order that promotes the welfare of all sectors, especially vulnerable producers like coconut farmers.
“Free enterprise does not call for removal of ‘protective regulations.’ Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez‑faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. This is clear from the following provisions of Art. XII of the Constitution which, so far as pertinent, state: Sec. 6. . . . Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands. Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.”
PLDT v. NTC, 190 SCRA 717 (1990)
ETCI, holder of a legislative franchise under R.A. No. 2090 to operate radio stations, applied with the NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) and provisional authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS) in Metro Manila.
PLDT opposed, arguing ETCI’s franchise did not cover CMTS, that PLDT had priority as an existing operator, and that granting authority would cause harmful duplication.
NTC ruled that “radiotelephony” in ETCI’s franchise could be liberally construed to include CMTS, found prima facie proof of ETCI’s legal, financial, and technical capability, and granted provisional authority for Phase A in Metro Manila.
The provisional authority required ETCI and PLDT to enter into an interconnection agreement so ETCI’s CMTS could connect to PLDT’s public switched telephone network.
PLDT sought to annul the NTC orders, claiming lack of jurisdiction, invalid franchise coverage, improper stock transfers, and that forced interconnection violated its rights.
Whether the NTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting ETCI provisional authority to operate a CMTS and ordering interconnection with PLDT, in light of constitutional and statutory policies on communication and information in nation‑building. NO.
The Supreme Court upheld the NTC’s orders.
NTC has jurisdiction and discretion to grant provisional authority after finding prima facie capability and public necessity.
ETCI’s franchise, liberally construed, covered CMTS as a form of radiotelephony.
Stock transfers did not amount to a franchise transfer requiring congressional approval; NTC approval sufficed.
Interconnection is mandated by law (R.A. No. 6849) and DOTC/NTC policies to promote rapid expansion of telecommunications, maximize facilities, and ensure nationwide access—consistent with the constitutional recognition of the vital role of communication and information in nation‑building.
Public need, interest, and the common good outweighed PLDT’s objections; no monopoly right exists under the Constitution.
“Article II, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution, recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation building. It is likewise a State policy to provide the environment for the emergence of communications structures suitable to the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country (Article XVI, Section 10, Ibid.). A modern and dependable communications network rendering efficient and reasonably priced services is also indispensable for accelerated economic recovery and development. To these public and national interests, public utility companies must bow and yield.”
Maquera v. Borra, G.R. No. L-24761, September 7, 1965
Republic Act No. 4421 required all candidates for national, provincial, city, and municipal offices to post a surety bond equal to one year’s salary or emoluments of the position sought.
The bond would be forfeited if the candidate (unless declared the winner) failed to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office, provided there were not more than four candidates for that office.
The COMELEC implemented the law by fixing specific bond amounts (e.g., ₱60,000 for President, ₱40,000 for Vice‑President, ₱32,000 for Senator or Congressman) and refusing to give due course to certificates of candidacy without the bond.
Petitioners argued that the law effectively imposed a property qualification for public office, disqualifying otherwise qualified candidates who could not afford the bond, and thus violated the Constitution’s democratic principles and social justice mandate.
Whether R.A. 4421, by requiring substantial surety bonds from candidates and forfeiting them under certain conditions, is constitutional in light of the principles of democracy, equal access to public service, and social justice under the Constitution. NO
The Supreme Court declared R.A. 4421 unconstitutional and void.
The Court held that:
The law imposed a property qualification inconsistent with the Constitution, which sets only age, citizenship, literacy, and residency requirements for elective office.
It denied equal opportunity for public service by barring poor but qualified candidates, contrary to the principle of social justice and the nature of a republican system where sovereignty resides in the people.
It restricted the electorate’s freedom to choose from all qualified candidates, violating the constitutional guarantee of free suffrage.
The measure was arbitrary and oppressive, as the bond was not tied to legitimate election expenses and disproportionately burdened those with fewer resources.
“Said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office.”
3. Respect for Human Dignity and Human Rights
4. The family as basic autonomous social institution
a. Protection of the Unborn
Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113
“Jane Roe” (a pseudonym for Norma McCorvey), a pregnant single woman, filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of Texas criminal abortion laws, which prohibited abortion except when necessary to save the mother’s life.
Dr. James Hallford, a physician facing abortion-related prosecutions, intervened; a married couple (the Does) also filed a related suit, though the wife was not pregnant.
A three‑judge U.S. District Court held that Roe and Hallford had standing, declared the Texas statutes void for vagueness and overbreadth, but denied injunctive relief.
The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal.
Whether state laws that criminalize abortion except to save the mother’s life violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by infringing on a woman’s right to privacy, and how that right balances against the state’s interest in protecting the health of the mother and the potential life of the unborn. YES
The laws are unconstitutional in their blanket prohibition, but the state’s interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling at viability.
The Court recognized a woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy under the constitutional right to privacy.
It established a trimester framework:
Before the end of the first trimester – the abortion decision is left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s physician.
After the first trimester until viability – the state may regulate abortion procedures in ways reasonably related to maternal health.
After viability – the state may regulate or prohibit abortion to protect the potential life of the unborn, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
The Texas statutes were struck down for failing to account for these distinctions and for prohibiting abortions regardless of pregnancy stage or other interests involved.
“For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization (June 24, 2022) – The Court upheld Mississippi’s 15‑week abortion ban and explicitly overruled Roe v. Wade, holding that the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion. The decision returned the authority to regulate abortion to the states.
b. Natural Right and Duty of Parents
Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 US 390
Robert T. Meyer, a teacher at Zion Parochial School in Nebraska, was convicted under a 1919 state law that prohibited teaching any subject in a language other than English to children who had not passed the eighth grade.
Meyer had taught reading in German to a 10‑year‑old student during school hours.
The law was intended to promote the use of English as the “mother tongue” and to discourage the influence of foreign languages and ideals, particularly in communities with large immigrant populations.
The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the conviction, viewing the statute as a valid exercise of the state’s police power.
Whether Nebraska’s law forbidding the teaching of modern foreign languages to young children in schools violates the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, including the rights of parents to control their children’s education and upbringing. YES
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the statute unreasonably infringed on the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
“Liberty” includes the rights of teachers to engage in their occupation, the rights of parents to engage teachers to educate their children, and the rights of children to acquire knowledge.
The Court recognized the natural duty of parents to provide their children with an education suited to their station in life, and that the state may not arbitrarily interfere with this right absent a reasonable and compelling justification.
While the state can require English instruction and regulate schools, it cannot completely prohibit the teaching of other languages in a way that infringes on fundamental rights.
“Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life, and nearly all the States, including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws.”
Pierce vs. Society of Sisters, 262 US 510
In 1922, Oregon voters passed the Compulsory Education Act, requiring all children aged 8–16 to attend public schools, with limited exceptions.
The law would take effect in 1926 and effectively eliminate most private primary schools.
The Society of Sisters (a Catholic organization operating schools and orphanages) and Hill Military Academy (a private school) sued to stop enforcement, arguing the Act would destroy their businesses and unlawfully interfere with parents’ rights to choose their children’s education.
They claimed the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them of property without due process and infringing on the liberty of parents and guardians.
Whether a state can compel all children to attend public schools, thereby prohibiting attendance at private schools, without violating the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of their children. NO
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Oregon Compulsory Education Act as unconstitutional.
The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of their children.
The State has no general power to “standardize its children” by forcing them to accept instruction only from public teachers
While the State may reasonably regulate all schools to ensure quality and protect welfare, it cannot unreasonably interfere with the family’s role in education
The decision affirmed that children are not mere creatures of the State and that those who nurture them have both the right and the duty to prepare them for life’s obligations.
“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”
Angeles vs Judge Sison, 112 SCRA 26 (1982)
Jose S. Angeles, a professor at FEU’s Institute of Technology, filed an administrative complaint against students Edgardo Picar and Wilfredo Patawaran for allegedly assaulting him at a restaurant during a faculty member’s birthday party.
The Dean, Gilberto Mercado, created a committee to investigate under FEU’s Code of Conduct.
The students argued the Dean had no authority because the incident happened off‑campus and outside school hours.
They obtained a preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance (CFI) stopping the investigation, which later became a permanent injunction.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court, asserting the school’s right to discipline students for misconduct that affects the school’s welfare, even if committed off‑campus.
Whether a school has the authority to investigate and discipline students for misconduct committed outside school premises and beyond school hours when such conduct directly affects the good order, welfare, and moral climate of the school. YES
The Supreme Court set aside the CFI decision and dissolved the injunction.
The Court held that while the general rule limits school authority to its premises, there are exceptions—such as when the misconduct affects the student’s status, the school’s reputation, or the moral climate essential to learning.
The alleged assault stemmed from the professor‑student relationship and was a continuation of animosity shown on campus; thus, it directly affected the school’s welfare.
Discipline is part of the school’s duty to assist the family in developing the moral character of the youth, aligning with the natural right and duty of parents to rear their children.
The administrative investigation could proceed independently of any criminal case.
“These statements clearly establish the necessity for an Administrative investigation of the alleged mauling incident because it cannot be denied that the same is a violation of the norms of decency and good taste which is antithetical to one of the school’s duties vis-à-vis the family, that of developing the moral character of the youth.”
5. Fundamental Equality of Men and Women
6. Promotion of Health and Ecology
7. A self-reliant and independent economic order
Tanada vs. Angara, G.R. 118295, May 2, 1997
Congress passed Republic Act No. 8762 (Retail Trade Liberalization Act), allowing foreign retailers to engage in domestic retail trade provided they meet minimum capitalization and other requirements.
Local retailers and lawmakers challenged the law, arguing it violated Section 19, Article II of the Constitution, which calls for “the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
Whether R.A. 8762 contravenes the constitutional policy mandating a self-reliant, independent economy effectively controlled by Filipinos by opening retail trade to foreign investors.
The Supreme Court upheld the law, holding that Section 19, Article II expresses a broad policy against foreign economic domination but does not require a Filipino monopoly in all economic sectors.
Congress has discretion to enact safeguards and conditions for foreign participation as long as overall Filipino control and national welfare are preserved
“Section 19, Article II of the Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, but it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment.”
8. Communication and information in nation-building
PLDT v. NTC, G.R. No. 88404, October 18, 1990
ETCI, holder of a legislative franchise under R.A. No. 2090 to operate radio stations, applied with the NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) and provisional authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS) in Metro Manila.
PLDT opposed, arguing ETCI’s franchise did not cover CMTS, that PLDT had priority as an existing operator, and that granting authority would cause harmful duplication.
NTC ruled that “radiotelephony” in ETCI’s franchise could be liberally construed to include CMTS, found prima facie proof of ETCI’s legal, financial, and technical capability, and granted provisional authority for Phase A in Metro Manila.
The provisional authority required ETCI and PLDT to enter into an interconnection agreement so ETCI’s CMTS could connect to PLDT’s public switched telephone network.
PLDT sought to annul the NTC orders, claiming lack of jurisdiction, invalid franchise coverage, improper stock transfers, and that forced interconnection violated its rights.
Whether the NTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting ETCI provisional authority to operate a CMTS and ordering interconnection with PLDT, in light of constitutional and statutory policies on communication and information in nation‑building. NO
The Supreme Court upheld the NTC’s orders.
NTC has jurisdiction and discretion to grant provisional authority after finding prima facie capability and public necessity.
ETCI’s franchise, liberally construed, covered CMTS as a form of radiotelephony.
Stock transfers did not amount to a franchise transfer requiring congressional approval; NTC approval sufficed.
Interconnection is mandated by law (R.A. No. 6849) and DOTC/NTC policies to promote rapid expansion of telecommunications, maximize facilities, and ensure nationwide access—consistent with the constitutional recognition of the vital role of communication and information in nation‑building.
Public need, interest, and the common good outweighed PLDT’s objections; no monopoly right exists under the Constitution.
“Article II, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution, recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation building. It is likewise a State policy to provide the environment for the emergence of communications structures suitable to the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the country (Article XVI, Section 10, Ibid.). A modern and dependable communications network rendering efficient and reasonably priced services is also indispensable for accelerated economic recovery and development. To these public and national interests, public utility companies must bow and yield.”
9. Autonomy of local governments
10. Recognition of rights of indigenous cultural communities
R.A. No. 8371 (1997), The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
Cruz vs. DENR Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, as citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 or IPRA) and its Implementing Rules.
They argued that the IPRA unlawfully deprived the State of ownership over lands of the public domain and natural resources, violating the Regalian Doctrine in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution.
They also claimed that the law’s broad definitions of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” could include private lands, infringing on private property rights, and that provisions granting the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) quasi‑judicial powers and applying customary law violated due process.
Respondents, including the NCIP, DENR, DBM, and intervenors (such as Sen. Juan Flavier, indigenous peoples’ groups, and the Commission on Human Rights), defended the law as a constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights and an instrument to correct historical injustices.
After deliberations, the Court was evenly divided (7–7) on the constitutionality of the challenged provisions.
Whether the provisions of the IPRA recognizing ownership and rights of indigenous peoples over ancestral domains and lands, and granting them certain rights over natural resources therein, violate the Constitution — particularly the Regalian Doctrine and State ownership of natural resources.
The petition was dismissed because the votes were equally divided, meaning no majority was reached to declare the law unconstitutional.
As a result, the IPRA and its Implementing Rules remained valid and in force.
The opinions upholding the law emphasized that the IPRA is consistent with the Constitution’s provisions on the recognition and promotion of the rights of indigenous cultural communities, and that ancestral domains are recognized under the concept of native title, which predates the Regalian Doctrine.
The recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights was seen as fulfilling the constitutional mandate to protect their ancestral lands and to respect their customs, traditions, and institutions.
“After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.”
11. Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure
Legaspi vs. CSC, 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
Valentin L. Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission (CSC) information on whether two Cebu City sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, were civil service eligibles.
The CSC refused to confirm or deny their eligibility.
Legaspi filed a petition for mandamus, invoking the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern and the State policy of full public disclosure.
Whether the public has the right to access information on the civil service eligibility of government employees, and whether the CSC has the ministerial duty to disclose it. YES.
The Court held that the civil service eligibility of a public employee is a matter of public concern.
Public office is a public trust, and citizens have a legitimate interest in ensuring that positions requiring eligibility are filled only by qualified persons.
There is no law exempting such information from disclosure, and the CSC has no discretion to refuse access.
The duty to disclose is ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus.
The CSC was ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian and confirm or deny the eligibility of the two employees.
“The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
Valmonte vs. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
Petitioners, mostly media practitioners, filed a petition for mandamus to compel GSIS General Manager Feliciano Belmonte to:
Provide a list of opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who allegedly obtained ₱2 million “clean loans” before the February 7, 1986 elections through the intercession of then First Lady Imelda Marcos.
Furnish certified true copies of the loan documents.
Allow access to public records containing the information.
GSIS refused, claiming a confidential relationship with borrowers and no obligation to disclose without a court order.
Petitioners argued that the loans involved public funds and public officials, making the matter one of public concern under the constitutional right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Whether the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern and the policy of full public disclosure compel the GSIS to allow access to documents evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa.
Yes, as to access to the loan documents; No, as to preparing a list of names.
The Court held that:
GSIS funds are public in nature, and their proper management is a legitimate concern of the public.
The borrowers were public officials, subject to closer public scrutiny, with a more limited right to privacy.
The constitutional right to information and the policy of full public disclosure apply to government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions.
There is no law granting GSIS confidentiality over such transactions.
However, the Constitution does not require custodians to prepare lists or summaries; the duty is only to allow inspection of existing records.
Petition granted in part — GSIS ordered to allow petitioners access to the loan documents, subject to reasonable regulations; request for a prepared list denied.
“In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.”
De Jesus vs. COA, G.R. 109023, August 12, 1998
Petitioners were employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) who, before July 1, 1989, received honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre‑Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law) took effect, consolidating allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates, with certain exceptions.
The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM‑CCC No. 10), which discontinued all allowances and fringe benefits on top of basic salary effective November 1, 1989.
Acting on this, the COA corporate auditor disallowed payment of petitioners’ honoraria.
Petitioners argued that DBM‑CCC No. 10 was inconsistent with R.A. 6758, void for lack of publication, and deprived them of benefits they were entitled to continue receiving under the law.
Whether DBM‑CCC No. 10, which disallowed payment of honoraria, had legal force and effect despite not being published in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation. NO
The Supreme Court held that DBM‑CCC No. 10 was ineffective and unenforceable for lack of the required publication.
The circular was not merely interpretative or internal; it implemented R.A. 6758 in a way that substantially reduced government employees’ income, thus affecting the public and requiring publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine in Tañada v. Tuvera.
The Court emphasized that before such a measure can deprive employees of benefits, they must be properly informed through publication to ensure fairness, transparency, and adherence to democratic principles.
“At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines — to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.”
Chavez v. PEA & Amari, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
In 1995, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Amari Coastal Bay Development Corp. to develop the Freedom Islands and reclaim an additional 250 hectares in Manila Bay.
The JVA was negotiated without public bidding and later criticized in the Senate as illegal and disadvantageous to the government.
In 1998, reports surfaced of on‑going renegotiations between PEA and Amari.
Francisco I. Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed a petition for mandamus to compel PEA to disclose the terms of the renegotiations and to stop the signing of any new agreement, invoking Sec. 28, Art. II (full public disclosure) and Sec. 7, Art. III (right to information) of the Constitution.
He argued that the sale of reclaimed lands to a private corporation violated Sec. 3, Art. XII of the Constitution.
Whether the constitutional right to information on matters of public concern includes access to official information on on‑going government negotiations before a final agreement, in line with the State policy of full public disclosure. YES.
The Supreme Court held that the right to information includes official information on on‑going negotiations before a final contract, provided the information constitutes definite propositions by the government and is not covered by recognized exceptions (e.g., national security, privileged communications).
The Court stressed that full transparency is essential to honest public service and democratic accountability, and that requiring a consummated contract before disclosure would defeat the purpose of the right.
PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to disclose terms of disposition of its property even without demand, especially since the law required public bidding.
The petition was allowed as a matter of transcendental public importance, and Chavez had locus standi as a citizen enforcing a public right.
“We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.”