The right to vote in the election of officers chosen by the people and in the determination of questions submitted to the people.
It includes within its scope election, plebiscite, initiative, and referendum, recall

[a] Fundamental Right to Suffrage

GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

The Supreme Court said that fundamental to the idea of democracy and a republican state is the right of the people to determine their own destiny through the choice of leaders they may have in government.
Thus, the primordial importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of such birthright.
In this case, it was held that Sec. 9 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which limited the airtime within which national candidates and political parties in the 2013 elections may air political advertisements on television and radio to an aggregate of 120 minutes and 180 minutes, respectively, was violative of the people's right to suffrage.
Candidates and political parties need adequate breathing space — including the means to disseminate their ideas. This cannot be reasonably addressed by the very restrictive manner by which COMELEC implemented the time limits in regard of political advertisements in the broadcast media.

Broadcast networks challenged COMELEC’s 2013 rules that capped aggregate airtime for national candidates and parties, arguing the limits and strict enforcement unduly restricted political speech and the electorate’s right to information. The Supreme Court struck down the implemented aggregate time caps as overbroad and unconstitutional, holding that while COMELEC may regulate media access to ensure equal opportunity, time, space, and right of reply, it may not do so in a way that unduly suppresses voters’ access to information or political expression; the Court left intact narrower, reasonable regulatory measures but required COMELEC to revise the minute‑cap scheme.

2. Election

The means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed period and to whom they entrust for the time being the exercise of the powers of government.

3. Kinds

[a] Regular

one provided by law for the election of officers either nationwide or in certain subdivisions thereof, after the expiration of the full term of the former officers.

[b] Special

one held to fill a vacancy before the expiration of the term for which the incumbent was elected.

B. Theories on Suffrage

1. Natural Right Theory

Suffrage is a natural and inherent right of every citizen who is not disqualified by reason of his own reprehensible conduct or unfitness.

2. Social Expediency Theory

Suffrage is a public office or function conferred upon the citizen for reasons of social expediency; conferred upon those who are fit and capable of discharging it.

3. Tribal Theory

It is a necessary attribute of membership in the State.

4. Feudal Theory

It is an adjunct of a particular status, generally tenurial in character, i.e., a vested privilege usually accompanying ownership of land.

5. Ethical Theory

It is a necessary and essential means for the development of society.

C. Theory Prevailing in the Philippines

Suffrage is both a privilege and an obligation.

D. Constitutional Mandate on Congress

[Sec. 2, Art. V, Constitution]

1. To provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

[a] Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369

Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369, providing for the Automated Election System (AES), is the response of Congress to the constitutional mandate to provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot.
See Sec. 1, R.A. 8436 — the statement of policy of the AES.

[b] Republic Act No. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)

Republic Act No. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) addressed the need for overseas Filipinos to be able to vote in Philippine elections.
The law provides that among those disqualified to vote is an immigrant or a permanent resident of another country who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual, physical, permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from the approval of his/her registration under the said Act, and that he/she had not applied for citizenship in another country.

⭐Makalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

The Supreme Court dismissed the constitutional challenge raised against R.A. 9189, saying that the Court should take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the law; that this law was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the 1st paragraph of Sec. 2, Art. V; and that since Sec. 2, Art. V does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law, then, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function.
Furthermore, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but it serves as an explicit expression that he has not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.

Petitioners argued R.A. 9189 conflicted with Article V Section 2 by improperly defining how Filipino citizenship may be retained or reacquired, and they attacked statutory devices like oaths and affidavits as constitutionally defective. The Supreme Court upheld R.A. 9189, ruling Congress acted within its legislative power, the affidavit is evidence of intent not the enabling act, and no constitutional prohibition barred the statute’s methods, so the petition was denied.

[c] Sec. 12, R.A. No. 7166

Sec. 12, R.A. No. 7166 provides that in the election for President, Vice President, and Senators, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police, and other government officers and employees who are duly registered voters and who, on election day, are temporarily assigned to places where they are not registered in connection with the performance of election duties, shall be allowed to vote in the place where they are temporarily assigned.

2. To design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterate to vote without the assistance of other persons.

[a] Sec. 196, B.P. 881

Under Sec. 196, B.P. 881, a voter who is illiterate or physically unable to prepare the ballot by himself may be assisted in the preparation of his ballot by a relative by affinity or consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, or if he has none, by any person of his confidence who belongs to the same household or any member of the board of election inspectors; provided, that no voter shall be allowed to vote as illiterate or physically disabled unless it is so indicated in his registration record; provided further, that in no case shall an assistor assist more than three times except the members of the board of election inspectors.

Notes:

Detention prisoners – COMELEC Resolution No. 11076, Comelec Resolution No. 9371
Indigenous people
Senior citizens

E. The Automated Election System (AES) [R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369]

1. Policy.

It is the policy of the State to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and informed elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, recall, and other similar electoral exercises by improving on the election process and adopting systems which shall involve the use of an automated election system that will ensure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and all election consolidation and transmission documents, in order that the process shall be transparent and credible, and that the results shall be fast, accurate, and reflective of the genuine will of the people [Sec. 1].

2. Authority.

To carry out the above-stated policy, the Commission on Elections is hereby authorized to use an automated election system or systems in the same election in different provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording electronic election system, as it may deem appropriate and practical for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of electoral exercises [Sec. 5].

[a] 2010 Election Automation Project

H. Harry Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009
It involves a petition seeking to nullify the contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic), based mainly on the non-compliance of the contract-award with the pilot-testing requirements of R.A. 9369, and the minimum system capabilities of the chosen automated election system, referring to the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) system.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upon a finding that:

The pilot-testing of the PCOS in the 2007 national elections in the areas specified in R.A. 8436 is not an absolute must for the machines' use in the 2010 national elections, it being sufficient that the capability of the chosen AES has been demonstrated in an electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction;
COMELEC adopted a rigid technical evaluation mechanism to ensure compliance of the PCOS with the minimum capability standards cited in Sec. 7, R.A. 8436, as amended, and its determination must be respected absent proof of grave abuse of discretion;
COMELEC retains under the automation agreement its supervision, oversight, and control mandate; it did not, by entering into the automation contract, abdicate its constitutional duty for election law enforcement; and
In accordance with the contract documents, continuity and back-up plans are in place to be activated in case the PCOS machines falter during the actual election exercise.

Petitioner challenged COMELEC’s award of the 2010 automation contract to TIM–Smartmatic on the ground that the PCOS machines were not pilot-tested in the Philippine areas required by statute and allegedly lacked the minimum capabilities required by law. The Court held that the lack of local pilot-testing did not automatically void the award when the AES had been demonstrated abroad, COMELEC followed a rigorous technical evaluation, retained oversight under the contract, and had contingency plans, and thus dismissed the petition

[b] Constitutionality of R.A. 9369

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009

The validity of R.A. 9369 was challenged on four (4) grounds:

It violates Sec. 26(1), Art. VI, which requires that every bill must contain only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof;
Secs. 37 and 38, which constitute Congress and the COMELEC as Boards of Canvassers, violate the constitutional provisions on the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET);
Sec. 43, which provides that the COMELEC shall have concurrent power to conduct preliminary investigation with other prosecution arms of government, violates Sec. 2(6), Art. IX-C; and
Sec. 34, providing a fixed per diem of ₱400 for watchers, violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of R.A. 9369.

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve; that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient, and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.
On the second, it was held that there is no conflict of jurisdiction, since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC on one hand, and that of PET and SET on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET and SET jurisdiction can be invoked only when the winning candidates are proclaimed, while Congress and COMELEC merely determine the authenticity and due execution of the Certificates of Canvass, a power exercised before proclamation.
On the third, the phrase “where appropriate” in Sec. 2(6), Art. IX-C leaves to the Legislature the power to determine the kind of election offenses which the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively. The grant of exclusive power to the COMELEC is found in Sec. 265, B.P. 881: “exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same.” Even in this, the COMELEC may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of government.
On the fourth, Sec. 34 does not violate the freedom of the parties to contract; it must be borne in mind that the freedom to contract is not absolute.

Petitioners attacked R.A. 9369 on four constitutional grounds: alleged single-subject violation in the title, alleged conflict with SET/PET jurisdiction, alleged unconstitutional grant of investigatory power to COMELEC, and alleged impairment of freedom to contract by fixing per diem for watchers. The Court upheld the statute, ruling the title was adequate for an amendatory law, SET/PET functions are not displaced because they operate at different stages, Congress may lawfully allocate investigatory roles to COMELEC within statutory limits, and the per diem provision is a valid legislative regulation, and thus dismissed the petition.

[c] Disclosure of the source code for the AES technologies

Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010

The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioner, for the COMELEC to disclose the source code for the AES technologies used in the May 2010 national and local elections, based on Sec. 12, R.A. 9369. Sec. 2(12), R.A. 9369 describes the source code as “the human-readable instructions that define what the computer equipment will do.”

3. Automated Election System (AES)

A system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election results and other electoral processes.

F. Election Period

Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission on Elections in special cases, the election period shall commence 90 days before the day of the election and shall end 30 days thereafter [Sec. 9, Art. IX-C, Constitution].

II. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

A. Composition: En Banc and Division Cases

1. Composition

A Chairman and six (6) Commissioners.

[a] Qualifications

A natural-born Filipino citizen,
at least 35 years of age,
holder of a college degree, and
must not have been a candidate in the immediately preceding election.

Majority, including the Chairman, must be members of the Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years [Sec. 1 (1), Art. IX-C].

Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Atty. Monsod's past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor, was held to more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for more than 10 years.
In deciding this case, the Supreme Court considered the liberal interpretation intended by the framers of the Constitution.

Atty. Monsod performed a long series of law-related functions—negotiating contracts, advising as counsel in managerial and economic roles, drafting legal instruments, and engaging in legislative-legal work—that together spanned more than ten years. The Court ruled that a liberal, functional reading of “practice of law” satisfies the constitutional ten-year requirement when the lawyer’s duties substantially involve legal skill and judgment, and therefore Monsod met the qualification.

[b] Appointment

They shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven (7) years, without reappointment.
No member shall be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358

The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the appointment by President Cory Aquino of COMELEC Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission.

[c] Rotational scheme of appointment:

The first appointees shall serve terms of seven, five, and three years, respectively [Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX-C].
After the first commissioners (of the three constitutional commissions) are appointed, the rotational scheme is intended to prevent the possibility of one President appointing all the Commissioners.

Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000].

In order to preserve the periodic succession mandated by the Constitution, the rotational plan requires two conditions, namely:

The terms of the first Commissioners should start on a common date; and
Any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term shall be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term

[d] Decisions

The Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty (60) days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution [Sec. 7, Art. IX-A].

Estrella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004

This constitutional provision is clear that what is required is the majority vote of all the members, not only of those who participated in the deliberations and voted thereon, in order that a valid decision may be made by the Constitutional Commissions.
Under rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained
This ruling effectively abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua v. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582.

Estrella challenged a COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order after Commissioner Lantion, who had earlier inhibited himself at the Division level, participated and voted en banc, resulting in only three unquestionably valid concurring votes. The Court ruled that a valid decision by a Constitutional Commission requires a majority of all its members, that piecemeal inhibition cannot be allowed, and thus nullified the En Banc order.

Dumayas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001

Because two Commissioners who participated in the deliberations retired prior to the promulgation of the decision, the Supreme Court held that the votes of the said Commissioners should merely be considered withdrawn, as if they had not signed the resolution at all, and only the votes of the remaining Commissioners considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy.
Unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned, there is no reason to declare the decision a nullity.
In this case, with the withdrawal of the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Gulani, the remaining votes among the incumbent commissioners, still constituting a quorum at the time of the promulgation of the resolution, would still be 3 to 1 (and thus, be a vote of the majority) in favor of the respondent.

Mamerto Sevilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 202833, March 19, 2013

Pursuant to COMELEC Rules of Procedure, when the COMELEC en banc is equally divided in an opinion, and the necessary majority cannot be had, there shall be a rehearing.
If, on rehearing, no majority decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be:

dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission;
in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed, and
in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

A protesting candidate cannot file a petition with the Supreme Court when the COMELEC vote is equally divided and a rehearing is not conducted, otherwise, the petition shall be considered premature and shall be dismissed.

Alvarez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142527, March 1, 2001,

On the need to expedite resolution of cases and the 60-day period of decision, the Supreme Court said that the COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical.
Considering the Commission's manpower and logistical limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically.
Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. This is not what the framers of the Constitution intended.

2. En Banc and Division Cases

The COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases.
All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided en banc [Sec. 3, Art. IX-C].

[a] Cases to be heard and decided in division:

[i] All election cases, including pre-proclamation contests, originally cognizable by the Commission in the exercise of its powers under Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C of the Constitution.

Sarmiento v. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307

Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC in this and several companion cases because the COMELEC en banc took original cognizance of the cases without referring them first to the appropriate division.

[ii] Petition to cancel certificate of candidacy

Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 122872, September 10, 1997;
Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 154796-97, October 23, 2003.
Kamarudin Ibrahim v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192289, January 14, 2013

Proceedings to cancel the certificate of candidacy involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial powers of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide.
The COMELEC en banc cannot shortcut the proceedings by acting on the case without prior action by a division, as it would amount to a denial of due process to the candidate.

[iii] Cases appealed from RTC and MTC have to be heard and decided in division before they may be heard en banc upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the division decision.

Abad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 128877, December 10, 1999

And even if not raised as an issue, the Supreme Court may, motu proprio, consider and resolve the question of jurisdiction.

[iv] A petition for certiorari from the decision of RTC or MTC is to be resolved in division before it may be heard en banc.

Soller v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139853, September 5, 2000

Zarate v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129096, November 19, 1999

Thus, where the appeal from the decision of the MTC in an election case involving the SK Chairman of Barangay Ican, Malasigui, Pangasinan, was directly taken cognizance of by the COMELEC en banc, the Supreme Court set aside the COMELEC decision because the appeal should have been referred first to the appropriate division.

[b] The COMELEC en banc shall take cognizance of:

[i] A motion for reconsideration of a decision of a division [Sec. 3, Art. IX-C].

[ii] A petition for correction of manifest errors alleging an erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the Statement of Votes by precinct.

Jaramilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155717, October 23, 2003

Such an error in the tabulation of results, which merely requires a clerical correction without opening the ballot boxes or examining the ballots, demands only the exercise of the administrative power of the COMELEC. Thus, the COMELEC en banc may properly assume jurisdiction.

Typoco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186359, March 5, 2010

Indeed, this does not include the recanvassing of votes; all that is required is to reconvene the Board of Canvassers for it to rectify the error it committed in order that the true will of the voters be given effect.

Torres v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 583, and in Ramirez v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 590

The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC en banc may directly assume jurisdiction over a petition to correct manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results (Statement of Votes) by the Board of Canvassers.
The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates, as reflected in the election returns. In making the correction in the computation, what is involved is simple arithmetic, and the Board of Canvassers acts in an administrative capacity under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
Pursuant to its constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections, the COMELEC en banc has authority to resolve any question pertaining to proceedings of the Board of Canvassers.
This ruling was reiterated in Mastura v. COMELEC, 285 SCRA 493.

[iii] The power of the COMELEC to prosecute cases of violation of election laws involves the exercise of administrative powers which may be exercised directly by the Commission en banc

Baytan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, February 4, 2003.

[iv] Cases when Commission does not exercise its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, i.e., when the COMELEC exercises purely administrative functions

Municipal Board of Canvassers v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150946, October 23, 2003
Jaramilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155717, October 23, 2003

3. Rules Concerning Pleading and Practice Before It

The Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleading and practice before it or before any of its offices [Sec. 6, Art. IX-A].
It shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation cases [Sec. 3, Art. IX-C].

[a] Limitations:

[i] Must not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights [Sec. 6, Art. IX-A].

[ii] They shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court [Sec. 5 (5), Art. VIII].

[iii] Procedural rules in election cases are designed to achieve not only a correct but also an expeditious determination of the popular will of the electorate.

The nature of election cases differs from ordinary civil actions; thus the Rules on Civil Procedure on demurrer to evidence shall not apply to election cases, even by analogy or in a suppletory character, because the application of the Rules would not be practicable and convenient.

Jose Tapales Villarosa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212953, August 5, 2014

The petitioner assailed the action of the COMELEC Special First Division in granting private respondent's request for preliminary injunction enjoining the RTC's writ of execution pending appeal.
He asserted that the COMELEC First Division had already acquired jurisdiction over the case, thus precluding the assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC Special First Division
The Supreme Court said that the First Division and the Special First Division are not two distinct bodies, and that there had been consequent transfers of the case between the two.
Strictly speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely and temporarily filled in the vacancies in both the Divisions. The term "special" merely indicates that the Commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity or via substitution.
The COMELEC First Division did not lose jurisdiction over the case by the subsequent formation of the Special First Division since this only entailed a change in the Division's composition.

Tapales Villarosa contested a preliminary injunction issued by a COMELEC panel labeled the Special First Division, claiming the regular First Division had already acquired the case and that the Special panel therefore acted without jurisdiction. The Court ruled the Special First Division is not a distinct body but a temporarily composed panel filling vacancies or substitutions, that a change in composition does not divest the Division of jurisdiction, and thus the injunction was valid.

[iv] The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it.

Gamal Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014]

The liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives — ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding before it.

[v] The Commission may suspend reglementary periods prescribed in its Rules, or the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of cases.

Likewise, the COMELEC is not constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of non-payment of filing fees.

Jaramilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155717, October 23, 2003
Barot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149147, June 18, 2003

4. Review of COMELEC Decisions by the Supreme Court [Sec. 7, Art. IX-A]

[a] Only decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari (as a special civil action under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).

Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, 244 SCRA 44.

Maria Laarni L. Cayetano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193846, April 12, 2011

It was held that the Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC.
The only exception to this rule is where grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC division is apparent on the face of the order or resolution.
See also:

Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, 398 Phil. 257
Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 548 Phil. 639
Blanco v. COMELEC, 577 Phil. 622.

The foregoing is the general rule.

⭐ ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780
In the Supreme Court enumerated the exceptions, i.e., when the Court could review orders and decisions of the COMELEC — in electoral contests — despite not having been reviewed by the COMELEC en banc, as follows:

If it will prevent the miscarriage of justice;
The issue involves a principle of social justice;
The issue involves the protection of labor;
The decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity; and
The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

The COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution to bar broadcast exit polls on election day, prompting ABS-CBN to seek certiorari and a temporary restraining order from the Supreme Court on grounds that the blanket ban unreasonably curtailed press and speech freedoms. The Court granted immediate relief, holding the ban overbroad, issued a TRO, and announced five narrow exceptions that permit direct Supreme Court review of COMELEC actions without prior en banc exhaustion when prompt protection of constitutional rights or prevention of grave injustice is necessary.

[b] Only decisions made in the exercise of the Commission's adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power may be brought to the Supreme Court for review.

Garces v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99

Where what was assailed in the petition for certiorari was the COMELEC's choice of an appointee, a purely administrative duty, the case was held cognizable by the Regional Trial Court or the Civil Service Commission.

Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25

Indeed, determinations made by the COMELEC which are merely administrative, not quasi-judicial in character, may be challenged in an ordinary civil action before the courts.

[c] In a petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court cannot tabulate the results reflected in the election returns.

If the Court were to do so, it would, in effect, convert itself into a board of canvassers.
This would entail a function which, obviously, the Court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot perform.

Jesus Typoco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186359, March 5, 2010.

[d] A breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion.

⭐ Diocese of Bacolod, represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205720, January 21, 2015

The petitioner filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify COMELEC's Notice to Remove Campaign Materials dated February 22, 2013, and letter dated February 27, 2013, ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin (listing on one side, "Team Buhay" senatorial candidates, and on the other side, "Team Patay" candidates), otherwise COMELEC will be constrained to file an election offense charge against petitioners.
COMELEC challenged the propriety of a certiorari petition, considering that the Notice and the Letter are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC en banc issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power.
In upholding the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, the Court said:

It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC's notice and letter on free speech. This does not fall under Sec. 2(3), Art. IX-C of the Constitution x x x
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction is Sec. 5(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution, which provides for the court's original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition x x x
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from the COMELEC is within this Court's power to review.

The Diocese posted large tarpaulins labeling candidates “Team Buhay” or “Team Patay” by their RH Law votes; COMELEC ordered their removal and threatened election-offense prosecution, prompting a Rule 65 petition. The Court held COMELEC’s removal order and threat of prosecution impermissibly curtailed protected political expression, found grave abuse of discretion, granted certiorari relief, and permanently enjoined enforcement of the Notice and Letter.

B. Constitutional Powers and Duties of the COMELEC [Sec. 2, Art. IX-C]

1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

[a] Definition of terms

[i] Election

the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed period, and to whom they entrust for the time being the exercise of the powers of government.

[ii] Plebiscite

the submission of constitutional amendments or important legislative measures to the people for ratification.

[iii] Initiative

the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution, or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose [Sec. 2(a), R.A. 6735].

[iv] Referendum

the power of the electorate to approve or reject national or local legislation through an election called for the purpose.

[v] Recall

the termination of the official relationship of a local elective official for loss of confidence prior to the expiration of his term through the will of the electorate.

[b] Broad Powers

The 1987 Constitution has granted the COMELEC broader powers than its predecessors.
It implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate rules and regulations in the enforcement of laws relative to elections.

Gallardo v. Judge Tabamo, 218 SCRA 253

Accordingly, where the subject of the action is the enforcement of provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC, not of regular courts.

[i] This power includes the ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its legitimate officers.

LDP v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161265, February 24, 2004

In this case, the COMELEC erred in resolving the controversy by granting official candidate status to LDP candidates under either the "Angara Wing" or the "Aquino Wing," because clearly, it is the Party Chairman, the Chief Executive Officer of the party, who has the authority to represent the party in all external affairs and concerns, and to sign documents for and in its behalf.

Luis Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012

The COMELEC's jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is well-established.
This singular power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers.

AKLAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162203, April 14, 2004

The Supreme Court declared that the authority of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce and administer all election laws includes the determination, within the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the accomplishment of pre-election acts like filing petitions for registration under the party-list system.

[ii] Consistent with these broad powers, the COMELEC has the authority to annul the results of a plebiscite.

Buac v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004].

To remove from the COMELEC the power to ascertain the true results of the plebiscite through revision of ballots is to render nugatory its constitutionally mandated power to enforce laws relative to the conduct of a plebiscite.

Marc Douglas Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013

The Supreme Court has also upheld the broad power or authority of the COMELEC to fix other dates for a plebiscite to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage.

[iii] Regulatory power over media of transportation, communication, and information

During the election period, the COMELEC may regulate enjoyment or utilization of all franchises and permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, grants, special privileges, and concessions — to ensure equal opportunity, time, space, right to reply, etc. — with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections [Sec. 4, Art. IX-C].
National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1;
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712.

Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004,

Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Sec. 32, Resolution No. 6520, dated January 6, 2004, providing that all materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, radio, or television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person who, subsequent to the placement or display thereof, becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed; otherwise, the person and the radio station, print media, or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Sec. 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The issuance of the resolution was also considered a valid exercise of the police power.

Chavez allowed commercial billboards and ads showing his image and name before he filed his candidacy, and COMELEC’s Section 32 ordered removal of such materials if they remained after a person becomes a candidate, presuming them to be premature campaign propaganda. The Court upheld Section 32 as a valid, reasonable exercise of COMELEC’s regulatory and police power to protect fair elections and prevent covert campaigning, and denied Chavez’s petition.

⭐ Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272

But the Court invalidated the COMELEC Resolution requiring newspapers to give, for free, one-half page newspaper space for use by the COMELEC.
This was held to be an invalid exercise of the police power, there being no imperious public necessity for the taking of the newspaper space.
Rather, this was an exercise of the power of eminent domain, and COMELEC should pay just compensation for the newspaper space taken.

The Philippine Press Institute challenged a COMELEC directive requiring newspapers to provide a half‑page “COMELEC Space” free of charge for distribution among candidates and for COMELEC use during campaigns, arguing this commandeered paid newspaper space without compensation. The Supreme Court held the directive unconstitutional: forcing newspapers to surrender paid space was not a valid exercise of the police power but an appropriation requiring eminent domain procedures and just compensation, and there was no “imperious public necessity” to justify an uncompensated taking; COMELEC may regulate equal access to media but may not compel free private press space without compensation.

Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001

The Court declared unconstitutional Sec. 5.4 of R.A. 9005, prohibiting publication of election survey results, among others, because the grant of authority to the COMELEC to regulate the enjoyment and utilization of franchises for the operation of media of communications is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space and right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for "public information campaigns for and among candidates."

SWS and Manila Standard challenged Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 and COMELEC Resolution 3636, which forbade publication of election survey results 15 days before national and 7 days before local elections, as an unconstitutional prior restraint that deprived voters of important, timely information. The Supreme Court struck down the blackout as unconstitutional, holding that COMELEC’s power to regulate media use is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and right of reply, and rejecting arguments that the ban was justified by fears of “junking” weak or losing candidates, bandwagon effects, or last‑minute manipulation—those harms could be addressed by narrower, less restrictive measures (like punishing false or fraudulent surveys), so a total suppression of survey publication was not warranted.

Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529

The Court held that this regulatory power may be exercised only over the media, not over practitioners of the media.
Thus, in this case, the Supreme Court invalidated a COMELEC resolution prohibiting radio and TV commentators and newspaper columnists from commenting on the issues involved in the forthcoming plebiscite for the ratification of the organic law establishing the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
"Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates."

COMELEC’s Resolution No. 2167, Section 19, barred columnists and broadcast commentators from using their platforms to campaign on plebiscite issues, and Sanidad challenged this as an unconstitutional restraint on press freedom. The Court struck down Section 19, ruling that COMELEC may regulate media outlets but not individual media practitioners’ opinions during a plebiscite, and that a blanket ban on commentary was an overbroad prior restraint on free expression.

See: Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections

GMA and TELEBAP challenged Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code requiring free COMELEC Time from broadcasters, claiming it confiscated valuable broadcast air time without compensation. The Supreme Court upheld Section 92, reasoning that broadcast franchises carry public‑service obligations tied to the limited public resource of the airwaves and that ensuring equal access and the public’s right to information during elections is a valid regulatory objective.

Diocese of Bacolod, etc., v. COMELEC, supra

Similarly, the COMELEC could not invoke Sec. 4, Art. IX-C, against the petitioners because the petitioners are neither franchise holders nor candidates.

⭐GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

Where five petitions were filed challenging the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which limited the airtime within which national candidates and political parties in the 2013 elections may air political advertisements on television and radio to an aggregate of 120 minutes and 180 minutes, respectively (instead of per station, as in the 2010 elections), the Supreme Court declared that it is not within the power of COMELEC to do so.
While it is true that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws, it cannot simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do.
The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules, especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past.
The Court ruled that the COMELEC went beyond the authority granted to it by law when it adopted the aggregate basis in the determination of allowable airtime.

Broadcasters challenged COMELEC’s switch to an aggregate nationwide airtime cap for candidates and parties under Resolution No. 9615 as an overreach that impaired press freedom and altered settled regulatory practice. The Court struck down the aggregate airtime provision as beyond COMELEC’s authority and unconstitutional, while upholding other reasonable and statutory implementing rules designed to protect equal opportunity in elections.

[iv] No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of COMELEC [Sec. 5, Art. IX-C].

[v] Power to declare failure of election

Joseph Peter Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096, March 3, 1999

The Supreme Court said that under pertinent provisions of B.P. 881, there are only three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely:

The election in any polling place had not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;
The election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.

Petitioners alleged voting, suspension, or tainted counting in certain precincts due to violence, fraud, or analogous causes and sought a declaration of failure of election under B.P. 881. The Court ruled that failure of election may be declared only in the three statutorily listed situations and refused to expand the remedy beyond those precise circumstances.

Mitmug v. COMELEC, 230 SCRA 54

The Supreme Court held that for the COMELEC to conduct a hearing on a verified petition to declare a failure of election, it is necessary that the petition must show on its face two conditions:

That no voting has taken place in the precinct on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and
The votes not cast would affect the results of the election.

In this case, for failure of the petition to show the existence of the first condition, the COMELEC correctly dismissed the petition even without a hearing.

A petitioner sought a failure-of-election hearing but failed to allege that no voting occurred or that the uncast votes would alter the result. The Court held that both factual conditions must appear on the petition’s face before COMELEC must hold a hearing, and it upheld dismissal where those conditions were absent.

Soliva v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141723, April 20, 2001

Applying the foregoing criteria, the Supreme Court upheld the COMELEC Resolution that there was failure of election in the Municipality of Remedios T. Romualdez in the local elections of May 11, 1998, on the basis of the finding that the counting of votes and the canvassing of election returns were clearly attended by fraud, intimidation, terrorism, and harassment.

[vi] COMELEC cannot exercise the power of apportionment

Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415

While Sec. 2 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution empowered the COMELEC to "make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made herein," the Ordinance did not vest in it the authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another.
And while the Ordinance grants COMELEC the power to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which a new province was created," the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when, in its Resolution No. 2736, it transferred the Municipality of Capoocan in the 2nd District and the Municipality of Palompon in the 4th District to the 3rd District of Leyte.
The COMELEC is without authority to reapportion the congressional districts, as only Congress is vested with such power.

After Biliran became a regular province and district populations became unequal, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2736 transferring Capoocan and Palompon to the 3rd District of Leyte to correct imbalance, prompting a constitutional challenge by Representative Montejo. The Court held that COMELEC exceeded its authority—only Congress may reapportion or transfer municipalities between legislative districts—and therefore struck down the transfers as void.

[vii] COMELEC cannot make an unofficial quick count of presidential election results

Brillantes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004

The assailed COMELEC Resolution usurps, in the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of the President and the Vice President .

[viii] COMELEC cannot deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy in due form without proper proceedings

Cipriano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004
Olivia de Silva Cerafica, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014

[ix] COMELEC can deny request for special registration

Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001

The denial of petitioner's request for special registration of voters in the youth sector who failed to register within the prescribed period was a valid exercise of its power to administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

Youth groups sought a two-day special registration for voters aged 18–21 after the statutory deadline, and COMELEC denied the request under the 120-day prohibition in R.A. 8189 citing logistical and integrity concerns. The Court upheld COMELEC’s denial, ruling that the prohibition is statutory, registration is a regulated prerequisite to voting, and allowing extra days so close to the election would be legally and practically impermissible.

[x] Power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of a recall

Alroben Goh v. Lucilo Bayron & COMELEC, G.R. No. 212584, November 25, 2014

In connection with its power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of a recall, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court invalidated COMELEC Resolution No. 9864, dated April 1, 2012, which suspended all proceedings under the recall petition because of the issue as to funding of the entire recall process, and COMELEC Resolution No. 9882, dated May 27, 2014, which suspended any proceeding relative to recall, ostensibly because the COMELEC had no appropriation in the 2014 GAA, and the GAA did not provide the COMELEC the legal authority to commit public funds for the recall process.
In rejecting the two COMELEC Resolutions, the Court said that the 2014 GAA provides a line-item appropriation for the COMELEC conduct of recall elections.
And because the COMELEC now admits that it does not have sufficient funds from its current line-item appropriation for the "conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x" to conduct an actual recall election, then there is an actual deficiency in its operating funds for the current year.
This is a situation that allows for the exercise of the COMELEC Chairman's power to augment actual deficiencies in the item for the "conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x x x" in its budget.

Goh filed a sufficient recall petition against Mayor Bayron, but COMELEC suspended recall proceedings through Resolutions No. 9864 and 9882 citing alleged lack of funding under the 2014 GAA. The Court held COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion because the 2014 GAA contained a line-item for recalls and the COMELEC could lawfully augment that appropriation, so the suspension was invalid and the Commission was ordered to proceed.

2. Exclusive original jurisdiction and exclusive appellate jurisdiction

Exclusive original jurisdiction

over all contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials.

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests:

involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

[a] Exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation cases [Sec. 242, B.P. 881].

See Sec. 15, R.A. 7166, which prohibits pre-proclamation controversies in national offices (except questions involving the composition and proceedings of the Board of Canvassers).

[i] Proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election

Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012

The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative.
At this point, the HRET assumes jurisdiction.

Wigberto Tanada, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207199, October 22, 2013

The Supreme Court explained that the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" refers to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title.

[ii] HRET can exercise jurisdiction only when one of the parties to the controversy is a member of the House

Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is "the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of members" of the House of Representatives.
But the HRET can exercise jurisdiction only when one of the parties to the controversy is a member of the House.
To be considered a member of the House of Representatives, there must be concurrence of all the following requisites:

a valid proclamation;
a proper oath; and
assumption of office.

Absent any one of the foregoing, the COMELEC is not divested of jurisdiction over the controversy.

Tan filed a petition to cancel Reyes’ COC alleging misrepresentations about marital status, residency, birthdate, and citizenship, and COMELEC ordered cancellation after admitting contested evidence. The Court held that HRET jurisdiction only attaches when a person has been validly proclaimed, sworn, and assumed office, so COMELEC retained authority to resolve pre-election COC challenges and the cancellation orders were set aside pending proper proceedings.

[b] The express grant of power to the COMELEC to resolve election contests carries with it the grant of all other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective and efficient exercise of the power expressly granted.

Governor Sadikul Sahali v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201796, January 15, 2013

Verily, the power to resolve election protests includes the authority to order a technical examination of relevant election paraphernalia, election returns, and ballots in order to determine whether fraud and irregularities attended the canvass of the votes.

Bince v. COMELEC, 218 SCRA 782

But the COMELEC is without the power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing, as this could constitute a violation of the due process clause.

[c] Power to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Relampagos v. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690

The COMELEC has the power to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, because the last part of Sec. 50, B.P. 697 remains in full force and effect, and had not been repealed by B.P. 881.

Festo Galang v. Hon. Ramiro Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011

Since it is the COMELEC that has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of Regional Trial Courts in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC that has the authority to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

[d] By express constitutional provision, the COMELEC has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by the RTC, or involving elective barangay officials decided by the MTC.

Flores v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484

Thus, R.A. 6679, insofar as it grants appellate jurisdiction to the RTC over decisions of the MTC or MeTC in electoral cases involving elective barangay officials, was declared unconstitutional.

Veloria v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 907

Appeal to the COMELEC from the RTC must be filed within five days from receipt of a copy of the decision; a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision is a prohibited pleading.

Lloren v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196355, September 18, 2012

The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case require two different appeal fees:

one to be paid in the trial court together with the filing of the notice of appeal, and
the other to be paid in the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of appeal.

Mateo Nollen v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010

The ruling in Divinagracia v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 186007 & 186016, July 27, 2009, stressed that if the appellants had already paid PhP1,000 to the lower court within the five-day reglementary period, they are further required to pay the COMELEC through its Cash Division PhP3,200 within fifteen days from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal with the lower court.
If appellants fail to pay the PhP3,200 within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be dismissed.
For notices of appeal filed after July 27, 2009, non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees is no longer excusable.

[e] Execution pending appeal.

Relampagos v. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690

The right of a party to seek execution pending appeal is strictly construed.
The grant of the motion is dependent on the public interest involved, the shortness of the remaining portion of the term, and the length of time that the protest has been pending.
It should be filed before the expiration of the period for appeal.

Balajonda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166032, February 28, 2005

The judgments which may be executed pending appeal are not only those rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC as well.

Quintin Saludaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189431, April 7, 2010

The discretion to allow execution pending reconsideration belongs to the division that rendered the assailed decision, order or resolution, or the COMELEC en banc, as the case may be, not to the Presiding Commissioner.

Edding v. COMELEC, 246 SCRA 502

The COMELEC cannot deprive the Regional Trial Court of its competence to order execution of judgment pending appeal, because the mere filing of an appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the authority to resolve pending incidents.

Santos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155618, March 26, 2003

The reason why such execution is allowed in election cases is "to give as much recognition to the worth of the trial judge's decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation of the board of canvassers".
Indeed, to deprive the trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would "bring back the ghost of the 'grab-the-proclamation, prolong-the-protest' techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold on an elective public office"

Navarrosa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157957, September 18, 2003

It was held that the RTC may grant a motion for execution pending appeal when there are valid and special reasons to grant the same, such as:

the public interest involved or the will of the electorate;
the shortness of the remaining portion of the term; or
the length of time that the election protest has been pending.

Gutierrez v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 413

Thus, the fact that only a short period is left of the term of office is a good ground for execution pending appeal, according to the Supreme Court.
This ruling was reiterated in Ramas v. COMELEC, 286 SCRA 189.

Jesus Calo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 185222, January 19, 2010

In election protest cases, the disruption of public service is an element that has been weighed and factored in, and cannot per se be the basis to deny execution pending appeal.
The COMELEC should accord respect and weight to the RTC's decision proclaiming petitioner as winner.

Camlian v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 757

However, it was held that the provision which allows execution pending appeal must be strictly construed against the movant, as it is an exception to the general rule.
Following civil law jurisprudence, the reasons allowing for immediate execution must be of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party should such party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal.
Absent such urgency, the order must be stricken down as flawed with grave abuse of discretion.
Not every invocation of public interest with particular reference to the will of the electorate can be appreciated as a good reason, especially if the same appears to be self-serving, and has not been clearly established.
Public interest will be best served only when the candidate voted for the position is finally proclaimed and adjudged winner in the election.

[f] Power to cite for contempt.

Guevara v. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269

The COMELEC has the statutory power to cite for contempt, but the power may be exercised only when the COMELEC is engaged in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers.

[g] Power of Supreme Court to review appellate decisions of the COMELEC.

Galido v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 78

The fact that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are final, executory, and not appealable [Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-C], does not preclude a recourse to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court.

Ambil v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398, October 25, 2000

However, as indicated above, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the COMELEC involves only final orders, decisions, and rulings of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

3. Decide, save those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

[a] Authority to determine polling places and appoint election officials

Cawasa v. COMELEC, G.R, No. 150469, July 3, 2002

It is the COMELEC that ultimately determines whether or not to effect a change in the location of polling places, after notice and hearing, although it may be initiated by a written petition of the majority of the voters, or by agreement of the political parties.

However, the COMELEC may not appoint military personnel as members of the Board of Election Inspectors. If there are no public school teachers available, then teachers in private schools, employees in the civil service, or other citizens of known probity and competence may be appointed.

[b] Authority to re-cluster of precincts

Salic Dumarpa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192249, April 2, 2013

The COMELEC has the authority to effect the re-clustering of precincts when necessary to prevent failure of election and promote free, orderly and honest elections. Unless clearly illegal, or constituting grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with the actions of the COMELEC in this respect.

[c] Authority to register voters

As an incident to its duties concerning registration of voters, and deciding questions involving the right to vote, please read appropriate chapter on Registration of Voters.

[e] Judicial Review of COMELEC Administrative Determinations

Filipinas Engineering & Machine Shop v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25

Determinations made in the exercise of this power may be questioned in an ordinary civil action before trial courts.

Salva v. Makalintal, G.R. No. 132603, September 18, 2000

Thus, the case questioning the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules to govern the conduct of the plebiscite relative to an ordinance abolishing a barangay, being merely an incident of the Commission's inherent administrative functions over the conduct of a plebiscite, may be taken cognizance of by the Regional Trial Court.

4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

[a] Authority to recommend to the President the removal or any other disciplinary action

May recommend to the President the removal of any officer it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision [Sec. 2(8), Art. IX-C].

[b] Authority to conduct administrative inquiry of deputized officials.

Tan v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 353

In order to ensure that the duly deputized officials and employees of the government carry out their assigned tasks, the law also provides that upon the recommendation of the COMELEC, the corresponding proper authority shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws.
It is the COMELEC, being in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform, that should conduct the administrative inquiry.
To say that it is without jurisdiction would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of its recommendatory power.

5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections.

[a] Denial of registration for certain religious denominations and sects

Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.
Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to the Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration [Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C].

[b] Prohibition of foreign financial contributions to political parties

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law [Id.].

[c] Free and open party system

A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article [Sec. 6, Art. IX-C].

[d] Validity of votes cast for unregistered parties

No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in the Constitution [Sec. 7, Art. IX-C].

[e] Restrictions on party-list groups in election boards

Political parties, organizations, or coalitions registered under the party-list system shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law [Sec. 8, Art. IX-C].

[f] Administrative character of political party registration

Magdalo Para Sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012

The power vested by Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C of the Constitution and Sec. 61 of B.P. 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character.
This process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration.

[g] The Party List System Act [R.A. 7941]

[i] Party-list system

The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections [Sec. 3(a)].

[ii] Definition of terms [Sec. 3]:

[iia] A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

[iib] A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

[iic] A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the following sectors: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers and professionals, whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

[iii] Registration

In order to acquire juridical personality as a political party, to entitle it to the benefits and privileges granted under the Constitution and the laws, and in order to participate in the party-list system, the group must register with the Commission on Elections by filing not later than 90 days before the election a verified petition stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional, or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations.

[iv] Grounds for cancellation of registration.

Under R.A. 7941, the COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon a verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional, or sector party, organization, or coalition on any of the following grounds:

it is a religious sect or denomination, organization, or association organized for religious purposes;
it advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
it is a foreign party or organization;
it is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members, or indirectly through third parties, for partisan election purposes;
it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to elections;
it declares untruthful statements in its petition;
it has ceased to exist for at least one year; and
it fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. [Sec. 6].

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.
The LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transgendered individuals) is a sector that can be represented in the party-list system even if it is not specifically enumerated in the law. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and R.A. 7941.
Homosexual conduct is not against generally accepted public morals. The Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into law. x x x Even the Office of the Solicitor General agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group members have committed or are committing immoral acts"

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010

The word "or" (in letter "h" of the grounds for cancellation of registration under Sec. 6, R.A. 7941) is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.
Thus, the plain, clear, and unmistakable language of Sec. 6(h) of R.A. 7941 provides for two separate reasons for delisting a party-list group, namely, that it failed to participate in the last two preceding elections, and that it failed to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it was registered.
This ruling effectively abandons Minero v. COMELEC, which erroneously held that a party-list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes cast.

Cocofed-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013

Sec. 8, R.A. 7941 expressly requires a party-list group to submit a list containing at least five qualified nominees. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the cancellation of the party's registration. The requirement of submission of a list of five nominees is primarily a statutory requirement for the registration of party-list groups, and the submission of this list is part of the registered party's continuing compliance with the law to maintain its registration. A party-list group's previous registration with the COMELEC confers no vested right for the maintenance of its registration. The party must prove not only its continued possession of the requisite qualifications but, equally, its compliance with the basic requirements of the law.

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013

The COMELEC may, motu proprio, cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to elections.

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206844-45, July 23, 2013

But where a party-list group was not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of the said party-list group in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organization's qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections, thus denying the party-list group the opportunity to answer this issue squarely, it was held that the party-list group was denied due process.

Abang Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013

Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future performance. There is no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking registration under the party-list system still need to comply with the track record requirement. Nowhere in R.A. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show track record as a group.

[v] Parameters of party-list representation

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000

The Supreme Court said that the Constitution and R.A. 7941 mandate at least four (4) inviolable parameters:

20% allocation: the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership in the House of Representatives;
2% threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House;
Three-seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and
Proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

[vi] Qualifications of party-list groups and nominees

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001

The Court said that the following guidelines shall be followed in order that a political party registered under the party-list system may be entitled to a seat in the House of Representatives:

must represent marginalized and under-represented sectors;
major political parties must comply with this statutory policy;
Ang Bagong Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (as a party) must be subject to the express constitutional prohibition against religious sects;
the party must not be disqualified under R.A. 7941;
the party must not be an adjunct of an entity or project funded by the government;
the party and its nominees must comply with the requirements of the law;
the nominee must also represent a marginalized or under-represented sector; and
the nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation.

[vii] Allocation of additional seats

BANAT (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009

The Supreme Court abandoned the formula adopted in Veterans Federation in the matter of the allocation of additional seats to party-list groups, even as it also explained that the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani that the nominees must represent a marginalized or under-represented sector does not mean that the nominee must wallow in poverty.
In this case, the Court prescribed the procedure to be followed in the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Sec. 11, R.A. 7941:

The parties, organizations and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the election.
The parties, organizations and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
Those garnering sufficient number of votes according to the ranking in paragraph 1 shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all additional seats are allocated.
Each party, organization or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included, because they have already been allocated, at one seat each to every two percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System less the guaranteed seats.
There shall be two steps in the second round of allocation:

First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, which is the difference between the maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the guaranteed seats of the two percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and the remaining available seats corresponds to the party's share in the remaining available seats.
Second, assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed.

[viii] Participation in party-list elections

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

The Supreme Court formulated new parameters which should guide the COMELEC in determining who may participate in the 13 May 2013 and subsequent elections:
Three different groups may participate in the party-list system, namely:

national parties or organizations;
regional parties or organizations; and
sectoral parties or organizations.

National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized or under-represented" sector.
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections.

A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and under-represented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies."

It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
The sectors that are "marginalized and under-represented" include:

labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.

The sectors that lack "well-defined constituencies" include:

professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and under-represented" must belong to the "marginalized and under-represented" sector they represent.

Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined constituencies" either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona fide members of such parties or organizations.
National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

COMELEC disqualified numerous party-list groups from the 2013 elections for allegedly failing to represent marginalized sectors, prompting a consolidated challenge before the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that the Party-List System is open to national, regional, and sectoral parties, and is not limited to those representing the marginalized and underrepresented. It remanded the petitions to COMELEC for reevaluation under the newly clarified standards.

[ix] Power of the COMELEC to cancel a political party's registration

The Supreme Court has recognized, on several occasions, the power of the COMELEC to cancel a political party's registration.

Bello v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010

The Court confirmed that a complaint for the cancellation of party-list registration, aside from a petition for the disqualification of the party-list nominee, provides a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" against a party-list organization alleged to have failed to comply with Sec. 6 of COMELEC Res. No. 8807 — to submit documentary evidence to prove that they belong to a marginalized and under-represented sector.

ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011

Likewise, the Court declared that the power of the COMELEC, not only to register political parties, but also to cancel their registration, emanates from no less than Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-C of the Constitution.

[x] Youth sector nominees

R.A. 7941 covers all youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats. A nominee of the youth sector must be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election [Milagros Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010].

[g] Read R.A. 9173 (An Act Granting All Citizens' Arms Equal Opportunity to be Accredited by the Commission on Elections).

6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion and exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

[a] Power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses

Under Sec. 265, B.P. 881, the COMELEC is granted the "exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses punishable under this (Omnibus Election) Code and to prosecute the same."
De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760
People v. Judge Inting, 187 SCRA 788.

Baytan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, February 4, 2003

It is well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion.

COMELEC v. Silva, 286 SCRA 177

This power includes the authority to decide whether to appeal the dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court.

People v. Judge Basilio, 179 SCRA 87

However, the COMELEC is authorized to avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of government; thus, it may validly delegate the power to the Provincial Prosecutor.

[b] Concurrent power

BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009

Under Sec. 43, R.A. 9369 [An Act amending R.A. 8436 (Election Modernization Act)], COMELEC has concurrent power to conduct preliminary investigation with other prosecution arms of Government.
The Supreme Court said that the phrase in the Constitution "where appropriate" leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively.

[c] Inclusion and exclusion proceedings

For inclusion and exclusion proceedings, see chapter on Registration of Voters.

7. Recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.

8. Submit to the President and Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

C. Statutory Powers of the COMELEC

1. Secs. 52 and 57, B.P. 881

Among the Commission's statutory powers in Secs. 52 and 57, B.P. 881, are:

To exercise supervision and control over all officials required to perform election duties,
Promulgate rules and regulations,
Punish contempt,
Inquire into financial records of candidates,
Prescribe forms to be used in the elections,
Procure supplies and materials needed for the election, etc.

2. Power to declare failure of election [Sec. 4, R.A. 7166].

This is a power statutorily granted, but before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking a declaration of failure of election, two conditions must concur, namely:

No voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and
The votes cast would affect the result of the election.

Mitmug v. COMELEC, 230 SCRA 54

Loong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133676, April 14, 1999

The Supreme Court denied the petition to declare failure of election because when the COMELEC resorted to manual count after the automated machines failed to read the ballots correctly, it did not do so arbitrarily.
The Court found that there was, after all, compliance with the due process clause, because the petitioner and the intervenor were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count, and the result of the said count was reliable.

Sambarani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004

Since there was failure of elections, the petitioners can legally remain in office as barangay chairmen of the respective barangays in a hold-over capacity.
While it is true that Sec. 43(c) of the Local Government Code limits the term of elective barangay officials to three years, Sec. 5, R.A. 9164 explicitly provides that incumbent barangay officials may continue in office in a hold-over capacity until their successors shall have been elected and shall have qualified.

3. Conduct of special election.

The prohibition on conducting special elections after 30 days from the cessation of the cause for failure of election is not absolute; it is directory, not mandatory.
The COMELEC has residual powers to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by law, and the COMELEC can fix other dates for the conduct of the special election when the same cannot be reasonably held within the period prescribed by law [Sec. 4, R.A. 7166].

[a] Notice requirement

Hassan v. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 125

For the validity of an election, it is essential that the voters have notice, in some form, actual or constructive, of the time, place, and purpose thereof.
The requirement of notice becomes stricter in the case of special elections where it was called by some authority after the happening of a condition precedent, or at least there must be substantial compliance therewith, so that it may fairly and reasonably be said that the purpose of the statute had been carried into effect.
The sufficiency of notice is based on whether the voters generally have knowledge of the time, place, and purpose of the elections so as to give them an opportunity to attend the polls and express their will.

4. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation contests [Sec. 241, B.P. 881].

III. Voters: Qualification and Registration

A. Qualifications for suffrage

Suffrage may be exercised by:

all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are at least eighteen years of age, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.

No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage [Sec. 1, Art. V, Constitution].

1. Transfer of residence solely by reason of occupation, profession, or employment does not result in loss of original residence [Sec. 117, B.P. 881].

2. Read R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)

Makalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 3, 2003.

B. Disqualifications [Sec. 118, B.P. 881]

1. Any person sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than one year; but right is reacquired upon the expiration of 5 years after service of sentence.

2. Any person adjudged by final judgment of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the government or any crime against national security; but right is reacquired upon expiration of 5 years after service of sentence.

3. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

C. Registration of Voters

1. It shall be the duty of every citizen to register and cast his vote [Sec. 4, B.P. 881].

[a] Permanent List of Voters

In order that a qualified elector may vote in an election, plebiscite, or referendum, he must be registered in the Permanent List of Voters for the city or municipality in which he resides [Sec. 115, B.P. 881].

[b] Registration as a condition precedent

Registration does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent for the exercise of the right.
Registration is a regulation, not a qualification.

Yra v. Abano, 52 Phil. 380

Yra challenged Abaño’s eligibility on the grounds that Abaño was not properly registered as a voter in Meycauayan and thus lacked the right to hold municipal office. The Court held that registration is a regulation, not a qualification; it is a condition precedent to voting but does not itself create or deny the substantive right to vote or hold elective office.

2. R.A. 8189 (Voters Registration Act of 1996).

For purposes of the 1998 elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives, and recalls subsequent thereto, the COMELEC shall undertake a general registration of voters [Sec. 7, R.A. 8189].

[a] System of continuing registration.

The personal filing of applications of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours, but no registration shall be conducted during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election [Sec. 8, R.A. 8189].

Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001

The Supreme Court upheld the action of the COMELEC in denying the petitioner's request for two additional registration days.
The law was simply followed by the COMELEC.

[b] Disqualification.

The same grounds as those enumerated in B.P. 881.

[c] Registration of illiterate or disabled voters

Registration of illiterate or disabled voters is done with the assistance of:

a relative within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
the Election Officer, or
any member of an accredited citizens' arm [Sec. 14].

[d] Election Registration Boards

There shall be in each city or municipality as many Election Registration Boards as there are election officers therein.
The board shall be composed of the election officer as chairman, the highest ranking public school official, and the civil registrar or, in his absence, the city or municipal treasurer.
Every registered party and such organizations as may be authorized by the Commission shall be entitled to a watcher in every registration board [Sec. 15].

[e] Challenges to the right to register

Challenges to the right to register must be made under oath and heard [Sec. 18].

[f] Grounds for deactivation of registration

Grounds for deactivation of registration are the same as the grounds for disqualification from suffrage.
Additional grounds are the

failure to vote in two successive preceding regular elections as shown by the voting records;
cancellation of registration as ordered by the court; and
loss of Filipino citizenship [Sec. 27].

[g] Reactivation of registration

The voter may file with the Election Officer a sworn statement for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit stating that the grounds for deactivation no longer exist any time but not later than 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election [Sec. 28].

[h] Posting of the certified list of voters

90 days before a regular election and 60 days before a special election [Sec. 30].

D. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings

1. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters

[a] Petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters shall be filed during office hours.

[b] Notice of the place, date, and time of the hearing of the petition shall be served upon the members of the Board and the challenged voter upon filing of the petition.

[c] A petition shall refer only to one precinct and shall implead the Board as respondents.

[d] No costs shall be assessed against any party in these proceedings. However, if the court finds that the application has been filed solely to harass the adverse party and cause him to incur expenses, it shall order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses.

[e] Any voter, candidate, or political party affected by the proceedings may intervene and present his evidence.

[f] The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case upon a stipulation of facts. If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged voter is fictitious.

[g] The petition shall be heard and decided within 10 days from the date of filing. Cases appealed to the RTC shall be decided within 10 days from receipt of the appeal. In all cases, the court shall decide these petitions not later than 15 days before the election, and the decision shall become final and executory.

2. Jurisdiction in inclusion and exclusion cases

The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective municipalities and cities.
Decisions of the MTC or MeTC may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within 5 days from receipt of notice thereof.
The RTC shall decide the appeal within 10 days from the time it is received, and the decision shall immediately become final and executory.
No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained [Sec. 33, R.A. 8189].

[a] Petition for Inclusion.

Any person whose application for registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken out from the list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the permanent list of voters in his precinct at any time except 105 days prior to a regular election or 75 days prior to a special election.
It shall be supported by a certificate of disapproval of his application and proof of service of notice of his petition upon the Board.
This petition shall be decided within 15 days after filing [Sec. 34, R.A. 8189].

[b] Petition for Exclusion.

Any registered voter, representative of a political party, or Election Officer may file with the court a sworn petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters, giving the name, address, and precinct of the challenged voter at any time except 100 days prior to a regular election or 65 days prior to a special election.
The petition shall be accompanied by proof of notice to the Board and to the challenged voter, and shall be decided within 10 days from filing [Sec. 35, R.A. 8189].

Asistio v. Hon. Thelma Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010

Private respondent Enrico Echiverri filed a petition for exclusion of voter Luis Asistio from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City, alleging that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan, specifically not of the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Caloocan.
The Supreme Court held that Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth, or for more than 72 years. His family is among the prominent families in the City; he served as 2nd District Representative of Caloocan for four terms; he also sought election as City Mayor in 2007. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city.
There is no showing that he established domicile elsewhere or that he abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. That Asistio allegedly indicated in his COC a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated, may, if these purported misrepresentations are true, be a basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code.
But they do not serve as proof that Asistio abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City or that he has established residence elsewhere.

E. Annulment of Book of Voters

1. Grounds

The COMELEC shall, upon verified petition of any voter, election officer, or duly registered political party, and after notice and hearing, annul any book of voters that:

was not prepared in accordance with the provisions of the law, or
was prepared through fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force, or any similar irregularity, or
which contains data that are statistically improbable.

No order, ruling, or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within 90 days before an election [Sec. 39, R.A. 8189].

Ututalum v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 335

However, the annulment of the list of voters shall not constitute a ground for a pre-proclamation contest.

IV. CANDIDATES; CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY

A. Qualifications. Some principles:

1. Continuing requirement

Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be possessed for the duration of the officer's active tenure.
Once any of the prescribed qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be seasonably challenged.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245
Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1.

2. Philippine citizenship

Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727

The Local Government Code does not specify any particular date when the candidate must possess Filipino citizenship.
Philippine citizenship is required to ensure that no alien shall govern our people. An official begins to govern only upon proclamation and on the day that his term begins.
Since Frivaldo took his oath of allegiance on June 30, 1995, when his application for repatriation was granted by the Special Committee on Naturalization created under PD 825, he was, therefore, qualified to be proclaimed and to assume office.
Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of qualifications of elective officials, not of candidates.
Furthermore, repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of his application for repatriation on August 17, 1994.

3. Residency requirement

Rommel Apolinario Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012

There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate's compliance with the residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention.
This notwithstanding, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:

Every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
Once established, the domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and
A person can have but one domicile at a time.

⭐ Svetlana Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93314, February 26, 2013

A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, because one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
Where there is no such proof of abandonment, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.

Petitioner ran for mayor of Baliangao claiming domicile there but COMELEC found she failed to show bodily presence, intent to remain, and abandonment of her Dapitan domicile; supporting affidavits and documents were inconsistent and insufficient. The Supreme Court affirmed COMELEC, holding that a change of residence requires clear and positive proof of actual and deliberate abandonment, and where such proof is lacking the original domicile persists and the candidacy may be cancelled.

⭐ Abraham Kahlil Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010

Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence, i.e., the dwelling where a person permanently resides, intends to return to and remain, his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial.

Mitra, a former representative whose home city was reclassified, ran for Palawan governo,r claiming Aborlan as his residence and had his COC cancelled by COMELEC for alleged false residence. The Supreme Court reversed COMELEC, holding that domicile is established by physical presence plus intent to remain, not by cosmetic signs like decorating a house, and that Mitra’s demonstrated presence, property ties, voter acts, and declared intention sufficed to establish Aborlan as his residence.

B. Disqualifications.

1. Under the Omnibus Election Code (Sec. 12, B.P. 881)

II-SIR18-M-F

[a] Declared as incompetent or insane by competent authority.

[b] Sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than 18 months imprisonment.

[c] Sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.

Alicia Risos Vidal v. COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

It involves a petition to disqualify Joseph Ejercito Estrada from running for the position of City Mayor of Manila in the 2013 local elections. The petition was anchored on Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, in relation to Sec. 12, B.P. 881. It will be recalled that former President Estrada was convicted of plunder by the Sandiganbayan on September 12, 2007, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of service of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency to Estrada, and the pardon extended restored Estrada's civil and political rights upon acceptance of the same. The COMELEC dismissed the petition, and on May 13, 2013, Estrada was proclaimed duly elected Mayor of Manila. On petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, former Mayor Alfredo Lim intervened, and joined Risos-Vidal's theory that Estrada is disqualified to run for and to hold public office, because the pardon extended by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo failed to expressly remit the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification. Lim further posited that since Estrada is disqualified, his certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, and the votes he obtained are considered stray votes; thus, in light of the ruling in Maquiling v. COMELEC, he (Lim), as second placer, should be proclaimed the winner in the electoral contest.
The Supreme Court ruled that Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which would naturally include the right to seek public office. The language used in the pardon extended to Estrada was complete, unambiguous and unqualified, unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective and constitutional interpretation of the language used in the pardon is that the same, in fact, conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase in the pardon which declares that Estrada "is hereby restored his civil and political rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration
Even if, ostensibly, the pardon is premised on Estrada's admission that he will no longer run for public office in the future, the text of the pardon does not support this position. The third preambular clause in the pardon, "Whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office", neither makes the pardon conditional nor militate against the conclusion that Estrada's right to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

Villaber v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148326, Nov. 15, 2001

It was held that violation of BP 22 is a crime involving moral turpitude, because the accused knows at the time of the issuance of the check that he does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon presentment.
A conviction thereof shows that the accused is guilty of deceit, and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of the person.

De la Torre v. COMELEC, 258 SCRA 483

Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law involves moral turpitude.

[d] Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country, unless he has waived his status as such [Sec. 69, B.P. 881]

Caasi v. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229

The Supreme Court declared that a "green card" is ample proof that the holder thereof is a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, the United States.

2. Under the Local Government Code [Sec. 40, R.A. 7160].

Applicable to candidates for elective local office only.

1,2-AOD-FFF

[a] Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, and within two years after serving sentence.

⭐ Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006

The Supreme Court said that probation is not a sentence but is rather a suspension of the imposition of the sentence.
The grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Thus, during the period of probation, the petitioner is not disqualified from running for a public office, because the accessory penalty of disqualification from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Furthermore, in the case of Moreno, the trial court had already issued an order finally discharging him, and under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law, the final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction, and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which the probation was granted.

Moreno was convicted, granted probation, and finally discharged before running for Punong Barangay, but COMELEC disqualified him under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code claiming the two‑year bar ran from discharge. The Supreme Court held probation suspends the execution of sentence and that the two‑year disqualification period applies only after one has actually served the sentence, thus restoring Moreno’s civil and political rights and annulling his disqualification.

[b] Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

Grego v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997

It was held that an elective local official who was removed from office as a result of an administrative case prior to January 1, 1992 (date of effectivity of the Local Government Code) is not disqualified from running for an elective local public office, because Sec. 40 of the LGC cannot be given retroactive effect.

Reyes v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner, a Municipal Mayor who had been ordered removed from office by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, was disqualified, even as he alleged that the decision was not yet final because he had not yet received a copy of the decision, since it was shown that he had merely refused to accept delivery of the copy of the decision.

[c] Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

[d] Those with dual citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, reiterated in Valles v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000

The Supreme Court clarified the "dual citizenship" disqualification and reconciled it with Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution on "dual allegiance".
One is disqualified only if he consciously or deliberately obtains "dual citizenship", thus, owing allegiance to two states.

Lopez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008

However, the statement that the filing of a certificate of candidacy by one who has dual citizenship suffices to renounce foreign citizenship should be deemed superseded by Sec. 5(2) of R.A. 9225 which categorically requires a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship by taking the oath of allegiance under R.A. 9225, to state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship, failing which he is disqualified from running for an elective public office.

Petitioner Lopez, a reacquired Filipino citizen under R.A. 9225, ran for barangay chairman but did not present a personal, sworn renunciation of his U.S. citizenship when he filed his candidacy. The Supreme Court upheld COMELEC’s disqualification, holding that Section 5(2) of R.A. 9225 requires a formal renunciation before filing and that filing the COC cannot substitute for this mandatory oath.

Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012

In fact, the Supreme Court declared that foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.

⭐ Casan Macode Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
If, after he had renounced his foreign citizenship, he should still use his foreign passport, he is not divested of his Filipino citizenship which he acquired by taking the required oath of allegiance.
However, by representing himself as a foreign citizen, he voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the moment he represented himself as a foreign citizen by using his foreign passport.
As a dual citizen, he was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
By being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. Without a valid certificate of candidacy, he is, therefore, a non-candidate, and the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. It is the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes who should be proclaimed; the rule on succession in the Local Government Code will not apply.

Arnado repatriated under R.A. 9225, took the Oath and executed renunciation, but later used a U.S. passport after filing his COC and winning votes for mayor. The Court ruled that his use of the foreign passport voluntarily reverted him to dual-citizen status and disqualified him under Sec. 40(d), voided his COC and votes, and required the proclamation of the highest-voted qualified candidate.

Read:

Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov 10, 2015
Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, Oct 9, 2012
⭐Mangudadatu v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 260219 & 260231, April 22, 2025

Pax Ali Mangudadatu filed for governor while still discharging mayoral duties elsewhere and the COMELEC canceled his COC for false material representation; the Supreme Court found his resignation came too late to cure the lack of required domicile and affirmed cancellation. The Court also abandoned the second‑placer rule and held that any permanent vacancy caused by disqualification must be filled according to the Local Government Code’s succession rules.

[e] Fugitives from justice in criminal and non-political cases here and abroad.

Marquez v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 538

The term "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.

Rodriguez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996

It was held that Rodriguez was not a "fugitive from justice" because his arrival in the Philippines from the US preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles court and the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the same foreign court.

[f] Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad, and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of the Local Government Code.

Caasi v. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229

The Supreme Court held that possession of a "green card" is ample evidence that one is an immigrant to the United States.

[g] Those who are insane or feebleminded.

3. Additional grounds for disqualification [Sec. 68, B.P. 881].

After having filed a certificate of candidacy, the following shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office:

MTE-CCE

[a] One who has given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions.

[b] One who committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy.

[c] One who spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code.

⭐ Emilio Ramon "E.R." Ejercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Elections disqualifying Governor ER Ejercito of Laguna for having spent an amount far exceeding that allowed by law in his media expenses during his campaign.
The Court declared that the COMELEC en banc properly considered as evidence the Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013.

Governor E.R. Ejercito was disqualified after COMELEC found, based on an Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013, and other records, that his campaign spent in excess of lawful media expense limits. The Supreme Court affirmed COMELEC’s decision, holding the contract was properly considered as evidence and that forgery or third‑party payment claims raise factual issues not resolvable by a Rule 65 petition.

[d] One who has solicited, received or made contributions prohibited

One who has solicited, received or made contributions prohibited under:

Sec. 89 — transportation, food and drinks
Sec. 95 — public or private financial institutions, public utilities or exploitation of natural resources, contractors of public works or other governmental contracts; franchise holders or concessionaires; educational institutions receiving grants from the government; officials of the Civil Service or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, foreigners or foreign corporations)
Sec. 96 — foreign-sourced contributions
Sec. 97 —- raising of funds through lotteries, cockfights, boxing bouts, bingo, beauty contests, etc., and
Sec. 104 — prohibited contributions to churches, school buildings, roads, bridges, medical clinics, etc.

[e] One who has violated the provisions of Sec. 80 (campaign period), Sec. 83 (removal, destruction of lawful election propaganda), Sec. 85 (regulation of propaganda through mass media).

Pangkat Laguna v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148075, February 4, 2002

The Supreme Court held that the acts of Laguna Governor Lazaro in ordering the purchase of trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, and the distribution of medals and pins to various schools, did not constitute a violation of Sec. 80 on premature campaigning.
Respondent Lazaro was not, in any way, directly or indirectly soliciting votes; she was merely performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law, which duties she had sworn to perform as Governor of Laguna.

[f] One who has violated the provisions of Sec. 261 (election offenses).

C. Certificate of Candidacy

1. Deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy.

The Commission on Elections shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election, to insure that the official ballot shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled, the names of all candidates for the same position, arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the same type size [Sec. 15, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

2. Effect of filing certificate of candidacy.

The 3rd paragraph of the same section provides:
"x x x Any person who files his certificate of candidacy shall be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy; Provided, that unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period; Provided, finally, that any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy."
Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009

Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period.
Thus, in enacting R.A. 9369, Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine [Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006] into the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Sec. 15 of RA 8436.
Under the present law, no candidate can be held liable for premature campaigning, because "he shall be considered a candidate (only) at the start of the campaign period". Furthermore, "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period".

Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision that appointive public officials who file certificates of candidacy shall be considered ipso facto resigned from their appointive public office on the day of filing such certificate of candidacy.

PNOC Energy Development Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100947, May 31, 1993

Relative to a similar provision in Sec. 66, BP 881, it was held that the law applies even to employees of government-owned or -controlled corporations without an original charter.

3. Formal defects in the certificate of candidacy.

[a] Not a ground for disqualifying a candidate

De Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil 211

While the certificate of candidacy is required to be under oath, the election of a candidate cannot be annulled on the sole ground of formal defects in the certificate, such as lack of the required oath.

Sergio Amora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011

Nowhere in Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code will one find that a defective certificate of candidacy is a ground for disqualifying a candidate.
Neither does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for disqualification of a candidate.

Juriila v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105435, June 2, 1994

It was held that the omission by a candidate to indicate in his certificate of candidacy his precinct number and the particular barangay where he is a registered voter, is not sufficient ground to disqualify the candidate, because the Local Government Code does not require these data to be indicated in the certificate.
It is enough that he is a registered voter in the precinct where he intends to vote which should be in the district where he is running for office.

4. Death, withdrawal or disqualification of candidate.

If, after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy for the office not later than mid-day of the day of the election [Sec. 77, BP 881].

[a] Votes cast for the substituted candidate shall be considered votes for the substitute

In view of the need to print the names of candidates in the official ballot, the COMELEC has promulgated rules on substitution of candidates, particularly the deadline for the substitution of a candidate who withdraws. Sec. 12, R.A. 8436 provides:

"In case of valid substitution after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidate shall be considered votes for the substitute."

[b] Valid Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) required

Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012; Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013

Evidently, Sec. 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution proceeds. x x x In this regard the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a candidate. x x x
Considering that Sec. 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate, it necessarily follows that if a person's CoC had been denied due course and/or is cancelled, he cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is, therefore, a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.

Olivia da Silva Cerafica v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014

Kimberly da Silva filed her certificate of candidacy for Councilor of Taguig in the 2013 elections. Her CoC showed that she would only be 20 years of age on the day of the election, having been born on 29 October 1992; but the City Charter of Taguig provides that Councilors must be at least 23 years of age on the day of the election. She was summoned by the COMELEC to a clarificatory hearing, but instead of attending the same, she withdrew her CoC. Subsequently, herein petitioner filed her own CoC, as substitute for Kimberly. The Director of the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberly's CoC and, consequently, the denial of the substitution by Olivia da Silva Cerafica.
The cancellation of a CoC involves the exercise of the quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC; a case for cancellation must first be heard and decided by the COMELEC in division, before it may be elevated to the COMELEC en banc on motion for reconsideration.
In this case, the COMELEC simply relied on the recommendation of the Law Department Director in the cancellation of Kimberly's CoC, effectively denying due process to the parties.
The substitution should be upheld. Olivia complied with all the requirements for substitution.

First, there was the withdrawal of Kimberly's CoC, after the deadline for the filing of CoCs.
Second, Olivia belongs to, and is certified by, the same political party as Kimberly's.
Third, Olivia filed her CoC not later than mid-day of the day of the election.

Aratea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012

The Court ruled that a cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
Thus, the "second placer" candidate is deemed to have garnered the highest number of votes and is entitled to hold the corresponding elective position.

Lonzanida’s COC was cancelled for having violated the three‑term limit and for prior disqualifying convictions, but his motion for reconsideration was pending when he was proclaimed after the automated count. The Court held that a COC void ab initio cannot produce a valid candidacy or valid votes, declared votes for Lonzanida stray, and ordered proclamation of the qualified candidate who obtained the next highest number of valid votes.

The same ruling was handed down in Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012.

Dominador Jalosjos Jr.’s Certificate of Candidacy was cancelled and declared void ab initio, so votes cast for him could not be given legal effect in determining the winner. The Supreme Court ruled that those invalidated votes are disregarded and the second placer with the highest number of valid votes is entitled to the office.

Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013,

The rationale for this ruling is found where the Supreme Court said:
"The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualification of the candidate. To rule otherwise would be to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates."

5. Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.

Ycain v. Caneja, 81 Phil 773

The withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy shall effect the disqualification of the candidate to be elected for the position.

Monsale v. Nico, 83 Phil 758

The withdrawal of the withdrawal, for the purpose of reviving the certificate of candidacy, must be made within the period provided by law for the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Loreto-Go v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147741, May 10, 2001

The Supreme Court ruled that there is nothing in Sec. 73, BP 881, which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. It can be filed directly with:

the main office of the COMELEC,
the office of the regional election director concerned,
the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality belongs, or
the office of the municipal election officer of the municipality.

6. Filing of two certificates of candidacy.

When a person files two certificates of candidacy for different offices, he becomes ineligible for either position [Sec. 73, BP 881].
He may withdraw one of his certificates by filing a sworn declaration with the COMELEC before the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy.

Loreto-Go v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147741, May 10, 2001

The petitioner filed two certificates; one for Governor of Leyte and another for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte. With the Supreme Court ruling that she had validly withdrawn her certificate of candidacy for Mayor, she was, therefore, considered a bona fide candidate for Governor of Leyte.

7. Duty of the COMELEC.

Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Sec. 78, BP 881, the COMELEC shall have only ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy [Sec. 76, BP 881].

[a] Ministerial duty

Abcede v. Imperial, 103 Phil 136

As early as in this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due course to a certificate of candidacy filed in due form.
While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificate, it may not inquire into matters not appearing on the face of the certificate.

Cipriano v. COMELEC, 479 Phil 677 (2004)

It was held that the COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due course to certificates of candidacy; that it may not unilaterally cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form without proper notice and hearing.
This is reiterated in Olivia da Silva Cerafica v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014.

Romeo Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013

The Supreme Court said that the COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of an election.
As such, it is the duty of the COMELEC to cancel, motu proprio, the certificate of candidacy of a candidate who is clearly disqualified under the law to run for public office, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same.

8. Instances when the COMELEC may go beyond the face of the certificate:

[a] Nuisance candidates [R.A. 6646].

The COMELEC may, motu proprio, or upon verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that the said certificate was filed:

To put the election process in mockery or disrepute;
To cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates; or
By other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate has been filed, and thus, prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

Joseph Timbol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015

To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by the COMELEC.
This denial or cancellation may be "motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party."
But the COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of candidacy without affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard.

Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 121139, July 12, 1996

The proclamation of the winning candidate renders moot and academic a motion for reconsideration filed by a candidate earlier declared by the COMELEC to be a nuisance candidate.

Celestino Martinez v. HRET, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010

The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates, until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.

Casimira Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012

The votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, are not stray but must be counted in favor of the latter.

[b] Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.

Under Sec. 78, BP 881, a verified petition may be filed exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained in the certificate as required under Sec. 74 is false. The petition may be filed not later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election.

Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 122872, September 10, 1997

Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC in division, not with the COMELEC en banc.

Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008

To deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy entails the exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers; hence, the Court may only compel the COMELEC to exercise its discretion and resolve the matter, but it may not control the manner of exercising such discretion.

Luis Villafuerte v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014

Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the contents of the CoC must refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the CoC.
Material misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election Code refers to "qualifications for elective office," e.g., residency, age, citizenship, or any other legal qualifications necessary to run for local elective office, as provided in the Local Government Code, coupled with a showing that there was an intent to deceive the electorate. The candidate's nickname does not pertain to his eligibility or qualification for office, and cannot be considered a material misrepresentation.

Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014

The false material representation may refer to the claim of eligibility for office when the candidate does not possess the requisite qualifications.
Sec. 74 of the Omnibus Election Code requires the candidate to state that "he is eligible for said office." If the candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be elected and is not a resident of the same, but still states under oath that he is eligible, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a petition to deny due course or cancel a CoC under Sec. 78.

Villaber v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001

The false material representation alleged in the petition for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy was in petitioner declaring that he was "eligible for the office sought to be elected to," because he had been convicted of violating BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude.

Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008

It was held that the denial of due course to the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office.
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Sec. 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Sec. 253, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Sec. 78 petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.

Lina Dela Pena Jalover v. John Henry Osmena and COMELEC, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014

The Supreme Court said that the false representation must pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity; a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of election laws.
Separate from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Sec. 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the candidate's qualifications for public office.
In this case, the mere fact that the respondent was "hardly seen in his residence in Toledo City" is not enough to prove that he committed a false representation on a material fact. Osmena was found by the COMELEC to have sufficiently established residence in Toledo City. The law does not require a person to be in his home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in order to fulfill the residency requirement.

Fernando Gonzalez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011

The period for filing a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy based on false representation is covered by Rule 23 and not Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Sec. 3 of Rule 25, allowing the filing of a petition at any time after the last day for the filing of CoCs but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule that cannot supersede Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, the petition must be filed within 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy sought to be cancelled.

Loong v. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760

A petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy filed beyond the 25-day period was not given due course; in Garvida v. Sales, supra, the Supreme Court faulted the COMELEC for entertaining a facsimile of a petition for disqualification, saying that the Commission should have awaited receipt of the original petition filed through registered mail.

Aratea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, much less to valid votes. If one's certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then he was never a candidate at all, and all the votes cast in his favor are stray votes.
If he obtained the highest number of votes, then it is the second placer who should be proclaimed the winner.
This is also the ruling in Dominador Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012.
The rationale for this is found in Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, where the Supreme Court said: "The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualification and disqualification of candidates. When a person who is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualification of the candidate. To rule otherwise would be to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates."

[c] A disqualification case based on any of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 68, BP 881, e.g., vote-buying, terrorism, overspending, etc.:

Codilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to the grounds enumerated in Sec. 68, BP 881. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of the COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature, and the power of the COMELEC over such cases is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offense for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the courts of justice [].

Albana v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004

Thus, the Supreme Court declared that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution disqualifying the petitioners on the strength of a petition for disqualification filed against the petitioners only on June 23, 2001, after the petitioners had been proclaimed winners on May 18, 2001.

Aznar v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703

It was held that a petition for disqualification cannot be treated as a petition for quo warranto, as the former is unquestionably premature.

9. Distinctions between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to a CoC

Alfais Munder v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194076, October 19, 2011

The Supreme Court discussed the distinctions between a petition for disqualification under Sec. 68 and a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, and the distinct periods to file the corresponding petitions on which the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the case is dependent.

Tagolino v. HRET and Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013

The Court explained these distinctions, as follows:

Primarily, a disqualification case under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is hinged on either:

A candidate's possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or
His commission of certain acts of disqualification, e.g., vote-buying, terrorism, overspending, soliciting or making prohibited contributions, etc.

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Sec. 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility.
In other words, while the candidate's compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Sec. 78 is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for.
It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must also have made a false representation of the same in the CoC.
The Court said that while a person who is disqualified under Sec. 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Sec. 78 is not treated as a candidate at all; it is as if he/she never filed a certificate of candidacy.

10. Effect of disqualification case

Sec. 6, R.A. 6646 provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If, for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before the election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Grego v. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481

The use of the word "may" indicates that the suspension of the proclamation is merely permissive.

Papandayan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147909, April 16, 2002

Where the decision of the COMELEC disqualifying the candidate is not yet final and executory on election day, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI), in the exercise of its ministerial duty, is under obligation to count and tally the votes cast in favor of the candidate.

Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998

Even as the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate had not yet attained finality on election day, May 11, 1998, the voters of Navotas were informed of such disqualification by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification.
Thus, the voters were considered to have constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for Mayor.

Martinez v. HRET, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010

The Supreme Court went one step beyond Bautista when it ruled that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment (only) after the elections. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing CoCs at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
The same ruling was reached in Casimira Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012.
The ruling in Ortega v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297, companion case to Labo v. COMELEC, that it is incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void as it would amount to disenfranchising the voters, must now be deemed modified by the Court's decisions in Aratea v. COMELEC, Dominador Jalosjos v. COMELEC, and Maquiling v. COMELEC.

If the ground for disqualification is the cancellation of the CoC under Sec. 78 because of a false representation on a material fact (constitutive of an eligibility requirement), then the votes cast for such candidate are null and void, deemed stray, because the person is considered not to have been a candidate at all. See Aratea, Jalosjos, and Maquiling.
On the other hand, if the disqualification is based on grounds mentioned in Sec. 68, the person is still considered technically to have been a candidate, although proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his statutory eligibility. In such a case, the Ortega ruling may still be applied, and the second placer cannot be proclaimed winner.

V. CAMPAIGN; ELECTION PROPAGANDA, CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENSES

A. Election campaign or partisan political activity

1. Definition

Election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office.
Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of or criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity [Sec. 79, BP 881].

[a] Elements of the offense

Under Sec. 80, BP 881, it shall be unlawful for any person or any party to engage in election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period.
Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154858, November 16, 2006

The Supreme Court enumerated the elements of the offense, as follows:

A person engages in election campaign or partisan political activity as defined in Sec. 79, BP 881;
The act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate; and
The act is done outside the campaign period.

[b] Lanot Doctrine

However, because of Lanot, and by virtue of Sec. 15, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369, which provides that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the said campaign period", it would seem that no one can be held liable for the offense of premature election campaign.
Sec. 11, R.A. 8436, moved the deadline for the filing of CoCs from March 23, 2004 to January 2, 2004, or 81 days earlier, only for the purpose of giving ample time for the printing of official ballots. Congress never intended that the early filing of CoCs is to make the person immediately a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots.
A similar ruling was handed down in Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, Nov. 25, 2009.

[c] Prohibition on members of the Civil Service

Distinguish this from the prohibition on members of the Civil Service to engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign under Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-B, Constitution.

2. Public rally

Any political party or candidate shall notify the election registrar of any public rally said political party or candidate intends to organize and hold in the city or municipality, and within seven days thereafter submit to the election registrar a statement of expenses incurred in connection therewith [Sec. 88, BP 881].

B. Lawful election propaganda

Read Sec. 82, BP 881.

Alvin Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010

Sec. 4, R.A. 9006, requires that print advertisements donated to a candidate shall not be published without the written acceptance of the said candidate, which written acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and submitted to the COMELEC.
Since the advertisement in question was published, there arises a presumption that there was written acceptance by the petitioner of the advertisement paid for or donated by his friends in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Emilio Ramon "E.R." Ejercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014

The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC en banc properly considered as evidence the Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013, in arriving at the conclusion that Laguna Governor Ejercito spent an amount beyond that allowed by law in the matter of his media expenses. E.R.'s allegation that the contract was paid for by an unknown supporter and that his signature on the contract was forged cannot be given credence.
Questions of forgery and consent are issues of fact and cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition.

C. Prohibited election propaganda

Read Sec. 85, BP 881.

Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529

In Badoy v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 285, the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was upheld as a valid exercise of the police power, "to prevent the perversion and the prostitution of the electoral apparatus, of the denial of due process of law".
But this evil does not obtain in a plebiscite, because in a plebiscite, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates.

Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004

The Court upheld the validity of the COMELEC resolution that all propaganda materials, including advertisements on print, in radio, or on television, showing the image or mentioning the name of a person who, subsequent to the placement or display thereof, becomes a candidate for public office, be immediately removed. Otherwise, this shall be presumed as premature campaigning in violation of the provisions of BP 881.
NOTE: Reconcile this with Lanot and Penera.

Read also:

National Press Club v. COMELEC, supra;
Adiong v. COMELEC, supra;
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, supra; and
Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, supra (discussed in the chapter on the Bill of Rights, Constitutional Law).

D. Electoral contributions

Read Secs. 94–97, BP 881.

1. Definition

The term "contribution" includes a gift; donation, subscription, loan, advances or deposit of money or anything of value, or a contract, promise or agreement to contribute, whether or not legally enforceable, made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections, but shall not include services rendered without compensation by individuals volunteering a portion or all of their time on behalf of a candidate or political party.
It shall also include the use of facilities voluntarily donated by other persons, the money value of which can be assessed based on the rates prevailing in the area.

2. Prohibited contributions

No contribution for purposes of partisan political activity shall be made directly or indirectly by any of the following:

Public or private financial institutions, provided, however, that nothing herein shall prevent the making of any loan to a candidate or political party by any such public or private institutions legally in the business of lending money, and that the loan is made in accordance with laws and regulations in the ordinary course of business;
Natural and juridical persons operating a public utility, or in possession of or exploiting any natural resources of the nation;
Natural and juridical persons who hold contracts or subcontracts to supply the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities with goods or services or to perform construction or other works;
Natural and juridical persons who have been granted franchises, incentives, exemptions, allocations or similar privileges or concessions by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled corporations;
Natural and juridical persons who, within one year prior to the date of the election have been granted loans or other accommodations in excess of P100,000 by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled corporations;
Educational institutions which have received grants of public funds amounting to no less than P100,000;
Officials or employees in the Civil Service, or members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; and
Foreigners and foreign corporations.

It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive any contribution from any of the persons or entities enumerated above.

E. Prohibited donations by candidates

No candidate, his or her spouse, or any relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, or his campaign manager, agent or representative, shall, during the campaign period, on the day before and on the date of the election, directly or indirectly, make any donation, contribution or gift in cash or in kind, or undertake to contribute to the construction or repair of roads, bridges, schoolhouses, puericulture centers, medical clinics and hospitals, churches or chapels, cement pavements or any structure for public use or for the use of any religious or civic organization; provided that normal and customary religious dues or contributions, such as religious stipends, tithes or collections on Sundays or other designated collection days, as well as periodic payments for legitimate scholarships established and school contributions habitually made before the prohibited period, are excluded from this prohibition.

F. Limitations on expenses; lawful expenditures

Sec. 13, R.A. 7166, provides that for the 1992 synchronized elections, the aggregate amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as follows:

1. For candidates

P10 for President and Vice President; and for other candidates, P3 for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy; provided that a candidate without any political party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend P5 for every such voter.

2. For political parties

P5 for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.

G. Statement of contributions and expenses

[Sec. 14, R.A. 7166]

Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within 30 days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the office of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.

1. No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of the office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party that nominated the winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein.

2. Administrative offense

Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from P1,000 to P30,000 at the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within 30 days from receipt of notice of such failure, otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense, the administrative fine shall range from P2,000 to P60,000 in the discretion of the Commission.
In addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
Pilar v. COMELEC, 245 SCRA 759

The Supreme Court held that this requirement to file the statement covers even those who withdrew as candidates after having filed their certificates, because Sec. 14, R.A. 7166 does not make any distinction.

VI. BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS; WATCHERS

A. Composition of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)

The BEI shall be composed of:

a chairman,
a member, and
a poll clerk, who must be public school teachers.

A member must be:

of good moral character and irreproachable reputation,
a registered voter of the city or municipality,
never been convicted of any election offense or any other crime punishable by more than six months imprisonment, and
must be able to speak and write English or the local dialect.

1. Disqualifications

Must not be related within the 4th civil degree by consanguinity or affinity to any member of the BEI or any candidate to be voted for in the polling place; and
Must not engage in any partisan political activity.

2. Automated election system (AES)

Where automated election system (AES) is adopted, at least one member of the Board of Election Inspectors shall be an information technology-capable person, who is trained or certified by the DOST to use the AES.
Such certification shall be issued by the DOST free of charge [Sec. 3, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

B. Powers of the BEI

The BEI shall:

conduct the voting and counting of votes in the polling place;
act as deputies of the COMELEC in the supervision and control of the polling place; maintain order within the polling place and its premises to keep access thereto open and unobstructed;
enforce obedience to its lawful orders; and
perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law or by the rules of the COMELEC.

1. Proceedings

Its proceedings shall be public and held only in the polling place.
The BEI shall act through its Chairman and shall decide without delay by majority vote all questions which may arise in the performance of its duties.

C. Watchers

[Sec. 26, R.A. 7166, as amended by R.A. 9369]

Every registered political party or coalition of political parties, and every candidate shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling place and canvassing center, provided that candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan belonging to the same ticket or slate shall collectively be entitled to one watcher.
The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which the Commission shall determine in accordance with law, shall each be entitled to one official watcher who shall be paid a fixed per diem of P400.00.
There shall also be recognized six (6) principal watchers, representing the six major political parties excluding the dominant majority and minority parties, who shall be designated by the Commission upon nomination of the said parties.

1. Qualifications

qualified voter of the city or municipality,
of good moral character,
never been convicted of any election offense or any crime,
knows how to read and write English, Pilipino or any of the prevailing local dialects, and
not related within the 4th civil degree by consanguinity or affinity to any member of the BEI in the polling place where he seeks appointment as watcher.

2. Rights and duties

To stay in the place reserved for them inside the polling place, witness and inform themselves of the proceedings of the BEI, take notes, photographs of proceedings, file protest against any irregularity or violation of law, and be furnished with a certificate of the number of votes cast for each candidate.

VII. CASTING AND COUNTING OF VOTES

A. Ballot box

Where applicable, there shall be in each precinct on election day a ballot box with such safety features that the Commission may prescribe and of such size as to accommodate the official ballots [Sec. 17, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

1. Official ballot

The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display and/or size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled and/or the proposition to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. A fixed space where the chairman of the BEI shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through the Committee shall ensure that the necessary safeguards, such as but not limited to bar codes, holograms, color-shifting ink, microprinting, are provided on the ballot. The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each city/municipality at the rate of one ballot for every registered voter with a provision of additional three ballots per precinct [Sec. 15, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

[a] There is nothing in the law that provides that a ballot which has not been authenticated shall be deemed spurious.

Libanan v. HRET, G.R. No. 129783, December 22, 1997

The law merely makes the Chairman of the BEI accountable for such an omission.

Punzalan v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 702

It was held that the ballot is valid even if it is not signed at the back by the Chairman of the BEI.

B. Procedure in voting

The Commission shall prescribe the manner and procedure of voting, which can be easily understood and followed by the voters, taking into consideration, among other things, the secrecy of the voting [Sec. 18, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

1. Challenge of illegal voter

Any voter or watcher may challenge any person offering to vote for not being registered, for using the name of another, or for suffering from existing disqualification.
A challenge may likewise be made on the ground that the challenged person has received or expects to receive, paid, offered or promises to pay, contributed, offered or promised to contribute money or anything of value as consideration for his vote or for the vote of another; made or received a promise to influence the giving or withholding of any such vote; or made a bet or is interested directly or indirectly in a bet which depends upon the results of the election.
The challenged voter shall take an oath before the BEI that he has not committed any of the acts alleged in the challenge.

2. Preparation of ballot for illiterate and disabled

An illiterate or disabled voter may be assisted in the preparation of his ballot by a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity; or, if he has none, by any person of his confidence who belongs to the same household, or by any member of the BEI; provided that no voter shall be allowed to vote as an illiterate unless so indicated in his registration record; and provided, further, that in no case shall an assistor assist more than three times, except the members of the BEI.

C. Closing of polls

The Commission shall prescribe the time, manner and procedure of closing the polls and the steps for the correct reporting of votes cast and the proper conduct of counting for areas covered by the AES [Sec. 19, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

D. Notice of designation of Counting Centers

The election officer shall post prominently in his office, in the bulletin boards at the city/municipal hall, and in three other conspicuous places in the city/municipality, the notice of the designated counting center(s) for at least three weeks prior to election day. The notice shall specify the precincts covered by each counting center and the number of registered voters in each of said precincts.
The election officer shall also furnish a copy of the notice to the headquarters or official address of the political parties or independent candidates within the same period. The election officer shall post in the Commission website concerned the said notice and publish the notice in the local newspaper. Where the polling place or voting center is also the designated counting center, such information shall be contained in the notice.
The Commission may not designate as counting center any building or facility located within the premises of a camp, reservation compound, headquarters, detachment, or field office of the military, police, prison or detention bureau, or any law enforcement or investigating agency [Sec. 20, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

E. Counting procedure

The Commission shall prescribe the manner and procedure of counting the votes under the automated system; provided that apart from the electronically stored result, thirty (30) copies of the election return are printed, distributed as follows:

1 to the city/municipal board of canvassers
1 to Congress
1 to the COMELEC
1 to the citizens' arm
1 to the dominant majority party
1 to the dominant minority party
1 to be placed inside the ballot box
1 to the provincial board of canvassers
9th–18th to the 10 accredited major political parties
19th–20th to accredited major local parties
21st–24th to national media
25th–26th to local media
27th–30th to major citizens' arms [Sec. 21, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369]

1. Electronic returns:

Each copy of the printed election returns shall bear appropriate control marks to determine the time and place of printing. Each copy shall be signed and thumbmarked by all the members of the board of election inspectors and the watchers present. If any member of the board of election inspectors present refuses to sign, the chairman of the board shall note the same in each copy of the printed election returns. The member of the board of election inspectors concerned refusing to sign shall be compelled to explain his or her refusal to do so. Failure to explain an unjustifiable refusal to sign each copy of the printed election return by any member of the board shall be punishable as provided in this Act.

[a] The chairman of the board shall then publicly read and announce the total number of registered voters, the total number of voters who actually voted, and the total number of votes obtained by each candidate based on the election returns. Thereafter, the copies of the election returns shall be sealed and placed in the proper envelopes for distribution.

[b] Within one hour after the printing of the election returns, the chairman of the board of election inspectors or any official authorized by the Commission shall, in the presence of watchers and representatives of the accredited citizens' arms, political parties/candidates, if any, electronically transmit the precinct results to the respected levels of board of canvassers, to the dominant majority and minority party, to the accredited citizens' arms, and to the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters ng Pilipinas (KBP).

[c] The election returns transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall be considered as official election results and shall be used as basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate [Sec. 22, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

F. Random Manual Audit

Where the AES is used, there shall be a random manual audit in one precinct per congressional district randomly chosen by the Commission in each province and city. Any difference between the automated and manual count will result in the determination of root cause and initiate a manual count for those precincts affected by the computer or procedural error [Sec. 29, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

G. Manual Elections: Procedure for Counting Votes

[Secs. 210–211, B.P. 881]

1. Manner of counting votes [Sec. 25, R.A. 7166]

In reading the individual official ballots during the counting, the chairman, poll clerk, and third member shall assume such positions as to provide the watchers and the members of the public, as may be conveniently accommodated in the polling place, an unimpeded view of the ballot being read by the chairman, of the election returns, and the tally board being simultaneously accomplished by the poll clerk and the third member respectively, without touching any of these election documents.
The table shall be cleared of all unnecessary writing paraphernalia. Any violation of this requirement shall constitute an election offense punishable under Secs. 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

2. Rules for appreciation of ballots [Sec. 211, B.P. 881]

[a] Idem sonans: A name or surname incorrectly written which, when read, has a sound similar to the name or surname of a candidate when correctly written, shall be counted in his favor.

[b] When two or more words are written on the same line on the ballot, all of which are the surnames of two or more candidates, the same shall not be counted for any of them, unless one is the surname of an incumbent who has served for at least one year, in which case it shall be counted in favor of the latter.

[c] When on the ballot is written a single word which is the first name of a candidate and which is at the same time the surname of his opponent, the vote shall be counted in favor of the latter.

[d] When two words are written on the ballot, one of which is the first name of the candidate and the other is the surname of his opponent, the vote shall not be counted for either.

[e] Ballots which contain prefixes such as "Sr.", "Mr.", "Datu", "Ginoo", etc., shall be valid.

[f] The use of nicknames and appellations of affection and friendship, if accompanied by the first name or surname of the candidate, does not annul such vote, except when they were used as a means to identify the voter, in which case the entire ballot is invalid.

[g] If the candidates voted for exceed the number of those to be elected, the ballot is valid, but the votes shall be counted only in favor of the candidates whose names were firstly written by the voter within the space provided for said office in the ballot until the authorized number is covered.

3. Some relevant decisions on appreciation of ballots

Bautista v. Castro, 206 SCRA 305

In appreciating a ballot, the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. Thus, the name of the candidate preceded by the words "Bo. Barangay" should be interpreted to mean "Po. (or Punong) Barangay", and should be counted for the candidate.
But where the name of the candidate is written seven times on the ballot, it is clear that the same is intended to identify the voter, and thus the vote should be invalidated.

Villagracia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168296, January 31, 2006

It was held that a distinction has to be made between marks that were apparently carelessly or innocently made, which do not invalidate the ballot, and marks purposely placed thereon by the voter with a view to possible future identification, which invalidates it.
In this case, the invalidated ballots are marked with the words "Joker" (14 ballots), "Aias" (6 ballots), "Queen" (7 ballots), and "Kamatis" (7 ballots), all written in the No. 7 slot of the list of Kagawad for Sangguniang Barangay, and appearing only in ballots wherein the Punong Barangay voted for was the petitioner. Clearly, the marks indicate no other intention than to identify the ballots; indubitably, these are marked ballots and were properly invalidated.

4. Election Returns

The BEI shall prepare the election return simultaneously with the counting of votes in the polling place. The seven copies of the election returns shall be distributed as provided in B.P. 881, as amended by R.A. 6646.

5. Announcement of the result of the election

Upon completion of the election returns, the BEI Chairman shall orally and publicly announce the total number of votes received in the election in the polling place by each and every one of the candidates.

6. BEI to issue Certificate of Votes to Watchers

This Certificate of Votes is issued upon request.
Sec. 16, R.A. 6646, requires that the certificate be signed and thumbmarked by each member of the BEI that issued the same.
Garay v. COMELEC, 261 SCRA 222

The certificate cannot be a valid basis for canvass; it can only be used as evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification, or any other anomaly committed in the election returns concerned.
A Certificate of Votes does not constitute sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; only election returns are.

VIII. CANVASS AND PROCLAMATION

A. Composition of Boards of Canvassers

1. Provincial

The provincial election supervisor, or a lawyer of a regional office of the Commission, as chairman; the provincial prosecutor as vice chairman; and the provincial superintendent of schools as member.
In the event of non-availability, absence, disqualification, or incapacity, substitute members are the following, in the order named:

Provincial Auditor,
Register of Deeds,
Clerk of Court nominated by the Executive Judge, and
any other available appointive provincial official.

2. City

The city election registrar or a lawyer of the Commission as chairman; the city prosecutor as vice chairman; and the city superintendent of schools as member.
Substitute members are officials in the city corresponding to the substitutes in the provincial board of canvassers.

3. Municipal

The election registrar or a representative of the Commission as chairman; the municipal treasurer as vice chairman; and the most senior district schools supervisor, or in his absence, a principal of the school, as member.
Substitute members are the:

Municipal Administrator,
Municipal Assessor,
Clerk of Court nominated by the Executive Judge, or
any other available appointive municipal official.

NOTE: For the automated election system, the chairman of the board shall be appointed by the Commission from among its personnel/deputies, and the members from those enumerated above.

B. Prohibitions on Members of the Board

1. No member of the Board shall be related within the 4th civil degree by consanguinity or affinity to any of the candidates whose votes will be canvassed by the Board, or to any member of the Board.

2. During the period beginning election day until proclamation of winning candidates, no member of the Board shall be transferred, assigned, or detailed outside of his official station without the prior authority of the Commission.

C. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District, and Municipal Boards of Canvassers

The City or Municipal Board of Canvassers shall canvass the votes for the president, vice president, senators, and parties, organizations, or coalitions participating under the party-list system by consolidating the electronically transmitted results contained in the data storage devices used in the printing of the election returns. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall print the certificate of canvass of votes for president, vice president, senators, members of the House of Representatives, and elective provincial officials, and thereafter proclaim the elected city or municipal officials, as the case may be.

1. The city board of canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative districts shall canvass the votes for president, vice president, senators, members of the House of Representatives, and elective city officials by consolidating the certificates of canvass electronically transmitted or the results contained in the data storage devices used in the printing of the election returns. Upon completion of the canvass, the board shall prepare the certificate of canvass of votes for president, vice president, and senators, and thereafter proclaim the elected members of the House of Representatives and city officials.

2. In the Metro Manila area, each municipality comprising a legislative district shall have a district board of canvassers, which shall canvass the votes for president, vice president, senators, members of the House of Representatives, and elective municipal officials by consolidating the electronically transmitted results or the results contained in the data storage devices used in the printing of election returns. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall produce the certificate of canvass of votes for president, vice president, and senators, and thereafter proclaim the elected members of the House of Representatives and municipal officials.

3. Each component municipality in a legislative district in the Metro Manila area shall have a municipal board of canvassers, which shall canvass the votes for president. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass of votes for president and thereafter proclaim the elected municipal officials.

4. The district board of canvassers of each legislative district comprising two municipalities in the Metro Manila area shall canvass the votes for president. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificates of canvass of votes for president and thereafter proclaim the elected members of the House of Representatives in the legislative district.

5. The municipal, city, district, and provincial certificates of canvass shall each be supported by a statement of votes.

6. Within one hour after the canvassing, the Chairman of the district or provincial Board of Canvassers, or the city board of canvassers of those cities which comprise one or more legislative districts, shall electronically transmit the certificate of canvass to the Commission sitting as the national board of canvassers for senators and party-list representatives, and to Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for president and vice president, directed to the President of the Senate.

7. The Commission shall adopt adequate and effective measures to preserve the integrity of the certificates of canvass transmitted electronically and the results in the storage devices at the various levels of the boards of canvassers.

8. The certificates of canvass transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall be considered as official election results and shall be used as the basis for the proclamation of a winning candidate [Sec. 25, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

D. National Board of Canvassers for Senators and Party-List Representatives

The chairman and members of the Commission on Elections sitting en banc shall compose the national board of canvassers for senators and party-list representatives. It shall canvass the results by consolidating the certificates of canvass electronically transmitted. Thereafter, the national board shall proclaim the winning candidates for senator and party-list representatives [Sec. 27, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

E. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for President and Vice-President

The Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session shall compose the national board of canvassers for president and vice-president. The certificates of canvass for president and vice president, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be electronically transmitted to the Congress, addressed to the President of the Senate.

Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than 30 days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session. The Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, shall canvass all the results for president and vice president, and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidates [Sec. 28, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

F. Authentication of Electronically Transmitted Election Results

The manner of determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates shall conform with the provisions of R.A. 7166, as may be supplemented or modified by the provisions of this Act, and where applicable, by appropriate authentication and certification procedures for electronic signatures as provided in R.A. 8792, as well as the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant thereto [Sec. 30, R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369].

G. Duty of the Board of Canvassers

A canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function, that of compiling and adding the results as they appear in the returns transmitted to it [Guiao v. COMELEC, 137 SCRA 366]. Canvass proceedings are administrative and summary in nature.

H. Manual Elections: Procedure for Canvass and Proclamation

Read Sec. 25, R.A. 6646; Secs. 28–30, R.A. 7166; Secs. 225, 232, B.P. 881.

IX. Pre-Proclamation Controversy

A. Pre-Proclamation Cases in Election for President, Vice President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives

For purposes of the election for president, vice president, senator, and member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except as provided in Section 30 hereof.
However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body, motu proprio, or upon written complaint of an interested person, to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election return before it.
Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the Board of Canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof [Sec. 15, R.A. 7166, as amended by R.A. 9369].

1. Contested Composition or Proceedings of the Board; Period to Appeal; Decision by Commission

Parties adversely affected by a ruling of the board of canvassers on questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board may appeal the matter to the Commission within 3 days from a ruling thereon. The Commission shall summarily decide the case within 5 days from the filing thereof [Sec. 19, R.A. 7166].

X. Election Contests

A. Jurisdiction over Election Contests

1. Original and Exclusive

President/Vice President – Supreme Court / Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Senator – Senate Electoral Tribunal
Representative – HoR Electoral Tribunal
Regional/Provincial/City – COMELEC
Municipal – Regional Trial Court
Barangay – Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Court

2. Appellate

[a] From decisions of the RTC and MTC/MeTC/MTCC, appeal shall be made exclusively to the COMELEC, whose decision shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

Alvarez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142527, March 1, 2001

However, in Galido v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 78, it was held that the COMELEC decision on appeal does not preclude a recourse to the Supreme Court, by way of a special civil action of certiorari, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

Veloria v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 502

The decision of the RTC in election contests involving municipal officials may be appealed to the COMELEC within 5 days from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof by the adverse party. A motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and does not interrupt the running of the 5-day period for appeal.

Lloren v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196355, September 18, 2012

The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case require two different appeal fees: one to be paid to the trial court together with the filing of the notice of appeal, and the other to be paid to the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of appeal.

Nollen v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010

The ruling in Divinagracia v. COMELEC [July 27, 2009] stressed that if the appellants had already paid PhP 1,000 to the lower court within the 5-day reglementary period, they are further required to pay the COMELEC, through the Cash Division, PhP 3,200 within 15 days from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal with the lower court. From July 27, 2009, non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees is no longer excusable.

Garcia v. De Jesus, 206 SCRA 779; Malaluan v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 397

But the COMELEC cannot deprive the RTC of its competence to order the execution of its decision pending appeal, this being a judicial prerogative and there being no law disauthorizing the same.

Navarosa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157957, September 18, 2003

The grant of the motion is dependent on the public interest involved, the shortness of the remaining portion of the term, and the length of time that the protest had been pending.

Relampagos v. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690

The motion should be filed before the expiration of the period for appeal.

Santos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155618, March 26, 2003

The reason why such execution is allowed in election cases is "to give as much recognition to the worth of the trial judge's decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation of the board of canvassers". Indeed, to deprive the trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would "bring back the ghost of the 'grab-the-proclamation, prolong-the-protest' techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold on an elective public office."

Camlian v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 757

However, it was held that the provision which allows execution pending appeal must be strictly construed against the movant, as it is an exception to the general rule.
Following civil law jurisprudence, the reasons allowing for immediate execution must be of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage of the losing party should such party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal. Absent such urgency, the order must be stricken down as flawed with grave abuse of discretion.

Relampagos v. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690

In the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the COMELEC has the power to issue writs of prohibition, mandamus, or certiorari, because the last paragraph of Sec. 50, B.P. 696 is still in full force and effect, and has not been repealed nor amended by BP 881.

[b] From decisions of the COMELEC, appeal shall be made through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to be filed with the Supreme Court within 30 days from receipt of a copy of the decision, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction or violation of due process.

[c] From a decision of the Electoral Tribunal, appeal shall be made through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court within 30 days from receipt of a copy of the decision, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or violation of due process.

Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391

The Supreme Court ruled that for purposes of election contests cognizable by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), the HRET rules of procedure prevail over the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.

B. Actions Which May Be Filed

1. Election protest

2. Quo warranto

C. Election Protest

1. Requisites

[a] Must be filed by a candidate who has filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted upon for the same office.

[b] On grounds of fraud, terrorism, irregularities, or illegal acts committed before, during, and after the casting and counting of votes.

Rosal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168253, March 16, 2007

The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the true and lawful choice of the electorate. The proceeding may be instituted on the theory that the election returns, which are deemed prima facie to be the true reports of how the electorate voted on election day and which serve as the basis for the proclamation of the winning candidate, do not accurately reflect the true will of the voters due to alleged irregularities which attended the counting of the ballots
In a protest prosecuted on such a theory, the protestant ordinarily prays that the official count as reflected in the election returns be set aside in favor of a revision and recount of the ballots, the results of which should be made to prevail over those reflected in the returns pursuant to the doctrine that "in an election contest where what is involved is the number of votes of each candidate, the best and the most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves".
However, the superior status of the ballots as evidence of how the electorate voted presupposes that these were the very same ballots actually cast and counted in the elections. Thus, it has been held that before the ballots found in a box can be used to set aside the returns, the court must be sure that it has before it the same ballots deposited by the voters.
In this case, the Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines:

The ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been preserved with a care which precludes the opportunity of tampering and all suspicion of change, abstraction, or substitution.
The burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved is on the protestant.
Where a mode of preserving the ballot is enjoined by law, proof must be made of such substantial compliance with the requirements of the mode as would provide assurance that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise mode of achieving that end.
It is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of law on the preservation of the ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or the likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee.
Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as reflected in the returns.

Sema v. HRET, G.R. No. 190734, March 26, 2010

When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, recourse can be made to untampered and unaltered election returns or other election documents as evidence.

Vinzons-Chato v. HRET, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013

In automated elections, the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise "official ballots" that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Sec. 2(3) of R.A. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an election protest.

Mayor Emmanuel Maliksi v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203302, March 12, 2013

The Supreme Court reiterated that the ballot images in the compact flash (CF) cards, as well as the printouts of such images, are the functional equivalent of the official ballots filled up by the voters and may be used in an election protest. Both are original documents and carry the same evidentiary weight as the official physical ballot.
However, despite the equal probative weight accorded the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, it does not authorize the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings before them without notice to the parties. Without such notice, there will be a violation of the party's right to due process, which cannot be brushed aside by the invocation that the said party was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration.

Bulaong v. COMELEC, 220 SCRA 745

An order regarding the revision of ballots is an interlocutory order because it still requires a party to perform certain acts leading to the final adjudication of the case.

Ceron v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199084, September 11, 2012

In correcting an erroneous entry, the COMELEC need not order the opening of the ballot box for the purpose of recounting the votes of the candidates affected if the correction sought is such that it can be done without opening the ballot box.

Laodeno v. COMELEC, 276 SCRA 706

As a rule, the filing of an election protest or quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to an abandonment of one earlier filed.

Dumayas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141952, April 20, 2001

But this rule admits of the following exceptions:

The Board of Canvassers was improperly constituted.
Quo warranto is not the proper remedy.
What was filed was not really an election protest or quo warranto but a petition to annul proclamation.
The filing of an election contest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam.
The proclamation was null and void.

[c] Within ten days from proclamation of the results of the election.

Gatchalian v. COMELEC, 245 SCRA 208

The period for filing an election protest is suspended by the pendency of a pre-proclamation contest.

Salvador Violago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194143, October 4, 2011

A one-day delay in the filing of the Preliminary Conference Brief does not justify the outright dismissal of an electoral protest based on technical grounds, where there is no indication of intent to violate the rules, and the reason for the delay is justifiable.

2. Payment of Docket Fees

Lloren v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196355, September 18, 2012

The rules on timely perfection of an appeal in an election case require two different appeal fees: one to be paid in the trial court together with the filing of the notice of appeal, and the other to be paid to the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of appeal.

Gatchalian v. COMELEC, supra

For failure of the protestant to pay the basic docket fee, the protest should be dismissed.

Jaramilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155717, October 23, 2003

However, the Supreme Court said that the COMELEC is not constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of non-payment of filing fees. The Court also said that the COMELEC has the authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided in its rules, or the requirement of non-forum shopping, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of cases.

3. Certification of Absence of Forum-Shopping

Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 477

The requirement under Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 for a Certification of Absence of Forum-Shopping applies to election cases.

4. Death of Protestant

The death of the protestant does not extinguish an election protest.

De Castro v. COMELEC, 267 SCRA 806

It was held that an election protest is imbued with public interest which raises it onto a plane over and above ordinary civil actions, because it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of the rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling once and for all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift. In this case, it was held that the Vice Mayor-elect has the status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings.

Poe v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 25, 2009

The Supreme Court said that if persons not real parties in the action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated, expensive, and interminable — and this is not the policy of the law.
Inasmuch as no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant, it is far more prudent to abide by the existing and strict limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules.

D. Quo Warranto

1. Requisites

[a] Filed by any registered voter in the constituency.

[b] On grounds of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.

[c] Within ten days from proclamation of the results of the election.

2. Cases

Sampayan v. Daza, 213 SCRA 807
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 275
Marquez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995
Rodriguez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1995.

3. Distinctions Between Quo Warranto in Elective and Appointive Offices

In an elective office, the issue is eligibility of the officer-elect; the court or tribunal cannot declare the protestant or the candidate who obtained the 2nd highest number of votes as having been elected.

This is true unless the certificate of candidacy is cancelled, the candidate deemed not to have filed a valid CoC at all, and thus, was never a candidate. In such a case, votes cast in his favor would be considered stray, and the candidate who obtained the 2nd highest number of votes would be proclaimed [Maquiling v. COMELEC, supra].

In an appointive office, the issue is the legality of the appointment; the court determines who of the parties has legal title to the office.

E. Award of Damages

Actual or compensatory damages may be granted in all election contests or quo warranto proceedings in accordance with law [Sec. 259, B.P. 881].

Malaluan v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 397

The award of damages was reversed by the Supreme Court, saying that the criterion for a justifiable award of election expenses and salaries and emoluments remains to be the existence of pertinent breach of obligations arising from contracts or quasi-contracts, tortious acts or crimes, or a specific legal provision authorizing the money claim in the context of election cases.
If any damage had been suffered by a private respondent due to the execution of judgment pending appeal, that damage may be said to be equivalent to damnum absque injuria.

XI. ELECTION OFFENSES

A. Enumeration of Election Offenses

See Sec. 261, B.P. 881:

1. Some prohibited acts under Sec. 261, B.P. 881:

[a] Vote buying and vote selling.

People v. Ferrer, 54 O.G. 1348

It was held that the distribution of cigarettes to people who attended a political meeting falls within the context of the prohibition.

[b] Wagering upon the result of the election.

Any money or thing of value put up as a bet or wager shall be forfeited in favour of the Government.

[c] Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion.

[d] Appointment of new employee (except in case of urgent need, with notice given to the COMELEC within 3 days from the appointment), creation of new positions, promotion or granting salary increases.

[e] Carrying of deadly weapon within a radius of 100 meters from the precinct.

Orceo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the COMELEC rule that declared airguns included in the list of deadly weapons, although replicas or imitations of the same are not.

[f] Transfer or detail of government official/employee with COMELEC approval.

To prove violation, two elements must concur, namely:

The transfer or detail is done within the election period, as fixed by the COMELEC; and
The transfer or detail was made without prior approval of the COMELEC.

Causing v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199139, September 9, 2014

The Supreme Court held that the mere physical transfer of the employee's office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor "some little steps" away did not constitute a violation of this provision. "Transfer" and "detail" must be understood in their technical and legal meanings, and the petitioner's argument that the prohibition encompassed "any and all kinds and manner of personnel movement" is unacceptable.

People v. Reyes, 247 SCRA 328

It was held that the transfer or detail of a government officer or employee will not be penalized if done to promote efficiency in the government service. In this case, however, the transfer was effected one day before the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2333, which prescribed the procedure for obtaining COMELEC approval for such transfer or detail.

2. Electoral Sabotage

The following shall be guilty of an election offense or a special election offense to be known as electoral sabotage:

Any person or member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who

tampers, increases or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election, or
any member of the board who refuses after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes;

Provided, however, that when the tampering, increase or decrease of votes or the refusal to credit the correct votes and/or deduct tampered votes are perpetrated on a large scale or in substantial numbers, the same shall be considered not as an ordinary election offense under Sec. 261, B.P. 881, but a special election offense to be known as electoral sabotage and the penalty to be imposed shall be life imprisonment.

The act or offense committed shall fall under the category of electoral sabotage in any of the following instances:

When the tampering, increase and/or decrease of votes perpetrated or the refusal to credit the correct votes or to deduct tampered votes, is/are committed in the election of a national elective office which is voted upon nationwide, and the tampering, increase and/or decrease in votes, refusal to credit the correct votes or to deduct tampered votes, shall adversely affect the results of the election to the said national office to the extent that losing candidate/s is/are made to appear the winners.
Regardless of the elective office involved, when the tampering, increase and/or decrease of votes committed or the refusal to credit the correct votes or to deduct tampered votes perpetrated is accomplished in a single election document or in the transposition of the figure/results from one election document to another, and involved in the said tampering, increase and/or decrease, or refusal to credit correct votes or deduct tampered votes EXCEED FIVE THOUSAND (5,000) VOTES, and that the same adversely affects the true results of the election;
Any and all forms of tampering, increase and/or decrease of votes perpetrated, or in cases of refusal to credit the correct votes or deduct the tampered votes, where the total votes involved EXCEED TEN THOUSAND (10,000) VOTES;

PROVIDED, finally, that any and all other persons or individuals determined to be in conspiracy or in connivance with the members of the BEIs or BOCs involved, shall be meted the same penalty of life imprisonment.

B. Good Faith is Not a Defense

Election offenses are generally mala prohibita.
Proof of criminal intent is not necessary; good faith, ignorance or lack of malice is not a defense; the commission of the prohibited act is sufficient.

C. Jurisdiction over Election Offenses

1. Investigation and prosecution

Under Sec. 2(6), Art. IX-C, Philippine Constitution, the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction to "investigate, and where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election fraud, offenses and malpractices." But it may validly delegate the power to the Provincial Prosecutor.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009

However, the Supreme Court said that the phrase "where appropriate" leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively.
Accordingly, Sec. 43, R.A. 9369, which provides that COMELEC shall have concurrent power to conduct preliminary investigation with other prosecution arms of government over violations of this law, does not violate the Constitution.

Jose Miguel Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 199082, July 23, 2013

The Supreme Court held that the creation of a Joint Panel to investigate the alleged commission of election fraud, and the grant thereto of concurrent jurisdiction with the COMELEC over the offense, did not violate the mandate of the COMELEC.
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the COMELEC and DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order that the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the COMELEC in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Thus, the creation of the Joint Committee was not an abdication of the independence of the COMELEC, as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

2. Trial and decision

The Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of election laws.

D. Preferential Disposition of Election Offenses [Sec. 269, B.P. 881]

Investigation and prosecution of election offenses shall be given priority by the COMELEC.
The courts shall, likewise, give preference to election offenses over other cases, except petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. Cases shall be decided within 30 days from submission.

E. Prescriptive Period for Election Offenses

Five years from the date of commission for the offenses enumerated in Sec. 261, B.P. 881.

Political Law Review: Election Laws

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A. Definition

1. Suffrage

[a] Fundamental Right to Suffrage

GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

2. Election

3. Kinds

[a] Regular

[b] Special

B. Theories on Suffrage

1. Natural Right Theory

2. Social Expediency Theory

3. Tribal Theory

4. Feudal Theory

5. Ethical Theory

C. Theory Prevailing in the Philippines

D. Constitutional Mandate on Congress

1. To provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

[a] Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369

[b] Republic Act No. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)

⭐Makalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

[c] Sec. 12, R.A. No. 7166

2. To design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterate to vote without the assistance of other persons.

[a] Sec. 196, B.P. 881

E. The Automated Election System (AES) [R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369]

1. Policy.

2. Authority.

[a] 2010 Election Automation Project

H. Harry Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009

[b] Constitutionality of R.A. 9369

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009

[c] Disclosure of the source code for the AES technologies

Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010

3. Automated Election System (AES)

F. Election Period

II. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

A. Composition: En Banc and Division Cases

1. Composition

[a] Qualifications

Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

[b] Appointment

Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358

[c] Rotational scheme of appointment:

Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000].

[d] Decisions

Estrella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004

Dumayas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001

Mamerto Sevilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 202833, March 19, 2013

Alvarez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142527, March 1, 2001,

2. En Banc and Division Cases

[a] Cases to be heard and decided in division:

[i] All election cases, including pre-proclamation contests, originally cognizable by the Commission in the exercise of its powers under Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C of the Constitution.

Sarmiento v. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307

[ii] Petition to cancel certificate of candidacy

Kamarudin Ibrahim v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192289, January 14, 2013

[iii] Cases appealed from RTC and MTC have to be heard and decided in division before they may be heard en banc upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the division decision.

Abad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 128877, December 10, 1999

[iv] A petition for certiorari from the decision of RTC or MTC is to be resolved in division before it may be heard en banc.

Soller v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139853, September 5, 2000

Zarate v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129096, November 19, 1999

[b] The COMELEC en banc shall take cognizance of:

[i] A motion for reconsideration of a decision of a division [Sec. 3, Art. IX-C].

[ii] A petition for correction of manifest errors alleging an erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the Statement of Votes by precinct.

Jaramilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155717, October 23, 2003

Typoco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186359, March 5, 2010

Torres v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 583, and in Ramirez v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 590

[iii] The power of the COMELEC to prosecute cases of violation of election laws involves the exercise of administrative powers which may be exercised directly by the Commission en banc

Baytan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, February 4, 2003.