Statutes setting up administrative authorities.
Rules, regulations, or orders of such administrative authorities promulgated pursuant to the purposes for which they were created.
Determinations, decisions, and orders of such administrative authorities made in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields.
Body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation, and effect of determinations and regulations of such administrative authorities.

3. Administration

[a] Meaning.

Understood in two different senses:

[i] As a function:

The execution, in non-judicial matters, of the law or will of the State as expressed by competent authority.
It is the activity of the executive officers of the government.

[ii] As an organization:

That group or aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins of government are for the time being.

Administration is both the function of execution of the law (or management of government affairs) and the totality of the executive and administrative authorities.

[b] Distinguished from government.

Government

Administration

refers to that "institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a civilized state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them."

Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society.

refers to the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins of government are entrusted by the people for the time being.

[c] Kinds

[i] Internal

Legal side of public administration,
e.g., matters concerning personnel, fiscal, and planning activities.

It treats the legal relations between the government and its administrative officers, and of the legal relations that one administrative officer or organ bears to another.

[ii] External

Deals with problems of government regulations,
e.g., regulation of lawful calling or profession, industries, or businesses.

It is concerned with the legal relations between administrative authorities and private interests.

B. Administrative Bodies or Agencies

1. Defined

Organ of government, other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties either through adjudication or rule-making.

2. Creation

They are created either by:

[a] Constitutional provision;

Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Commission on Audit (COA)
Office of the Ombudsman
Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)

[b] Legislative enactment; or

Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

[c] Authority of law.

These are typically created by the President under delegated authority from Congress:

Presidential Task Forces or Special Commissions
Investigative bodies under the Office of the President

3. Criterion

A body or agency is administrative where its function is primarily regulatory even if it conducts hearings and determines controversies to carry out its regulatory duty.
On its rule-making authority, it is administrative when it does not have discretion to determine what the law shall be but merely prescribes details for the enforcement of the law.

4. Types

GBBRR-CP

Bodies set up to function in situations where the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege

Examples:

Bureau of Lands
Philippine Veterans Administration (PVA)

Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain of the actual business of government

Examples:

Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
Bureau of Customs
Bureau of Immigration
Land Registration Authority

Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public

Examples:

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
Philippine National Railways
National Electrification Administration

Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest

Examples:

Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
Energy Regulatory Board
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)

Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking, under the police power, to regulate private business and individual

Examples:

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB)
Games and Amusement Board (GAB)
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)

Bodies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of a strong social policy involved

Examples:

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)

Bodies set up to make the government a private party

Example:

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)

II. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

A. Powers of Administrative Bodies

Quasi-legislative or rule-making power;
Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power; and
Determinative powers.

B. Quasi-Legislative Power

1. Nature

This is the exercise of delegated legislative power, involving no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.

Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Secretary Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006

The Supreme Court said that quasi-legislative power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separation of powers.

Petitioners, the Holy Spirit Homeowners Association and its president, challenged the National Government Center Administration Committee’s IRR under R.A. No. 9207, arguing provisions on beneficiary qualifications, lot sizes, a P700/sq.m. selling price, deadlines to execute Contracts to Sell, and a price-escalation penalty exceeded the statute and were arbitrary. The Supreme Court held the Committee acted within its quasi-legislative delegation under Section 5 of R.A. 9207, that the IRR provisions were germane and reasonable to the statute’s purpose, and dismissed the petition as prohibition was the improper remedy.

[a] Republic, represented by the Bureau of Food and Drugs (now Food and Drugs Administration) v. Drugmakers Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014

Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative powers only if there exists a law which delegates these powers to them.
Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself.

The FDA resumed enforcement of AO 67’s BA/BE testing requirement by issuing Circulars Nos. 1 and 8 in 1997 after local testing facilities became available, and respondents challenged those circulars as beyond FDA authority and lacking required procedures. The Supreme Court held the circulars merely administered an existing AO 67 requirement under RA 3720, were not substantive legislative rules needing prior hearing or publication, and therefore the circulars were valid and the RTC injunction was set aside.

[b] Rules and regulations issued by administrative authorities pursuant to the powers delegated to them have the force and effect of law; they are binding on all persons subject to them, and the courts will take judicial notice of them.

[c] Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres, 225 SCRA 417

Both Letters of Instruction and Executive Orders are presidential issuances; one may repeal or otherwise alter, modify, or amend the other, depending on which comes later.

DOLE suspended private recruitment for Hong Kong and POEA issued implementing circulars to take over processing, and PASEI challenged those issuances as beyond authority and procedurally defective. The Court held DOLE and POEA have power to regulate recruitment but struck down the specific issuances for failure to comply with required filing and publication formalities, and noted that later presidential issuances (Letters of Instruction or Executive Orders) supersede earlier ones when inconsistent.

[d] Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 149

It may be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the law into effect.
Thus, administrative regulations cannot extend the law or amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.

DAR’s Administrative Order allowed Land Bank to open trust accounts instead of depositing compensation in cash or Land Bank bonds as Section 16(e) of R.A. 6657 requires, and landowners sued to compel statutory-mode deposits. The Supreme Court held AO No. 9 invalid insofar as it substituted trust accounts, ruling that administrative regulations cannot contradict an explicit statutory mandate and must strictly implement the law.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 368

Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, but must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement.
They are intended to carry out, not to supplant nor to modify, the law.

Taxpayers challenged Commissioner rulings that they claimed conflicted with statutory tax law and the Court of Appeals reviewed the validity of those administrative issuances. The Supreme Court upheld the rule that administrative issuances must conform to and implement the statute and may not override or modify clear legislative provisions.

[e] Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116356, June 29, 1998

It is axiomatic that an administrative agency like the Philippine Ports Authority has no discretion whether or not to implement a law.
Its duty is to enforce the law.
Thus, if there is a conflict between PPA circulars and a law like E.O. 1088, the latter prevails.

Eastern Shipping refused to pay pilotage fees billed by a pilots association and relied on lower PPA circular rates while contesting the applicability of EO 1088, leading to trial and judgments awarding the unpaid fees. The Supreme Court held EO 1088 valid and controlling, declared conflicting PPA circulars void, and affirmed the award, stating agencies must implement the law and may not set rates below those prescribed by the EO.

[f] Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of Government.
It cannot be argued that Administrative Order No. 308 (prescribing a National Computerized Identification Reference System) merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987.
Such a national computerized identification reference system requires a delicate adjustment of various contending State policies—the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy against dossier-gathering by the Government, and the choice of policies.
It deals with a subject which should be covered by a law, not just an administrative order.

AO 308 directed the creation of a decentralized national computerized identification system and an inter-agency committee to implement it, prompting Ople to challenge the order as an unlawful exercise of legislative power that threatened privacy. The Supreme Court held AO 308 exceeded executive authority, ruled that creating such a national ID system requires an act of Congress rather than an administrative order, and declared the order void.

2. Kinds of Administrative Rules or Regulations

SIC

[a] Supplementary or detailed legislation

Republic (FDA) v. Drugmaker’s Laboratories, G.R. No. 190387, March 5, 2014

They are rules and regulations “to fix the details” in the execution and enforcement of a policy set out in the law.
They are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.
They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress.

Respondents’ CPR renewals were conditioned on satisfactory BA/BE tests and the FDA issued Circulars Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 to resume enforcement of the BA/BE requirement originally set out in AO 67 and RA 3720 after local testing became available. The Supreme Court held the circulars valid as implementing and detailing an existing statutory policy, set aside the RTC’s annulment, and ruled that no prior notice, hearing, or publication was necessary for their validity.

An example would be the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.

[b] Interpretative legislation

Republic v. Drugmaker’s Laboratories, supra

They are rules and regulations construing or interpreting the provisions of a statute to be enforced; they are intended to clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates.

Examples are BIR Circulars, Bangko Sentral Circulars, etc.

[i] Gonzalez v. Land Bank, 183 SCRA 520

They are binding on all concerned until they are changed; they have the force and effect of law, and are entitled to great respect; they have in their favor the presumption of legality.

Ramon A. Gonzales sought issuance of Land Bank bonds in his name as assignee of Ramos Plantation’s land transfer claim even though the assignor had not complied with several documentary and staged-release requirements imposed by the Land Bank. The Supreme Court held the Bank’s procedural requirements were valid and binding, affirmed the Court of Appeals, and denied Gonzales’s claim because assignee rights remain subject to lawful administrative conditions governing payment.

Manila Jockey Club v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103533, December 15, 1998

The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a subsequent correct application of the law.

Manila Jockey Club had been using racing “breakages” for club promotions under a long-standing informal practice, while PHILRACOM and the franchise statutes required those funds be distributed to specified public beneficiaries. The Supreme Court held that past administrative error does not create a legal entitlement to continue the practice and affirmed that the law must be correctly applied going forward, requiring allocation of breakages according to the franchise statutes.

[c] Contingent legislation

They are rules and regulations made by an administrative authority on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
See: Cruz v. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234.

Cruz sought to land imported cattle but the BAI refused under Act No. 3155, which barred cattle importation to prevent disease. The Supreme Court upheld the statute as a valid exercise of the police power, found the Director’s refusal within lawful administrative discretion, and denied Cruz’s petition.

3. Requisites for Validity

Issued under authority of law.
Within the scope and purview of the law.
Reasonable
Publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation

[a] Issued under authority of law.

There must be a valid law which delegates legislative powers to the administrative agency.
See: Olsen v. Aldanese, 43 Phil. 64.

Act No. 2613 empowered the Collector of Internal Revenue to prescribe rules for classification, inspection, and certification of tobacco for export, and the Collector issued Administrative Order No. 35 setting specific standards that petitioner’s machine-made, short-filler cigars failed to meet. The Supreme Court held A.O. 35 a valid exercise of the statutory delegation—because it reasonably implemented the statute’s purpose by fixing necessary standards—and upheld the Collector’s refusal to certify the shipment.

[i] Department of Health v. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, G.R. No. 202943, March 25, 2015

The Supreme Court ruled that R.A. 9211 (“An Act Regulating the Packaging, Use, Sale, Distribution and Advertisements of Tobacco Products”), or the “Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003,” repealed R.A. 7394 (“Consumer Act of the Philippines”), insofar as the Department of Health is authorized to regulate tobacco sales promotions.
Under the latter law, it is the Inter-Agency Committee-Tobacco (IAC-Tobacco) which has the exclusive power and function to administer and implement the provisions of R.A. 9211, which includes the conduct of regulating “promotion.”
Accordingly, the DOH’s ruling, including its construction of R.A. 9211 (i.e., that it completely banned tobacco advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships) is declared null and void.
The applications filed by Philip Morris for a sales promotion permit are remanded to IAC-Tobacco for appropriate action.
Notably, in the proper exercise of its rule-making power, nothing precludes IAC-Tobacco from designating any of its pilot agencies, including the DOH, to perform its multifarious functions under R.A. 9211.

Philip Morris applied for tobacco sales-promotion permits but DOH/FDA refused processing based on a DOH memorandum construing RA 9211 as a complete ban on tobacco promotions. The Supreme Court held that RA 9211, not the Consumer Act, governs tobacco-promotion regulation and vests implementation and permit authority in the collective body IAC‑Tobacco—so DOH’s unilateral construction was void and the permit applications were remanded to IAC‑Tobacco to be evaluated under the statutory framework and standards.

[ii] SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), G.R. No. 203655, March 18, 2015

It was held that NEDA JV Guidelines, providing for the co-organization of joint ventures between the government and a private entity, were duly promulgated executive issuances in the exercise of NEDA’s rule-making power, as granted by statute.
They must, therefore, be respected and followed, as they have the force and effect of law.

SM Land’s accepted unsolicited proposal for the Bonifacio South Property was not given the required competitive challenge by BCDA, and the Supreme Court ordered BCDA to subject the negotiated Certification to that mandatory challenge. The Court explained that the NEDA JV Guidelines were valid exercises of delegated rule‑making power that fix procedural details necessary to implement the statutory scheme, so those Guidelines have the force of law and bindingly require the competitive‑challenge process.

[b] Within the scope and purview of the law.

[i] Public Schools District Supervisors Association v. Hon. Edilberto de Jesus, G.R. No. 157299, June 19, 2006

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.
The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.
However, administrative bodies are allowed, under their power of subordinate legislation, to implement the broad policies laid down in the statute by “filling in” the details.
All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by law.

DepEd issued implementing rules that reassigned duties and changed salary classifications for district supervisors, and the supervisors challenged those rules as exceeding the statute’s authority. The Supreme Court ruled the rules invalid to the extent they expanded or altered statutory coverage, holding that agencies may only “fill in” details germane to the statute and cannot amend or extend the law.

[ii] Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 149

The Court nullified DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, which allowed the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for the property taken, because Sec. 16(e), R.A. 6657, is specific that the deposit must be made in “cash” or in “Land Bank bonds.”
The implementing regulation cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.

See also Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. Drilon, 176 SCRA 24.

COACO’s CBA provided crediting of contractual wage increases against any later statutory raises, and after RA 6640 increased minimum wages DOLE issued a rule interpreted to prohibit such crediting. The Supreme Court held the DOLE rule invalid because an implementing order cannot create a prohibition not found in the statute, and it granted COACO’s petition.

[iii] Luis Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179431, June 22, 2010

Administrative implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be issued for the sole purpose of carrying the law’s general provisions into effect.
The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

Luis K. Lokin Jr. was originally listed and published as CIBAC’s second nominee, but the party later filed an amended list and COMELEC applied IRRs to allow substitutions and canvass actions not explicitly provided by R.A. No. 7941. The Supreme Court held COMELEC’s IRRs invalid insofar as they created substitution procedures beyond the statute, ruling that administrative rules cannot expand or amend the law.

[iv] GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

On the issue of the validity of Resolution No. 9615, which limited the airtime within which national candidates and political parties may air political advertisements on television and radio to an “aggregate” 120 minutes and 180 minutes respectively (instead of “per station,” as in the 2010 elections), the Supreme Court ruled that this is an invalid administrative rule; that it is not within the power of COMELEC to effect such a drastic reduction.
“What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to that level of requirement and accountability which elevates administrative rules to the level of respectability and acceptability. Those governed by administrative rules are entitled to a reasonable and rational basis for any changes in those rules.”

COMELEC’s Resolution No. 9615 replaced per‑station time limits with aggregate caps of 120 minutes for national candidates and 180 minutes for parties, and broadcasters challenged the rule as an unreasonable reduction of airtime and an infringement on press and information rights. The Supreme Court held the aggregate limits invalid because COMELEC failed to justify such a drastic restriction with a reasonable, rational, and evidence‑based basis, stressing that major curtailments of constitutional freedoms need clear authority and solid factual support.

[v] Romulo, Mabanta Law Office v. Home Development Mutual Fund, G.R. No. 131082, June 19, 2000

The Supreme Court ruled that the HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to enforce and administer.
Administrative issuances must not override, supplant, or modify the law.

The HDMF Board amended the Pag‑IBIG implementing rules to require employers seeking exemption to have both superior retirement and housing plans, and the law firm petitioner was denied exemption under that new rule. The Supreme Court held the Board’s amendment invalid because administrative rules cannot contradict or modify the statute they implement, and only Congress may change the law.

[vi] Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998

Where the regulatory system has been set up by law, it is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.
Any change in policy must be made by the legislative department.

The PCA adopted Resolution No. 018‑93 removing the licensing requirement for new coconut processors and began issuing certificates of registration, while APCD had a pending injunction and had appealed to the President with no response. The Supreme Court held the PCA could not dismantle the statutory regulatory framework by board resolution, declared the resolution and registrations void, and confirmed that only the Legislature may effect such policy changes.

[vii] Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998

R.A. 8171 empowers the Secretary of Justice, in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations.
The rules, however, authorized the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare a manual setting forth the details of the proceedings prior to, during, and after the administration of the lethal injection on the convict.
Because the rule did not provide for the approval of the said manual by the Secretary of Justice, considering that the Bureau of Corrections is merely a constituent unit of the Department of Justice and it is the Secretary of Justice who is granted rule-making authority under the law, the rule authorizing the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to promulgate said manual is invalid, being an abdication of responsibility by the Secretary of Justice.

[viia] In the same case, Sec. 17 of the rules and regulations implementing R.A. 8171, which provided that the death penalty shall not be inflicted upon a woman within three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, was declared invalid — the same being an impermissible contravention of Sec. 83 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the death penalty shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one year after delivery.

Echegaray challenged implementing rules under R.A. 8177 that let the BuCor Director prepare a confidential lethal injection manual without Secretary of Justice approval and extended the deferment period for executing women to three years. The Supreme Court held those provisions invalid because they unlawfully delegated the Secretary’s rule‑making power and contradicted the Revised Penal Code, and it enjoined enforcement until corrected.

[c] Reasonable.

See Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848.

PRC Resolution No. 105 barred examinees from attending review classes or receiving review materials during the three days before licensure exams, and examinees sued claiming the rule was unreasonable and infringed academic freedom. The Supreme Court held the rule unreasonable and void, explaining that administrative regulations must be reasonably and narrowly adapted to their purpose and cannot arbitrarily restrict liberty or academic freedom.

[d] Publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation

Publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, as provided in Executive Order No. 200.

Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446

Publication must be in full, or it is no publication at all.

Petitioners asked the Court to compel full publication in the Official Gazette of presidential decrees and similar issuances of general application that had not been published in full. The Supreme Court ruled that such issuances must be published in full in the Official Gazette to be binding, holding that “unless otherwise provided” affects only the date of effectivity and not the publication requirement.

However, interpretative rules and regulations, or those merely internal in nature — or the so-called letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties — may be simply posted in conspicuous places in the agency itself.
Such posting already complies with the publication requirement.

[i] National Power Corporation v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010

The Supreme Court said that NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law, but was merely a directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-reinforced wires.
It did not in any way affect the rights of the public in general or of any other person not involved in the bidding process.
Thus, it was internal in nature, regulating only the personnel of NPC and not the public; therefore, it did not have to be published.

NPC Circular No. 99-75 limited bidders for scrap ACSR to manufacturers/processors and denied Pinatubo Commercial pre-qualification, prompting a suit that the RTC invalidated but which the Supreme Court reviewed. The Supreme Court held the Circular was an internal procedural directive not requiring publication and that the bidder classification was a reasonable, non‑arbitrary measure tied to legitimate objectives, so the RTC ruling was reversed.

Irene Nacu, substituted by Benjamin Nacu v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187752, November 23, 2010

Likewise, PEZA Memorandum Order No. 99-003, prohibiting its employees from charging and collecting overtime fees from PEZA-registered enterprises, is an internal regulation that clearly falls within the administrative rules and regulations exempt from the publication requirement.

PEZA issued Memorandum Order No. 99‑003 prohibiting employees from charging overtime fees to PEZA‑registered enterprises, and Nacu was investigated and dismissed for alleged violations under that memorandum. The Supreme Court held the memorandum was an internal regulation exempt from publication and upheld the administrative findings and sanctions as supported by evidence and valid internal rule‑making.

[ii] De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998

It was held that administrative rules and regulations the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, except interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature (i.e., regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency, not the general public).

LWUA employees who had been receiving honoraria were affected by DBM Circular No. 10, which discontinued allowances effective November 1, 1989, but the Circular was not published in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation. The Supreme Court held that administrative circulars implementing a statute must be published to be effective and ordered that the petitioners’ honoraria be passed on audit because DBM‑CCC No. 10 was ineffective for lack of publication.

The same rule was upheld in Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 273.

The case arose from a commercial dispute over CTDs and also questioned the legal effect of administrative circulars issued under delegated authority. The Supreme Court held that administrative rules implementing a statute and affecting the public must be published in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation, while interpretative or purely internal rules are exempt, and unpublished implementing rules cannot validly alter substantive rights.

Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 132593, June 25, 1999

Likewise, it was held that DBM Corporate Compensation Circular (DBM-CCC) No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation, and must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
The reissuance of the CCC and its submission for publication per letter to the National Printing Office on March 9, 1999, will not cure the defect, precisely because publication is a condition precedent to its effectivity.

PITC officers received car plan benefits under agreements entered into before RA 6758, COA disallowed post‑1989 reimbursements relying on DBM‑CCC No. 10, and PITC petitioned the Court. The Supreme Court held DBM‑CCC No. 10 ineffective for lack of publication and ordered PITC’s allowances passed on audit, explaining that implementing rules affecting public rights must be published before they take effect.

[iii] ⭐ Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres, 212 SCRA 298

DOLE Department Order No. 16-91 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, while recognized as valid exercises of police power as delegated to the executive department, were declared legally invalid, defective, and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register (as required by Art. 5, Labor Code of the Philippines).

Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001

This ruling was reiterated, where POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983, which provided the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies, was declared ineffective because it was not published and filed with the National Administrative Register.

PITC officers received car plan benefits under agreements entered into before RA 6758, COA disallowed post‑1989 reimbursements relying on DBM‑CCC No. 10, and PITC petitioned the Court. The Supreme Court held DBM-CCC No. 10 ineffective for lack of publication and ordered PITC’s allowances to be passed on audit, explaining that implementing rules affecting public rights must be published before they take effect.

[iv] Transaction Overseas Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 109583, September 5, 1997

On the question of the validity of the cancellation of the petitioner’s license to recruit workers for overseas work because the Revised Rules of Penalties had not been filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center as required by the Administrative Code of 1987, the Supreme Court said that the Revised Rules of Penalties did not prescribe additional rules governing overseas employment but merely detailed the administrative sanctions for prohibited acts.
Besides, the cancellation of the license was made under authority of Art. 35 of the Labor Code, not pursuant to the Revised Rules of Penalties.

Transaction Overseas had its overseas recruitment license cancelled under authority of Article 35 of the Labor Code while the Revised Rules of Penalties had not been filed with the UP Law Center. The Court held the Rules merely set out administrative sanctions and did not create the statutory ground for cancellation, so the cancellation under Article 35 remained valid.

4. Administrative Rules with Penal Sanctions — Additional Requisites:

[a] The law must itself declare as punishable the violation of the administrative rule or regulation.

See People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450.

Five men were charged for electro fishing under Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, but the Fisheries Law did not expressly prohibit electro fishing or classify electricity as an obnoxious substance. The Supreme Court held that an administrative order cannot create a criminal offense absent statutory declaration, and therefore the prosecution was properly dismissed

[b] The law should define or fix the penalty for the violation of the administrative rule or regulation.

5. Necessity for Notice and Hearing

[a] There is no constitutional requirement for a hearing in the promulgation of a general regulation by an administrative body.

Where the rule is procedural, or where the rules are, in effect, merely legal opinions, there is no notice required.
Neither is notice required in:

the preparation of substantive rules where the class to be affected is large and
the questions to be resolved involve the use of discretion committed to the rule-making body.

Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 111953, December 12, 1997

The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that a prior hearing is not necessary for the issuance of an administrative rule or regulation.

The PPA issued a one‑year renewable appointment scheme for harbor pilots by PPA‑AO No. 04-92, pilots challenged it as depriving their vested right to practice without due process, and lower courts invalidated the order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that agencies need not hold prior hearings to issue rules but that PPA‑AO No. 04-92 was substantively unreasonable and an unlawful interference with pilots’ vested interests.

[i] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236,

However, see where the Supreme Court distinguished between administrative rules in the nature of subordinate legislation and those which are merely interpretative rules.
An administrative rule in the nature of subordinate legislation is designed to implement a law by providing its details, and before it is adopted there must be a hearing under the Administrative Code of 1987.
When an administrative rule substantially adds to or increases the burden of those concerned, an administrative agency must accord those directly affected a chance to be heard before its issuance.
In this case, prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, the cigarettes manufactured by the respondent were in the category of locally manufactured cigarettes not bearing a foreign brand.
Had it not been for Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, the enactment of R.A. 7654 would not have resulted in a new tax rate upon the cigarettes manufactured by the respondent.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) did not simply interpret the law; it exercised quasi-legislative authority, and the requirements of notice, hearing, and publication should not have been ignored.

Fortune Tobacco’s cigarette brands were reclassified by RMC 37‑93 two days before RA 7654 took effect, leading to a large deficiency assessment; Fortune challenged the circular for lack of notice, hearing, and proper procedure. The Supreme Court held that RMC 37‑93 was not a mere interpretative rule but a quasi‑legislative / quasi‑adjudicatory measure that substantially increased Fortune’s burden and thus required prior notice, hearing, and publication, so the circular was invalid and the assessment was cancelled.

[ii] GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

While it is true that the COMELEC is an independent office and not a mere administrative agency under the Executive Department, rules which apply to the latter must also be deemed to similarly apply to the former—not as a matter of administrative convenience but as a dictate of due process.
Thus, whatever might have been said in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (supra) should also apply mutatis mutandis to the COMELEC when it comes to promulgating rules and regulations which adversely affect or impose a heavy and substantial burden on the citizenry in a matter that implicates the very nature of government we have adopted.
Thus, for failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with Resolution No. 9615, the said Resolution—specifically in regard to the new rule on aggregate airtime—is defective and ineffectual.

[b] ⭐ Philippine Consumers Foundation v. Secretary, DECS, 153 SCRA 622

It was held that the function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function.
If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process.
As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.
Where the rules and the rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character.
But if they apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

DECS issued Department Order No. 37 setting uniform national ceilings on private school fee increases, which PCF challenged for lack of prior notice and hearing. The Supreme Court held the Order was legislative in character applying to all private schools, so prior individualized hearings were not required and the Order was upheld.

[c] Lina v. Cariño, 221 SCRA 515

The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Secretary of Education to issue DECS Order No. 30, prescribing guidelines concerning increases in tuition and other school fees.

DECS issued Department Order No. 37 setting uniform national ceilings on private school fee increases, which PCF challenged for lack of prior notice and hearing. The Supreme Court held the Order was legislative in character, applying to all private schools, so prior individualized hearings were not require,d and the Order was upheld.

[d] Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board, 192 SCRA 363

The Supreme Court declared that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase subject to its final disposition of whether or not to make it permanent, to reduce or increase it further, or to deny the application.
Sec. 3(e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the court, which is given ex parte, and which is subject to the resolution of the main case.

Oppositors challenged ERB's provisional increases in oil prices granted shortly after the Gulf crisis, arguing a lack of full hearings and denial of cross‑examination; ERB relied on E.O. No. 172 and contemporaneous economic evidence to justify provisional relief. The Supreme Court held that while a full hearing is indispensable for final determination, the ERB may lawfully order a provisional ex parte increase under Section 8 as an interim measure subject to subsequent hearing and final disposition.

[e] Republic (FDA) v. Drugmakers Laboratories, G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014

Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997, are not administrative rules and regulations because they do not:

Implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof;
Interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or
Ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of R.A. 3720 depends.

The only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of A.O. 67, s. 1989, consistent with and pursuant to R.A. 3720.
Inasmuch as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative rules or regulations, no prior hearing, consultation, or publication is necessary for their validity.

6. Petition for Prohibition Not Proper Remedy

A petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail Implementing Rules and Regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative functions.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person—whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions—ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when the said proceedings are without or in excess of jurisdiction, or are accompanied by grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Thus, prohibition lies against the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.

Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Secretary Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006

C. Determinative Powers

1. Enabling

To permit or allow something which the law undertakes to regulate

e.g., grant or denial of licenses to engage in a particular business.

2. Directing

Illustrated by the power of assessment of the BIR or the Bureau of Customs.

3. Dispensing

To exempt from a general prohibition, or relieve an individual or corporation from an affirmative duty

e.g., authority of zoning boards to vary provisions of zoning ordinances, or the authority of the Acceptance Board of the Philippine Army to relieve certain persons from military training.

4. Examining

Also called the investigatory power;
consists in requiring production of books, papers, etc., the attendance of witnesses, and compelling their testimony.

[a] Power to compel attendance of witnesses

Power to compel attendance of witnesses is not inherent in an administrative body; but an administrative officer authorized to take testimony or evidence is deemed authorized to administer oaths, summon witnesses, require production of documents, etc.

[b] Power to punish for contempt

Power to punish for contempt must be expressly granted to the administrative body; and when so granted, may be exercised only when the administrative body is actually performing quasi-judicial functions.
See Guevara v. Commission on Elections, 104 Phil. 268;

The case involved COMELEC attempting to punish for contempt arising from administrative, ministerial activities, and the Court held that contempt power is judicial and attaches only when an agency is performing quasi‑judicial functions. The Court enjoined the exercise of contempt in that context because the requisite statutory grant and quasi‑judicial setting were lacking.

Masangcay v. Commission on Elections, 6 SCRA 27;

COMELEC attempted to punish noncompliance during ministerial election operations, and the Court held such contempt power was unavailable because the conduct was not before COMELEC in a quasi‑judicial proceeding. The ruling protects individuals from administrative contempt when agencies act in a ministerial, non‑adjudicatory capacity.

Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483.

The CHR sought to punish contempt but lacked either an express statutory grant or the quasi‑judicial setting required for contempt sanctions, and the Court invalidated the penalties. The decision reinforces that administrative contempt power is narrow: expressly granted by law and exercisable only during actual quasi‑judicial functions.

5. Summary

Power to apply compulsion or force against persons or property to effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize such action

e.g., in the fields of health inspections, abatement of nuisances, etc.

D. Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Power

1. Proceedings partake of the character of judicial proceedings.

Administrative body is normally granted the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure, provided they do not increase, diminish, or modify substantive rights, and subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court [Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII, Constitution].
The requisites of procedural due process must be complied with.

An impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.
Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant and over the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard
Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

2. Administrative Due Process

[a] The requisites of administrative due process, as enumerated in Ang Tibay v. CIR, 40 O.G. 7th Supp. 129, are:

Right to a hearing;
Tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
Decision must have something to support itself;
Evidence must be substantial;
Decision must be based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
The Board or its judges must act on its or their independent consideration of the facts and the law of the case, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision;
Decision must be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the controversy can know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decision rendered.

[b] Cases

[i] SPO1 Leonito Acuzar v. Aproniano Jorolan, G.R. No. 177878, April 7, 2010

The Court said that in administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following:

The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights;
A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights;
A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively with a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties.

Acuzar was tried by the PLEB for alleged improper relations with a minor while a related criminal case proceeded in the municipal court, and the PLEB found him guilty and dismissed him from service. The Supreme Court held that administrative disciplinary proceedings must provide notice, opportunity to be heard, an impartial tribunal, and findings supported by substantial evidence, and found those requirements met so the PLEB decision of dismissal was sustained.

[ii] Ute Paterok v. Bureau of Customs, 193 SCRA 132

The Supreme Court held that in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the allegedly prohibited article is known, mere posting of the notice of hearing in the respondent's bulletin board does not constitute compliance with procedural due process.

Petitioner Ute Pateroki mported a Mercedes Benz that Customs seized and forfeited after a hearing whose notice was posted on the Customs bulletin board; the owner did not receive actual notice and only discovered the forfeiture much later. The Supreme Court held that posting on the bulletin board alone is inadequate where the owner is known, annulled the forfeiture, and required meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard.

[iii] Lumiqued v. Exeña, G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997

it was held that administrative due process does not necessarily require the assistance of counsel.

Petitioner imported a Mercedes Benz that Customs seized and forfeited after a hearing whose notice was posted on the Customs bulletin board; the owner did not receive actual notice and only discovered the forfeiture much later. The Supreme Court held that posting on the bulletin board alone is inadequate where the owner is known, annulled the forfeiture, and required meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard.

Gonzales v. NLRC and Ateneo de Davao University, G.R. No. 125735, August 26, 1999

But the Supreme Court held that there was a violation of administrative due process where the teacher was dismissed by the university without having been given full opportunity to confront the “witnesses” against her.

Gonzales, a veteran teacher, was investigated and dismissed by Ateneo based largely on student affidavits collected under committee rules that restricted counsel and denied her meaningful opportunity to confront witnesses. The Supreme Court held those procedures violated administrative due process, found the dismissal unsupported by substantial evidence, annulled the NLRC’s validation of the dismissal, and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s award for illegal dismissal.

[iv] Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000

In the evaluation by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Justice of a request for extradition, the prospective extraditee does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land.
He is, therefore, entitled to the minimum requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, as basic elements of due process.

The DOJ evaluated a U.S. extradition request in 1999 using a grand jury indictment and arrest warrant but proceeded without notifying the prospective extraditee or giving him a chance to respond. The Supreme Court held that because extradition endangers a person’s liberty, the executive must provide notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard during its evaluation, and it ordered the DOJ to furnish the papers and allow time to comment.

Clarita Carbonell v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010

But the right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations.

Clarita Carbonell challenged an administrative investigation and the CSC’s handling on the ground that she was entitled to counsel at every investigatory stage. The Supreme Court held that the right to counsel in administrative investigations is not absolute; what the Constitution requires is notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and limitations on counsel do not void proceedings unless they cause actual prejudice.

[v] Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 114683, January 18, 2000

However, administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in the strict judicial sense.

Ocampo, a training coordinator, received training payments totaling US$9,600/P204,960 and failed to remit them to his employer; despite repeated orders to file a counter-affidavit he did not present a defense and the Ombudsman found him guilty of dishonesty and dismissed him. The Supreme Court affirmed that administrative due process is not identical to judicial due process, that criminal acquittal does not bar administrative discipline, and that administrative liability may be sustained on substantial evidence even where criminal conviction is lacking.

Adamson v. Amores, 152 SCRA 237

The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored.
Even in the absence of previous notice, there is no denial of due process as long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard.

Adamson sued to enjoin Johnson & Johnson’s expanded product lines, claiming the BOI hearing lacked adequate prior notice and denied opportunity to present full evidence. The Supreme Court held administrative due process tolerates procedural flexibility so long as parties receive notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and it dismissed Adamson’s petition for lack of demonstrated prejudice.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings:

an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of [De la Cruz v. Abille, G.R. No. 130196, February 26, 2001],

DAR denied petitioners’ emancipation patent after a prior DAR order granting retention to the owner and cancelling the tenant’s CLT, and petitioners claimed they were deprived of notice and due process. The Supreme Court held that administrative due process is satisfied by practical opportunities to be heard or to seek reconsideration and affirmed DAR’s decision because the administrative record showed final acts supported by substantial evidence and no actual prejudice.

an opportunity to explain one's side [Pilipinas Loan Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 104720, April 4, 2001].

The SEC found Pilipinas Loan engaged in pawnbroking contrary to its charter and ordered amendments and cease‑and‑desist measures after complaint, investigation, and agency proceedings. The Supreme Court held that administrative due process requires an opportunity to explain one’s side and to seek reconsideration, found those opportunities were present, and therefore upheld the SEC’s regulatory orders.

See also Ray Peter Vivo v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013.

Vivo was charged in 2002, investigated by PAGCOR’s CIU (statement taken at his house), denied copies of witness statements and rescheduling for counsel, and was dismissed by PAGCOR’s Board, after which he sought relief up to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that administrative due process was satisfied because Vivo received notice, had a real opportunity to explain and to seek reconsideration and appeal, and any procedural defects were cured or nonprejudicial, so his petition was denied.

[vi] Busuego v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95326, March 11, 1999

The Monetary Board, as an administrative agency, is legally bound to observe due process.
In the case at bench, the Supreme Court held that the Monetary Board complied with all the requisites of administrative due process, as enumerated in Ang Tibay.
As to petitioners' suspension, no notice was necessary because it was only preventive in nature.

Central Bank examiners found serious irregularities at PESALA, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 805 imposing supervisory directives and placing petitioners on a watchlist, and petitioners sought injunctive relief claiming denial of due process. The Supreme Court held the Monetary Board observed the substance of due process—petitioners received notice and opportunities to respond—and that preventive supervisory measures need not be preceded by full adversary hearings, so the Monetary Board’s action stood.

[vii] Globe Telecom v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 143964, July 26, 2004

The Supreme Court said that the assailed Order of NTC violated due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and imposing a corresponding fine on, Globe, despite the absence of due notice and hearing.

The NTC ordered penalties against Globe for alleged interconnection and service violations after Smart’s complaint, but Globe argued the Order lacked adequate notice, explanation, and evidentiary support. The Supreme Court found the NTC’s Order violated due process and was unsupported by substantial evidence, set aside the defective portions, and required the agency to provide reasoned findings and proper opportunity to be heard before imposing sanctions.

[viii] MIAA v. Airspan Corporation, G.R. No. 157581, December 1, 2004

Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) cannot validly raise, without prior notice and public hearing, the fees, charges, and rates being paid by aviation entities doing business at the airport.
The rate increases imposed are also ultra vires because, to begin with, it is the DOTC Secretary, not MIAA, who is authorized to increase the subject fees.

MIAA implemented increases in airport fees, rentals and concession charges in 1998–1999 without conducting the statutorily required prior notice and public hearing and while the DOTC Secretary retained rate‑revision authority. The Supreme Court held the increases were procedurally void and ultra vires, affirmed the nullification of MIAA’s Resolutions, and required adherence to statutory notice, hearing, and delegated authority in setting public rates.

[ix] Nicolas v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154668, December 16, 2004

The Supreme Court found that Nicolas was not accorded the first requirement of administrative due process: the right to present his case and submit evidence in support thereof.
Petitioner was not notified of the preliminary conference which would have afforded him the opportunity to appear and defend his rights, including the right to request a formal investigation.
Substantial evidence — or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion — which is the quantum of proof necessary to prove a charge in an administrative case, was not met here.

Nicolas, an EIIB official, was dismissed by the Ombudsman for alleged gross neglect based on disposition of a seized shipment, but he was not notified of a preliminary conference that would have allowed him to present evidence and explain his actions. The Supreme Court held this failure violated administrative due process and that the conviction lacked substantial evidence, so the administrative finding and penalty were set aside.

[x] Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, June 8, 2005

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
“To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

Casimiro, Municipal Assessor, was suspended, investigated by a fact‑finding committee, and dismissed for alleged dishonesty after written notices, committee hearings, and opportunities to submit explanations. The Supreme Court held administrative due process was satisfied because Casimiro had a meaningful opportunity to explain her side through answers, hearings, and remedies, so her petition was denied.

Rimando Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 180141, May 13, 2011.

Gannapao was accused of moonlighting as a private bodyguard and participating in unauthorized operations, underwent pre‑charge investigation and administrative hearings, and was dismissed after CSC proceedings. The Supreme Court held he was afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present his side, found the record supported the administrative conviction by substantial evidence, and denied his petition.

John Arroyo v. Rosal Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 175155, October 22, 2012

The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard.

Long‑time occupants who refused to sign the required LPA and failed to pay dues were subjected to eviction proceedings by RHAI and were ordered ejected by RTC and CA. The Supreme Court held that procedural due process was satisfied because petitioners had notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and therefore denied their petition.

Spouses Eugene and Angelita Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran, G.R. No. 169391, October 10, 2012

What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense.
What matters for due process purposes are notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which the notice is given, and simply the opportunity to be heard.

Kim was accused of fraternity membership, notified, given chance to submit a written denial and attend conferences, then suspended/removed by Letran under its disciplinary rules. The Supreme Court held that the school afforded notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, that administrative due process need not mirror judicial formality, and therefore denied the petition.

[xi] Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161086, November 24, 2006

In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.
As long as the party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.
Moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.

A COA fraud audit led to administrative charges and initial dismissal then modification to suspension of Municipal Accountant Maniago; she secured CA reinstatement which the CSC appealed. The Supreme Court held administrative due process requires filing of charges and a reasonable opportunity to answer, and where those were afforded the party was not denied due process.

Civil Service Commission v. Arlic Almojuela, G.R. No. 194368, April 2, 2013

Thus, a government officer subject of an administrative action cannot claim that his right to due process was violated when he was made aware of the charges against him and was able to file a counter-affidavit to refute the allegations against him.
Administrative due process is the opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Following an inmate’s escape, Almojuela was charged administratively, received notice, filed a counter‑affidavit, and faced evidence linking him to lapses leading to the escape. The Supreme Court held that administrative due process was satisfied by notice and the opportunity to file a counter‑affidavit and be heard, and therefore denied relief.

Manolito Mendoza v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 195395, September 10, 2013

As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, it cannot be said that he was denied due process.

COA disallowed portions of Mendoza’s salary and issued final notices through agency channels; Mendoza claimed lack of personal service and denial of opportunity to answer. The Supreme Court held Mendoza was not denied administrative due process because administrative notice and opportunity to be heard were satisfied in substance and COA’s disallowance was supportable under the salary law.

[xii] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Ariel Marquez, G.R. No. 191877, June 18, 2013

The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in an administrative case.
The law simply requires that the civil servant be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in a clear and concise manner to give him the chance to answer the allegations intelligently.

PAGCOR’s investigation showed Marquez declared void dice throws as good, triggering administrative charges and dismissal; Marquez complained the charges lacked precise legal labeling. The Supreme Court held that as long as the nature and cause of the accusation were clearly communicated and Marquez had the chance to answer, lack of technical precision did not violate administrative due process and the sanction stood.

[xiii] Office of the Ombudsman v. Manuel Valencia, G.R. No. 183890, April 13, 2011

In administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence.
Substantial evidence is enough.

Valencia, a Customs officer, was investigated and dismissed for alleged unexplained wealth based largely on photocopied bank and credit card records that he disputed. The Supreme Court held administrative liability must rest on substantial evidence and that contested photocopies lacking proof of authenticity could not sustain dismissal, so it affirmed the reversal of the Ombudsman’s order.

[xiv] Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodolfo Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010

Even in administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary in order to support a finding of liability.

COA audits initially reported a multi‑million peso shortage under Zaldarriaga’s stewardship, leading to Ombudsman dismissal, but subsequent audits and investigations raised serious inconsistencies. The Supreme Court held that administrative liability must rest on substantial evidence and a requisite degree of moral certainty, found the record deficient and affirmed the reversal of the dismissal.

Hon. Primo Miro v. Reynaldo Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010

However, administrative liability may attach as long as there is evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have been performed (or have not been performed).

Dosono was arrested after an entrapment operation alleging he extorted marked money from taxpayers and was suspended and charged administratively by the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court affirmed acquittal because the administrative record lacked sufficiently convincing evidence to support a finding that Dosono committed the charged acts.

[xv] Sheryll Dela Cruz v. Pamelao Malunao, A.M. No. P-11-3019, March 20, 2012

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, it is provided that “administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.”
The weight of evidence required is substantial evidence.

Malunao was arrested in an NBI entrapment for alleged extortion and faced administrative investigation supervised by the Office of the Court Administrator; she denied the charges and contested the evidence. The Court held administrative investigations may proceed without strict judicial technicalities under the Uniform Rules, but administrative sanctions require substantial evidence to support findings.

[xvi] Nacion v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015

The petitioner was formally charged by COA Chairperson Tan following evidence that pointed to irregularities committed while she was with the MWSS.
Being the COA Chairperson who, under the law, could initiate administrative proceedings motu proprio, no written complaint against the petitioner from any other person was necessary.
The constitution of a separate fact-finding team specifically for the petitioner’s case was not necessary for the satisfaction of her right to administrative due process.

COA’s fraud audit of MWSS personnel uncovered documents suggesting Nacion received bonuses and other benefits while assigned to MWSS, and COA Chairperson Tan formally charged her and furnished investigation reports to require a written answer. The Supreme Court held that the COA Chairperson could initiate proceedings motu proprio and that due process was satisfied by sending formal charges with supporting reports and giving Nacion the opportunity to answer, so no separate fact‑finding team was required.

3. Administrative determinations where notice and hearing are not necessary for due process

PDCAP

[a] Grant of provisional authority for increased rates, or to engage in a particular line of business

RCPI v. National Telecommunications Commission, 184 SCRA 517;

RCPI was investigated by the NTC for alleged deficient service, the Commission found lapses and imposed sanctions after notice and hearings, and RCPI challenged the Commission’s authority. The Supreme Court held the NTC acted within its regulatory and quasi‑adjudicatory powers, affirmed the sanctions, and explained that agencies may impose provisional or corrective measures when supported by notice, evidence, and public‑interest considerations.

PLDT v. National Telecommunications Commission, 190 SCRA 717.

The NTC granted provisional authority to a new cellular operator despite PLDT’s opposition, conditioning the grant to protect interconnection and public interest. The Supreme Court upheld the grant, ruling the NTC may allow provisional operations when prima facie fitness and public necessity exist and may attach reasonable safeguards.

[b] Summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of a delinquent taxpayer.

[c] Cancellation of a passport where no abuse of discretion is committed by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Suntay v. People, 101 Phil 770.

Suntay left the Philippines after a seduction complaint was filed against him, obtained a passport, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs cancelled that passport to secure his return to face charges. The Supreme Court held the Secretary did not abuse discretion in cancelling the passport without a prior hearing because the action was based on undisputed facts and served the public interest.

[d] Summary abatement of a nuisance per se which affects the immediate safety of persons or property

Art. 704, Civil Code of the Philippines

[e] Preventive suspension of a public officer or employee pending investigation of administrative charges filed against him

Sec. 51, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Administrative Code of 1987.

4. Right against self-incrimination

[a] Cabal v. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1064

It was held that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under R.A. 3019, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching on his right against self-incrimination.

Cabal was subpoenaed to testify as the complainant’s first witness in a Presidential Committee investigation into alleged unexplained wealth, and he refused on grounds of self‑incrimination; a contempt charge followed but Cabal sought relief. The Supreme Court held that because the administrative proceeding could lead to forfeiture under the Anti‑Graft law, Cabal could not be compelled to be the complainant’s witness and his privilege against self‑incrimination was protected.

Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 345

The same rule was followed in administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner where the proceedings could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice medicine.

Pascual was to be called as the complainant’s first witness in a Board of Medical Examiners malpractice hearing and he refused, citing the privilege against self‑incrimination because revocation of his license was at stake. The Supreme Court held that administrative proceedings threatening loss of a professional license are quasi‑criminal in nature and that Pascual could not be compelled to testify as the complainant’s witness.

[b] This right may be invoked by the respondent at the time he is called by the complainant as a witness; however, if he voluntarily takes the witness stand, he can be cross-examined.

But he may still invoke the right at the time the question which calls for an answer that incriminates him of an offense other than that which is charged is asked.
See People v. Judge Ayson, supra.

Ramos gave written and oral statements during PAL’s internal inquiry and later faced criminal prosecution where those statements were offered in evidence, raising questions about waiver and invocation of the privilege against self‑incrimination. The Court held the privilege must be claimed to be effective, that voluntary testimony waives it for the matters testified to, and that

5. Power to punish contempt

The power to punish contempt is inherently judicial; it may be exercised only if expressly conferred by law, and when the administrative body is engaged in the performance of its quasi-judicial powers.
See Guevara v. Comelec, supra;

Guevara published criticism about COMELEC’s contract awards while COMELEC was handling related petitions, and COMELEC sought to punish him for contempt. The Supreme Court held COMELEC lacked contempt power while exercising purely administrative functions and enjoined the contempt proceedings.

Dumarpa v. Dimaporo, 177 SCRA 478.

Provincial fiscals and an OIC vice‑governor were held in contempt by COMELEC after providing legal opinions on a contested proclamation, and they challenged the contempt ruling. The Supreme Court held that contempt is a judicial power exercisable by administrative agencies only when acting in quasi‑judicial mode and with lawful authority, and it set aside the contempt convictions.

6. Administrative decisions not part of the legal system

Philippine Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999

Article 8 of the Civil Code recognizes judicial decisions applying or interpreting statutes as part of the legal system of the country.
But administrative decisions do not enjoy that level of recognition.
A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a taxpayer with a shield against judicial action, for there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong construction of the law by administrative officials.
Such wrong interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same.

PBCom paid excess income taxes and relied on a BIR memorandum‑circular to claim refunds, but the Bureau later rejected the claims as time‑barred and the courts denied recovery. The Supreme Court held that an administrative memorandum cannot create vested legal rights or estop the Government from correcting an erroneous administrative interpretation, so judicial review — not reliance on an RMC — is the proper remedy.

7. Administrative appeal and review

[a] Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be made to a higher or superior administrative officer or body.

[b] By virtue of the power of control which the President exercises over all executive departments, the President—by himself or through the Department Secretaries (pursuant to the “alter ego” doctrine)—may affirm, modify, alter, or reverse the administrative decision of subordinate officials and employees.

See Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328.

Trawl operators challenged Executive Orders and departmental regulations banning trawl fishing in San Miguel Bay issued for conservation and public welfare. The Court recognized the President’s supervisory power over executive departments and affirmed that the President (through secretaries) may modify or reverse subordinate administrative acts within lawful bounds to serve public interest.

[c] The appellate administrative agency may conduct additional hearings in the appealed case, if deemed necessary.

Reyes v. Zamora, 90 SCRA 92.

Mario Reyes was dismissed for alleged misappropriation had the Minister of Labor order reinstatement, but the Office of the President conducted further hearings on appeal and reversed that reinstatement. The Court held an appellate administrative body may conduct additional hearings when necessary, and a party who participates in such hearings is estopped from later attacking the appellate procedure.

8. Doctrine of res judicata

[a] Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190 SCRA 673

The Supreme Court said that decisions and orders of administrative agencies have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.
These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction.
The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. sought court relief to reinstate a cancelled timber license and to set aside reallocation of concession areas after administrative cancellations and re‑awards; the Supreme Court held the administrative determinations were final and barred relitigation. The Court ruled that final administrative decisions by competent authorities carry res judicata effect and cannot be reopened except for jurisdictional defect or grave abuse.

See also Boiser v. National Telecommunications Commission, 169 SCRA 198;

Boiser repeatedly tried to relitigate licensing and intervention issues already decided by the NTC and appellate courts concerning a local telephone system and PLDT’s regulatory status. The Supreme Court held prior final administrative and judicial determinations were conclusive under res judicata and dismissed Boiser’s repeated petition

Nasipit Lumber v. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93;

Collado was implicated in theft, NALCO obtained and the Acting Secretary affirmed a clearance to dismiss, but Collado later filed for unjust dismissal and labor tribunals awarded relief which NALCO challenged. The Supreme Court held that an administrative clearance does not automatically bar a worker’s separate labor complaint and denied the petition claiming absolute res judicata.

United Housing v. Dayrit, 181 SCRA 285;

National Housing Authority v. Pascual, G.R. No. 158364, November 26, 2007.

Tapia obtained a final HSRC judgment requiring UHC to deliver title, UHC failed to comply and later tried to litigate the same dispute in the RTC, where the motion to dismiss was denied. The Supreme Court held that final HSRC decisions within the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction have preclusive effect and ordinarily bar relitigation in regular courts.

[b] United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15

The Supreme Court reiterated that the doctrine of res judicata applies to adversary administrative proceedings.
Thus, because proceedings for certification election are quasi-judicial in nature, the decisions therein can attain finality.

UPSU asked for certification elections for route managers, but the Secretary of Labor and the courts found the route managers to be managerial employees and denied union certification; UPSU challenged Art. 245 as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court upheld the statutory scheme, applying a functional test for managerial status and holding the exclusion of managerial employees fro

Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624

It was held that when the Office of the President declared its decision final because the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time, it lost jurisdiction over the case.
Accordingly, its act of modifying its decision (upon a second motion for reconsideration) was in gross disregard of the rules and the legal precept that accords finality to administrative decisions.

The Office of the President declared a decision final because a motion for reconsideration was late, then later attempted to modify the decision; petitioners challenged that modification. The Supreme Court held the Office lost jurisdiction once it declared the decision final for late reconsideration and therefore the subsequent modification was invalid.

[c] Board of Commissioners, CID v. Judge de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853

However, the doctrine does not apply in administrative adjudication relative to citizenship.
On questions of citizenship, the doctrine of res judicata can apply only when the following conditions mentioned in Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra, obtain, namely:

the question of citizenship is resolved by a court or an administrative body as a material issue in the controversy after a full-blown hearing;
with the active participation of the Solicitor General; and
the finding made by the administrative body on the citizenship issue is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

William Gatchalian’s Filipino status had been the subject of repeated administrative proceedings and conflicting Board determinations, prompting deportation actions and temporary restraining orders from lower courts as the Board attempted to revisit earlier recognitions of his citizenship. The Supreme Court held that administrative finality and res judicata do not automatically protect citizenship determinations: a prior administrative finding on citizenship is conclusive only if it was decided after a full adversarial hearing, the Solicitor General actively participated, and the Supreme Court expressly affirmed the finding; otherwise the State may reopen the question to correct errors affecting national status.

[d] B.F. Goodrich Philippines v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 1988

Neither is the doctrine applicable where the administrative decision of the WCC Referee awards the employee less than what the law provides.

Castro accepted P1,377 and signed a release, but later filed for full statutory workmen’s compensation before the WCC. The Supreme Court held the private release void insofar as it limited statutory benefits and denied the employer’s petition to set aside the WCC award.

9. Reconciliation of the parties or desistance by the complainant

Carlito Encinas v. PO1 Alfredo Agustin, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013

The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the Court of its jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its resolution.
Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have been committed against the public service.
The subsequent desistance by the complainant does not free the public officer from liability, as the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect the public service—based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.

Respondents alleged Encinas demanded money and reassigned them when they could not fully pay; they filed administrative complaints but later reconciled or desisted. The Supreme Court held reconciliation or desistance does not bar administrative jurisdiction or relieve a public officer of liability and affirmed dismissal for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to service.

10. Some Relevant Decisions

[a] LLDA v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) has regulatory and quasi-judicial powers in respect to pollution cases, with authority to issue a “cease and desist” order, and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages, and other aquaculture structures in Laguna de Bay, pursuant to R.A. 4850 and its amendatory laws.
The charter of LLDA grants it exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for fish pens and fish enclosures in Laguna de Bay.
The Local Government Code did not repeal this provision expressly—and the charter of LLDA, being a special law, prevails over the Local Government Code, a general law.

LLDA’s charter vested it with exclusive authority to issue permits and regulate fishpens and other aquaculture structures in Laguna de Bay while municipalities tried to issue local permits under the Local Government Code. The Supreme Court held the LLDA charter still governs and that the Local Government Code did not repeal LLDA’s exclusive powers, affirming LLDA’s regulatory and quasi-judicial authority.

[b] Regional Director, DECS Region VII v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110193, January 17, 1995

The DECS Regional Director has the authority to issue a return-to-work order (to striking public school teachers), to initiate administrative charges, and to constitute an investigating panel.

Teachers in Negros Oriental struck to demand salary release; the DECS Regional Director ordered them back to work, filed administrative charges, and set up an investigating panel while some teachers sued in court. The Supreme Court held DECS had authority to issue the return‑to‑work order, initiate administrative investigations, and constitutionally recognized procedural deference to the administrative process, denying DECS’s petition to forbid the courts from letting administrative proceedings continue.

[c] Alberto Pat-og v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 198755, June 5, 2013

When a public school teacher is subject of an administrative action, concurrent jurisdiction exists in the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Department of Education (DepEd), and the Board of Professional Teachers–Professional Regulation Commission (PRC).
Hence, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others

A student accused teacher Alberto Pat‑og of punching him; the RTC convicted Pat‑og of slight physical injury and the CSC later found him guilty of grave misconduct, ordering dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, holding that CSC, DepEd, and the PRC may have concurrent jurisdiction over teacher disciplinary matters but the tribunal that first takes cognizance generally proceeds to the exclusion of the others and the CSC’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.

[d] Realty Exchange Venture Corporation v. Sendino, G.R. No. 109703, July 5, 1995

The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is the successor-agency of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and has, therefore, assumed the latter’s powers and functions, including the power to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices and cases of specific performance.
It has also been granted exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving homeowners associations.

Sendino paid reservation fees and downpayment but REVI canceled the contract for alleged document defects, prompting Sendino to seek specific performance before the HLURB–OAALA which ordered REVI to comply and awarded damages. The Supreme Court held HLURB, as successor to HSRC/NHA functions, has authority to hear unsound real estate practice and specific performance cases and may validly delegate adjudicatory functions to divisions, and denied REVI’s petition.

[e] Calma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122787, February 9, 1999

The Prosecution and Enforcement Division was established as the adjudicatory arm of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

HUKVETS members alleged that rival officers usurped control and held invalid conventions and elections, so Luis Taruc brought a complaint to the SEC’s Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED), which investigated and ordered a new general membership meeting and election. The Supreme Court held that the SEC may delegate adjudicatory functions to the PED under its enabling law and internal rules, that petitioners’ active participation waived timely jurisdictional objections, and therefore the PED’s resolution ordering a new election was valid and the petition was denied.

[f] Energy Regulatory Board and Iligan Light & Power, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127373, March 25, 1999

By virtue of R.A. 7638, it is now the Department of Energy, not the Energy Regulatory Board, that has jurisdiction over disputes involving direct connection of electric power.
Definitely, the exploration, production, marketing, distribution, utilization, or any other activity involving any energy resource or product falls within the supervision and control of the Department of Energy.

ILPI sought ERB intervention to stop NPC from directly supplying industries within ILPI’s franchise area, while opponents argued that authority over direct connections had been transferred by statute to the Department of Energy. The Supreme Court held that under the restructured statutory scheme (notably R.A. 7638) jurisdiction over direct connection/disconnection and broader energy supervision rests with the DOE, not the ERB.

[g] Ernesto Francisco v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010

By express provision of law, the Toll Regulatory Board is given the power to grant administrative franchises for toll facility projects.

Petitioners challenged TRB actions, contracts, and toll adjustments for major tollways, contending the Board exceeded its authority. The Supreme Court confirmed that the TRB—under P.D. 1112/1113 and related law—has statutory power to grant administrative franchises and regulate toll operations, while reminding that such powers must be exercised within statutory and constitutional limits.

[h] Samar II Electric Cooperative v. Ananias Seludo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012

When the question involves the validity of a resolution issued by an electric cooperative, it is the National Electrification Administration (NEA), pursuant to its power of supervision, which has the authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules, and regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives.

The SAMELCO II board disqualified a director and barred his attendance, prompting the director to seek a TRO and petition the RTC while SAMELCO II argued NEA had exclusive supervisory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that NEA supervision over cooperatives does not automatically oust the courts of jurisdiction to grant provisional relief or review board acts where judicial intervention is appropriate and denied SAMELCO II’s petition.

[i] Salvacion Villanueva v. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, G.R. No. 178347, February 25, 2013

The fact that the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) conducts public consultations or hearings does not mean that it is performing quasi-judicial functions.

Residents sought to nullify a PCSD SEP Clearance for a proposed mining project, arguing the site was in a prohibited core zone, and filed certiorari in the RTC after PCSD’s public consultations and clearance process. The Supreme Court held that PCSD’s issuance of SEP Clearances is regulatory, not quasi‑judicial, that certiorari was the improper remedy, and denied the petition.

III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

A. The Doctrine

Whenever there is an available administrative remedy provided by law, no judicial recourse can be made until all such remedies have been availed of and exhausted.
Aquino v. Mariano, 129 SCRA 532;

A petitioner sought mandamus to force a prosecutor to include an additional accused despite available motions and administrative avenues. The Supreme Court held mandamus was improper because ordinary, adequate remedies existed and must be exhausted first.

National Development Company v. Hervilla, 151 SCRA 200;

Disputes over possession and administrative rights proceeded without first exhausting available administrative or ordinary remedies. The Supreme Court held that available administrative and ordinary remedies must be exhausted before resorting to judicial relief, denied the petition, and reaffirmed the exhaustion doctrine.

Union Bank v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 198

Union Bank sought court‑ordered examination of Allied Bank’s account while parallel Arbicom arbitration was pending over an under‑encoded check. The Court held that judicial relief was premature because available administrative/arbitral remedies had not been exhausted and denied the petition.

Mark James Magalang v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013

Thus, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he should have availed himself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.

A suspended PAGCOR teller sought court review before fully exhausting internal remedies and motions for reconsideration available within PAGCOR. The Supreme Court held the petition premature, affirmed dismissal, and reaffirmed that judicial relief is barred until available administrative remedies are exhausted.

1. Reasons

[a] If relief is first sought from a superior administrative agency, resort to the courts may be unnecessary.

Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas, G.R. No. 131442, July 10, 2003

The petitioners, instead of appealing the action of the Regional Executive Director to the DENR Secretary, immediately filed their complaint with the Manila RTC, thus depriving the DENR Secretary of the opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate.
Under applicable jurisprudence, petitioners’ omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action.

Petitioners challenged an ECC issued by the DENR regional director but went directly to the RTC without appealing to the DENR Secretary. The Supreme Court dismissed the case because petitioners failed to exhaust the available administrative remedy of elevating the matter to the Secretary.

[b] The administrative agency should be given a chance to correct its error.

Bernardo v. Abalos, G.R. No. 137266, December 5, 2001

Thus, for failure of the petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration from the resolution of the COMELEC en banc dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence, the petition for certiorari filed with the Supreme Court was deemed premature and was dismissed.
It was held that the purpose of the motion for reconsideration is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it.

Petitioners sought certiorari with the Supreme Court after the COMELEC En Banc dismissed their vote‑buying complaint but failed to file a motion for reconsideration first. The Supreme Court dismissed the certiorari petition as premature, holding that the COMELEC should have been given the opportunity to correct any error through the motion for reconsideration.

[c] Principles of comity and convenience require that the courts stay their hand until the administrative processes are completed.

[d] Since judicial review of administrative decisions is usually made through special civil actions, such proceedings will not normally prosper if there is another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

This was also cited by the Supreme Court as one of the reasons for the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in Bernardo v. Abalos, supra.

2. Application of the Rule

Lopez v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 127139, February 19, 1999

It was held that the rule must be observed in order to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
Besides, Sec. 187, R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code) expressly provides that administrative remedies must be exhausted before the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance may be challenged in court.

The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7894 revising fair market values and sharply increasing Lopez’s property taxes, and Lopez sued without exhausting administrative remedies under the Local Government Code. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Section 187 of R.A. 7160 requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before courts may consider the legality or constitutionality of a local tax ordinance.

[a] The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system.

Universal Robina Corp. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011

The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.

URC’s plant was found to violate effluent standards and LLDA ordered payment of accumulated daily penalties after hearings and monitoring, and URC sought judicial relief after administrative processes including a motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court denied the petition and held that LLDA’s specialized administrative processes must be allowed to operate and that judicial review should follow only after administrative remedies are exhausted, absent grave abuse or lack of jurisdiction.

[b] National Irrigation Administration v. Enciso, G.R. No. 142571, May 5, 2006

Where a contractor tasked to widen a river immediately sued the National Irrigation Administration in court for payment without first filing a claim with the Commission on Audit, it was held that the contractor’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to his collection suit.

Enciso performed river‑widening work for NIA, received partial payment, and sued for the unpaid balance without first presenting his claim to the Commission on Audit or following applicable administrative claim procedures. The Supreme Court held the contractor’s failure to exhaust the prescribed administrative remedies was fatal to his collection suit and reversed the judgment for non‑exhaustion.

3. Limitation of the Doctrine

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998

It must be noted, however, that only those decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are subject to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In like manner, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory powers.

Smart Communications v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003

Thus, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.

The NTC issued a comprehensive billing and prepaid/SIM regulation that major telecom operators challenged as beyond the agency’s power, and lower courts granted temporary relief on some provisions. The Supreme Court held that courts have direct jurisdiction to review quasi‑legislative agency rules for legality and constitutionality and proceeded to assess the Circular’s provisions.

4. Exception: Protection of Fundamental Rights

Diocese of Bacolod, represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente Navarra, v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

The respondents raised the issue of the failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies, arguing that they should have first brought the matter to the COMELEC en banc or any of its divisions.
In rejecting this contention, the Court said that petitioners’ exercise of their right to free speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of an election offense against petitioners was already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation was enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of administrative remedies as suggested by COMELEC would only prolong the violation of petitioners’ freedom of speech.
Political speech is a direct exercise of sovereignty.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies must yield in order to protect this fundamental right.

The Diocese displayed election‑period tarpaulins and COMELEC threatened prosecution and removal, chilling the Diocese’s political speech; the Court held that forcing administrative exhaustion would prolong the constitutional injury and therefore granted immediate judicial protection, permanently enjoining COMELEC’s threatened enforcement.

B. Corollary Principles

1. Doctrine of Prior Resort (Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction)

Where there is competence or jurisdiction vested upon an administrative body to act upon a matter, no resort to the courts may be made before such administrative body shall have acted upon the matter.

University of Santo Tomas v. Danes Sanchez, G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010

But this rule applies only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions.

Sanchez sued UST for withholding his transcript after claimed graduation while UST argued non-enrollment and that CHED had primary jurisdiction. The Court affirmed that the dispute required factual inquiry at trial and could not be dismissed on jurisdictional or administrative-exhaustion grounds.

[a] Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 426

It was held that inasmuch as the memorandum of agreement between IEI and MMIC was derived from the coal-operating contract and intrinsically tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands, IEI’s cause of action was not merely rescission of contract but the reversion of the operation of the coal blocks.
Accordingly, the case should have been filed with the Board of Energy Development, not with the Regional Trial Court.

IEI sued to rescind an MOA with MMIC and to recover reversion and administrative confirmation of its coal operating rights after alleged wrongful transfer and mismanagement. The Court held that disputes requiring determination of operation or reversion of coal blocks belong to the specialized administrative agency, so they must be raised before the BED/Board rather than decided by ordinary civil courts.

See also Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 264

Importers obtained a trial-court injunction stopping Customs from auctioning seized goods while forfeiture proceedings were ongoing, prompting Customs to seek relief. The Supreme Court held that seizure and forfeiture are within Customs’ exclusive administrative domain and that trial courts should not enjoin such administrative forfeiture proceedings; judicial relief is limited to certiorari for grave abuse after administrative remedies are exhausted.

Almendras Mining v. Office of the Insurance Commissioner, 160 SCRA 656;

Almendras brought complaints against its insurer before the Insurance Commissioner and sought judicial intervention instead of pursuing the statutory administrative appeal routes. The Court ruled that the Insurance Commissioner exercises regulatory and quasi‑judicial functions and that parties must follow the Insurance Code’s prescribed administrative and appellate remedies before invoking certiorari in the courts.

PCGG v. Peña, 159 SCRA 556.

Private parties obtained RTC injunctions challenging PCGG’s sequestration and management of alleged ill‑gotten assets, leading the PCGG to seek Supreme Court intervention. The Supreme Court held that PCGG’s sequestration powers fall within its specialized administrative jurisdiction and that RTCs should not interfere, reserving judicial review to the proper extraordinary remedies and channels and limiting trial‑court intervention to cases of proven grave abuse.

[b] Regional Director, DECS Region VII v. Court of Appeals, supra

The Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeals to suspend action on the cases brought before the latter until the final outcome of the administrative investigation, conformably with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction.
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100579, June 6, 2001

Where petitioner, who was then the Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Administration, after having been preventively suspended on the basis of administrative charges filed against him, immediately filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, it was held that resort to the courts was premature and precipitate because the administrative proceedings were still ongoing.
Furthermore, from the decision of the Philcoa Board, the administrative remedy of appeal to the Civil Service Commission was still available to the administrator.

Leandro P. Garcia, PCA Administrator, was preventively suspended and faced ongoing administrative charges but went straight to court seeking certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus while administrative hearings and the remedy of appeal to the Civil Service Commission remained available. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding his resort to the courts was premature because he failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies and did not show a compelling exception (plain, speedy, and adequate remedy absent or grave abuse).

See also Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106028, May 9, 2001.

Lilia Gonzales challenged DAR orders requiring surrender of land titles, claiming lack of notice, yet she filed certiorari in court instead of using clearly available administrative remedies such as motion for reconsideration or appeal to the DAR Adjudication Board. The Supreme Court dismissed her petition as premature, reiterating that certiorari is extraordinary and administrative remedies must be exhausted unless a narrow exception is convincingly shown.

[c] Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122

Questions relative to compliance with the requirements for the conversion of subdivision lots are properly cognizable by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, not by the regular courts.
Thus, no resort to the court may be made before the administrative body shall have acted upon the matter.

Petitioners disputed whether a private road converted into residential lots complied with statutory conversion requirements after purchasers fenced the lot and blocked access. The Court held that compliance questions are for the HLURB to decide first, so courts should not be resorted to until the administrative agency has acted.

[d] Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 16

The enforcement of forestry laws, rules, and regulations falls within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); thus, the assumption by the RTC of jurisdiction over the suit filed by respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency.

A truck seized and administratively ordered forfeited by DENR prompted a replevin suit in RTC while administrative appeals were pending. The Court held that enforcement and forfeiture under forestry laws fall under DENR’s primary competence, so administrative remedies must be exhausted first except under narrowly defined exceptions, and the RTC’s assumption of jurisdiction was an encroachment.

Sy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121587, March 9, 1999

Thus, the Supreme Court said that the lumber forfeited under P.D. 705 which the petitioner sought to recover came under the custody of the DENR, and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency before any resort to the courts may be made.

Lumber seized and later forfeited under the Revised Forestry Code was placed in DENR custody, and the owner’s replevin suit in RTC was premature because administrative forfeiture proceedings had not been exhausted. The Court held that recovery actions for such forfeited forest products must first be directed to DENR, so courts should not order return while administrative remedies are pending.

[e] Crusaders Broadcasting System v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 139583, May 31, 2000

In the matter of issuing licenses to operate radio stations, the National Telecommunications Commission is in a better position than the courts to determine to whom the privilege should be granted in order that public interest may be served.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents the court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed with special competence.

NTC denied renewal of Crusaders’ temporary broadcast permit and recalled its frequency after finding the station inoperative and raising public-interest concerns, and Crusaders’ appeals were denied. The Court affirmed that licensing and frequency allocation fall within NTC’s special competence and that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires administrative resolution before courts intervene, with court review limited to legal defects or absence of substantial evidence.

[f] Philrock v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, G.R. Nos. 132848-49, June 28, 2001

Executive Order No. 1008 vests in the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with construction contracts entered into by parties who have agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration

Parties to a construction dispute that agreed to arbitrate repeatedly invoked and participated in CIAC proceedings while contesting issues of party inclusion and damages; the CIAC rendered a decision affirmed by the CA. The Supreme Court held that under Executive Order No. 1008 the CIAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes and upheld the CIAC/CA rulings.

[g] Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113079, April 20, 2001

The interpretation of a law made by an administrative agency like the Energy Regulatory Board is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls.
It is a basic rule that courts will not interfere in matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under their special technical knowledge and training.
The courts give much weight to the government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law, considering their competence, expertise, experience, and informed judgment, and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret.

ERB approved Shell’s service-station relocation after extensive administrative proceedings while rivals challenged the decision in court. The Supreme Court ruled that the ERB’s technical and statutory interpretations merit deference, set aside the CA’s conflicting interference, and affirmed administrative primacy subject to narrow judicial review.

[h] Prosecutor Tabao v. Judge Lilagan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651, September 4, 2001

Since the complaint for replevin stated that the shipment of tanbark, as well as the vessel on which it was loaded, was seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents, and that the NBI had turned over the seized items to the DENR “for official disposition and appropriate action,” these allegations should have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge that the DENR had custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence.
Besides, it was clear that the plaintiff in the replevin suit had not exhausted administrative remedies available to him.
Respondent judge’s act of taking cognizance of the replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law.

NBI seized a vessel and tanbark for irregular shipping documents and turned custody over to DENR pending confiscation, yet the consignee filed replevin in RTC which issued a writ while administrative proceedings continued. The Supreme Court held the RTC erred: recovery actions for property in DENR custody under forestry enforcement belong first to DENR and courts should not intervene before administrative remedies are exhausted.

[i] Sarne v. Maquiling, G.R. No. 138839, May 9, 2002

Sec. 50, R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) vests the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) with quasi-judicial powers.
Since the law does not distinguish, the jurisdiction of DARAB should therefore include all “agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP,” including private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture, as defined in Sec. 4 of the law.
Accordingly, it was held that DARAB may properly take cognizance of this case involving a complaint for redemption, it being a case concerning the rights of respondents as tenants on agricultural land.

Tenants sued for redemption of agricultural land sold without giving them preemption/redemption rights and DARAB took cognizance; landowners contested DARAB’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held DARAB has quasi-judicial power over agrarian disputes involving lands covered by CARP, so the redemption complaint was properly within DARAB’s jurisdiction.

[j] Estrada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137862, November 11, 2004

The Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) is the agency of government tasked with determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions.
It also has the power to issue, ex parte, cease and desist orders.
Thus, the premature invocation of the court’s intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground.

Residents sought injunctive relief against a proposed cement plant alleging pollution but sued the RTC before the Pollution Adjudication Board acted. The Court held such pollution-related claims must first be brought to the PAB, and premature court suits are dismissible for lack of cause of action.

Shell Philippines Exploration v. Efren Jalos, G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010

Accordingly, with regard to pollution-related matters, administrative recourse to the PAB must first be made before filing the complaint with the regular courts.

Fishermen sued Shell in RTC claiming pipeline-induced pollution hurt their livelihood, but Shell argued the case was within the PAB’s primary jurisdiction. The Court ruled pollution disputes must first be brought before the PAB and affirmed dismissal pending exhaustion of administrative remedies.

[k] Caballes v. Sison, G.R. No. 131759, March 23, 2004

The petitioners’ premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to their cause of action.
It is presumed that an administrative agency, in this case the Board of Optometry, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, would decide the same correctly or correct any previous error committed in its forum.

An administrative ethics complaint against optometrists employed by a corporation was pending before the Board of Optometry, but petitioners resorted prematurely to the courts. The Court held that the Board should first be allowed to decide and that the court action was therefore dismissed as premature.

[l] Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, G.R. No. 156109, November 18, 2004

However, where the petitioner sued the school for damages before the RTC for preventing her from taking the final exams due to her failure to pay for tickets for a school fund-raising activity, and respondent insisted that the complaint should first be filed with the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Supreme Court said that the CHED does not have the power to award damages, and thus, the petitioner could not have commenced her case before the CHED.

Khristine Regino was barred from exams and sued her college for damages while the college insisted CHED should first be invoked. The Court held CHED cannot award damages, so the student’s court action was permissible and the RTC dismissal was reversed.

[m] Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. v. Senate Committee of the Whole, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011

Likewise, when the issues presented do not require the expertise, specialized skill, and knowledge of the administrative body, but are purely legal questions that are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should not be applied.

Senators sought to enjoin Senate Committee hearings but contended the issues raised were legal and not requiring specialized administrative expertise. The Court held that primary jurisdiction does not bar judicial resolution of purely legal questions and denied the broad injunctive relief sought.

[n] Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction, G.R. No. 197592, November 27, 2013,

The Supreme Court acknowledged that under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445, it is the Commission on Audit (COA) that has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities.
However, the scope of the authority of COA to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed to mean only liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers.

Jody King sued the Province for unpaid change orders and various unliquidated contract claims arising from construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port, while the Province invoked COA’s exclusive jurisdiction over claims against government. The Court held COA’s authority is confined to liquidated claims determinable from accounting papers, so unliquidated contract disputes properly proceed in the regular courts and the CA rulings allowing court actions were affirmed.

2. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action

No resort to the courts will be allowed unless the administrative action has been completed and there is nothing left to be done in the administrative structure.
See Sta. Rosa Mining v. Leido, 156 SCRA 1.

Santa Rosa Mining sought court relief on the constitutionality of a mining decree while administrative appeals over the status of its claims were still pending. The Court dismissed the petition for prematurity, ruling that available administrative remedies must be exhausted before courts may be resorted to.

SSS Employees Association v. Bathan-Velasco, G.R. No. 108765, August 27, 1999

Because the petitioner did not take an appeal from the order of the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, but went directly to court, it was held that the court action was premature and the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

SSSEA sought judicial annulment of BLR election orders without appealing to the Secretary of Labor as required. The Court dismissed the petition for prematurity, holding that administrative remedies must be exhausted before court intervention.

[a] A party aggrieved must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but must also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention, in order to give that administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts

Zabat v. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 551.

The Zabats challenged NHA’s allocation of a housing lot after administrative determinations by the AAC and NHA, but filed suit in court before exhausting and completing the administrative route. The Court held that administrative remedies must be pursued to their conclusion before seeking judicial relief, and the premature court action was therefore barred.

C. Effect of Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The jurisdiction of the court is not affected; but the complainant is deprived of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss.
However, if no motion to dismiss is filed on this ground, there is deemed to be a waiver.
See Soto v. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116;

The petitioner went to court over a land/registration dispute while an available administrative remedy remained pending and unexhausted; the respondent moved to dismiss for failure to pursue that remedy. The Court held that although jurisdiction was intact, non‑exhaustion deprived the petitioner of a cause of action and warranted dismissal when timely raised, because the administrative agency should first be given the chance to apply its expertise and correct errors.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533.

A seaman’s death‑benefit case processed by the POEA prompted the shipowner to bypass administrative appeals and directly challenge POEA’s jurisdiction in court, advancing essentially legal questions about the agency’s authority. The Court ruled that where the issue is purely legal and does not require administrative fact‑finding or technical expertise, the exhaustion rule yields and the courts may entertain immediate judicial review.

D. Exceptions to the Doctrine

1. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency (Alter Ego Doctrine)

See Kilusang Bayan, etc. v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92.

The Secretary of Agriculture ordered takeover of a municipally managed market and disbanded its cooperative board, prompting the cooperative to seek immediate judicial relief for alleged lack of due process. The Court held that secretarial acts are administrative and should first be addressed through prescribed administrative channels under the qualified political‑agency doctrine, allowing the agency to correct or justify its action and reserving court intervention for clear excess, grave abuse, or denial of due process.

Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 589

The Supreme Court held that when the Undersecretary of Natural Resources denied the motion for reconsideration, he was acting on behalf of the Secretary of Natural Resources; accordingly, administrative remedies had been exhausted.

A land dispute produced a motion for reconsideration that was denied by the Undersecretary of Natural Resources, after which the parties sought judicial review. The Court ruled that a lawful denial by an Undersecretary acting within delegated authority constitutes the Secretary’s act for exhaustion purposes, so administrative remedies were treated as exhausted and judicial review was appropriate.

[a] Except where the law expressly provides for exhaustion.

Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302

Where the failure of the petitioner to appeal the order of the Secretary of Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines (who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238, withdrawing the area from private exploration and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve) was deemed fatal to the petition.

Following executive and agency measures withdrawing land for watershed reservation, the petitioner challenged forestry actions in court but failed to pursue the expressly mandated appeal from the Secretary to the President. The Court dismissed the petition, emphasizing that where the law expressly requires hierarchical administrative review, failure to exhaust that prescribed remedy is fatal to a judicial action.

[b] Calo v. Fuertes, 5 SCRA 399

Where appeal had already been made to the President and, before the President could act on the appeal, the same was withdrawn, there was deemed to have been failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Besides, by appealing to the President, the party recognized a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy still open to him in the ordinary course of law—and thus, his special civil action must fail.

Calo pursued administrative review of adverse land decisions and filed an appeal to the President but withdrew that presidential appeal before the President acted, then immediately brought a court action. The Court ruled the withdrawal amounted to failure to exhaust the prescribed administrative remedy, which deprived Calo of a cause of action and warranted dismissal because he had abandoned the plain, adequate administrative channel.

See also National Development Company v. Hervilla, supra;
Industrial Power Sales v. Sinsuat, 160 SCRA 19.

IPS protested a 1965 government procurement award, alleging procedural irregularities and grave abuse after the contract was given to a rival despite earlier administrative protests. The Court held that although exhaustion of administrative remedies is the norm, recognized exceptions (purely legal questions, patently illegal acts, alter‑ego acts, or urgent necessity) applied here, so it granted certiorari to correct an administrative grave abuse and annul the award.

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, 286 SCRA 109

However, where the appeal to the Office of the President had not been acted upon (and despite follow-up for two months, no reply was received by the petitioner), and in the meantime, the Philippine Coconut Authority, pursuant to the assailed resolution, was issuing certificates of registration indiscriminately, the Supreme Court held that the Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators was justified in filing the case in court.

[c] Samahang Magbubukid ng Kapdula, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103953, March 25, 1999

It was held that the decisions of the DAR Secretary cannot be questioned before the DARAB.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is improper in this case, because Sec. 54 of R.A. 6657 specifically provides that decisions and awards of the DAR shall be brought up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari.

DAR issued CLOAs in 1991 awarding parcels to the petitioner association while other farmworkers claimed entitlement and alleged they were denied meaningful notice and hearing, prompting certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 permits certiorari to the Court of Appeals, that exhaustion before DARAB was not required here, and that estoppel and due process concerns justified direct judicial review.

2. Where the administrative remedy is fruitless,

e.g., a suit for recovery of title to office must be instituted within one year from illegal ouster; otherwise, the action prescribes.

3. Where there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency

Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil 377.

The widow of Lt. Tan, a recognized guerrilla who died in 1945, sought backpay benefits under R.A. Nos. 304 and 897 and petitioned the court when the Veterans Backpay Commission refused to give due course to her claim. The Supreme Court held that once the factual prerequisites were established the Commission’s duty was ministerial, mandamus was proper to compel issuance of the backpay certificate, and the Commission could not invoke exhaustion because of its prior representations (estoppel).

4. Where the issue involved is purely a legal question

Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz, 160 SCRA 751

Dr. Palma‑Fernandez was transferred by hospital orders from the Medical Center Chief without action by the Secretary of Health, prompting quo warranto. The Court found the issue purely legal, held the transfer ultra vires and patently illegal, and restored petitioner without requiring administrative exhaustion.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, supra;
Samson v. NLRC, 253 SCRA 112.

Samson, a managerial employee dismissed for alleged misconduct, challenged NLRC’s legal conclusions about managerial prerogative and sufficiency of cause. The Court treated those matters as pure questions of law and used certiorari to correct legal errors without remanding for further fact‑finding.

Castro v. Secretary Gloria, G.R. No. 132174, August 20, 2001

The Supreme Court said that there is a question of law when the doubts or differences arise as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.
There is a question of fact when the doubts or differences arise as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts.

Castro was dismissed for immoral conduct, pursued administrative remedies but faced delay, and asked the courts to correct the legal penalty imposed. The Court held the issue a pure question of law—what penalty the law prescribes for a first offense—and reduced dismissal to suspension, permitting judicial review without exhausting administrative remedies.

[a] In Castro, the petitioner was not disputing the administrative finding of guilt, but the correctness of the penalty imposed.

He claimed that the proper penalty for the first offense of immoral or disgraceful conduct is only suspension, not dismissal from the service.
Understandably, the issue is a pure question of law.
Bordallo v. Professional Regulation Commission & Board of Marine Deck Officers, G.R. No. 140920, November 19, 2001

Similarly, it was held that the issue was purely a legal question, inasmuch as the question was which law to apply:
R.A. 8544 (Philippine Merchant Marine Officers Act of 1998) prescribing a passing grade of 70%, or Presidential Decree No. 97 prescribing 75%.

Examinees took the April 1998 marine officer exams after R.A. No. 8544 (which set the passing grade at 70%) but the Board applied the old P.D. No. 97 standard of 75%, causing those who scored between 70–75% to be failed. The Court treated which statute governed as a pure question of law, held R.A. 8544 controlled (70% passing), and ordered the affected examinees to be credited as passing.

Boncodin v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 168476, September 27, 2006

Where the dispute was on the legality of the resolution adopted by the NPC Board granting salary step increments, it was held that the issue involved was purely legal.

NPC adopted resolutions granting step increments which DBM challenged and the RTC enjoined; the dispute centered on the legal validity of the Board action. The Supreme Court treated the question as legal but vacated the injunction because the union failed to establish a clear, vested legal right necessary for extraordinary interim relief.

[b] Ty v. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500

It was held that there was no necessity to appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals, considering that the parties agreed that the issues in the petition were purely legal, and thus, no evidence was presented in the lower court.

Ty challenged Pasig’s increased real estate tax assessments and the parties agreed the dispute involved only legal issues about which law applied to assessment procedures. The Court held exhaustion unnecessary when issues are purely legal and decided the case on the merits without requiring appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals.

Espina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97903, August 24, 1998

Since the issue called for interpretation of the law creating the National Electrification Administration and the by-laws of the Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, it was held that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required.

Espina contested NEA’s reversal of a local disqualification for a cooperative directorship, raising legal questions about NEA’s charter and the cooperative’s by‑laws. The Court treated the matter as a pure question of law, dispensed with exhaustion, and reviewed NEA’s action on the merits.

5. Where the administrative action is patently illegal, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

Industrial Power Sales v. Sinsuat, supra.
Cabada v. Alunan, 260 SCRA 838

The Supreme Court said that the Commissioner of the National Police Commission who denied petitioners’ appeal to the Secretary of Interior and Local Government acted in a patently illegal manner, because only the Secretary of DILG could act on the appeal.
The NAPOLCOM, being a collegial body, cannot be bound by the act of an individual Commissioner.

Two police officers’ appeals were blocked by a single NAPOLCOM Commissioner though statute reserved final action to the DILG Secretary and NAPOLCOM is a collegial body. The Court found the Commissioner’s denial patently illegal and ultra vires, set it aside, and allowed direct judicial relief without administrative exhaustion.

6. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438

The inaction of the PCGG on the motion filed by the respondent (it took seven years before the PCGG filed its motion to dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies) gave rise to unreasonable delay.

Whether unreasonable delay or official inaction by an administrative body excuses exhaustion of administrative remedies and permits immediate judicial intervention; YES.

7. Where there is irreparable injury or threat thereof, unless judicial recourse is immediately made

De Lara v. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269.

Petitioners faced imminent enforcement actions that would cause irreversible harm if they waited for administrative remedies. The Court held that the threat of irreparable injury justified immediate judicial intervention and granted appropriate relief to avert irreversible loss.

National Food Authority v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 470,

Because the contracts of the security agencies had already been terminated and their replacements were hired, appeal to the Board of Trustees of the NFA and to the Secretary of Agriculture was not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
The respondents had to go to court to stop the implementation of the new contracts.

NFA terminated security contracts and replacements were already hired and working, so administrative appeal would not promptly or adequately remedy the harm. The Court held that exhaustion was unnecessary and allowed court action to stop implementation because administrative remedies were not plain, speedy, and adequate.

8. In land cases, where the subject matter is private land

Soto v. Jareno, supra.

9. Where the law does not make exhaustion a condition precedent to judicial recourse, or where no administrative review is provided by law.

Example: where the law provides no administrative review for cases where an employee covered by the Civil Service Law is penalized with suspension of not more than 30 days
Mark James Maglalang v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013.

10. Where observance of the doctrine will result in the nullification of the claim.

11. Where there are special reasons or circumstances demanding immediate court action.

[a] Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999

The Supreme Court held that where exhaustion of remedies before the DAR does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, the party may seek immediate redress in court.

Roxas & Co. challenged DAR’s compulsory acquisition of haciendas under CARL, raising core questions of statutory scope, notice, and procedure. The Supreme Court held that where the controversy is primarily legal, exhaustion is unnecessary and the courts may decide the legal issues on their merits.

[b] Department of Agrarian Reform v. Apex Investment and Financing Corporation, G.R. No. 149422, April 10, 2003

The Court said that the doctrine may be disregarded when:

there are circumstances indicating urgency of judicial intervention; and
the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In that case, the PARO delayed for over a year in acting on a protest, while titles were cancelled and reissued to alleged farmer-beneficiaries.

Apex faced prolonged PARO inaction while titles were cancelled and CLOAs issued, producing irreversible changes to its property rights. The Supreme Court held that special circumstances—extended delay and issuance of replacement titles—excused exhaustion and justified immediate judicial intervention to prevent irreparable harm.

12. When due process of law is clearly violated

Anzaldo v. Clave, 119 SCRA 353

Anzaldo was denied a supervisory post after the same official who made the initial recommendation (as CSC chairman) later acted in a reviewing capacity (as PEA) to affirm that recommendation. The Court found that procedure denied due process—a review by the same decision‑maker is inherently unfair—and set the action aside without requiring exhaustion.

Zambales Chromite v. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 261).

ZCM’s appeal was decided by the same official who issued the original adverse decision, producing no real review. The Court held that self‑review by the same official denies due process and set the affirmed decision aside, requiring genuine, independent reconsideration.

Pagara v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 606,

Parcels of land were placed under Operation Land Transfer without giving the respondent an opportunity to be heard.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was denial of due process, hence exhaustion was unnecessary.

Parcels were placed under OLT and titles issued without giving affected owners a real chance to be heard. The Court found a denial of due process and allowed immediate judicial relief, annulling the administrative action without requiring exhaustion.

13. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy

Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, 193 SCRA 520.

Secretary Quisumbing ordered the reassignment of Esther Yap and the RTC enjoined enforcement after Yap filed for prohibition; petitioners argued failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court held the controversy raised pure legal questions about authority to reassign, found exhaustion unnecessary, and allowed judicial review, denying the petition to set aside the RTC orders.

Estuerte v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 541

The Court said that in a civil action for damages, the issue is whether damages were caused by the acts of defendants; such a case can proceed independently of administrative action.

Plaintiffs sued for monetary damages allegedly caused by government acts while administrative remedies were available; they sought full civil relief in court. The Supreme Court held that civil actions for damages—focused on causation and compensation—may proceed without exhausting administrative remedies because administrative channels are inadequate to provide full, prompt monetary relief.

[a] Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Comelec, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004

COMELEC awarded an election automation contract despite technical failures and procedural defects, prompting Infotech to allege grave abuse and demand judicial nullification. The Supreme Court found patent illegality and potential irreparable harm, applied recognized exceptions to the exhaustion rule, voided the award, and enjoined its implementation without requiring administrative exhaustion.

The Supreme Court cited Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, enumerating instances when exhaustion may be disregarded:

VLIEI-ANPNU

When there is violation of due process;
When the issue is purely a legal question;
When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency;
When there is irreparable injury;
When the respondent is a Department Secretary acting as alter ego of the President;
When requiring exhaustion would be unreasonable;
When it would nullify the claim;
When the subject matter is private land;
When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, or adequate remedy; and
When there are circumstances indicating urgency of judicial intervention.

IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

A. Rule

Except when the Constitution requires or allows it, judicial review may be granted or withheld as Congress chooses.
Thus, the law may provide that a determination made by an administrative agency shall be final and irreviewable.
In such a case, there is no violation of due process.

1. However, Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VIII, Philippine Constitution, which provides that the judicial power includes the power of the courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any agency or instrumentality of government, clearly means that judicial review of administrative decisions cannot be denied the courts when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion.

B. Bases for Judicial Review

1. Constitution

For instance, Sec. 7, Art. IX-A, Constitution, provides:
“x x x Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

2. Statutes

3. General principles of law

San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. L-39195, May 16, 1975

It was held that there is an underlying power in the Courts to scrutinize the acts of administrative agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction although no right of review is given by statute.
This is designed to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and to protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions.
It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudication.

San Miguel dismissed an employee and sought to overturn an NLRC reinstatement affirmed by the Secretary of Labor; the company argued courts lacked review power where statute was silent. The Supreme Court held courts retain inherent power to review administrative acts on questions of law and jurisdiction to check agency excess and protect substantial rights.

Continental Marble v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 151

The Supreme Court held that by the nature of his functions, the voluntary arbitrator acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.
The Court must pass upon his work where a question of law is involved, or where a showing of abuse of authority or discretion in their official acts is properly raised in a petition for certiorari.

Continental Marble’s dispute went to a voluntary arbitrator whose award the NLRC deemed final, but the employer alleged denial of due process and legal error. The Supreme Court held that voluntary arbitral awards are reviewable for legal error, denial of due process, or abuse of authority and granted relief accordingly.

Unicraft Industries International v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134903, March 23, 2001

It was held that the decision of a Voluntary Arbitrator, although generally accorded finality, may still be subject to judicial review if there was a violation of due process.
In this case, the omission to give the petitioner a chance to present evidence was a clear violation of a party's constitutional right, and had the effect of rendering the Arbitrator's judgment null and void.

Unicraft argued it was denied the chance to present key evidence in voluntary arbitration and an adverse award was executed. The Supreme Court found a due process violation, annulled the award, and remanded the case for the party’s evidence to be received and considered.

C. Methods of Obtaining Judicial Review

Classes:

1. Statutory or Non-Statutory

[a] Statutory

available pursuant to specific statutory provisions.

[b] Non-statutory

where there is no express statute granting review, relief is obtained by means of the common law remedies, or by the prerogative writs of certiorari, mandamus, habeas corpus, quo warranto, or prohibition.
NOTE: If statutory methods for judicial review are available, they are generally exclusive, and the use of non-statutory methods will not likely be permitted.

2. Direct or Collateral

[a] Direct

attempt to question in subsequent proceedings the administrative action for lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, etc.

[i] Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692

It was held that the citizenship of an individual cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding.

Jose Ong was proclaimed congressman and the HRET found him a natural-born Filipino and resident of the district after election protests by Co and Balanquit; they sought Supreme Court review alleging HRET grave abuse. The Supreme Court held that citizenship as a qualification cannot be attacked collaterally because the HRET has sole jurisdiction over membership contests, and it dismissed the petitions for lack of a showing of grave abuse.

[b] Collateral

relief from administrative action sought in a proceeding the primary purpose of which is some relief other than the setting aside of the judgment, although an attack on the judgment may be incidentally involved, e.g., a damage suit against the administrative officials.

D. What Court Has Jurisdiction

1. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Provides that the Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction over judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders, or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

2. In Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Cagayan Electric Power & Light, G.R. No. 127371, April 25, 2002, the Supreme Court noted that Sec. 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating the Energy Regulatory Board) provides that a review of ERB's decisions or orders is lodged in the Supreme Court (now in the Court of Appeals).

The Court then reiterated the rule that where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
This doctrine of non-interference by trial courts with co-equal administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.

3. However, in Board of Commissioners, CID v. Judge de la Rosa, the Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing in the law creating the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) which provides that its decisions may be reviewed only by the Court of Appeals; accordingly, review by the RTC was upheld.

Likewise, in Commendador v. de Villa, 200 SCRA 80, it was held that the decision/order of a court martial may be reviewed by the RTC.
By the same token, although the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body, it is not co-equal to the Regional Trial Court (LLDA v. Court of Appeals).

E. Questions Which May Be Subject of Judicial Review

1. Questions of Law

2. Questions of Fact

Factual findings of administrative agencies are generally conclusive upon the courts if supported by substantial evidence; thus, courts are precluded from reviewing questions of fact, except:

[a] When expressly allowed by statute;

[b] Fraud, imposition or mistake other than error of judgment in evaluating the evidence

Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil 440; or

Ortua applied to buy public agricultural land but the Director of Lands, later approved by the Secretary, found him not qualified on citizenship grounds; Ortua sought mandamus to compel action. The Supreme Court held that administrative factfindings approved by the Secretary are conclusive if supported by some evidence and will be disturbed only upon proof of fraud, imposition, or mistake other than mere error in judging evidence, while legal misinterpretations remain reviewable.

[c] Error in appreciation of the pleadings and in the interpretation of the documentary evidence presented by the parties

Tan Tiang Teek v. Commission, 40 O.G., 6th Supp. 125.

The commission resolved a dispute after interpreting pleadings and documents in a way the losing party claimed was incorrect; the party argued the commission misappreciated key submissions. The Court held that when an administrative body’s interpretation of pleadings or documents constitutes a material misapprehension causing manifest injustice, judicial review will annul or remand the decision to correct the error.

3. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact (Brandeis Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts)

Where what purports to be a finding upon a question of fact is so involved with and dependent upon a question of law as to be, in substance and effect, a decision on the latter, the Court will, in order to decide the legal question, examine the entire record including the evidence if necessary.

F. Guidelines for the Exercise of the Power

1. Findings of fact are respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant.

See Bagsican v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226;

Bagsican was ejected from the coconut holding he tilled and CAR found him a lawful tenant, but the Court of Appeals reversed using a preponderance standard. The Supreme Court held that CAR’s factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence and reversed the CA for applying the wrong evidentiary yardstick.

Lianga Bay Logging v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 357;

Lianga Bay Logging disputed forest boundary survey findings made by forestry officials after hearings and fieldwork. The Supreme Court held administrative survey and boundary findings supported by substantial evidence must be respected and will not be disturbed by courts except for grave abuse or jurisdictional excess.

Beautifont v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 481;

Beautifont’s BOI applications were opposed and litigated, but challengers failed to show BOI acted with grave abuse or without evidentiary support. The Supreme Court held that where administrative findings are supported by substantial evidence, courts will not substitute their judgment for the agency’s discretionary determinations.

Planas Commercial v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121696, February 11, 1999;

A deliveryman claimed illegal dismissal and the Labor Arbiter awarded relief while the NLRC altered the outcome, leading to Supreme Court review. The Court held tribunal fact findings supported by substantial evidence must be respected and refused to substitute its judgment for the NLRC’s reasonable factual determinations.

Artuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142444, September 13, 2001.

Artuz was dismissed for alleged falsification of attendance based mainly on logbook evidence while other attendance proofs existed; she contested the CSC and CA rulings. The Supreme Court held that agency findings deserve deference only if supported by substantial evidence and reached after a fair process, and it intervened where those conditions were not met.

[a] Ruben Reyna v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 157219, February 8, 2011

It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Commission on Audit, are generally accorded respect and even finality by the Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction.

Bank officers were made administratively liable after COA disallowed payments to a supplier who failed to deliver, and they contested the audit findings. The Supreme Court held COA’s quasi‑judicial findings are accorded deference and will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and fair procedure.

See also Biak-na-Bato Mining v. Tanco, 193 SCRA 323

The petition disputed which party had the better right to 170 mining claims based on complex prewar locations, transfers, and postwar development, and the Secretary affirmed the Director of Mines in favor of respondent mining corporations. The Supreme Court upheld the administrative findings because they were supported by substantial evidence and there was no showing of grave abuse or jurisdictional excess.

Nuesa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132048, March 6, 2002.

DAR regional investigation found an awardee had not complied with award conditions while another was in possession and cultivation, prompting cancellation and conflicting administrative and appellate rulings. The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s affirmation of DAR’s cancellation because the agency’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and not tainted by grave abuse.

[b] Arboleda v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119509, February 11, 1999

However, the principle that factual findings of administrative bodies are binding upon the Court may be sustained only when no issue of credibility is raised.
Thus, when the factual findings of the NLRC do not agree with those of the Labor Arbiter, the Court must, of necessity, review the records to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.

Arboleda was dismissed for alleged mishandling of collection funds; the Labor Arbiter found for him but the NLRC reversed, producing conflicting credibility findings. The Supreme Court held that when administrative tribunals disagree on credibility, courts must review the record to determine which findings best conform to the evidence rather than mechanically deferring to one tribunal.

2. It is not for the reviewing court:

to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence.
Mollaneda v. Umacob, G.R. No. 140128, June 6, 2001

The Court recognizes that the trial court or the administrative body, as the trier of facts, is in a better position to assess the demeanor of the witnesses and the credibility of their testimonies as they were within its proximal view during the hearing or investigation.

A school division superintendent was accused of sexual harassment, the CSC regional office found the charge substantiated after hearings, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the trier of facts’ proximate view of witnesses makes it best suited to assess credibility and sustained the administrative findings because they were supported by substantial evidence.

[a] As a rule, it is beyond the province of the Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again in reviewing administrative decisions.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Antonio Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011

An exception to this rule lies when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would result if the Court simply accepts the administrative body's full findings.

LTO officers were accused of extorting extra payment for licenses and the Ombudsman found misconduct, but the CA reversed and the Ombudsman sought Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court held that courts generally defer to administrative factfinding but must intervene when there is serious ground to believe that accepting the agency’s findings would cause a miscarriage of justice, and it reviewed the record accordingly.

3. The administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, collusion, or error of law.

See Anzaldo v. Clave
Atlas Consolidated v. Factoran, 154 SCRA 49.

A complex administrative quarrel over mining contracts produced agency actions the petitioners sought to overturn in court. The Supreme Court held that administrative decisions within executive competence stand unless shown to be tainted by grave abuse, fraud, collusion, or error of law, and it declined to annul the challenged actions absent such proof.

[a] Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 137473, August 2, 2001

The Supreme Court said that courts will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies, unless there is a clear showing of arbitrary, capricious, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Remolona obtained and used a fraudulent Report of Rating for his wife, was found guilty of dishonesty by the CSC and dismissed, and he sought judicial annulment. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding courts will not disturb administrative disciplinary actions absent proof of grave abuse, fraud, collusion, or error of law.

G. Judicial Review is Not Trial de Novo

It is merely an ascertainment of whether the findings of the administrative agency are:

consistent with law,
free from fraud or imposition, and
supported by evidence.

LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

I. General Principles

A. Public Office.

The right, authority or duty,

created and conferred by law,

by which for a given period,

either fixed by law or

enduring at the pleasure of the creating power,

an individual is invested

with some sovereign power of government

to be exercised by him

for the benefit of the public.

1. Elements

C-D-D-I-P

Created by law or by authority of law;
Possess a delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of government, to be exercised for the benefit of the public;
Powers conferred and duties imposed must be defined, directly or impliedly, by the legislature or by legislative authority;
Duties must be performed independently and without the control of a superior power other than the law, unless they be those of an inferior or subordinate office created or authorized by the legislature, and by it placed under the general control of a superior office or body; and
Must have permanence or continuity.

2. Creation.

Public offices are created:

By the Constitution

e.g., Office of the President;

By valid statutory enactment

e.g., Office of the Insurance Commissioner; and

By authority of law

e.g., the Davide Commission.

B. Public Officer.

A person who holds a public office.

1. Distinguished from public officer as understood in criminal law.

[a] Art. 203, Revised Penal Code

any person who,

by direct provision of law,

popular election or appointment by competent authority,

shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands,

or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class,

shall be deemed to be a public officer.

[b] Under Sec. 2, R.A. 3019,

the term “public officer” includes

“elective and appointive officials and employees,

permanent or temporary,

whether in the classified, unclassified or exempt service,

receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government”

[i] The terms “classified, unclassified or exempt service” were the old categories of the positions in the Civil Service, which have been reclassified into Career and Non-Career service by P.D. 807.

Piclaro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110544, October 16, 1995

Petitioner, as Project Manager of a government building construction project, falls under the Non-Career service category, and is, thus, a public officer under the law.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over him.

Preclaro was a contractual Project Manager who, according to NBI‑assisted evidence, accepted P200,000 to overlook a deductive change order while supervising a government building project. The Supreme Court held that because he was contracted for a specific government project, received government compensation, and performed continuous governmental functions that influenced official decisions, he fell within the Non‑Career Service definition of public officer, affirmed his conviction under R.A. No. 3019, and confirmed the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.

Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747

Although the National Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Bureau of Internal Revenue to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person to preserve the distrained property, there is no provision constituting such person as a public officer by reason of such requirement.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has no jurisdiction over the case involving such a person.

Azarcon, a private contractor, signed a BIR receipt acknowledging custody of a distrained truck and agreed to preserve and surrender it, but he was not appointed to a public office. The Supreme Court held that being designated custodian under BIR distraint does not make a person a public officer, so the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over him.

2. Distinguished from clerk or employee.

“Officer”

refers to a person whose duties,

not being of a clerical or manual nature,

involve the exercise of discretion in the

performance of the functions of government.

When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of governmental power, “officer” includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.

[a] Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002

The Supreme Court said that the most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public, and that the same portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit.
Unless the powers so conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.

Laurel chaired a government-created National Centennial Commission that planned, coordinated, and implemented national centennial programs and projects, and was implicated in investigations over alleged irregularities. The Supreme Court held that because the Commission exercised sovereign governmental functions and was supported by staff and appropriations, Laurel’s chairmanship constituted a public office, so he was a public officer subject to the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.

II. Eligibility and Qualification

A. Qualification.

1. Understood in two different senses:

[a] May refer to endowments, qualities or attributes which make an individual eligible for public office

e.g., citizenship;

[b] May refer to the act of entering into the performance of the functions of a public office

e.g., taking the oath of office.

2. Endowments, qualities or attributes, the individual

When used in the sense of endowments, qualities or attributes, the individual must possess the qualifications at the time of appointment or election and continuously for as long as the official relationship continues.

[a] Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727

The Supreme Court said that the Local Government Code does not specify the date when the candidate must possess Filipino citizenship. Philippine citizenship is required in order to ensure that no alien shall govern our people.
An official begins to govern only upon his proclamation and on the day that his term begins.
Since Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance (as Filipino) on June 30, 1995 when his application for repatriation was granted by the Special Committee on Naturalization created under PD 825, he was therefore qualified to be proclaimed.
Besides, Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of qualifications of elective officials, not of candidates.

[b] Property qualifications may not be imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.

Maquira v. Borra, 15 SCRA 7

The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the law requiring each candidate to post a bond of P20.00 upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy, subject to forfeiture if he did not obtain at least 10% of the total votes cast in the constituency where he ran.

The Court struck down R.A. No. 4421 because its surety bond and forfeiture requirement forced candidates to post property or pay premiums, effectively excluding the poor from running and imposing a property qualification inconsistent with democratic principles. The Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement to protect equal political rights.

[c] Loss of any of the qualifications during incumbency will be a ground for termination.

See Frivaldo v. Comelec, 174 SCRA 245;
Labo v. Comelec, 176 SCRA 1.

Labo was shown to have been naturalized abroad and to have sworn allegiance to a foreign state, rendering him ineligible to hold local elective office under the citizenship requirement. The Supreme Court held that loss of Filipino citizenship by foreign naturalization disqualifies one from holding office unless citizenship is validly and duly restored before proclamation, and thus the COMELEC’s cancellation of his candidacy was sustained.

3. Act of entering into the performance of the functions of the office

When referring to the act of entering into the performance of the functions of the office, failure of an officer to perform an act required by law could affect the officer’s title to the given office.

[a] Prolonged failure or refusal to take the oath of office could result in forfeiture of the office.

See Sec. 11, B.P. 881:

The office of any official elected who fails or refuses to take his oath of office within six months from his proclamation shall be considered vacant, unless said failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.

[b] An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office.

Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, GR. No. 130872, March 25, 1999

Only when the public officer has satisfied this prerequisite can his right to enter into the position be considered plenary and complete.
Until then, he has none at all, and for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant.

Mayor Lecaroz continued to recognize his son as KB sectoral representative and caused payments after a rival claimed the seat based on later appointment papers, leading to Sandiganbayan convictions for estafa through falsification. The Supreme Court held that, absent clear statutory prohibition, an incumbent may hold over until a successor has properly qualified and, given the legal and factual doubts, reversed the convictions and protected the holdover doctrine.

An oath of office taken before one who has no authority to administer oath is no oath at all.

[c] However, once proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the functions thereof.

Mendoza v. Laxina, G.R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003

The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions.

Laxina was proclaimed and later faced an election protest that produced conflicting orders, but the COMELEC annulled an execution that had ousted him and he re‑assumed office and took a new oath. The Supreme Court held that the pendency of an election protest, by itself, does not bar a proclaimed official from assuming or exercising office; an enforceable order is required to prevent re‑assumption.

4. Authority to prescribe qualifications.

[a] When the qualifications (in the sense of endowments, attributes, etc.) are prescribed by the Constitution, they are generally exclusive, except where the Constitution itself provides otherwise.

[b] Relative to public offices created by statute, Congress has virtually plenary powers to prescribe qualifications, provided that

the qualifications are germane to the objective/s for which the public office was created; and
the qualifications are not too specific as to fit a particular, identifiable person, because that would deprive the appointing authority of discretion in the selection of the appointee.

See Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104 732, June 22, 1993

Petitioners challenged R.A. No. 7227’s proviso that the Mayor of Olongapo be the first SBMA Administrator, claiming constitutional violations of appointment and election rules. The Supreme Court upheld the proviso, ruling that Congress may set reasonable, germane qualifications for statutory offices and that the challenged proviso did not unconstitutionally single out a person or usurp presidential appointment power.

B. Disqualification.

1. Authority.

The legislature has the right to prescribe disqualifications in the same manner that it can prescribe qualifications, provided that the prescribed disqualifications do not violate the Constitution.

Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 400

The part of the law which provided that the mere filing of a criminal information for disloyalty was prima facie proof of guilt, and thus sufficient to disqualify a person from running for public office, was held unconstitutional for being contrary to the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Dumlao and others challenged statutes that would treat mere filing of criminal charges as enough to disqualify candidates. The Supreme Court held that treating the mere filing of a criminal information as prima facie proof of guilt—and thus as sufficient ground to deny a person the right to run—violates the presumption of innocence and due process, and the offending provision was struck down insofar as it permitted disqualification based solely on untested allegations.

See also Pamil v. Teleron, 86 SCRA 413.

Pamil challenged an ecclesiastic’s eligibility under an old Administrative Code ban, producing a sharply divided Supreme Court. The Court’s split resulted in a judgment disqualifying the priest in that case but left the larger constitutional question unsettled because no majority declared the old provision wholly inoperative.

The disqualifications prescribed by law may be:

because of unfitness for public office, or
because the person is rendered ineligible for the office.

2. General disqualifications under the Constitution.

[a] Sec. 6, Art. IX-B

No candidate who lost in an election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in Government.

[b] Sec. 7(1), Art. IX-B:

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

[i] Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993

The Supreme Court declared as constitutional the provision of the law creating the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority which mandated the appointment — as first Administrator of the Authority — the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City.

[c] Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B:

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other position in Government.

[i] National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit, G. R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004:

It was held that when another office is held by a public officer in an ex officio capacity, as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office, there is no violation, because such other office does not comprise “any other position.”
The ex officio position is actually and, in legal contemplation, part of the principal office. But the official concerned is not entitled to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.

NAC paid honoraria to representatives of its ex officio members but COA disallowed those payments as unauthorized. The Supreme Court held that ex officio duties are part of the principal office and do not entitle the official or his representative to additional compensation, and it affirmed COA’s disallowance.

3. Specific disqualifications under the Constitution.

[a] Sec. 13, Art. VII

The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.

[i] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317:

The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284, which would allow Cabinet Secretaries to hold two other offices.

EO 284 sought to let Cabinet members and deputies hold other government posts, but the Constitution narrowly restricts such exceptions. The Supreme Court held EO 284 unconstitutional because Section 13, Article VII permits only those exceptions expressly provided in the Constitution and aims to avoid concentration of power and conflicts of interest.

National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on Audit, G. R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004:

But when the other office is held in an ex officio capacity, there is no violation, provided that the official concerned is not entitled to additional compensation for his services.

[b] Sec. 13, Art. VI

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

See Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431.

Adaza, having been elected Governor, took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and attempted to retain and exercise the governorship, while the vice‑governor claimed succession. The Court held that taking the legislative oath rendered him ineligible to hold the executive post concurrently, applied the constitutional bar against dual office‑holding, and affirmed that succession and forced‑leave rules allow the vice‑governor to assume the governorship to preserve continuity and prevent incompatible offices.

[c] Sec. 12, Art. VIII

The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

See In Re: Manzano, 166 SCRA 246

Judge Manzano sought permission to sit as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, but the Committee’s functions — receiving complaints, referring abuses, and recommending law revisions — were administrative or quasi‑judicial in nature. The Supreme Court held that Section 12, Article VIII bars designation of judges to such agencies, denied the request, and allowed only strictly incidental judicial assistance that would not compromise judicial independence.

[d] Sec. 2, Art. IX-A & Sec. 8, Art. XI:

No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment.
The same disqualification applies to the Ombudsman and his Deputies.

[e] Sec. 11, Art. XI:

The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

[f] Sec. 1, Art. IX-B; Sec. 1, Art. IX-C; Sec. 1, Art. IX-D; Sec. 8, Art. XI:

Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.

[g] Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-B; Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-C; Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-D; Sec. 11, Art. XI:

Members of Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman and his Deputies are appointed to a term of seven (7) years, without reappointment.

[h] Sec. 13, Art. VII:

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as:
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or
the Office of the Ombudsman, or as
Secretaries,
Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

III. De Facto Officers

A. Defined.

One who has the reputation of being the officer that he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law.
He must have acted as an officer for such length of time, under color of title and under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the public and public authorities, as to afford a presumption of election or appointment, and induce people, without inquiry, and relying on the supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be, to submit to or invoke his action.
Torres v. Ribo, 81 Phil 44

The case arose from contested proceedings of a provincial board of canvassers where persons acted under color of office and the Court applied the de facto officer doctrine to uphold reliance‑protecting effects of their acts. The Court held that where a person has held himself out, acted under color of title, and enjoyed public acquiescence, his official acts affecting the public are valid to protect those who relied on them.

B. Legal Effects of Act; Rationale.

The acts of the de facto public officer, insofar as they affect the public, are valid, binding and with full legal effect.
The doctrine is intended not for the protection of the public officer, but for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of a public office.
Monroy v. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 620

Monroy involved disputed succession after a mayor filed for another office and the Court applied de facto officer principles to preserve the validity of official acts relied upon by the public. The Court held that acts of one exercising governmental functions under color of office and public acquiescence are valid to protect third parties and ensure continuity.

C. Elements.

PPC

1. A validly existing public office.

See Tuamda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110544, October 16, 1995.

In a contested local‑office scenario with competing claims, the Court held that an incumbent who legitimately holds over pending a successor’s valid qualification may have his official acts treated as valid under the de facto officer/holdover doctrines to preserve public reliance. The Court reversed convictions where legal uncertainty and public‑interest considerations supported protection of the incumbent’s acts.

2. Actual physical possession of said office.

3. Color of title to the office.

There is color of title to the office in any of the following cases: RFVU

By reputation or acquiescence, the public, without inquiry, relies on the supposition that he is the public officer that he purports to be.

This is acquired usually when the individual has acted as an officer for such a length of time that the public believes that he is the public officer that he assumes to be.

Under a known and valid appointment or election, but the officer failed to conform to a requirement imposed by law.

e.g., taking the oath of office.

Under a known appointment or election, void because of:

the ineligibility of the officer,
or want of authority of the appointing or electing authority, or
because of an irregularity in his appointment or election, such ineligibility, want of authority or irregularity being unknown to the public.

Under a known appointment or election pursuant to an unconstitutional law, before the law is declared unconstitutional.

D. Entitlement to Salaries.

General Rule: The rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title.
Monroy v. Court of Appeals, supra

General Manager, PPA v. Monserate, G.R. No. 129616, April 17, 2002

The Supreme Court ordered petitioner Ramon Anino to pay to the respondent backpay differentials pertaining to the period from the time he (Anino) wrongfully assumed the contested position of Manager II up to his retirement on November 30, 1997.

Monserate, the lawful Manager II, was displaced and Anino served in her stead until November 30, 1997; Monserate sought backpay differentials for the period of wrongful occupancy. The Supreme Court ordered Anino to pay the backpay differentials, holding that a person who wrongfully assumes an office and benefits from its pay may be required to restore the differential to the rightful officer.

Exception: Where there is no de jure public officer, the officer de facto who in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may, in an appropriate action, recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office.

[a] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra:

Even as Executive Order No. 284 was declared unconstitutional because it allowed Cabinet members to hold multiple offices in direct contravention of Sec. 13, Art. VII, it was held that during their tenure in the questioned positions, the respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to the emoluments of the office/s for actual services rendered.

Menzon v. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251:

The Supreme Court declared that even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint petitioner [as Acting Vice Governor], at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of Vice Governor under color of appointment, exercised the duties attached to said office for a long period of time, and was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte.
Under the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based, and on basic considerations of justice, it would be iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered.

Menzon assumed and performed vice‑gubernatorial duties under color of appointment though appointing authority was doubtful; he served publicly for a long time. The Supreme Court applied the de facto officer doctrine and held he was entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.

Sampayan v. Daza, 213 SCRA 807:

It was held that Daza would have been a de facto officer, and as such, he cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts were valid.

Daza’s occupancy of office was later challenged, and petitioners sought reimbursement of funds disbursed during his term. The Supreme Court held that, under the de facto officer doctrine, his official acts were valid as to the public and he could not be ordered to reimburse those disbursements absent proof of bad faith or fraud.

2. Rodriguez v. Tan, 91 Phil 724

The Supreme Court said that having been duly proclaimed Senator and having assumed office as required by law, the defendant is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which the Constitution provides for the position.

Concurring opinion of Justice Padilla:

If the defendant, directly or indirectly, committed unlawful or tortious acts which led to and resulted in his proclamation as Senator-elect, he would be answerable for damages.

Carlos Tan was proclaimed and served as senator until the Senate Electoral Tribunal later declared Rodriguez entitled to the seat, and Rodriguez sought recovery of the pay Tan received. The Supreme Court held that Tan, as a de facto officer who lawfully performed the duties in appearance, was entitled to retain the compensation he received while serving.

3. Malaluan v. Comelec, G.R. No. 120193, March 6, 1996:

The Comelec, finding merit in Evangelista’s appeal from the regional trial court, ordered Malaluan to vacate the office of mayor and to pay Evangelista attorney’s fees, actual expenses, unearned salary and other emoluments, obviously considering Malaluan a usurper, inasmuch as he was ordered proclaimed only by the regional trial court.
The Supreme Court deemed the award of salaries and other emoluments improper, holding that Malaluan was not a usurper but a de facto officer, having exercised the duties of the elective office under color of election (having been declared winner by the regional trial court).

Malaluan assumed the mayoralty after a Regional Trial Court declared him the true winner and allowed execution pending appeal (with bond), served publicly under that court order while the electoral contest continued, and was later ordered by COMELEC to vacate and to pay his rival salaries and other damages. The Supreme Court held that because Malaluan assumed office under judicial authority, acted openly and in good faith, and was publicly recognized as mayor, he was a de facto officer entitled to the salaries and emoluments for services actually rendered, so COMELEC’s award treating him as a usurper and ordering disgorgement was improper.

IV. Commencement of Official Relations

A. Official relations are commenced:

By appointment; or
By election.

B. Appointment.

1. Definition of terms

[a] Appointment

the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to perform the functions of a given office.

[b] Commission

the written evidence of the appointment.

[c] Designation

the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in public service.

2. Classification

Permanent and Temporary.
Regular and Ad-interim.

[a] Permanent and Temporary.

A permanent appointment is

extended to a person possessing the requisite qualifications, including the eligibility required, for the position, and thus protected by the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure.

A temporary appointment is an acting appointment;

it is extended to one who may not possess the requisite qualifications or eligibility required by law for the position, and is revocable at will, without the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation.

[i] Justina Maniebo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158708, August 10, 2010

A permanent appointment implies the holding of the appropriate civil service eligibility on the part of the appointee, unless the position involved requires no such eligibility.
Where the appointee does not possess the requisite civil service eligibility, the appointment is considered temporary.

Maniebo was promoted to Cashier III in 1994 on the basis of a purported civil service eligibility later shown to be spurious, and the CSC dismissed her for falsification and dishonesty after administrative proceedings. The Court ruled that a permanent appointment presumes valid civil service eligibility and, lacking that eligibility (especially when fraud is shown), the appointment cannot confer permanent status; the petition was denied.

Emmanuel de Castro v. Emerson Carlos, G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013

When a government employee lacks the requisite civil service eligibility, he cannot be deemed to hold his managerial position in a permanent capacity, nor acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment is temporary.

De Castro was appointed AGMO in 2009 but lacked Career Executive Service eligibility and was reassigned during administrative restructuring; he sought quo warranto to regain the post after a later appointment. The Court ruled that without CES eligibility an appointee cannot claim permanent managerial tenure in a CES-classified position; de Castro’s petition was denied.

[ii] Marohombsar v. Alonto, 194 SCRA 391

An “acting” appointment is a temporary appointment and revocable in character.

Marohombsar served as acting Vice-Chancellor with Board confirmation that the designation would remain until revoked, and she held the post for a considerable period without protest before being challenged. The Court held that under those circumstances an acting appointment can acquire de facto permanence and that removal then requires cause and due process.

Maturan v. Maglana, 113 SCRA 268

Acquisition of the appropriate civil service eligibility by a temporary appointee will not ipso facto convert the temporary appointment into a permanent one; a new appointment is necessary.

Maturan was appointed temporarily without the required eligibility, later obtained eligibility, and claimed his status had become permanent. The Court held that later acquisition of eligibility does not automatically convert a prior temporary appointment into a permanent one; a new appointment is necessary.

[iii] Department of Labor and Employment v. Ruben Maceda, G.R. No. 185112, January 18, 2010

Maceda, who held a temporary appointment as Professor I at the National Maritime Polytechnic (NMP), was informed that his temporary appointment would be renewed on a contractual status, and he agreed and signed a contract of employment.
When his contract expired, it was no longer renewed. On his contention that NMP demoted him from a temporary to a contractual employment, the Supreme Court said that, as uniformly held by DOLE and CSC, a contractual appointment is of the same nature as a temporary appointment.
Thus, when the contract was not renewed, there was no dismissal, but merely an expiration of term

Maceda served under temporary appointments at NMP, accepted a contractual appointment, and his contract was not renewed. The Court ruled that contractual appointments are equivalent to temporary ones for tenure purposes, so nonrenewal was merely expiration of term and not illegal dismissal.

[iv] Achacoso v. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235

It was held that an appointment to a position in the Career Service of the Civil Service does not necessarily mean that the appointment is a permanent one and the appointee entitled to security of tenure.
Where the appointee does not possess the qualifications for the position, the appointment is temporary and may be terminated at will.

Achacoso served in a POEA post classified under the Career Service but lacked CES eligibility and was later replaced. The Court held that lack of required eligibility means the appointment remains temporary and does not carry security of tenure despite the position’s Career Service classification.

De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182, January 22, 2001

The Supreme Court said that the mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure. Such right will have to depend on the nature of the appointment which, in turn, depends on the appointee’s eligibility or lack of it.
A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it only in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
Such being the case he could be transferred or reassigned without violating the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.

Montesa occupied a Director III post and was reassigned despite prior attestation; the legal dispute turned on whether his status carried security of tenure because the position belonged to the Career Service. The Court held that Career Service classification alone does not guarantee tenure; tenure depends on the appointee’s eligibility and nature of appointment, so lacking proper eligibility an appointment is not automatically permanent.

[v] Romualdez III v. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 168

The acceptance by the petitioner of a temporary appointment resulted in the termination of official relationship with his former permanent position.
When the temporary appointment was not renewed, the petitioner had no cause to demand reinstatement thereto.

Romualdez accepted temporary PCA appointments with fixed terms which lapsed and were not renewed. The Court ruled acceptance of temporary appointment subjects the appointee to nonrenewal as expiration of term rather than wrongful removal, and conversion to permanency is discretionary with the appointing authority.

Felix v. Buenaseda, G.R. No. 109704, July 17, 1995:

The Supreme Court said that whatever objections the petitioner had against the earlier change from his status as permanent Senior Resident Physician to temporary Senior Resident Physician were never pursued nor mentioned at, or after his designation as temporary Medical Specialist I.
He is therefore estopped from insisting upon a right or claim which he had plainly abandoned when, from all indications, he enthusiastically accepted the promotion.

Felix accepted temporary redesignations after reorganization and later failed to meet renewed qualification standards (board certification), leading to nonrenewal of his temporary specialist appointment. The Court held he was estopped from claiming permanent status after accepting temporary posts, and nonrenewal under valid qualification rules did not violate security of tenure.

Pabu-aya v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128082, April 18, 2001

Petitioner, holding a permanent appointment as Utility Worker, accepted a temporary appointment as Bookbinder II, in the Office of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental.
Since a temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, pursuant to Sec. 13(b), Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, petitioner could not claim security of tenure upon the expiration of the one-year period and demand reappointment or reinstatement.

Pabu-aya, a permanent Utility Worker, accepted a one-year temporary Bookbinder II appointment which expired and was not renewed. The Court held that accepting a temporary appointment carries no automatic right to reappointment; expiration of the twelve-month temporary term does not breach security of tenure.

Padilla v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 149451, May 8, 2003

Petitioner resigned from her permanent position and accepted casual or temporary appointments.

Padilla resigned a permanent post, later took casual/temporary positions which expired and were not renewed. The Court held that resignation plus acceptance of casual/temporary work forecloses a claim to security of tenure; nonrenewal of temporary assignments is expiration of term, not illegal dismissal.

[v] Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 537

A mere designation does not confer security of tenure, as the person designated occupies the position only in an acting capacity.

Sevilla ran a branch under a commission/agency arrangement, was designated “branch manager” but was not a formal, plantilla employee, and was later ousted when the branch closed. The Court held that mere designation does not confer security of tenure; the substance of the relationship, not the title, determines whether tenure protections apply.

Gloria v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 116183, October 6, 1995

It was held that private respondent’s assignment as Coordinator of Extension Services (CES) at PSCA was a mere designation; thus, not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement.

PSCA employees were merely designated to coordinative duties on a non‑plantilla basis while holding temporary appointments, and a designee sought court-ordered reinstatement after removal. The Court held that designation to a non‑plantilla post does not create a permanent appointment entitled to reinstatement, and reappointment is discretionary with the appointing authority.

[vi] Sinon v. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410

Where the appointment is subject to conditions, e.g., that there is no pending protest against the appointment or any decision by competent authority which will adversely affect the approval of the appointment, the appointment is not permanent.
In any event, the appointee cannot claim a “complete appointment” as long as the re-evaluation incidental to the re organization is still pending.

Sinon was placed in an MAO slot under a reorganization where a subsequent re‑evaluation and pending protest affected the final ranking and appointment outcome. The Court ruled that appointments made subject to pending protests or re‑evaluation are not complete permanent appointments and the appointee cannot claim security of tenure while the administrative review is unresolved.

Orcullo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 138780, May 22, 2001

Where the employment is qualified by the phrase “unless terminated sooner”, it is clear that even if the employment is co-terminous with the project, the employee nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Orcullo was hired as a contractual, co‑terminous project manager under a contract clause “unless terminated sooner” and was terminated before the project end date for unsatisfactory performance. The Court held that co‑terminous contractual appointments governed by explicit termination clauses do not confer the constitutional security of tenure enjoyed by career officers, and the contract’s terms control separation.

[vii] Ambas v. Buenaseda, 201 SCRA 308

It was held that where the temporary appointment is for a fixed period, the appointment:

may be revoked only at the expiration of the period, or,
if revocation is made before such expiration, the same has to be for a valid and just cause.

Resident trainee physicians at NCMH held one‑year renewable temporary contracts with explicit performance standards and several were terminated mid‑term after poor evaluations; the Secretary of Health later affirmed those terminations. The Court held that fixed‑term temporary appointments may be revoked before expiration only for valid and just cause supported by the contract’s standards and proper procedure, and it denied the petitioners’ challenges.

Osea v. Malaya, G.R. No. 139821, January 30, 2002

In connection with Sec. 99 of the Local Government Code which requires consultation with the local school board in the appointment of a schools division superintendent, the Supreme Court said that the requirement obviously applied to appointments extended by the DECS.
In 1994, when the position of schools division superintendent was placed within the career executive service, the power to appoint was vested in the President. Thus, the President issued the appointment which was not specific as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their respective stations was vested in the DECS, pursuant to the exigencies of the service.
The petitioner could not demand that she be designated to the Camarines Sur division because she lacked one essential ingredient, her appointment to the position. Her earlier designation as OIC, Asst. Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, was temporary, giving her no vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent.

Osea was an OIC designee who claimed entitlement to stationing and permanency after local endorsement, while Malaya held a presidential CES appointment later designated by DECS to Camarines Sur. The Court held that OIC designation does not vest rights to a specific station or permanency and that reassignments of presidential appointees by DECS are not appointments subject to Section 99 consultation, so Osea’s petition was denied.

[x] Sta. Maria v. Lopez, G.R. No. L-30773, February 18, 1970

An appointment for a fixed term of five years “unless sooner terminated” is not terminable at will. It is not an appointment in an acting capacity, and the appointee cannot be terminated without just cause.
Having an appointment with a fixed term, he cannot, without his consent, be transferred before the end of his term.
Thus, in this case, the appointee’s transfer to the position of Special Assistant with the rank of Dean was a demotion, because deanship in the university is more exalted than that of a Special Assistant.

Sta. Maria was appointed Dean for a five‑year term and was transferred mid‑term to a Special Assistant post after campus unrest; he challenged the transfer as an unlawful demotion. The Court ruled that fixed‑term appointments are protected for their agreed duration and cannot be terminated or effectively demoted without just cause, so the transfer was invalid as a demotion.

[xi] PCSO v. Marie ·Jean Lapid, GR. No. 191940, April 12, 2011

Although respondent is a casual employee as contemplated in Rule Ill, Sec. 2(1) of the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, she is entitled to due process, especially if she is to be removed for more serious causes or for causes other than:

her services are no longer needed;
funds are no longer available;
the project has already been completed/finished; or
her performance is below par.

Lapid, a casual teller at PCSO, was dismissed for alleged grave misconduct without adequate notice or formal investigation and appealed through administrative and judicial channels. The Court ruled that casual employees are entitled to due process when removed for cause and, because procedural protections were not observed, affirmed reinstatement and appropriate remedies.

[b] Regular and Ad-Interim.

A regular appointment is

one made by the President while Congress is in session after the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and continues until the end of the term.

An ad interim appointment is

one made while Congress is not in session, before confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, is immediately effective, and ceases to be valid if disapproved or bypassed by the Commission on Appointments upon the next adjournment of Congress.

[i] Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22

An ad-interim appointment is a permanent appointment, and its being subject to confirmation does not alter its permanent character.

Esteban received an ad interim appointment as Vice‑President for Administration at PLM, served for years, then had that appointment withdrawn while confirmation processes were ongoing. The Court held that ad interim appointments are permanent in character pending confirmation and therefore carry security of tenure until properly disapproved.

[ii] Classification of appointments into regular and ad interim can be used only when referring to the four (4) categories of appointments made by the President of the Philippines in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VIII of the Constitution, which require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, viz: EAAC

Heads of executive departments;
Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
Officers of the armed forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
Officers whose appointments are vested in the President under the Constitution.

See Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549

Petitioners challenged the President’s appointment of the Customs Commissioner as not having been submitted for Commission on Appointments confirmation. The Court ruled that heads of bureaus are not among the officers requiring confirmation under Section 16, Article VII, so the presidential appointment without Commission submission was valid.

Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 169

Bautista was appointed to head the CHR and the CA insisted on confirmation; she contested the CA’s jurisdiction. The Court ruled that appointments requiring CA confirmation are limited to the enumerated categories in Sec. 16, Art. VII, and the CHR Chair is not among them, so CA confirmation is not required.

Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259

Quintos-Deles was appointed as a sectoral representative to the House but her oath was blocked by the CA pending confirmation. The Court held that sectoral representatives fall under the constitutional category requiring CA confirmation, so the CA’s review was proper and the petition was denied.

Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254.

Calderon challenged statutory expansion of CA confirmation to NLRC appointees, arguing CA confirmation was not constitutionally required for those posts. The Court ruled Congress cannot expand the CA’s confirmation list beyond the categories expressly set out in Sec. 16, Art. VII; CA confirmation is limited to the constitutionally enumerated offices.

3. Steps in the Appointing Process

[a] For regular appointments

NCIA

Nomination by the President;
Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
Issuance of the commission; and
Acceptance by the appointee.

In the case of ad interim appointments, the nomination:

Nomination by the President;
Issuance of the commission;
Acceptance by the appointee; and
Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

[b] For appointments which do not require confirmation

AIA

Appointment by appointing authority;
Issuance of the commission; and
Acceptance by the appointee.

[i] Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil 740:

The Supreme Court held that acceptance of the appointment by the appointee is the last act that completes the appointing process.

Lacson was nominated and confirmed to a fiscal post but rival confirmation and assumption by Romero raised the question whether acceptance completes the appointment. The Court held that acceptance (oath and assumption) completes the appointment and that one cannot be compelled to accept office, subject to statutory exceptions and administrative rules requiring CSC submission for full effect.

General Rule: A person cannot be compelled to accept an appointment to public office, as the same will constitute a violation of the constitutional right against involuntary servitude.
Exception: When the appointment is made to an office required in defense of the State, as contemplated in Sec. 4, Art. II of the Constitution.

[c] Where the appointment is to the career service of the Civil Service.

Attestation by the Civil Service Commission is required.
An appointment to the career service of the Civil Service is not deemed complete until attestation/ approval by the Civil Service Commission.

Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, E.O. 292:

An appointment not submitted to the Civil Service Commission within 30 days from issuance (which shall be the date appearing on the face of the appointment) shall be ineffective.
Without the favorable certification or approval of the Civil Service Commission, no title to the office can yet be deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can still be revoked or withdrawn by the appointing authority.
Until the appointment shall have been a completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke security of tenure.
Tomali v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 110598, December 1, 1994

Tomali assumed duties under an appointment that was not timely submitted to the Civil Service Commission for approval and was later replaced by a new appointing authority who appointed someone else. The Court ruled that an appointment not timely submitted to the CSC is ineffective and does not confer security of tenure, so the appointing authority may revoke or replace the incumbent.

Lopez v. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 269

However, all that the Civil Service Commission is authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the qualifications and appropriate eligibility; “if he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved”

The City Council submitted appointments amid reorganization and dispute over appointing power, and the CSC reviewed nominees while Placement Committee recommendations existed. The Court ruled the CSC’s role is limited to checking eligibility and qualifications and that Placement Committee recommendations are recommendatory, so the petition was denied.

[i] Natanya Joana Argel v. Governor Luis Singson, G.R. No. 202970, March 25, 2015

In this case, Argel’s appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office I (CSCRO I) and affirmed by the Civil Service Commission in a decision which eventually attained finality.
The appeal by Governor Singson was made beyond the reglementary period, and thus, should not have been entertained by the Court of Appeals. The perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory; it is jurisdictional.
Failure to interpose a timely appeal renders the appealed decision, order, or award final and executory and deprives the appellate body of jurisdiction to alter the appealed judgment. The principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to judgments of courts but extends as well to those of all other tribunals exercising adjudicatory powers.

Argel’s Nurse II appointment was approved by CSCRO I but the provincial government filed its appeal late and a later CA decision improperly disturbed that now‑final approval. The Supreme Court held that untimely appeals render administrative decisions final and executory, depriving appellate bodies of jurisdiction to alter them, and thus reinstated CSCRO I’s approval.

4. Completion of Appointment.

An appointment becomes complete only when the last act required of the appointing power is performed; until the process is completed the appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor claim security of tenure.
Corpuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123989, January 26, 1998

The years of service of the employee involved cannot substitute for the want of consent of another body required by law to complete the appointment.
For the duration of his occupancy of the office, he is merely a de facto officer, because he assumed office under color of title of a known appointment which is void by reason of some defect.

Corpuz served under an appointment later disapproved by the MTRCB for lack of required Board approval, and despite long service he was held only a de facto officer. The Court ruled that years of service cannot substitute for the missing consent or formal approval required to complete an appointment, so the appointment remained defective and did not vest security of tenure.

5. Position Must Be Vacant.

For the appointment to be valid, the position must be vacant.

Gayatao v. Civil Service Commission, 210 SCRA 183

The reassignment by Customs Commissioner Mison of incumbent Customs Operations Chief Fernandez as Acting Chief of the Export Division of the NAIA Customs House was illegal, the subsequent appointment of Gayatao as Customs Operations Chief was null and void, because the position to which Gayatao was appointed was not vacant.

Gayatao was appointed to a Customs Operations Chief post while Fernandez, a permanent incumbent, had not been lawfully displaced; Fernandez protested to CSC. The Court held appointment to a non‑vacant position is invalid and upheld CSC’s revocation and reinstatement of the prior incumbent.

Garces v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99

Where a private respondent refused to vacate his office because he was being transferred without consent, the Supreme Court said that the appointment of the petitioner was invalid because the position to which he was appointed was not vacant.

Garces was appointed Election Registrar to a post that the incumbent refused to vacate, and local authorities prevented her assumption on grounds the office was not vacant. The Court held that no valid appointment can be made to a non‑vacant position and stressed that transfers without consent may amount to unlawful removal, so the appointment could not be enforced while the post remained occupied.

6. Discretion of Appointing Authority.

Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in whom it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the minimum qualification requirements prescribed by law for the position.
The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
Not only is the appointing authority primarily responsible for the administration of his office, he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can effectively discharge the functions ofjk the position.
Thus, the final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed.
Civil Service Commission v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004;

De la Cruz was promotionally appointed to ATO chief, faced a protest over supervisory experience, and the Court of Appeals validated his appointment after conflicting CSC actions. The Supreme Court held that the appointing authority’s discretionary choice among qualified candidates must be respected and that the CSC may not revoke a properly completed appointment simply because it prefers another candidate.

Department of Labor and Employment v. Ruben Maceda, G.R. No. 185112, January 18, 2010.

[a] Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 240:

It was held that when the appointing authority has already exercised his power of appointment, the Commission cannot revoke the same on the ground that another employee is better qualified, for that will constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing authority.
The Commission may not and should not substitute its judgment for that of the appointing authority.

Aquino assumed the Supply Officer I post after DECS actions favored him while a prior appointee asserted a completed, vested appointment and the CSC restored the prior appointee. The Court held that the CSC cannot revoke a properly completed appointment solely because another appears more qualified, though it may restore a prior appointment whose vested rights were unlawfully displaced.

[b] Next-in Rank Rule

While the Civil Service Law grants career service officers preference in promotion under the “next-in-rank” rule, it is not mandatory that the appointing authority fill a vacancy by promotion, as the appointing authority should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible.
For disregarding this doctrine, the CSC drew a stern rebuke from the Court in Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission; warned in Guieb v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 93935, February 9, 1994;
and again “duly warned; henceforth, it disobeys at its peril”, in Mauna v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 97794, May 13, 1994.

Mauna was appointed chief of an EBAD division while a next‑in‑rank incumbent protested claiming greater qualification and seniority; administrative bodies and CSC examined the protest and appeals. The Court held that although the next‑in‑rank rule favors career officers, the appointing authority need not automatically promote the next‑in‑rank if he or she reasonably selects another qualified and eligible candidate, absent grave abuse or illegality.

[i] Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999

Sec. 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) provides that all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice” should be interpreted to be a mere advise, exhortation and indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character but is not binding or obligatory upon the person to whom it is made.
Accordingly, the discretion of the appointing authority still prevails.

Bermudez contested Quiaoit’s presidential appointment for lack of the Justice Secretary’s recommendation while Quiaoit had already assumed office and received emoluments. The Court held the Secretary’s recommendation under EO 292 is advisory and not a mandatory precondition to presidential appointment, so the appointment remained valid.

[ii] Modesto Agyao v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182591, January 18, 2011

When the position is not among those enumerated in Sec. 7, Chapter 2, Book V, Title I (Subtitle A) of Executive Order No. 292 (Revised Administrative Code of 1987), the filling up of the position does not require a Presidential appointment.

Agyao’s temporary reappointment as PEZA Department Manager II was invalidated by CSC for lacking CESO/CSEE eligibility, but Agyao argued the post was not a presidential/third‑level position under EO 292. The Court ruled that positions not enumerated as presidential/third‑level under EO 292 do not automatically require CESO/CSEE eligibility, so CSC may only enforce eligibilities that legitimately apply to the post.

[c] The discretion of the appointing authority is not only in the choice of the person who is to be appointed, but also in the nature and character of the appointment extended, i.e., whether the appointment is permanent or temporary.

Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 281:

The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the Civil Service Commission cannot convert a temporary appointment into a permanent one, as it would constitute an arrogation of a power properly belonging to the appointing authority.
The Civil Service Commission may, however, approve as temporary an appointment intended to be permanent where the appointee does not possess the requisite eligibility, and the exigency of the service demands that the position be filled up, even in a temporary capacity.

Tito Dato held a temporary Assistant Provincial Warden appointment because he lacked the civil service eligibility; later events and a CSC communication attempted to treat his status as permanent but the plantilla and appointing procedures were not properly followed. The Supreme Court held that CSC cannot convert a temporary appointment into a permanent one and that acquiring eligibility later does not automatically create permanence—only a new valid appointment by the appointing authority can do so.

7. Judicial Review of Appointments.

Given the discretion vested in the appointing authority, an appointment is generally a political question so long as the appointee fulfills the minimum qualification requirements prescribed by law for the position.

Tanada v. Philippine Atomic Energy Commission:

The Court held that where the validity of the appointment is not challenged in appropriate proceedings, the question of the competence of the public officer is beyond the pale of judicial inquiry.

Tañada and others attacked PAEC decisions and tried to invalidate those acts by asserting the officers who made them were not validly appointed, but they did not use the proper, timely remedies to challenge appointments. The Supreme Court ruled that absent a proper challenge to an appointment, the competence of the officer cannot be collaterally questioned and the petition was denied.

Bongbong v. Parazo, 57 SCRA 623:

An action for usurpation of office may be brought only by one who claims valid title to the office.

Bongbong sued to recover a Municipal Health Officer post but failed to show he had a valid, specific appointment or legal title to that Palompon office. The Court held that a quo warranto action requires the challenger to claim and prove lawful title to the office, and absent that proof the suit must be dismissed.

8. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission:

Disciplinary cases, and
cases involving:

“personnel action” affecting employees in the Civil Service, including:

appointment through certification, promotion,
transfer,
reinstatement,
reemployment,
detail,
reassignment,
demotion and
separation

employment status and
qualification standards.

Mantala v. Salvador

The Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for quo warranto and mandamus filed by one who, claiming she is next-in-rank and better qualified, should have been extended the promotional appointment.

[a] Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, 237 SCRA 184:

The power of the Civil Service Commission includes the authority to recall an appointment which has been initially approved when it is shown that the same was issued in disregard of pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.

The mayor appointed his wife to a city post and the CSC, after investigation, recalled the field approval and disapproved the promotion for violating anti‑nepotism rules. The Supreme Court held the CSC may recall an appointment initially approved when it is shown the appointment was issued in disregard of civil service laws, rules, or regulations.

[c] University of the Philippines and Alfredo de Torres v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 132860, April 3, 2001:

But the Civil Service Commission is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies.
Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their compliance with the Civil Service Law.
On its own, the Commission does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop members from the rolls.

UP asked the Court to review CSC resolutions that declared Dr. De Torres had been dropped and that his re‑employment would require a formal appointment; UP argued CSC overstepped into academic management. The Supreme Court held that the CSC’s authority is limited to policing compliance with civil service rules and it is not a co‑manager or surrogate administrator that can unilaterally terminate employment or drop members from institutional rolls.

C. Appointments to the Civil Service.

1. Scope of the Civil Service

Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-B

Embraces all:

branches,
subdivisions,
instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government,
including government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters.

University of the Philippines v. Regino, 221 SCRA 598:

It was held that the University of the Philippines, having been created by a special law and having an original charter, is clearly part of the Civil Service.

Angel Pamplina, a dismissed UP mimeograph operator, appealed to the Merit Systems Board and Civil Service Commission and was ordered reinstated, while UP claimed its charter gave exclusive disciplinary control to the Board of Regents. The Supreme Court ruled that UP employees are part of the Civil Service and that the CSC has jurisdiction to review disciplinary cases involving UP personnel, so UP’s petition was denied.

Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284:

It was held that the Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD 198, is a government-owned corporation with an original charter.
Accordingly, its employees fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees in the said water district.

The Morong Water District board dismissed its general manager and he sought relief in the RTC, but the district is a quasi-public corporation created under P.D. No. 198. The Supreme Court ruled that employees of such water districts are part of the Civil Service and disciplinary disputes fall under the Civil Service Commission’s jurisdiction, not the RTC.

EIIB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129133, November 25, 1998:

It was held that the Economic Intelligence and Information Bureau is a government agency within the coverage of the Civil Service.

The EIIB refused to submit its appointments to the Civil Service Commission, claiming exemptions under PD 1458 and LOI 71 because of its intelligence role. The Supreme Court held that the EIIB is covered by the Civil Service and that confidentiality does not remove the agency from CSC jurisdiction, so EIIB must submit appointments for CSC review.

Department of Health v. NLRC, 251 SCRA 700:

The Jose M. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital is a government hospital exercising governmental functions, and is within the coverage of the Civil Service.

Ceferino Laur, a patient-assistant at the Dr. Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital, was dismissed and sought relief before the NLRC, while the hospital maintained that it is a government hospital and its personnel are civil servants. The Supreme Court held the hospital is within the Civil Service and that the CSC, not the NLRC, has jurisdiction over dismissal disputes involving its employees.

Camporedondo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, August 6, 1999:

The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter under RA 95, as amended.
Paid staff of the PNRC are government employees who are members of the GSIS and covered by the Civil Service Law .

Baltazar Camporedondo, a paid staff of the Philippine National Red Cross, was forced into early retirement after audit findings and sought relief before the NLRC. The Supreme Court held the PNRC is a GOCC with an original charter and that its paid staff are civil servants covered by the Civil Service Law, placing jurisdiction over employment disputes with the CSC rather than the NLRC.

Juco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98107, August 18, 1997:

It was held that the employment relations in the National Housing Corporation (NHC) are within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, not the Civil Service Commission, even as the controversy arose prior to 1987, because, as held in National Service Corporation v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122, it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision which governs.
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that the phrase “with original charter” refers to corporations chartered by special law, as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code.

Benjamin Juco, previously separated from the National Housing Corporation (an entity organized under the Corporation Code), sought relief for illegal dismissal and raised the question whether NHC employees are within civil service coverage. The Supreme Court held that “with original charter” means corporations created by special law, NHC was not so chartered, and employment disputes of NHC belong to the NLRC rather than the Civil Service Commission.

Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) v. Venus, G.R. No. 163782, March 24, 2006:

The Supreme Court said that LRTA being a government-owned corporation with an original charter, employment therein is governed by civil service rules, not by the Labor Code, and is beyond the reach of the DOLE.
However, METRO was originally organized under the Corporation Code and became a government-owned and controlled corporation only when it was acquired by LRTA. Thus, it is the DOLE, not the Civil Service Commission.

LRTA, an original-charter GOCC, contracted operations to METRO, a Corporation Code company that later remained a distinct juridical person even after LRTA acquired its shares; METRO hired the dismissed workers. The Court held that LRTA’s civil service status does not automatically attach to METRO’s employees, so METRO’s workers are governed by labor law and DOLE jurisdiction unless the corporate veil is clearly pierced.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007:

It was held that the person occupying the position of Director II in the Central Administrative Service or Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman is appointed by the Ombudsman, not by the President.
As such, he is neither embraced in the Career Executive Service (CES) nor does he need to possess Career Executive Service eligibility.
To classify the positions as covered by the CES and require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences, as it will result either in:

vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution, or
including in the CES a position not held by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.

The Ombudsman challenged a CSC opinion that classified certain Director II positions as CES posts requiring CES/CSE eligibility, arguing this would improperly shift appointing power or include non-presidential appointees in the CES. The Supreme Court held that those Director II positions are appointed by the Ombudsman and are not covered by the CES, so CES/CSE eligibility is not required.

2. Classes of Service.

Career Service.
Non-career service.

[a] Career Service.

Characterized by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications, opportunity for advancement to higher career positions, and security of tenure.
The positions included are: OCCC-AGL

Open career positions

prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;

Closed career positions

e.g., scientific or highly technical in nature;

Career Executive Service

e.g., undersecretaries, bureau directors, etc., where the appointee is required to possess the appropriate Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) eligibility;

Career officers (other than those belong to the Career Executive Service)

who are appointed by the President;

Positions in the Armed Forces of the Philippines,

although governed by a separate merit system;

Personnel of government-owned or -controlled corporations with original charter; and
Permanent laborers,

whether:

skilled,
semi-skilled or
unskilled.

Career executive service.

The two requisites that must concur in order that an employee in the career executive service may attain security of tenure are:

career executive service eligibility; and
appointment to the appropriate career executive service rank.

It must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and second level employees in the civil service) pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed.
Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned.
In fact, a career executive service officer suffers no diminution in salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office which he occupies.

Dimayuga v. Benedicto, G.R. No. 144153, January 16, 2002

Accordingly, where the appointee does not possess the required career executive service eligibility, his appointment will not attain permanency.
On this basis, the appointment of the respondent as Ministry Legal Counsel, CESO IV, Department Legal Counsel or Director III — inasmuch as he did not possess the appropriate CESO eligibility — was merely temporary. Thus, he could be transferred or reassigned without violating security of tenure.

[b] Non-career service.

Characterized by entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests utilized for the career service.
Tenure:

limited to a period specified by law, or
which is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made.

The officers and employees embraced in the non-career service are: EDCCE

Elective officials, and their personal and confidential staff;
Department Heads and officials of Cabinet rank who hold office at the pleasure of the President, and their personal and confidential staff;
Chairmen and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office, and their personal and confidential staff;
Contractual personnel or those whose employment in government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period not exceeding one year, under their own responsibility, with the minimum direction and supervision; and
Emergency and seasonal personnel.

Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 131954, June 28, 2001:

The Supreme Court said that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Civil Service Commission is expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as primarily confidential.
This signifies that the enumeration in the Civil Service decree, which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive list.
The Commission can supplement this enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. 1991, specifying positions in the Civil Service which are considered primarily confidential and, therefore, their occupants hold tenure co-terminous with the officials they serve.

Orcullo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 138780, May 22, 2001:

The co-terminous status of an officer or employee may be classified as follows:

co-terminous with the project

when the appointment is coexistent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;

co-terminous with the appointing authority,

when the appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;

co-terminous with the incumbent

when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent, the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and

co-terminous with a specific period,

the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.

3. Requisites:

Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-B

Shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and by competitive examination except appointments to positions which are:

policy determining,
primarily confidential or
highly technical.

Umoso v. Civil Service Commission, supra

In a department, the appointing power is vested in the Department Secretary, and although such power may be delegated to the Regional Director, the same is still subject to the approval, revision, modification or reversal by the Department Secretary.

PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001:

Three important points are underscored:

The classification of a particular position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position;
The exemption provided in this section pertains only to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service; and
Sec. 16, RD. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions in PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.

Exempt from the competitive examination requirement are appointments to positions which are:

Policy determining

The officer lays down principal or fundamental guidelines or rules; or formulates a method of action for government or any of its subdivisions.
Ex: department head.

Primarily confidential

denoting not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals on confidential matters of state; or one declared to be so by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission.
Civil Service Commission and PAGCOR v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997:

The Supreme Court said that prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential, namely:

when the President, upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, has declared the position to be primarily confidential; and
in the absence of such a declaration, when from the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and the appointing authority which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals on confidential matters of State.

When R.A. 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959, Sec. 5 thereof provided that “the non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service, or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature”.
Thus, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position which determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical.

Pinero v. Hechanova, 18 SCRA 417:

It was declared that executive pronouncements, such as P.D. 1869, can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict; otherwise, it would lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the constitutional protection of security of tenure.
This rule prevails even with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987, despite the fact that the phrase “in nature” was deleted.
Furthermore, the “proximity rule” enunciated in De los Santos v. Mallare, supra., is still authoritative, i.e., that the occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayals of personal trust and confidential matters of State.
Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant, and therefore, would not be primarily confidential.

PAGCOR v. Rilloraza:

It was held that the position of Casino Operations Manager (COM) is not a primarily confidential position.
While the COM is required to exercise supervisory, recommendatory and disciplinary powers with wide latitude of authority, and he is a tier above the ordinary rank-and-file employee, nonetheless, lacking is that amplitude of confidence reposed in him by the appointing authority.
For one thing, he reports directly to the Branch Manager, not to the appointing authority.
It becomes unmistakable that the stratum separating the COM from reporting directly to the higher echelons renders remote the proposition of proximity between the respondent and the appointing authority.

Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission, supra.:

The Supreme Court recognized the express authority of the Civil Service Commission, under the Administrative Code of 1987, to declare positions in the Civil Service as primarily confidential.
Accordingly, the enumeration of primarily confidential employees in the Civil Service decree is not exclusive; the Commission may supplement the same, as it did when it issued Memo Circular No. 22, s. 1991.

Highly technical

which requires possession of technical skill or training in a supreme or superior degree.
Besa v. Philippine National Bank, supra.:

The position of legal counsel of the PNB was declared to be both primarily confidential and highly technical, with the former aspect predominating.

Cadiente v. Santos, 142 SCRA 280:

The position of City Legal Officer is primarily confidential, requiring the utmost degree of confidence on the part of the Mayor.

Pacete v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 185 SCRA 1:

The position of City Attorney was held to be both confidential and technical in nature.

Borres v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 120:

It was held that the positions of Security Officer and Security Guards of the City Vice Mayor are primarily confidential positions.

D. Other Personnel Actions.

1. Promotion

It is a movement from one position to another with increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law and usually accompanied by an increase in pay.

Next-in-rank rule.

The person next in rank shall be given preference in promotion when the position immediately above his is vacated.
But the appointing authority still exercises discretion and is not bound by this rule, although he is required to specify the “special reason or reasons” for not appointing the officer next-in-rank.
This means that the one who is “next-inrank” is given only preferential consideration for promotion; but it does not necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed.

Automatic Reversion Rule

Sec. 13 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V, E.O. 292, states: “All appointments involved in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for approval by the Commission. The disapproval of the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position invalidates the promotion of those in the lower positions and automatically restores them to their former positions. However, the affected persons are entitled to payment of salaries for services actually rendered at a rate fixed in their promotional appointments.”
For this rule to apply, the following must concur:

there must be a series of promotions;
all promotional appointments are simultaneously submitted to the Commission for approval; and
the Commission disapproves the appointment of a person to a higher position.

Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 110954, May 31, 1995:

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the movement of private respondent Nacario from the Budget Office to the MPDO was not a promotion, but a lateral transfer.

2. Appointment through Certification.

It is issued to a person who has been selected from a list of qualified persons certified by the Civil Service Commission from an appropriate register of eligibles, and who meets all the qualifications prescribed for the position.

3. Transfer.

It is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service.
Under current Civil Service rules and regulations, transfer may be imposed as an administrative penalty.
An unconsented transfer violates security of tenure.

A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction, or a transfer that aims to lure the employee away from his permanent position, cannot be done without the employee’s consent, for that would constitute removal from office.
Indeed, no permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position

Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, 193 SCRA 520:

The appointment of the private respondent Yap being that of District Supervisor at large, she could be assigned to any station, as she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific station.

Chato v. Natividad, G.R. No. 113843, June 2, 1995:

The Supreme Court sustained the legality of the reassignment of Bias from Pampanga to Cagayan, after BIR Commissioner Chato had issued Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-93 redefining the jurisdiction and re-numbering the regional district offices of the BIR.
The Court found that the private respondent failed to show patent illegality in the action of the BIR Commissioner, saying that to sustain private respondent’s contention that his transfer was a demotion simply because the new assignment is not to his liking would be to subordinate government projects, along with the great resources and efforts they entail, to individual preferences and opinions of civil service employees; and this would negate the principle that public office is a public trust.
Moreover, the employee should have questioned the validity of his transfer by appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The lower court should have dismissed the action for failure of private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies.
In any event, the movement was held to be a reassignment, made in the exigency of the service — and there was no demotion.

Teotico v. Agda, 197 SCRA 675:

It was held that the holder of a temporary appointment cannot claim a vested right to the station to which assigned, nor to security of tenure thereat.
Thus, he may be reassigned to any place or station.

Cuevas v. Bacal, G.R. No. 139382, December 06, 2000:

Likewise, Career Executive Service personnel can be shifted from one office to another without violating their right to security of tenure, because their status and salaries are based on their ranks and not on the positions to which they are assigned.

4. Reinstatement.

Any person who has been permanently appointed to a position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is qualified.

Gloria v. Judge de Guzman, supra.:

The Court said that private respondent’s subsequent acquisition of the appropriate civil service eligibility is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint private respondent.
Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment.
Still to be considered are performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and more importantly, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the appointing power, considering that the position of Board Secretary II is primarily confidential.
Reappointment to such position is an act which is discretionary on the part of the appointing power; it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus.
Reinstatement is technically the issuance of a new appointment, which is essentially discretionary; such exercise of the discretionary power cannot be controlled even by the Courts, as long as it is properly exercised by the appointing authority.
Thus, the order of the lower court for the reinstatement of the private respondent amounts to an undue interference by the court in the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees.

Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190:

One who, because of conviction of a crime, has forfeited her right to the public office but was extended a plenary pardon by the President, cannot, by reason of the pardon, demand reinstatement as a matter of right.

Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture & Sports, 180 SCRA 623:

The Supreme Court held that a pardoned elementary school principal, on considerations of justice and equity, should be reinstated to the same position and not to the lower position of classroom teacher, there being no circumstances which would justify the reduction in rank.

Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. L-75025, September 14, 1993:

It was held that when a person is given a pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves him from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring him to his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to his finding of guilt.
The bestowal of executive clemency in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service.
This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon.
This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply for reinstatement; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency, and he is entitled to back wages.

5. Detail.

It is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment, and shall be allowed only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions.
It is temporary in nature.

6. Reassignment.

An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency, provided that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.
Reassignment is recognized as a management prerogative vested in the Civil Service Commission and, for that matter, in any department or agency embraced in the Civil Service; it does not constitute removal without cause.

Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, supra.:

Considering that the petitioners retained their positions as Director IV and III, and they continued to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their newly assigned stations which they enjoyed at the Civil Service Commission Head Office, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
The appointments to the staff of the CSC Head Office are not appointments to specified public offices, but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks.

But like detail, the reassignment should have a definite date or duration.

Padolina v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 133511, October 10, 2000:

The reassignment of the respondent was deemed a violation of security of tenure.
The lack of specific duration of the reassignment was tantamount to a floating assignment, thus a diminution in status or rank.
The respondent was also deprived of emoluments, like RATA and other allowances, thus the movement was deemed a diminution in compensation.
Finally, the reassignment also removed respondent’s power of supervision over 41 employees, thus deemed a diminution in status.

Pastor v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 146873, May 09, 2002:

The Supreme Court found that the petitioner’s reassignment to different offices in the city government was indefinite; petitioner was on virtual floating assignments amounting to reduction in rank, hence impermissible under the law.

Carino v. Daoas, G.R. No. 144493, April 09, 2002:

The Supreme Court ruled that the reassignment of petitioner was unlawful and, as earlier found by the Civil Service Commission, it was tantamount to transfer without consent.
On the question whether or not petitioner should have, in the meanwhile, complied with the reassignment order, and whether she can be considered AWOL for her refusal to report to her new assignment during the pendency of respondent’s appeal, the Supreme Court noted that it was not the petitioner, but the respondent who appealed to the CSC from the CSC Regional Office’s finding that the petitioner’s reassignment was “not in order”.
The CSC Regional Office’s finding must be accorded the presumption of regularity.
Petitioner cannot be considered on AWOL, as she continued to report to her original station.

7. Reemployment.

Names of persons who have been appointed permanently to positions in the career service and who have been separated as a result of reduction in force and/or reorganization, shall be entered in a list from which selection for reemployment shall be made.

See Sec. 16, Art. XVIII, which provides that career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, and the reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution, shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay, and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation.
In lieu of separation pay, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the government, or in any of its subdivisions, etc.
This provision shall also apply to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted.

See Ortiz v. Comelec, 162 SCRA 812.

V. Powers and Duties of Public Officers

A. Authority of Public Officers.

The authority of public officers consists of those powers which are:

Expressly conferred upon him by the act appointing him;
Expressly annexed to the office by law; and
Attached to the office by common law as incidents to it.

Under the doctrine of necessary implication, all powers necessary for the effective exercise of the express powers are deemed impliedly granted.

The authority can be exercised only during the term when the public officer is, by law, invested with the rights and duties of the office.

Jandaya v. Ruiz, 95 SCRA 562:

Where the decision penned by Judge Marquez was promulgated by Judge Ruiz after Marquez had already retired, the Supreme Court held that the decision had no binding effect.

Lao v. To Chip, 158 SCRA 243:

The decision promulgated by the division of the Court of Appeals was ruled to be null and void, considering that it was promulgated after the justices had been notified of the acceptance of their resignation.

People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 126252, August 30, 1999:

It was held that although the effectivity of Judge de Guzman’s disability retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time the subject decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge of the RTC Branch LX of Baguio City, and had, in fact, continued to hold said office and act as judge thereof until his application for retirement was approved in June, 1996.
Accordingly, the decision under review was held to have been validly promulgated.

B. Ministerial and discretionary powers.

1. Ministerial

One the discharge of which by the officer concerned is imperative and requires neither judgment nor discretion
The exercise of ministerial powers may be compelled.

Aristorenas v. Molina, A.M. No. P-94-1030, July 4, 1995:

The Sheriff’s role in the execution of judgment is purely ministerial; he has no discretion whether to execute a judgment or not.

2. Discretionary

One imposed by law upon a public officer wherein the officer has the right to decide how and when the duty shall be performed.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary power.
But where there is grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority equivalent to a denial of a settled right to which the petitioner is entitled, and where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy, the writ of mandamus will issue.

Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 299

The Supreme Court said that while mandamus will not lie to control discretion, the writ may issue to compel the exercise of discretion, but not the discretion itself.

BF Homes v. National Water Resources Council, 154 SCRA 88

The Court held that mandamus will not lie to compel a body discharging discretionary powers to act in a particular way, or to approve or disapprove a particular application.
But the petitioner is entitled to a writ that would require the respondent Council to consider and deliberate upon the applications before it, examining in that process whatever evidence lies before it, and to act accordingly, either approving or disapproving the applications, in accordance with applicable law and jurisprudence and in the best interest of the community involved.

Note that in the 2nd par., Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution, the courts may review the exercise of discretion, to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by any government agency or instrumentality.

3. Judgment v. Discretion.

Judgment

It is a judicial function, the determination of a question of law.
There is only one way to be right.

Discretion

It is the faculty conferred upon a court or other officer by which he may decide the question either way and still be right.
But discretion, as exercised, is limited to the evident purpose of the act, i.e., sound and legal discretion, not arbitrary, capricious or oppressive proceedings.

C. Duties of Public Officers.

1. General (Constitutional) duties of public officers

Sec. 1, Art. XI:

To be accountable to the people; to serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; to act with patriotism and justice; and to lead modest lives.

Sec. 17, Art. XI:

To submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law.

Sec. 18, Art. XI:

To owe the State and the Constitution allegiance at all times.

2. Specific cases

Gonzales v. Chavez, 205 SCRA 817:

The Solicitor General’s duty to represent the government, its offices and instrumentalities and its officials and agents — except in criminal cases or civil cases for damages arising from felony — is mandatory.
Although he has discretion in choosing whether or not to prosecute a case or even withdraw therefrom, such discretion must be exercised within the parameters set by law and with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal.

Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 88:

The government is not estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they are erroneous or irregular.

D. Prohibitions.

1. Partisan political activity.

Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-B:

No officer or employee of the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

The Civil Service Law prohibits engaging directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or taking part in any election except to vote; or use official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any person or body.

Armed Forces.

Sec. 5(3), Art. XVI:

The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote.
But only active members, not those in the reserve force, are covered by the prohibition

The prohibition does not prevent:

❌ expression of views on current political problems or issues, or
❌ mention of the names of candidates for public office whom public officer supports.

Exempt from this prohibition are those:

Holding political offices, but it shall be unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
Members of the Cabinet are, thus, exempt from this prohibition.

This prohibition should be distinguished from the provision of Sec. 79, BP 881 which makes it unlawful for any person or any political party to engage in election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period.

Under Sec. 79, BP 881, election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office.
If done for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nomination for candidacy to a public office by a political party, etc., it shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan political activity

2. Additional or double compensation.

Sec. 8, Art. IX-B

No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government.

But note that pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation.

Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139792, November 22, 2000:

The Supreme Court said that this provision simply means that the retiree can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even after he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached.
But he cannot credit his years of service in the Judiciary (for which he now receives his pension or gratuity under RA 910) in the computation of the separation pay to which he may be entitled under RA 7924 for the termination of his last employment.
To allow this would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services.

3. Prohibition against loans.

Sec. 16, Art. XI.

No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure

4. Limitation on Laborers.

Shall not be assigned to perform clerical duties.

5. Detail or reassignment.

No detail or reassignment shall be made within three months before any election without the approval of the Comelec.

6. Nepotism.

All appointments made in favor of:

a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or
of the chief of the bureau or office, or
of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are prohibited.

The prohibition covers all appointments, including designations, in the national, city and municipal governments, or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing E.O. 292, the original appointment — and all subsequent personnel actions, such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement, etc., must conform with the rule against nepotism; otherwise, the prohibition would be rendered “meaningless and toothless”
“Relative” is to be understood to mean those related within the third civil degree by consanguinity or affinity.
Exempt are persons:

employed in a confidential capacity;
teachers;
physicians; and
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,

provided that in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission.

Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29,1999:

The respondent Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades was found guilty of nepotism, because although he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver and utility worker of the school, “the unseen but obvious hand of the respondent” was behind the appointment.

VI. Liability of Public Officers

A. General Rule on Liability.

A public officer is not liable for injuries sustained by another as a consequence of official acts done within the scope of his official authority, except as otherwise provided by law.
Sec. 38(1), Chapter 9, Book I, Administrative Code of 1987:

A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or negligence.

Sec. 39, Chapter 9, Book I, Administrative Code:

No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for wilful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under orders or instructions of his superiors.

But under Sec. 24, Local Government Code, it is explicitly provided that local governments and their officials are not exempt from liability:

for death or injury to persons or
damage to property.

B. Statutory Liability.

Art. 27, Civil Code:

Any person suffering moral or material loss because a public officer refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty, may file an action for damages and other relief against the public officer. This is without prejudice to administrative disciplinary action against the officer.

Art. 32, Civil Code:

Liability of public officer for violation of constitutional rights of individuals.

Art. 34, Civil Code:

Liability of peace officers who fail to respond or give assistance to persons in danger of injury to life or property.
Note: The municipal corporation is subsidiarily liable.

Sec. 38(2), Chapter 9, Book I, Administrative Code:

Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects to perform a duty within a period fixed by law or regulation, or within a reasonable period if none is fixed, shall be liable for damages to the private party concerned without prejudice to such other liability as may be prescribed by law.

C. Liability on Contracts.

The public officer shall be personally liable on contracts he enters into if he acted without, or exceeded his, authority.

D. Liability for Tort.

The public officer shall be personally liable if he goes beyond the scope of his authority, or exceeds the powers conferred upon him by law.

Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282:

The Supreme Court said that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to be performed in connection with official duties where their actions are ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. The immunity granted to PCGG officials under Executive Order No. 1 is not an absolute immunity; it merely refers to immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of their task, much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office.

Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713:

It was held that unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts of State, and so the public officer may be held personally liable in damages for such unauthorized acts.
Where a public official acted in ultra vires, or where there is a showing of bad faith, the officer can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties.

Rama v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 496:

Provincial officials of Cebu were held liable in their personal capacity for illegally and in bad faith dismissing employees in the Provincial Engineer’s Office.
In this case, it was shown that the dismissal was effected for partisan political reasons.

Pilar v. Sangguniang Bayan of Dasol, Pangasinan, 128 SCRA 173:

The Mayor was held personally liable for vetoing, without just cause, the Sanggunian ordinance appropriating the needed amount for the salary of the petitioner.

Correa v. CPI of Bulacan, 92 SCRA 312:

The Mayor who illegally dismissed employees was held personally liable, even if at the time of execution of judgment, he was no longer the Mayor.

Alinsugay v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 521

It was held that in the absence of malice, provincial board members who disapproved the appointments of laborers are not personally liable.

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

The police station commander who confiscated petitioner's carabaos was held not personally liable in damages for enforcing Executive Order No. 626-A, because the executive order was presumptively valid, and it was his duty to enforce it.

E. Presidential immunity from suit.

This privilege is enjoyed only during the tenure of the President.

Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties.

Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393

The Supreme Court declared that while the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit.

Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 534

It was held that the President is immune from civil liability.

F. Threefold Liability Rule.

The wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to:

civil liability
criminal liability and
administrative liability.

An action for each can proceed independently of the others.
Dismissal of the criminal action does not foreclose the institution of an administrative action.
Relief from criminal liability does not carry with it relief from administrative liability.

Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 114683, January 18, 2000:

The Supreme Court said that the dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action or give the accused a clean bill of health in all respects.
After all, there is a difference in the quantum of evidence required: in criminal cases, conviction requires proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, while in administrative cases, what is required is merely substantial evidence.

G. Liability of Ministerial Officers.

Nonfeasance:

Neglect or refusal to perform an act which is the officer’s legal obligation to perform.

Misfeasance:

Failure to use that degree of care, skill and diligence required in the performance of official duty.

Malfeasance:

The doing, through ignorance, inattention or malice, of an act which he had no legal right to perform.

H. Command Responsibility.

Sec. 38(3), Chapter 9, Book I, Administrative Code:

A head of a department or a superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.

Command Responsibility in Amparo Cases

[a] Rubrico v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, February 11, 2010

The Supreme Court said that an amparo petition is not criminal in nature, nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit.
Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specific courses of action in government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty, and security.
Thus, it was held inappropriate to apply to amparo proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility as a form of criminal complicity through omission, because individual respondents' criminal liability, if there is any, is beyond the reach of amparo.

[b] Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011:

That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil, or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility, on the theory that this doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or contemporary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
Amparo proceedings determine

responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and as a measure of the remedies this Court should craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases in the proper court against the responsible parties; and
accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those

who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; and
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil, or administrative liability, the doctrine of command responsibility may, nevertheless, be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within the foregoing definitions.

[c] Balao v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011

"We have clarified that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence.

Commanders may, therefore, be impleaded — not actually on the basis of command responsibility — but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least, accountability (as defined in Rodriguez).

VII. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. Right to Office

The just and legal claim to exercise the powers and the responsibilities of the public office.

1. Term v. Tenure

Term is the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right; while tenure is the period during which the officer actually holds office.
Nunez v. Averia, 57 SCRA 726

It was held that the extension of the tenure of elective local officials beyond their term is predicated on having been duly elected in the November 8, 1971 elections.

B. Right to Salary

1. Definition

Salary is the personal compensation to be paid to the public officer for his services, and it is generally a fixed annual or periodical payment depending on the time and not on the amount of the services he may render.
It is distinguished from wages, in that salary is given to officers of higher degree of employment than those to whom wages are given.
Salary is regarded as compensation per annum, while wages are paid day by day or week by week.

2. Basis

The legal title to the office and the fact that the law attaches compensation to the office.

[a] Compensation not intended purely for the personal benefit

Ramon Yap v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010

Compensation and benefits of public officers are not intended purely for the personal benefit of officers; neither does payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfy the public purpose requirement.
This theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government.

[b] No right to salary from an office Held without authority

Dimaandal v. Commission on Audit, 291 SCRA 322

The petitioner, a Supply Officer II who was designated by the Provincial Governor as Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration, was declared not entitled to claim the difference between the salary and representation allowance of Assistant Provincial Treasurer and Supply Officer II, because the Provincial Governor was without authority to designate petitioner, the power being vested in the Secretary of Finance under the Local Government Code.
Because petitioner's designation was without color of authority, the right to salary or to an allowance due from the said office never existed.

[c] Right of a de facto officer to salary

Where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has possession of the office and has discharged the duties thereof, is entitled to salary.
See Menzon v. Petilla
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
Rodriguez v. Tan
Monroy v. Court of Appeals.

[d] Salary cannot be garnished.

The salary of a public officer cannot, by garnishment, attachment, or order of execution, be seized before being paid to him and appropriated to the payment of his debts.
Public policy also prohibits the assignment of unearned salaries or fees.
Agreements affecting compensation are void as contrary to public policy.

[e] Estoppel bars claim for former salary after accepting lower position

Manalo v. Gloria, G.R. No. 106692, September 1, 1994

Where, on account of reorganization, the position is abolished and the incumbent requests retention and even accepts an appointment to a lower position, she cannot demand that she be paid the salary equivalent to that of her former position, because she is now barred by estoppel from claiming the desired relief.

[f] Unauthorized compensation without DBM approval; CHR not a constitutional commission

Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004

Compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by government officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) are unauthorized and irregular.
It is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the Commission on Human Rights, based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
The Commission on Human Rights is not a constitutional commission; it does not enjoy fiscal autonomy.

[g] COA may withhold but not apply salaries pending resolution of liability

Santiago v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 146824, November 21, 2007

The Commission on Audit has the authority to order the withholding of an officer's salary and other emoluments up to the amount of his alleged shortage, but not to apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage for which her liability is still being litigated.

3. Some Constitutional Provisions Affecting Salaries

[a] No immediate effect of salary Increases until expiration of current term

Sec. 10, Art. VI

No increase in the salaries of members of Congress shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the Senate and House of Representatives who approved the increase.

See Ligot v. Mathay.

[b] No decrease during tenure; increase effective only after current term

Sec. 6, Art. VI

Salaries of the President and Vice President shall be fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure.
No increase shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.

[c] Judicial salaries protected from diminution

Sec. 10, Art. VIII

The salary of members of the Judiciary shall not be decreased during their continuance in office.

Nitafan v. Tan, 152 SCRA 284

Authority for the rule that the imposition of income taxes on salaries of judges does not constitute unconstitutional diminution of salaries.

[d] Prohibition on additional or indirect compensation

Sec. 8, Art. IX-B

Additional, double, or indirect compensation is prohibited, unless specifically authorized by law.

[e] Standardization of compensation

Sec. 5, Art. IX-B
R.A. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law) was passed in compliance with this constitutional provision.

[i] Intia v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 131529, April 30, 1999

It was held that the discretion of the Philippine Postal Corporation Board of Directors on the matter of personnel compensation is not absolute, as the same must strictly conform with R.A. 6758 in relation to the General Appropriations Act.

[ii] Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004

The Supreme Court said that while the “policy determination” argument may support the inequality of treatment of the rank-and-file employees and the officers of BSP, it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file employees and the employees of other Government Financing Institutions (who are exempted from the Salary Standardization Act by their respective charters).

[iii] De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127515, May 10, 2005

The Supreme Court upheld the entitlement of LWUA officials and employees to the rice subsidy, since it was shown that the benefit had existed prior to the effectivity of R.A. 6758, had not been included in the standardized salary rates, and was limited to incumbents as of July 1, 1989 (to avoid violating the policy of non-diminution of pay).
In this case, it was also reiterated that DBM Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, issued October 2, 1989, was ineffective because it was not published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country.

[f] Entitlement to separation pay due to reorganization

Sec. 16, Art. XVIII

Separation pay is to be given to career Civil Service employees who are separated from the service not for cause but by reason of reorganization.

4. Preventive Suspension and the Right to Salary

Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999

The Supreme Court clarified that there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension, viz:

Preventive suspension pending investigation under Sec. 51, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987; and
Preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated under Sec. 47 of the same Code.

It was held that the employee has no right to compensation during preventive suspension pending investigation, even if exonerated, because to be entitled to back salaries, it must be shown that the suspension is unjustified.
Preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by law and cannot be considered “unjustified,” even if later the charges are dismissed.
However, if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated, the civil service officer or employee is entitled not only to reinstatement but also to back salaries for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal

5. Right to Back Salaries of Illegally Dismissed Employees

Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, G.R. No. 156039, August 14, 2003

The Court has consistently held that an illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of illegal dismissal up to reinstatement.
The policy of “no work, no pay” cannot be applied because the dismissal was not of her own making.
To withhold back salaries would render meaningless the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.

[a] Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, G.R. No. 152833, May 9, 2005 (and Municipality of Jasaan v. Gentallan, G.R. No. 154961, May 9, 2005),

The Supreme Court ruled that an illegally dismissed government employee who is later reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of illegal dismissal up to reinstatement.
This was reiterated in Civil Service Commission v. Gregorio Magnaye, G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010.

[i] This was modified in Isabel Galang v. Land Bank, G.R. No. 175276, May 31, 2011, where the Court held that an illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum of five (5) years from illegal termination up to reinstatement.

[b] Balitaosan v. Secretary, DECS, G.R. No. 138238, September 2, 2003

It was held that where reinstatement was not the result of exoneration but an act of liberality, the claim for back wages must be denied.

Brugada v. Secretary of Education, G.R. Nos. 142332-43, January 31, 2005,

Similarly, petitioners were denied back wages because they were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended.

6. Right to Additional Allowances and Benefits

Villareña v. Commission on Audit, G.R. Nos. 145383-84, August 6, 2003.

Under the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), local government units may provide for additional allowances and benefits to national government officials stationed in their jurisdiction.
However, where such grant conflicts with R.A. 6758, it is invalid.

[a] Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA)

Department of Budget and Management v. Leones, G.R. No. 169726, March 18, 2010

Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) is distinct from salary.
Unlike salary, which is paid for services rendered, RATA covers unavoidable expenses in office.
RATA is paid only to officials who, by the nature of their duties, incur such expenses.
Under Sec. 3.3.1 of National Compensation Circular No. 67, government officials cannot collect RATA when on full-time detail with another unit, except when performing comparable duties.

[b] Rice subsidy

Manolito Agra v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011

Rice subsidy is granted to employees of GOCCs or GFIs only if they are “incumbents” as of July 1, 1989.

[c] Additional incentive benefits

Generoso Abellanosa v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012

R.A. 6758 withdrew the authority of the NHA to grant additional incentive benefits to its project personnel.
Only those compensation benefits being received by incumbents before the effectivity of R.A. 6758, which were not integrated into the standardized salary rates, shall continue to be authorized.

C. Right to Preference in Promotion

See Meram v. Edralin, 154 SCRA 238.
Luego v. Civil Service Commission, supra

But the right does not prevail over the discretion of the appointing authority.

D. Right to Vacation and Sick Leave

1. Elective officials not entitled to leave credits (old rule)

Maleniza v. Commission on Audit, 179 SCRA 408

It was held that elective officials, e.g., municipal mayors, are not entitled to accrued vacation and sick leave credits because they have no official hours of work.
Note: This ruling may now be deemed abandoned in view of the specific provision of Sec. 81, R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code), that elective local officials shall be entitled to the same leave privileges as those enjoyed by appointive local officials, including the cumulation and commutation thereof.

2. Government officers entitled to commutation

Request of CTA Presiding Judge Alex Reyes, 216 SCRA 728

It was held that under Office of the President Memorandum Circular No. 54, dated March 24, 1988, government officers or employees are now entitled to commutation of all leave credits without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned, provided the claimant was in the service as of January 9, 1986.

3. Absence before or after non-working days not ground to withhold pay

Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425

The Supreme Court ruled that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and thus cannot be declared absent on such non-working days.
Accordingly, they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to or after said non-working days.
A different rule would constitute deprivation of property without due process of law.

E. Right to Maternity Leave

F. Right to Retirement Pay

1. Retirement laws are liberally construed

Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777

Retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the retiree, because their objective is to provide for the retiree’s sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the capability to earn a livelihood.

GSIS v. Fernando De Leon, G.R. No. 186560, November 17, 2010

The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.

[a] Government error cannot defeat entitlement

GSIS v. De Leon, supra

Respondent, Chief State Prosecutor, compulsorily retired under R.A. 910 and was receiving his regular monthly pension when the GSIS informed him that his monthly pension was being discontinued on the strength of a memorandum of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), which in turn was based on the opinion of the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel that, not being a judge, respondent was not entitled to the benefits of R.A. 910.
Because respondent had been mistakenly allowed to receive retirement benefits under R.A. 910, GSIS concluded that respondent was not entitled to any retirement benefits at all, not even under any extant retirement law.
This, according to the Supreme Court, was flawed logic.

[i] Prior to the effectivity of R.A. 8291 (which took effect after respondent’s retirement), retiring government employees who were not entitled to the benefits under R.A. 910 had the option to retire under either of two laws: Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by R.A. 660, or P.D. 1146.

Respondent had complied with all the requirements of P.D. 1146, and since he had been declared ineligible to retire under R.A. 910, GSIS should simply apply the proper retirement law (in this case, P.D. 1146) to respondent’s claim in substitution of R.A. 910. In this way, GSIS would be faithful to its mandate to administer retirement laws in the spirit in which they have been enacted

[ii] In granting retirement benefits to respondent under P.D. 1146, GSIS would not be agreeing to respondent’s seeking to convert his retirement mode (which is prohibited under R.A. 8291), because respondent did not seek this voluntarily but was left without a choice after the DBM refused to release the funds needed to continue his monthly pension benefits under R.A. 910.

The necessity to “convert” was not a voluntary choice of the respondent but a circumstance forced upon him by the government itself.

[iii] Finally, while the case was pending, Congress passed R.A. 10071 (The Prosecution Service Act of 2010), which provides, among others, that the Chief State Prosecutor (now known as the Prosecutor General) shall enjoy the same retirement benefits as the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.

The law also explicitly provides that members of the National Prosecution Service are to be granted retirement benefits under R.A. 910.

[b] Per diem payments creditable for retirement

GSIS v. Civil Service Commission, 245 SCRA 179

The period when respondent was paid on a per diem basis was held creditable for purposes of retirement, it being clear that the per diem received was paid for performance of services and not as an allowance for expenses incurred while the respondent was away from home base.

Conte v. Commission on Audit, 264 SCRA 19

See also where it was held that petitioners should be allowed to avail of retirement benefits under R.A. 1616 after the Commission on Audit disallowed their claim for entitlement to additional benefits granted by SSS Resolution No. 56-71 (which was adopted in order to induce employees to retire under R.A. 660).

2. Terminal leave pay computed at retiree’s highest monthly salary

The well-settled rule is that the money value of the terminal leave of a retiring government official shall be computed at the retiree’s highest monthly salary.

Belicena v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 143190, October 17, 2001

It was held that the petitioner's highest monthly salary, for purposes of computing his terminal leave pay, should be that corresponding to the salary of the Secretary of Finance which he received as Acting Secretary of Finance.
When the President designated the petitioner as Acting Secretary of Finance on May 22, 1997, he did so under a well-considered opinion that the absence of Secretary Ocampo was of such an extent that the latter would be unable to perform his duties and, by reason of such opinion, the President extended a temporary designation to the petitioner consistent with Sec. 17 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Even the Commission on Audit has opined that a government official appointed or designated in an acting capacity pursuant to the Administrative Code is entitled to salary differential, and that his highest monthly salary for purposes of computing his terminal leave pay shall include such salary differential.

3. Extension of service

Cena v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 179

It was held that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, allowing extension of service only for one year (instead of what is needed to complete the 15-year service requirement for retirement), cannot prevail over Sec. 11(b), P.D. 1146, which allows extension in order to complete the 15-year service requirement.

Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111812, May 31, 1995

This ruling was re-examined and modified, where the Supreme Court said that when it enunciated the Cena ruling, it took the narrow view on what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is permissible and valid, and it likewise laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees by allowing extension of services without considering the significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement at the age of 65.
Henceforth, CSC MC No. 27, series of 1990, is deemed valid and effective, and Sec. 11, P.D. 1146, is to be read together with CSC MC 27.
However, the head of the agency is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of service of an official or employee who has reached 65 without completing 15 years of government service, although this discretion is to be exercised conformably with CSC MC 27.

4. Judiciary may allow extension beyond retirement age

In Re: Gregorio Pineda, 187 SCRA 469

In the judiciary, however, the Court allows such extension if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.

See also Cruz v. Tantuico, 166 SCRA 670.

5. Reserved officers with ten years of continuous service covered by compulsory GSIS membership

GSIS v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125982, January 22, 1999

Pursuant to E.O. 79-86, a reserved officer who satisfactorily rendered a total of ten years of continuous active commissioned military service shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause or upon his own request.
Accordingly, they are covered by compulsory membership in the GSIS.

6. Retirement benefits computed based on highest salary

Request of Clerk of Court Tessie L. Gatmaitan for Payment of Retirement Benefits of CA Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial, A.M. No. 97-77-RET, August 26, 1999

Liberally interpreting the provisions of R.A. 910, along the lines of Profeta v. Drilon, supra, the Supreme Court approved the recommendation that the retirement benefits of Justice Jorge Imperial shall be computed on the basis of the highest salary, emoluments, and allowances he received as Acting Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.

7. No totalization of service credits when qualifies under one system

Gamogamo v. PNOC Shipping & Transport Corp., G.R. No. 141707, May 7, 2002

The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that for the purpose of computing his retirement pay, his 14 years of service with the Department of Health should be tacked in and added to the creditable service later rendered in two government-owned and controlled corporations without an original charter.
Totalization of service credits is only resorted to when the retiree does not qualify for benefits in either or both of the systems.

G. Others

1. Right to reimbursement

Domingo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 112371, October 7, 1998

Right to reimbursement for expenses incurred in the due performance of duty.
But a public officer who uses a government vehicle is not entitled to, nor can he charge, a transportation allowance.

2. Right to be indemnified

Right to be indemnified against any liability which they may incur in the bona fide discharge of their duties.

3. Right to longevity pay.

[a] Loyalty Award.

Section 35, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), as well as Section 7(e), Rule 10 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V of E.O. 292, provides that all members of the government workforce shall receive incentive awards, including the grant of loyalty award based on continuous and satisfactory service.
The particular agency where the employee or official completed the required years of service is responsible for granting this award.

[i] National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 204800, October 14, 2014

Involves employees of the National Power Corporation (NPC) who, because of the reorganization mandated by the EPIRA Law, were terminated effective February 28, 2003, and received their separation benefits and terminal leave pay.
Some of them were rehired by TransCo. After a query was sent to the Civil Service Commission, TransCo granted loyalty awards to its employees, including those who had received separation benefits. COA issued a Notice of Disallowance alleging that the said employees had not met the 10-year continuous government service requirement because they were considered legally terminated when they received separation benefits.
The employees are entitled to the loyalty award.
The Supreme Court ruled that the grant of loyalty award under the CSC Memorandum Circular and the separation benefits under the EPIRA Law should be treated distinctly and separately.
The loyalty award under the CSC Memorandum Circular aims to reward employees who have efficiently served the government for more than a decade and opted to continue serving the government instead of taking employment elsewhere.
On the other hand, the separation pay under the EPIRA Law was a consequence of the restructuring of the electric power industry, and the funds came from the NPC. The payment of separation benefits is a statutory right designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period when he is seeking another employment.

VIII. TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP

A. Modes of Terminating Official Relationship

ERRRR-AAAPI-DFCF

Expiration of term or tenure
Reaching the age limit
Resignation
Recall
Removal
Abandonment
Acceptance of an incompatible office
Abolition of office
Prescription of the right to office
Impeachment
Death
Failure to assume elective office within six months from proclamation
Conviction of a crime
Filing of a certificate of candidacy

B. Expiration of Term or Tenure

1. Distinction between term and tenure

Term is the period of time during which a public officer has the right to hold the public office;
Tenure is the period of time during which the public officer actually held office.

[a] Holds office at the pleasure of the appointing authority

When a public officer holds office at the pleasure of the appointing authority, his being replaced shall be regarded as termination through expiration of term, not removal.
Astraquillo v. Manglapus, 190 SCRA 280.

[b] Congress cannot shorten the fixed constitutional term

Osmeña v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750

Where the Constitution provides that the term of office of local elective officials is three (3) years, Congress cannot, by a law calling for delayed elections, effectively reduce the term.

[c] Acceptance of courtesy resignations

Ortiz v. COMELEC, 162 SCRA 812; In re: Retirement of Justice Britanico, 173 SCRA 42

Upon the change of government brought about by the EDSA Revolution, the acceptance by the President of the “courtesy resignations” of constitutional officers with fixed terms of office resulted in the expiration of term (or tenure), entitling the officers to retirement benefits.

[d] Expiration of appointment or abolition of office not considered termination

Gloria v. Judge de Guzman, supra

It was held that there was no termination in the sense that termination presupposes an overt act committed by a superior officer.
What happened was that the private respondents’ appointments or employment simply expired, either by their own terms, or because they may not exceed one year, but most importantly, because PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by PSCA.

2. Commencement of the Term of Office — Rules

[a] Where the statute fixes a period within which a chosen officer may arrange his affairs and qualify for the office in a prescribed manner, his term begins upon qualification.

[b] Where no time is fixed by law for the commencement of his official term, it begins from the date of appointment in cases of an appointive office, or from the date of election, in case of an elective office.

[c] Where the law fixing the term of a public office is ambiguous, the one that fixes the term at the shortest period should be followed.

[d] Where both the duration of the term of office and the time of its commencement or termination are fixed by constitutional or statutory provisions, a person elected or appointed to fill the vacancy in such office shall hold the same only for the unexpired portion of the term.

[e] Where only the duration of the term is fixed, but no time is established for the beginning or end of the term, the person selected to fill the vacancy in such office may serve the full term and not merely the unexpired balance of the prior incumbent’s term.

[f] Where an office is created, or an officer is appointed, for the purpose of performing a single act or the accomplishment of a given result, the office terminates and the officer’s authority ceases with the accomplishment of the purposes which called it into being.

3. The Principle of Hold-Over

In the absence of any express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the public officer is entitled to hold his office until his successor shall have been duly chosen and shall have qualified.
The purpose of the hold-over principle is to prevent a hiatus in public service.

Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999

The principle was reiterated where the Supreme Court said that although B.P. 51 does not authorize a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman who sits as a Sangguniang Bayan member to continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over.
The legislative intent of not allowing hold-over must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment; otherwise, it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same.

[a] But see Art. 237, Revised Penal Code, which penalizes any public officer who shall continue to exercise the duties and powers of his office beyond the period provided by law.

[b] During this period of hold-over, the public officer is a de jure officer.

[c] When the law fixes a specific date for the end of the term, there is an implied prohibition against hold-over.

C. Reaching the Age Limit

1. Compulsory retirement age

Seventy (70) years of age for members of the Judiciary;
Sixty-five (65) for other government officers and employees.
See the new GSIS Charter.

[a] Special retirement laws, e.g., R.A. 1616, which allows optional retirement after an officer has rendered a minimum number of years of government service, when availed of by the public officer, will result in termination of official relationship through reaching the age limit (or retirement).

2. Retirement Benefits

In Re: Amount of Monthly Pension of Judges, 190 SCRA 315; Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 728

Retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.

See GSIS v. Civil Service Commission, 245 SCRA 179
Conte v. Commission on Audit, 264 SCRA 19.
Garnogamo v. PNOC Shipping & Transport Corp., supra

However, the Supreme Court denied the tacking in of 14 years of service with the Department of Health and adding the same to the creditable service rendered to two government-owned and -controlled corporations without original charters.

[a] Extension of service

Cena v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 179

It was held that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, allowing extension of service only for one year (instead of what is needed to complete the 15-year service requirement for retirement), cannot prevail over Sec. 11(b), P.D. 1146, which allows extension in order to complete the 15-year service requirement.

Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111812, May 31, 1995

This ruling was re-examined and modified in, where the Supreme Court said that when it enunciated the Cena ruling, it took the narrow view on what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is permissible and valid, and it likewise laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees by allowing extension of services without considering the significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement at the age of 65.
Henceforth, CSC MC No. 27, series of 1990, is deemed valid and effective, and Sec. 11, P.D. 1146, is to be read together with CSC MC 27.
However, the head of the agency is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of service of an official or employee who has reached 65 without completing 15 years of government service, although this discretion is to be exercised conformably with CSC MC 27.

[b] Judiciary may allow extension beyond retirement age

In Re: Gregorio Pineda, 187 SCRA 469

In the judiciary, however, the Court allows such extension if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.

See also Cruz v. Tantuico, 166 SCRA 670.4

[c] Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992]

When the retiree has satisfied the requirements for retirement under more than one subsection of Sec. 12, C.A. 108, as amended, he is entitled to choose the subsection under which he wants to retire.
See also Conte v. Commission on Audit, supra.

3. A person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 may still be appointed to a government position provided that it is a coterminous or primarily confidential position.

Civil Service Commission v. Pililla Water District, G.R. No. 190147, March 5, 2013

The tenure of a confidential employee is coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latter’s pleasure.
The position of General Manager (GM) in a water district is considered a confidential position due to the intimate relations between the GM and the Board of Directors (BOD) of the water district, and the power of the BOD to terminate the services of the GM on the ground of loss of confidence.

4. Retirement from the service during the pendency of an administrative case does not render the case moot and academic.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Marcelino Dechavez, G.R. No. 176702, November 13, 2013

D. Resignation

Ortiz v. Comelec, 162 SCRA 812

The act of giving up, or the act of a public officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it.
It is an expression of the incumbent, in some form—express or implied—of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office, and the acceptance thereof by competent and lawful authority.

1. Voluntariness as an Element of Resignation

Resignation must be voluntary on the part of the public officer.
When procured by fraud or by duress, the resignation may be repudiated.
A “courtesy resignation” lacks the element of voluntariness and is, therefore, not a valid resignation.
See Ortiz v. Comelec, 162 SCRA 212.

[a] Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

The Supreme Court said that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.
In the press release containing his final statement:

he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
he emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country; and
he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

[b] Collantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169604, March 6, 2007

The Supreme Court said that a courtesy resignation is just as effectual as any other resignation.
There can be no implied promise of another position just because the resignation was made out of courtesy.
Any express promise of another position, on the other hand, would be void, because there can be no derogation of the discretion of the appointing power and because its object is outside the commerce of man.
Even assuming that such promise was true, petitioner, as a ranking member of the bureaucracy, ought to have known that such promise offers no assurance in law that the same would be complied with.
The time-honored rule is that public office is a public trust and cannot be made subject of personal promises or negotiations by private persons.

2. Need for Acceptance

Resignation must be accepted by competent authority, either expressly or impliedly (as in the appointment of a successor).

[a] Mere tender of resignation, without acceptance by competent authority, does not create a vacancy in public office; resignation is not complete until accepted by proper authority.

Joson v. Nario, 187 SCRA 453
Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118883, January 16, 1998

[b] In the Philippines, acceptance of resignation is necessary, because Art. 238 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes any public officer who, before the acceptance of his resignation, abandons his office to the detriment of the public service.

[c] If the public officer is mandated by law to hold over, the resignation, even if accepted, will not be effective until after the appointment or election of his successor.

3. The Accepting Authority

Acceptance of the resignation shall be made by competent authority, as provided by law.

[a] Under Sec. 82, R.A. 7160, the following are the officers authorized to accept resignations of local elective officials:

President

in case of governors,
vice-governors,
and mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities;

Governor

in the case of municipal mayors and vice-mayors, and
city mayors and vice-mayors of component cities;

Sanggunian concerned

in case of sanggunian members;

City or municipal mayor

in the case of barangay officials.

Note: The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned within 15 working days from receipt thereof.

Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon presentation before an open session of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its records, except where the sanggunian members are subject to recall elections or to cases where existing laws prescribe the manner of acting upon such resignations.

[b] If the law is silent on who shall accept the resignation, the following rules shall apply:

[i] If the public officer resigning is an appointive officer, then the tender shall be made with, and accepted by, the appointing authority;
[ii] If an elective officer, then tender shall be made with, and accepted by, the officer/s authorized by law to call an election in order to fill the vacancy.

[c] The President and Vice President tender their resignations with Congress; members of Congress, with their respective Houses.

4. Effective Date of Resignation

The effective date shall be:

The date specified in the tender; and
If no such date is specified, then resignation shall be effective when the public officer receives notice of the acceptance of his resignation, not the date of the letter or notice of acceptance.

Gamboa v. Court of Appeals (1981)

5. Resignation Does Not Divest Court of Jurisdiction

Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Owen Amor, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2140, October 7, 2014,

The respondent was charged with abuse of authority, discourtesy, absenteeism, and for demanding “grease money” from newspaper publishers to avoid blacklisting.
While the administrative investigation was ongoing, Judge Amor filed his certificate of candidacy during the barangay elections.
The Supreme Court said that Amor’s automatic resignation did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction over the administrative investigation.

E. Recall

The termination of official relationship of an elective official for loss of confidence prior to the expiration of his term through the will of the electorate.

1. By Whom Exercised

By the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs. [Sec. 69, R.A. 7160]

2. Initiation of the Recall Process

By the registered voters of the local government unit.
[Sec. 70, R.A. 7160]

[a] By virtue of R.A. 9244, Secs. 70 and 71 of the Local Government Code were amended, and the Preparatory Recall Assembly has been eliminated as a mode of initiating recall of elective local government officials.

3. Procedure for Initiating Recall

Recall of a provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official shall be initiated upon petition by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected.

[a] A written petition for recall, duly signed before the election registrar or his representative, and in the presence of a representative of the petitioner and of the official sought to be recalled, and in a public place in the concerned locality, shall be filed with the COMELEC through its local office.

The COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall cause the publication of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than 10 days nor more than 20 days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and the required percentage of voters.

[i] Angobung v. Comelec, G.R. No. 126571, March 5, 1997

The Supreme Court underscored the need for a petition signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the constituency in order to validly initiate a recall election.
Thus, where the petition is signed only by the petitioner and does not even bear the names of the citizens who have allegedly lost confidence in the public official, then the petition should be dismissed.

[b] Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the list of candidates, which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled.

4. Election on Recall

Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall with the appropriate local office of the COMELEC, the Commission or its duly authorized representative shall set the date for the election on recall, which shall not be later than:

30 days after the filing of the petition in the case of barangay, city, or municipal officials; and
45 days in the case of provincial officials.

The official or officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon
Sec. 71, R.A. 7160.

5. Effectivity of Recall

The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the elections on recall.
Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.
Sec. 72, R.A. 7160

6. Prohibition from Resignation

The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress.
Sec. 73, R.A. 7160

7. Limitations on Recall

Sec. 74, R.A. 7160

[a] Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

[b] No recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

Paras v. Comelec, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996

It was held that the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election is not a regular election within the contemplation of the Local Government Code as would bar the holding of a recall election.
Neither will the recall election of the Mayor be barred by the barangay elections.

Angobung v. Comelec, supra

It was held that the “regular local election” referred to in Sec. 74 of the Local Government Code means that the approaching local election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled is actually contested and to be filled by the electorate.

F. Removal

1. Constitutional Guarantee of Security of Tenure

Sec. 2(3), Art. IX-B, Constitution

No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.

Sec. 3, Art. XIII, Constitution, provides:

“The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas x x x It shall guarantee the right of all workers to self-organization x x x They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work and a living wage.”

[a] Sec. 46(a), Civil Service Law, provides that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due process.”

[b] Civil Service Commission v. Gregorio Magnaye, G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010

The Constitution, in using the expressions “all workers” and “no officer or employee,” puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee, which means that both probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of tenure.
Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees.

2. Grounds for Removal or Disciplinary Action

Read Sec. 36(b) of the Civil Service Law which enumerates the grounds for the suspension or dismissal of officers and employees in the Civil Service. Read also R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials), particularly Sec. 5 on duties, and Sec. 7 on prohibited acts and transactions.

[a] Removed only for any of the causes enumerated in the law

Thus, career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be suspended or removed only for any of the causes enumerated in the law, and in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein.

[i] Removal not for a just cause, or non-compliance with the prescribed procedure

Removal not for a just cause, or non-compliance with the prescribed procedure constitutes a reversible error and entitles the officer or employee to reinstatement with back salaries and without loss of seniority rights.

Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 112513, August 21, 1997

Thus, it was held that when an official or employee is illegally dismissed and his reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he is considered as not having left his office, and the silence of the decision notwithstanding, he is entitled to payment of back salaries.

Tan v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 110936, February 4, 1994

The Supreme Court reiterated what it said in Cristobal v. Melchor, 101 SCRA 857 — that when a government official or employee in the classified civil service has been illegally dismissed and his reinstatement is ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held.

Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, G.R. No. 156039, August 14, 2003

Indeed, the Supreme Court said that an illegally dismissed employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement.

[ii] Demotion

Demotion is tantamount to unlawful removal if no cause is shown for it, or if it is not part of any disciplinary action.
Floreza v. Ongpin, 182 SCRA 692
De Guzman v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 101105, March 1, 1994

General Manager, PPA v. Monserate, G.R. No. 139616, April 17, 2002

The same conclusion was reached when respondent was demoted from Division Manager II to Administrative Officer.

[iii] Unconsented Transfer

Unconsented transfer resulting in demotion in rank or salary is tantamount to removal without just cause.
Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas, supra

A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction, or a transfer that aims to lure the employee away from his permanent position cannot be done without the employee’s consent, for that would constitute removal from office.
Indeed, no permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position.

Orcino v. Civil Service Commission

But an “Elementary Grades Teacher in Manila” may be assigned to any elementary school in Manila and reassigned from Grade VI to Grade IV without violating security of tenure; the choice of grade, subject areas, primary or intermediate level, school and district is pure policy and, in the absence of arbitrariness, best left to the administrators concerned.

Department of Education, Culture & Sports v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555

Thus, when one is appointed Secondary School Principal II without reference to any particular school, she may be reassigned to any station or school as the exigencies of the service demand.

Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, 193 SCRA 520

Similarly, where the appointment of private respondent Yap was that of District Supervisor-at-large, she could be assigned to any station as she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific station; thus, there is no violation of security of tenure.

[iiia] Valid Reassignment

Chato v. Natividad, G.R. No. 113843, June 2, 1995

The Supreme Court sustained the legality of the reassignment of Blas from Pampanga to Cagayan, after BIR Commissioner Chato had issued Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-93 redefining the jurisdiction and renumbering the regional district offices of the BIR.
The Court found that the private respondent failed to show patent illegality in the action of the BIR Commissioner, saying that to sustain private respondent’s contention that his transfer was a demotion simply because the new assignment was not to his liking would be to subordinate government projects, along with the great resources and efforts they entail, to individual preferences and opinions of civil service employees; and this would negate the principle that public office is a public trust.
Moreover, the employee should have questioned the validity of his transfer by appeal to the Civil Service Commission. The lower court should have dismissed the action for failure of private respondent to exhaust administrative remedies.
In any event, the movement was held to be a reassignment made in the exigency of the service — and there was no demotion.

[iv] Some Cases on Grounds for Disciplinary Action

[iva] Dishonesty

Dishonesty has been defined as “intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion.”
It also implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of fairness or straightforwardness; disposition to betray.
Ferreras v. Eclipse, A.M. No. P-05-2085, January 20, 2010
National Power Corporation v. Alan Olandesca, G.R. No. 171434, April 23, 2010
Civil Service Commission v. Cayobit, G.R. No. 145737, September 3, 2003

It is the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty.
It is a serious offense which reflects on the person’s character and exposes moral decay which virtually destroys his honor, value, and integrity.
Under the Civil Service Law, the use of fake or spurious Civil Service eligibility is regarded as dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service, even if committed for the first time.

Francisco Duque, in his capacity as Chairman, Civil Service Commission v. Florentino Veloso, G.R. No. 196201, June 19, 2012

Dismissal from the service, as the prescribed penalty for dishonesty even as a first offense, underscores the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust, and only those who can live up to such exacting standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service.

[iva1] Misdeclaration of SALN

Office of the Ombudsman v. Nieto Racho, G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011

Mere misdeclaration of the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty.
Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the public officer’s or employee’s income and other sources of income, and the officer/employee fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he become susceptible to a charge of dishonesty.

Gupilan-Aguilar v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014

Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements; otherwise, the government employee may only be held liable for negligence, not for dishonesty.
But in this case, the petitioner committed dishonesty when she failed to declare in her SALN the residential lot in Naga City; failed to explain her use and possession of the Antel Seaview Towers unit and of the two BMWs registered in the name of different corporations.

[iva2] Misrepresentation of Qualifications

Antonio Exequiel Momongan v. Primitivo Sumayo, A.M. No. P-10-2767, April 12, 2011

Misrepresentation of qualifications, i.e., educational attainment and eligibility for government service, amounts to plain and simple dishonesty, as it refers to the act of intentionally making a false statement on a material fact in securing one’s appointment.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Romeo de Lemos, A.M. No. P-11-2953, September 28, 2011

Falsification or irregularities in the keeping of time records constitute dishonesty, a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service.

[iva3] Impersonation in Civil Service Examination

Where a person takes the civil service examination on behalf of another, or allows another person to take the examination in one’s stead, the said act constitutes dishonesty punishable by dismissal from the service. The length of service of the said government official or employee is inconsequential.
Civil Service Commission v. Merle Ramoneda-Pita, A.M. P-08-2531, April 11, 2013
Civil Service Commission v. Longos, A.M. No. P-12-3070, March 11, 2014

Civil Service Commission v. Maria Riza Vergel De Dios, G.R. No. 203536, February 4, 2015

The verification done by the Integrated Records Management Office of the Civil Service Commission showed discrepancies in the signatures and pictures of the respondent as appearing in her personal data sheet and in the picture seat plan used in the CS examination.
The CSC found respondent guilty of dishonesty and dismissed her from the service. The Court of Appeals reversed the CSC decision saying that the discrepancies could have been the result of a possible mix-up. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the Civil Service Commission, declaring:
“We entertain no doubt that someone impersonated respondent and took the examination for her.”
As held in Donato v. Civil Service Commission, government employees who prepared the picture seat plan and who supervised the conduct of the examination enjoy the presumption that they regularly performed their duties, and this presumption cannot be disputed by mere conjectures and speculations.

[iva4] Administrative disabilities

Office of the Court Administrator v. Ampong, A.M. No. P-13-3132, June 4, 2014

The penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities:

cancellation of civil service eligibility;
forfeiture of retirement benefits; and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financing institutions.

However, the public officer shall be entitled to receive accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

[ivb] Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service

Cabano v. Monreal, 218 SCRA 558

This offense is classified as grave, and the penalty for a second offense is dismissal from the service.

Heirs of Celestino Teves v. Augusto Felicidario, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013

The Civil Service Law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
However, the Court defined such an offense in Ito v. De Vera as acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest in the administration of justice.
The acts need not even be related to or connected with the public officer's official functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be imposed on the erring public officer or employee.

[ivb1] Tarnishes the image and integrity of the public office.

Balasbas v. Manayao, G.R. No. 190524, February 17, 2014

Acts may constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of the public office.
Acts of public officials even in their private dealings, such as misrepresentations committed in relation to a land dispute, can lead to administrative charges against them.

Dr. Zenaida Pia v. Hon. Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., Overall Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013

Where a professor in a state university directly sells books to her students, the act constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service—taking into account that such act is prohibited by the institution, her moral ascendancy over the students, the book/compilation was overpriced, and the refusal of the students to buy it could result in their failure in the subject.

[ivc] Misconduct

Misconduct, by uniform legal definition, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence by the public officer. The word misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment.
Advincula v. Dicen, G.R. No. 162403, May 16, 2005

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) is an official document required of a government employee or official by the Civil Service Commission. It is the repository of all information about any government employee and official regarding personal background, qualification, and eligibility. Concealment of any information in the PDS, therefore, warrants a penalty for the erring official.

Bautista v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-46199, June 29, 1982

Indeed, the Supreme Court held that concealment (from the PDS) of a previous charge, albeit dismissed, constitutes mental dishonesty amounting to misconduct.

Narvasa v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 169449, March 26, 2010, reiterated in Priscilla Hernando v. Juliana Bengson, A.M. No. P-09-2686, March 21, 2012, and in Gupilan-Aguilar v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014

However, it was held that for misconduct to constitute an administrative offense, it should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of the public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.

Rolando Ganzon v. Fernando Arios, G.R. No. 174321, October 22, 2013

The Supreme Court held that a government employee who is found guilty of grave misconduct may be dismissed from the service even upon the first offense.

[ivc1] Refuses to recognize a legitimate operation

Franklin Alejandro v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 173121, April 2, 2013

When an elected official refuses to recognize a legitimate operation of a government agency and willfully intervenes to lead the said operation to failure, grave misconduct is committed.
It is characterized by a clear intent to violate the law or a flagrant disregard of established rules.

[ivc2] Corruption

Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or employee who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another at the expense of the rights of others.
GSIS v. Arwin Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191219, May 30, 2011
Primo Miro v. Marilyn Mendoza Vda. de Erederos, G.R. No. 172532, November 20, 2013

[ivd] Unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, a government officer or employee may be removed from office on two grounds: unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity.
While the Code does not define or delineate these concepts, the Civil Service Law provides specific grounds for dismissal, including inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties.
Miranda v. Carreon, G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003, and Civil Service Commission v. Gregorio Magnaye, G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010

The Court held that poor performance falls within inefficiency and incompetence—but such can only be determined after sufficient time.
Hence, a probationary period is necessary to evaluate performance.

[ive] Length of service

Civil Service Commission v. Aurora Clave, G.R. No. 194665, March 6, 2012

Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that length of service may be considered either mitigating or aggravating depending on the circumstances.

Cesar Dumdum v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182606, December 4, 2011

Good faith is a question of intention, determined not by self-serving claims but by evidence of conduct and outward acts.

[ivf] Gross Negligence

Victory M. Fernandez v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 193983, March 14, 2012

Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care—acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences.
It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. In public service, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.

[ivf1] Gross negligence amounting to bad faith

TESDA v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 204869, March 11, 2014

Where the Director-General allowed TESDA officials designated as project officers to claim extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses (EMEs) in excess of allowable amounts under the GAA, such blatant violation of constitutional and COA rules constituted gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
He was required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund.

[ivf2] Simple neglect of duty

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Artemio San Juan, G.R. No. 186279, April 2, 2013

Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference.
When a bank official willfully disregards bank procedure, the act constitutes gross, not simple neglect of duty—given the high fiduciary nature of banking.

[ivg] Habitual Absenteeism

Judge Ma. Monina Misajon v. Jerence Hipona, A.M. No. P-08-2439, June 25, 2013

Where an officer or employee incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credits for at least 3 months in a semester or at least 3 consecutive months during the year, such acts constitute habitual absenteeism.
If it is a second offense, the proper penalty is dismissal from the service.
Nonetheless, in several cases, the Court refrained from imposing the actual penalties when mitigating circumstances were present.

[b] Political" or "non-career" members of the Foreign Service

Astraquillo v. Manglapus, 190 SCRA 280

The tenure of "political" or "non-career" members of the Foreign Service is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure; their termination is not dependent on proof of some legally recognized cause and after due notice and hearing, but lies entirely within the will of the President in the exercise of her discretion.

[c] Primarily confidential positions

Pacete v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 185 SCRA 1

Officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions continue in office for as long as confidence in them endures; the termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence, but in that case, their cessation from office involves no removal but expiration of term of office.

[i] Tanjay Water District v. Quinit, G.R. No. 160502, April 27, 2007

Even as the Court acknowledged that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law, the Court said that the phrase "cause provided by law" includes loss of confidence. It is an established rule that the tenure of those holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures. Their cessation from office involves no removal but expiration of the term of office.

[d] Temporary or acting appointments

Subject to the principles mentioned above, as a rule, officers and employees holding temporary or acting appointments may be removed at any time, without necessity of just cause or a valid investigation.

3. Procedure in Disciplinary Cases

Read Sec. 38, P.D. 807 and Sec. 48, Chapter 3, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987.

[a] Formal charge

When a government officer is subject to an administrative action, there must be a formal charge against him and an investigation to give him ample opportunity to be heard. A formal charge issued prior to the imposition of administrative sanctions must conform to the requirements set forth in Section 16, Rule II of the Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

Teresita Salva v. Flaviana Valle, G.R. No. 193773, April 2, 2013

If the purported "formal charge" does not contain the requirements set forth in Section 16, it cannot be said that the employee concerned has been formally charged, rendering the dismissal from service invalid.
A memorandum directing the person to explain within a given period of time does not constitute a formal charge.

[b] Continue despite the withdrawal

Baroy v. Peralta, 287 SCRA 1; Dagsa-an v. Conag, 290 SCRA 12

An administrative case against a public officer shall continue despite the withdrawal by the complainant.

Sandoval v. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611

Disciplinary actions against public officers do not involve purely private matters; they are impressed with public interest by virtue of the public character of the public office.
The affidavit of desistance of the complainant should, therefore, be disregarded.

[c] Substantial proof

Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, June 8, 2005

Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon an employee.
The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position.

[d] Revised Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service

The procedural rules on the conduct of administrative cases have been codified, and on November 18, 2011, the Civil Service Commission adopted the Revised Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
These are the rules that are now applicable in administrative cases in the civil service.

4. Jurisdiction in Disciplinary Cases

[a] Heads of ministries, agencies, and instrumentalities, provinces, cities, and municipalities have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.

Their decision shall be final in case the penalty imposed is:

suspension of not more than 30 days or
fine in an amount not exceeding 30 days’ salary.

In other cases, the decision shall be initially appealed to the department head and finally to the Civil Service Commission.
Pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the department head.
Sec. 37, P.D. 807]

[i] Fabella v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110379, November 28, 1997

However, Sec. 9, R.A. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers) provides that the committee to hear administrative charges against public school teachers must include a representative of the teachers' organization.
Appointment by the DECS Secretary of teachers to the committee does not comply with this requirement, as it is the teachers' organization which possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative in the committee, and the DECS Secretary cannot usurp such right. The inclusion of a representative of the teachers' organization in the committee is indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal.

[b] The Civil Service Commission has appellate jurisdiction, but it may also exercise jurisdiction over a complaint filed directly with it, regardless of who initiated the complaint.

In such case, the Commission may hear and decide the case, or deputize a department or agency to conduct the investigation.

Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 176162 & 178842, October 9, 2012

Thus, the Commission exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the Board of Regents over administrative cases against university officials and employees.

[i] Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 144464, November 27, 2001

The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Civil Service Commission to hear and decide a complaint filed by the CSC itself against petitioners.
In this case, the acts complained of arose from cheating allegedly committed by the petitioners in the civil service examination. The examination was under the direct control and supervision of the Commission. The culprits were government employees over whom the Commission undeniably has jurisdiction.

5. Preventive Suspension

Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999,

The Supreme Court clarified that there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension:

Preventive suspension pending investigation, under Sec. 51, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987; and
Preventive suspension pending appeal, if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated under Sec. 47 of the same Code.

[a] Preventively suspension for 90 days

The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend for 90 days any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation if the charge against such officer or employee involves:

dishonesty
oppression
grave misconduct
neglect in the performance of duty, or
if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

This is not a penalty.
It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against the respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him.
If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within a period of 90 days, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated.
If, after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.

[i] Alonzo v. Capulong, G.R. No. 110590, May 10, 1995

The Supreme Court reiterated that the preventive suspension of a civil service officer or employee can be ordered even without a hearing, because such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step to administrative investigation.
Its purpose is to prevent the respondent from using his position or office to influence prospective witnesses, or to tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.

[ii] Plaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138464, January 18, 2008

The Court upheld Governor Democrito Plaza's order of preventive suspension issued against appointive local officials facing administrative charges.
The law provides for the preventive suspension of appointive local officials and employees pending investigation of the charges against them.
This is one of the sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good.

[iii] Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang-Demegillo, G.R. No. 176343, September 18, 2012

The issuance by the proper disciplining authority of an order of preventive suspension for 90 days of an officer or employee under investigation is authorized, provided that a formal charge is served upon the public officer or employee, that the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the public officer or employee is guilty of the charge as to warrant removal from the service.

[iv] Board of Trustees, GSIS v. Velasco, G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011

An employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to the step increment after serving the period of preventive suspension, even if the pending administrative case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed.

[b] Exercised concurrently by the Ombudsman

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995

The authority to preventively suspend is exercised concurrently by the Ombudsman, pursuant to R.A. 6770; the same law authorizes a preventive suspension of six months.

[i] Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 116259-60, February 20, 1996

Although Sec. 13, R.A. 3019 does not specifically authorize the Court of First Instance to preventively suspend a public officer facing criminal charges, the Court may validly order the preventive suspension of such officer.
Since removal from office is within the power of the Court — perpetual disqualification from office being one of the penalties which may be imposed for violation of R.A. 3019 — no amount of legerdemain would deprive the Court of the power to suspend, suspension being necessarily included in the greater power of removal.

[c] Gloria v. Court of Appeals, supra

The Supreme Court held that the employee has no right to compensation during preventive suspension pending investigation even if he is exonerated.
Invoking Mechem, Law of Public Officers, the Court said that in order to be entitled to payment of back salaries, it is not enough that an employee be exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, it must be shown that his suspension is unjustified.
The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty, is authorized by the Civil Service Law.
It cannot, therefore, be considered “unjustified,” even if later the charges are dismissed.
It is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. For this reason, it is limited to 90 days.

[d] Back salaries

In the same case, it was held that the employee is entitled to payment of back salaries for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent.

This is so because preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension.
Sec. 47 (4) states that the respondent “shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.”
It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a result of the immediate execution of the decision against him and continue to do so even after it is shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he was suspended. Under existing jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the equivalent of five (5) years’ pay at the rate last received before the suspension was imposed.

On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal.

[i] The same rule should apply in decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases ordering suspension of more than one month, or dismissal from the service, which have been held to be immediately executory pending appeal.

Villasenor v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 202303, June 4, 2014

The Supreme Court said that no vested right is violated even if the Ombudsman decisions are executed pending appeal.
After all, the respondent in the administrative case is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salaries and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of his suspension or removal.
It is important to remember that there is no such thing as a vested right in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.

[ii] But back salaries are not warranted when the immediate execution of the order of dismissal is justified.

De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999]

In this case, the CSC found the petitioners liable only for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, not for grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, or gross violation of Civil Service law, rules, and regulations (as charged by Secretary Carino).
Having been found answerable for a lesser offense, petitioners could not be considered as being fully innocent of the charges against them. Not having been exonerated, petitioners are not entitled to back salaries.

[iia] National Power Corporation v. Olandesca, G.R. No. 171434, April 23, 2010

However, even as respondent was found to have violated reasonable office rules and regulations, and the penalty of reprimand imposed on him, the Supreme Court found that the respondent was unfairly denied from reporting for work and earning his keep, thus, entitling him to payment of back wages.
The Court deemed it proper to distinguish between the penalties of dismissal or suspension and reprimand, and their respective effects on the grant of back wages.
When an employee is dismissed or suspended, it is logical that since he is barred from reporting for work, he has no right to receive back wages. He has no opportunity to work during the period he was dismissed or suspended and, therefore, he has no salary to expect.
This does not hold true for an employee who is reprimanded. A reprimand usually carries the warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Under normal circumstances, an employee who is reprimanded is not prevented from reporting to work. He continues to work despite the warning.
Thus, in this case, since respondent's penalty should only be a reprimand, the Court deems it proper and equitable to award him back wages.

6. Appeal

When allowed, an appeal shall be made within 15 days from receipt of the decision, unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within 15 days.

[a] Petition for reconsideration shall be based only on the following grounds:

new evidence has been discovered which materially affects the decision rendered;
the decision is not supported by the evidence on record; or
errors of law or irregularities have been committed which are prejudicial to the interest of the respondent.

[b] Pursuant to Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 1-91, as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable by certiorari under Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals within 15 days from receipt of a copy thereof.

From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the party adversely affected thereby shall file a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

[c] Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, reiterated in Civil Service Commission v. Jocelyn S. Gentallan, G.R. No. 152833, May 9, 2005

The Supreme Court expressly abandoned the rule that:

“The phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office,” and that not included are “cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than 30 days or fine in an amount not exceeding 30 days’ salary,” or “when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal.”

In this case, the Supreme Court sustained the right of the Civil Service Commission to appeal to the Supreme Court the decision of the Court of Appeals exonerating the respondent and reversing the Civil Service Commission’s decision which found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism and ordered his dismissal from the service.
This decision overrules prior decisions holding that the Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges, as enunciated in Paredes v. CSC, Mendez v. CSC, Magpale v. CSC, Navarro v. CSC, and more recently, Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, 241 SCRA 317.

[i] Pastor v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 146873, May 9, 2002

This ruling was applied when the City of Pasig appealed to the Court of Appeals the decision of the Civil Service Commission.
The City of Pasig, in this case, was a “party adversely affected” by the CSC decision.

7. Summary Dismissal

While Sec. 40 of the Civil Service Law still provides for cases of summary removal (when the charge is serious and evidence of guilt is strong; when respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged, and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge; and when respondent is notoriously undesirable), and these same provisions are reproduced in toto in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), which took effect in 1989, nonetheless, these provisions on summary dismissal have already been repealed by Republic Act No. 6654, approved on May 20, 1988 and published in the Official Gazette on May 30, 1988.
See Abalos v. Civil Service Commission, 196 SCRA 81; Rosete v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107841, November 14, 1996.

8. Removal of Administrative Penalties or Disabilities

In meritorious cases and upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, the President may commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities imposed upon officers or employees in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the interest of the service.

[a] Vicente Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. L-75025, September 14, 1993

It was held that when a person is granted a pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves him from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring him to his clean name, good reputation, and unstained character prior to his finding of guilt.
The bestowal of executive clemency in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service.
This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon.
This signifies that the petitioner need no longer apply for reinstatement; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency, and he is entitled to back wages.

H. Acceptance of an Incompatible Office

1. Test of Incompatibility

By the nature and relation of the two offices to each other, they ought not to be held by one person from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other.

[a] Distinguish incompatible from forbidden office.

See: Sec. 12, Art. VI, Constitution.
Forbidden office refers to a specific office that a person is statutorily prohibited from holding, often due to conflicts with their existing position or for other legal reasons.
Incompatible office refers to the situation where a person already holds one office, and the duties of a second office conflict with the first, making it impossible to perform both effectively.

2. Acceptance of Incompatible Office Ipso Facto Vacates the Other

There is no necessity for any proceeding to declare or complete the vacation of the first office.
Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431.

Canonizado v. Aguirre, supra

However, the incompatibility of duties rule never had a chance to come into play, because the petitioner never occupied the two positions — that of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and that of Inspector General of the IAS — even as petitioner accepted the latter position, but continued to pursue legal remedies to recover the first from which he had been unlawfully ousted by the law itself (Sec. 8, R.A. 8551), which was later declared unconstitutional.

[a] Exception

Where the public officer is authorized by law to accept the other office — e.g., the Secretary of Justice, who is, by express provision of the Constitution, a member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317

See where the Supreme Court declared Executive Order 284 unconstitutional.

I. Abolition of Office

1. Power of Legislature to Abolish an Office

Except when restrained by the Constitution, Congress has the right to abolish an office, even during the term for which an existing incumbent may have been elected.

[a] Constitutional offices cannot be abolished by Congress.

[b] No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its members.

Sec. 2, Art. VIII, Constitution

[c] Valid abolition of office does not constitute removal of the incumbent.

[d] It is within the legal competence of the City Council to create, consolidate, and reorganize city offices and positions wholly supported by local funds.

Mama, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 489

Javier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49065 (1994)

The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Provincial Board of Antique to abolish the Office of the Provincial Engineer.
Under R.A. 5185 (Local Autonomy Law), provincial governments are empowered to create, among other positions, the office of the provincial engineer; and while the law did not expressly vest the power to abolish, it can be deemed embraced by implication from the power to create it.

2. Abolition of Office; Requisites

The abolition must be:

made in good faith,
with the clear intent to do away with the office,
not for personal or political reasons, and
cannot be implemented in a manner contrary to law.

See Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108
De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294
Cruz v. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998.

[a] Ginson v. Municipality of Murcia, 158 SCRA 1

The abolition of the position of Municipal Dentist on grounds of fiscal restraint and economy was held invalid because, after the abolition, new offices were created and salary increases granted to municipal officers and employees.

Rama v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 496

The abolition of the various items of employees in the Provincial Engineer's Office of Cebu was held to be politically motivated, and thus invalid.

3. Reorganization of Government Offices

Virginia Bautista v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010

Reorganization is valid as long as it is done in good faith.
As a rule, the test of good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient.
Termination of official relations as a result of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good faith.

Carlos Cotiangco v. Province of Biliran, G.R. No. 157139, October 19, 2011

Thus, if the government official's termination from office is a result of a bona fide reorganization, there is no illegal removal.

[a] Constitutional Recognition of Authority to Reorganize

Sec. 16, Art. XVIII, Philippine Constitution.

Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84

There is no dispute that, pursuant to the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution and the various executive orders issued by the President when she was the sole law-making authority, the different departments of government were authorized to carry on reorganization programs.

Mendoza v. Quisumbing, supra

But the nature and extent of the power to reorganize were circumscribed by the source of the power itself.
It was never intended that department and agency heads would be vested with untrammeled and automatic authority to dismiss the millions of government workers on the stroke of a pen and, with the same sweeping power, determine under their sole discretion who would be appointed or reappointed to the vacant positions.
The promotion of simplicity, economy, and efficiency is the usual standard which enables a delegation of powers in reorganization statutes to pass the test of validity.
Because the heads of departments and agencies concerned have chosen to rely on their own concepts of unlimited discretion and progressive ideas on reorganization instead of showing that they have faithfully complied with the clear letter and spirit of the two Constitutions and the statutes governing reorganization, the reorganizations (in these consolidated petitions) are hereby set aside.

[b] Due Process in Government Reorganization

Domingo v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766

There is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted in the matter of reorganization of the DBP, as long as the employee was given a chance to present evidence.

Letter of Associate Justice Puno, 210 SCRA 589

The Court of Appeals and the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to EO 33 were phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution.
The Court of Appeals established under EO 33 is an entirely new court; hence, reference to preference in rank contained in BP 129 refers to prospective situations, not retroactive ones.
As head of the revolutionary government, President Aquino could disregard any seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.

Sison v. Civil Service Commission, 208 SCRA 859

The removal of petitioner from his position and his subsequent demotion from Municipal Food and Agricultural Officer to Production Technician violated security of tenure.
The reorganization of the Department of Agriculture under EO 116 was set aside for failure to observe the guidelines in EO 33 for removal of employees, namely:

existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Sec. 40, Civil Service Law;
probable cause for violation of R.A. 3019;
gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
misuse of public office for partisan political activities; and
analogous grounds showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service.

The same ruling was applied in Abaya v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 98027, October 4, 1994.
See also Pari-an v. Civil Service Commission, 202 SCRA 772.

[c] Role of Placement Committees in Reorganization

Lopez v. Civil Service Commission, 194 SCRA 269

The Supreme Court said that Sec. 6 of R.A. 6656 on government reorganization merely provides that the selection or placement should be done through the creation of a Placement Committee composed of representatives of the head of the agency as well as representatives of the employees.
The committee’s work is recommendatory and does not fix a stringent formula regarding the mode of choosing from among the candidates.

[d] Requirement of Good Faith in Reorganization

Romualdez-Yap v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 104226, August 12, 1993

Reorganization in a bureau or office performing constituent functions (like the Bureau of Customs), or in a government-owned or -controlled corporation (like the PNB), must meet a common test — the test of good faith.

Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84

Good faith, as a component of reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case.

[e] Presidential Authority to Reorganize the National Government

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 142891-02, July 10, 2001,

The Supreme Court held that PD 1772, which amended PD 1416, grants the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services, and activities, and to standardize salaries and materials.
The deactivation of EIIB and the creation of Task Force Aduana were well within this authority.
The executive orders were issued in good faith because:

There was no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force;
The thrust of the EO was to encourage the utilization of personnel, facilities, and resources of already existing departments, agencies, and bureaus; and
It appeared that the creation of the Task Force was intended to lessen EIIB’s expense.

[f] Valid Abolition of Office under R.A. 9497

Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines Employees Union (CAAP-EU) v. CAAP, G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014

R.A. 9497 created the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), an independent regulatory agency with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers, as well as corporate attributes.
It assumed the functions of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) and had new and expanded features intended to meet the growing needs of a globally competitive civil aviation industry, adherent to internationally recognized standards.
As a consequence, on the premise that there was no bad faith, there was valid abolition of the ATO, and the ATO employees’ right to security of tenure was not impaired when CAAP implemented a new staffing pattern.

[i] No Automatic Absorption; Application of the Hold-Over Principle

CAAP-EU v. CAAP, supra

The Court cannot agree to petitioner’s submission that there should be automatic absorption of all ATO employees by CAAP because there is no such thing as a vested right to public office.
Indeed, the fundamental right to security of tenure cannot be invoked against a valid abolition of office effected by the Legislature itself.
However, a perusal of Sec. 86, R.A. 9497 reveals that the transfer of ATO personnel, unless they opted to retire from the service, to the CAAP implies the application of the “hold-over” principle, there being no express or implied prohibition in R.A. 9497.

[g] Reorganization by Board of Directors of GOCCs

Ma. Rosario Manalang-Demegillo v. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 168613 & 185571, March 5, 2013

When there is reorganization conducted pursuant to authority granted to the Board of Directors (BOD) of a government-owned and controlled corporation, an officer reassigned to a new position cannot claim that she was illegally removed from the previous one on the ground that the BOD had no authority to effect reorganization.
The BOD of a GOCC may be granted by law the authority to effect reorganization therein.
In this case, because there was specific statutory authority granted to the BOD, the reorganization was valid.

[i] Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013]

Where the law allows a GOCC’s Board of Directors to create its own staffing pattern, it may hire a person even if the position being filled does not exist in the compensation and classification system of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The rules that the CSC formulates should implement and be in harmony with the law it seeks to enforce.
The CSC cannot enforce civil service rules and regulations contrary to laws enacted by Congress.

J. Prescription of the Right to Office

The Rules of Court provide that a petition for reinstatement (after illegal ouster or dismissal), or the recovery of the public office, must be instituted within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is unlawfully ousted from his office.

[a] Reason for the rule

Tumulak v. Egay, 82 Phil 828

Title to public office should not be subjected to continued uncertainty; and the people's interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as possible.

[b] Not suspend the period for filing the appropriate judicial proceeding

Galano v. Roxas, 67 SCRA 8

The filing of an action for administrative remedy does not suspend the period for filing the appropriate judicial proceeding (quo warranto) [].

Morales v. Patriarca, 13 SCRA 766

The one-year period runs even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration.

[c] Exception

Unless there are strong, compelling, and special circumstances to warrant a different course, courts will not entertain a petition for reinstatement filed beyond the one-year period.
Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175

However, the Supreme Court allowed the suit filed in 1971—nine years after the petitioner was dismissed from office—on grounds of equity.

K. Impeachment

See Chapter on Accountability of Public Officers, Constitutional Law, supra.

L. Death

The death of the incumbent of an office necessarily renders the office vacant.

M. Failure to Assume Office

Section 11, B.P. Blg. 881 provides:

“The office of any official elected who fails or refuses to take his oath of office within six months from his proclamation shall be considered vacant, unless said failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.”

N. Conviction of a Crime

When the penalty imposed upon conviction carries with it the accessory penalty of disqualification, conviction by final judgment automatically terminates official relationship.

[a] Plenary pardon

Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190

While a plenary pardon extinguishes the accessory penalty of disqualification, it will not restore the public office to the officer convicted.
He must be given a new appointment to the position.

Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports, 180 SCRA 623

However, for reasons of equity, the Supreme Court held that the former elementary school principal should not be re-appointed to a lower position than that which he formerly occupied.

O. Filing of Certificate of Candidacy

1. Automatic Resignation of Appointive Officials upon Filing of Certificate of Candidacy

Section 66, B.P. Blg. 881 provides:

“Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

[a] PNOC Energy Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100947, May 31, 1993

It was held that this section applies even to employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations without an original charter.

2. Statutory Amendment under R.A. 8436 (Automated Election Law), as Amended by R.A. 9369

The third paragraph of Section 15, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369, provides:

“Provided, finally, that any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.”

[a] Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this provision.

Political Law Review: Administrative Law

A. Administrative Law

1. Defined

2. Kinds

3. Administration

[a] Meaning.

[b] Distinguished from government.

[c] Kinds

B. Administrative Bodies or Agencies

1. Defined

2. Creation

[a] Constitutional provision;

[b] Legislative enactment; or

[c] Authority of law.

3. Criterion

4. Types

A. Powers of Administrative Bodies

B. Quasi-Legislative Power

1. Nature

2. Kinds of Administrative Rules or Regulations

[a] Supplementary or detailed legislation

[b] Interpretative legislation

[c] Contingent legislation

3. Requisites for Validity

[a] Issued under authority of law.

[b] Within the scope and purview of the law.

[c] Reasonable.

[d] Publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation

4. Administrative Rules with Penal Sanctions — Additional Requisites:

[a] The law must itself declare as punishable the violation of the administrative rule or regulation.

[b] The law should define or fix the penalty for the violation of the administrative rule or regulation.

5. Necessity for Notice and Hearing

6. Petition for Prohibition Not Proper Remedy

C. Determinative Powers

1. Enabling

2. Directing

3. Dispensing

4. Examining

[a] Power to compel attendance of witnesses

[b] Power to punish for contempt

5. Summary

D. Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Power

1. Proceedings partake of the character of judicial proceedings.

2. Administrative Due Process

3. Administrative determinations where notice and hearing are not necessary for due process

4. Right against self-incrimination

5. Power to punish contempt

6. Administrative decisions not part of the legal system

7. Administrative appeal and review

8. Doctrine of res judicata

9. Reconciliation of the parties or desistance by the complainant

10. Some Relevant Decisions

A. The Doctrine

1. Reasons

[a] If relief is first sought from a superior administrative agency, resort to the courts may be unnecessary.

[b] The administrative agency should be given a chance to correct its error.

[c] Principles of comity and convenience require that the courts stay their hand until the administrative processes are completed.

[d] Since judicial review of administrative decisions is usually made through special civil actions, such proceedings will not normally prosper if there is another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

2. Application of the Rule

3. Limitation of the Doctrine

4. Exception: Protection of Fundamental Rights

B. Corollary Principles

1. Doctrine of Prior Resort (Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction)

2. Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action

C. Effect of Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

D. Exceptions to the Doctrine

1. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency (Alter Ego Doctrine)

2. Where the administrative remedy is fruitless,

3. Where there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency

4. Where the issue involved is purely a legal question

5. Where the administrative action is patently illegal, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

6. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction.

7. Where there is irreparable injury or threat thereof, unless judicial recourse is immediately made

8. In land cases, where the subject matter is private land

9. Where the law does not make exhaustion a condition precedent to judicial recourse, or where no administrative review is provided by law.

10. Where observance of the doctrine will result in the nullification of the claim.

11. Where there are special reasons or circumstances demanding immediate court action.

12. When due process of law is clearly violated

13. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy

A. Rule