Constitutional Law: Article III, Section 14 Summary (De Leon)
Sec 14. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Constitutional rights of the accused in criminal cases.
(1) The right to adequate legal assistance (Sec. 11.);
(2) The right, when under investigation for the commission of an offense, to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have counsel;
(3) The right against the use of torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will;
(4) The right against being held in secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention (Sec. 12.);
(5) The right to bail and against excessive bail (Sec. 13.);
(6) The right to due process of law;
(7) The right to presumption of innocence;
(8) The right to be heard by himself and counsel;
(9) The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(10) The right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial;
(11) The right to meet the witnesses face to face;
(12) The right to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf;
(13) The right against self-incrimination (Sec. 17.);
(14) The right against detention by reason of political beliefs and aspirations (Sec. 18.);
(15) The right against excessive fines;
(16) The right against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment;
(17) The right against infliction of the death penalty except for heinous crimes (Sec. 19.); and
(18) The right against double jeopardy. (Sec. 21.)
Reasons for constitutional safeguards. (USPP)
(1) A criminal case, an unequal contest.
Every criminal case is a contest between an individual and the government. It is of necessity an unequal contest because the parties are of unequal strength. The government is very powerful. It is the repository of the enormous power of organized society. In order to reduce the possibilities of injustice, the Constituhon seeks to redress the imbalance between these parties by guaranteeing the accused the right to an impartial trial, the privilege of cross-examination and other procedural safeguards.
(2) Criminal accusation, a very serious matter.
Experience teaches that it is a very serious matter for the government formally to accuse a man of having committed a crime. The defendant, by being merely accused, may find himself in immediate trouble, whether guilty or not. He may lose his job, or be suspended from it pending trial. He may lose his liberty or even his life ( where death penalty is allowed) upon conviction. His reputation is under an immediate cloud.
The accused, therefore, needs every possible opportunity to establish his innocence, as soon, as publicly, and as decisively, as possible. The constitutional rights granted him are intended to assure a full and unimpeded opportunity for him to meet what in the end could be a baseless accusation.
(3) Protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction.
The underlying purpose then is not to coddle wrongdoers or to protect the guilty but to assure that truth will be discovered and that justice, which is the very end of government, will be done. Under the Constitution, the acquittal of the innocent is given more importance or preference than conviction of the criminal. Indeed, in a criminal prosecution, the interest of the government is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall prevail.
(4) Protection of the guilty against arbitrary punishment.
Protection of the Constitution covers both the innocent and the guilty. It is meant to be a safeguard against putting an innocent to prison and, at the same time, a guarantee that the guilty obtains his just dues.
Every person is entitled to due process. It is not exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one.
Right to due process of law in criminal cases.
(1) Of the accused. (ITD-J-J)
A person cannot be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. The importance of criminal due process is stressed in the above provision, although it is already covered by Section 1. But this constitutional right pertains more to the procedural aspect. It requires that:
(a) The accused must be -
1) informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet;
2) given a fair and impartial trial before a competent court; and
3) allowed to use all legal mean and opportunity to defend himself;
(b) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by the court over his person; and
(c) The judgment against him must be rendered upon lawful hearing under the authority of a valid law.
As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process has been equated with "the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."
(2) Of the accuser (State/offended party).
The State, like the accused, is also entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge.
The rights of the offended parties who usually take part in the trial are equally entitled to the protection offered by the courts to the public at large in the trial of a criminal case.
The court is not mandated to apply a rule of procedure (see Art VIII, Sec. 5[5].) simply because it is favorable to the accused where it was promulgated for the benefit of both the State and the accused not for the accused only.
A decision is void for lack of due process if as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.
To do justice to the accused and injustice to the State is no justice at all. Justice must be done to all alike.
Criminal prosecutions.
The term criminal prosecutions has always been interpreted to mean proceedings before the trial court from the arraignment up to the rendition of decision, either acquitting or convicting the accused.
Purpose and significance of the rights.
The rights assured an individual accused are intended for his protection. They relieve him of the apprehension that once indicted, conviction must automatically follow.
Again, they are intended to assure the accused a full and unimpeded opportunity for him to meet what in the end could be a baseless accusation. At the same time, a much larger end is subserved.
Waiver of the rights.
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall into two classes:
(a) those in which the State as well as the accused is interested (waiver is NOT allowed); and
(b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges (waiver is allowed).
A waiver of any right conferred by the State or guaranteed by the Constitution is not favored, and the waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others or is contrary to law, morals, good customs, or public order. A judge may validly render a decision although he came only after the trial has commenced and, therefore, has not heard the testimony of the previous witnesses. In fact, there is no provision of law which could preclude a judge from deciding a criminal case on the basis of the and documentary evidence presented before the first judge who left the service for any reason without deciding the case, which oral evidence was taken by the stenographer and was produced by the second judge.
B. RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Presumption.
A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in an action.
It is an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with another which is known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what course of human affairs ordinarily taken.
It has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the party who would be disadvantaged by a finding of the presumed fact.
Presumption of innocence.
Rule of substantive law, and is a legal inference growing out of the fact that persons generally are not criminals.
Reasonable doubt.
Reference to degree of proof required for conviction.
It is that engendered by an investigation on the whole proof and inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy certainty of guilt.
Standards of "proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt."
It is required that "every circumstance favoring the accused's innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason, the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment."
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for correction if the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Importance of the right. (BF)
The right to presumption of innocence is founded upon the first principle of justice, and is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. The right to bail emanates from this right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
(1) A safeguard to balance unequal contest between the State and accused.
In a criminal prosecution, the accused is pitted against the full might of State authority itself with all the resources at its command. To lighten the heavy odds against him or to balancethe scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between him and the State, he is accorded, among others, the presumption of innocence which continues until overthrown by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The conviction or acquittal of the accused is simply the consequence of the presumption of the innocence of the accused, being either overcome or not being overcome by the evidence presented by the prosecution.
(2) A guarantee against false conviction of accused.
This presumption of innocence is a guarantee that no person accused shall be convicted except upon confession or unless his guilt is established by the stringent quantum of evidence beyond reasonable doubt which is more than just a preponderance of evidence sufficient to win in a civil case.
If an accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence, with more reason, mere suspects of a crime are presumed innocent.
The presumption takes an even more paramount significance in offenses involving the capital punishment.
Preponderance of evidence.
lt means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side (in civil cases) is superior to that of the other. It means the greater weight of the evidence, or evidence that outweighs the evidence of the adverse party.
Duty imposed upon the court.
The constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence of the accused and his right to due process of law impose upon the court the duty to ascertain in every case that no person is made to answer for a crime without proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
To overcome this constitutional presumption he has in his favor and to justify a criminal conviction, there must exist in the record "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" of the accused's culpability.
The presumption cannot be overcome by mere suspicion o conjecture, i.e., a probability that the accused committed the crime or that he had the opportunity to do so.
Evidence required for filing criminal case in court.
A finding of probable cause by the public prosecutor will warrant the filing of a particular criminal information.
The question for the prosecution in filing a criminal case in court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof."
Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt'' is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such a degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
Burden of proof upon the prosecution.
(1) To overcome presumption of innocence.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt; neither is presumption of innocence proof nor intended as evidence of innocence but only to shift the burden of proof in a criminal proceeding upon the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies.
It is incumbent upon the prosecutor: (CA)
(a) to prove beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti, more specifically, that the crime charged had been committed and
(b) to establish with same quantum of proof that the accused precisely committed the same.
In the absence of the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, he shall have the right to be acquitted. To meet the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction, when there is doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator.
(2) To establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Save in certain circumstances, as where the accused admits the commission of the imputed criminal act but interposes justifying circumstances, that burden of proof is never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of the defense.
Stated otherwise, it is for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged and that the accused is guilty thereof. It is not for the accused to prove that he is innocent.
In case there is a reasonable doubt of his guilt, the accused is not only entitled to acquittal; it is, even more, the court's constitutional duty to acquit him. The theory is that it is preferable to acquit the guilty erroneously than to convict the innocent wrongly.
Evidence required of the prosecution.
(1) Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused is entitled to be presumed innocent but only until the contrary is proved.
The evidence of the prosecution must be strong per se to pierce that shield of presumptive innocence and establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its own evidence, without seeking to rely upon, or even invoke, what it may claim is a weakness of that of the defense.
It is not sufficient that the preponderance or the weight of the evidence points to the guilt of the accused.
The accused is not even called upon to offer evidence on his behalf. His freedom or life is forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence, no matter no matter how despicable the crime for which he may have been charged.
Note that the quantum evidence required for conviction is merely proof beyond reasonable doubt, not absolute proof beyond any doubt or absolute certainty excluding possibility of error, but only a moral certainty as to the presence of the elements constituting the offense, as well as the identity of the offender. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, the accused is entitled to exoneration or acquittal as a matter of right, irrespective of the reputation of the accused.
Absence of any circumstance consistent with innocence.
The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion should not be permitted to sway the court's judgment. The circumstances of the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence in order to convict.
Exception: By invoking self-defense as a justifying circumstance, an accused, in effect, admits that he has indeed committed the crime. In order that an accused may be relieved of criminal liability, he is obliged to establish the presence of these requisites: unlawful aggression; reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In so doing, the accused must rely on the strength oi his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution for even if the prosecution's evidence were weak, it cannot be disbelieved after accused has admitted the killing. If the evidence on his claim of self-defense consists solely of his own testimony, the trial court may reject that testimony if not supported by convincing corroborated evidence and if the accused is perceived to be lying in his testimony.
Weakness/non-presentation of accused's defense.
The accused should be acquitted although his defense is weak, regardless of whether his moral character is good or bad, or even if he presents naught a shred of evidence as long as the prosecution's evidence is not strong enough to convict him.
Thus, even if the evidence submitted by the accused is weak as where, for instance, it consists merely of bare denials or alibi, the judgment of acquittal must follow if the prosecution fails for any reason to discharge its onus probandi.
Mere suspicion, no matter how strong it may be, is not sufficient to sustain conviction, nor even if the defense engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime. But once the presumption of innocence is overcome it is the duty of the defense to bear burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt.
Uncorroborated testimony of lone prosecution witness.
The settled rule, however, is that the uncorroborated testimony of a Ione prosecution eyewitness, as long as it is credible and positive, can prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, especially where the witness is a police officer who enjoys the presumption of regularity of the performance of his duties. No rule exist which requires that a testimony has to be corroborated to be adjudged credible. Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. The important thing is that the testimony has clearly and unmistakably established the commission of the crime charged.
Equipoise rule.
Under the rule, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not hurdle or fulfill the test of moral certainty required to support a conviction. The scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact, should be tipped in favor of the accused because of the constitutional presumption of innocence which must prevail.
Therefore, the constitutional presumption is not available where the prosecution is strong enough to overcome the presumption but the defense is not strong enough to overcome the prosecution. In such case, the equipoise rule that where the evidence of the parties is in equipoise or evenly balanced, or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused, cannot be invoked. If the rule applies, the prosecution which is the party having the burden of proof, loses.
Presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
(1) Presumption inferior to constitutional presumption of innocence.
The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is not a mere procedural tool of the law; it is not overcome by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. Simply put, the latter is inferior to and can never be stronger than the former.
The presumption that official duty had been regularly performed which is only a matter of procedure, cannot by itself prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by an accused person which may be overcome only with proof beyond reasonable doubt.12
This is particularly true when the prosecution's evidence is weak, or where the testimony of the law officer concerned is ambiguous and unpersuasive, or where the performance of duty is tainted with irregularities, or where the death penalty is at stake.
(2) Where presumption not rebutted by defense's evidence.
This presumption must be applied with caution. It should not by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt or support a judgment of conviction, or prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual.
But when police officers had no motive in testifying falsely against the accused or when no physical violence or harm was applied to the accused, courts should uphold the presumption of regularity of performance of duty by police officers.
In other words, where the presumption of regularity of performance of official functions has not been rebutted by the defense's evidence and it is not the sole basis for conviction, it prevails over the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
An accused has the right to remain silent and no adverse inference should be drawn from that silence. Besides, the rule is that, in order to gain conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence rather than on the weakness of the defense.
But while the accused is not required to testify or offer evidence in his own behalf, nor required to produce witnesses, yet he runs the risk of an inference from non-production of evidence.
Where the prosecution has already established a prima facie case against the accused, his failure or refusal to take the witness stand may prejudice him.
The burden of proof designed merely as a rule of procedure, confers only a temporary benefit upon the accused. The prosecution is required in the first instance to make out a prima facie case proving the essential facts embraced in the criminal transaction alleged. If this is done, and the accused offers no evidence, the case, as made out by the State, is submitted to the court which must consider it, but only in connection with the presumption of innocence to which the accused is always entitled, though he may have introduced no evidence of whatever.
Dumlao vs COMELEC
Under Section 7 of B.P. Blg. 152, the filing of charges for the commission of any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact and, therefore, shall justify the disqualification of a person to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by the Act. The validity of this provision is assailed as violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence. YES.
Law condemns before one is fully heard. An accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged provision contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of nrresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence.
Time constraints prevent refutation of charge. And the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and, therefore, may be rebutted, yet there is a clear and present danger that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome prima facie evidence against him. Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only the objectionable portion is mandated.
C. RIGHT TO BE HEARD
Right of accused to be heard by himself and counsel.
(1) Effectiveness of counsel.
It is the constitutional right of the accused in all criminal prosecutions to be heard in his defense by himself and/ or by counsel beginning from the custodial investigation and at every stage of the trial from arraignment well into the pronouncement of sentence or judgment on him, and even on appeal.
This right is the most fundamental tenet of due process. It basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned or subject to liability.
(a) The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. It means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance particularly at the trial of the case and not a simple perfunctory representation.
Exception is made in the Charter only during the custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime, who may not waive his right to counsel except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and during the trial of the accused, who has the right 'to be heard by himself and counsel,' either retained by him or provided for him by the government at its expense. These guarantees are embodied in the Constitution along with the other rights of the person facing criminal prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to defend his liberty, if not his life, against the awesome authority of the State.
D. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
Right of accused to be informed of the accusation against him.
Basic is the precept that the accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. This constitutional right is implemented by the arraignment of the accused.
Arraignment.
Arraignment is not a mere formality but a vital stage in criminal proceedings. It is at the stage of arraignment that the accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him.
The arraignment is made in open court by the judge or clerk, and consists in:
(1) furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information,
(2) reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and
(3) asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
It is a formal procedure in a criminal prosecution "to afford an accused due process" and it is also the means of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The accused is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense he has purportedly committed.
Information.
An accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the prosecutor (formerly fiscal) and filed with the court. It is filed in court usually by the prosecutor after due investigation.
If no information can be filed against a prisoner because the records have been lost by their custodian, it is not the prisoner who should be made to suffer. In the eyes of the law, he is not guilty or does not appear to be guilty of any crime for which he may be legally held. Hence, he is entitled to be set free. It is illogical and absurd to suggest that because the government cannot prosecute him, the prisoner's detention must continue.
Plea of Guilt.
A plea of guilt made by the accused freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act, besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a judicial confession of guilt - an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances.
Where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory for the court, to forestall the entry of an improvident plea of guilt,
(a) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused's plea;
(b) to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and his precise degree of culpability,
(c) with the accused being likewise entitled, if he so desires to present evidence to prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances.
Objects of the written accusation.
(1) To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;
(2) To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
(3) To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.
Specific allegations of crime charged.
Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint or information must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
It should be sufficiently clear to a person of ordinary intelligence as to what the charge is so as to enable him to properly prepare his defense. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.
Characterization of the crime charged.
The accused need be informed of the characterization of the crime charged, which is a conclusion of law. Hence, an incorrect caption is not a fatal defects.
What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not its caption or preamble, nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.
Conviction not for offense charged.
It has been held that an accused charged with rape through one mode of commission (while the victim was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason) may still be convicted of the crime if evidence shows another mode of commission (through force and intimidation) without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, provided that the accused did not object to such evidence.
It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charge against him, and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape on which he was arraigned, and be convicted of qualified rape punishable by death.
Variance doctrine.
A person may be convicted of an offense proved even if not charged in the information provided it is included in what is charged.
Remedy of accused whose right is violated.
This requirement of notice is indispensable.
Thus, there is a violation of the right where an accused has been charged with an offense and convicted of another; or of a higher offense; or where no arraignment of the accused has taken place. The absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the trial court.
Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.
(1) The proceedings in such case may be challenged and annulled in the proper court, at the instance of the accused, on the ground of denial of his constitutional and legal right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and to due process of law. But an accused may be convicted of a lesser offense (e.g., theft) included in that (e.g., robbery) which he is charged.
(2) An accused may, at or before judgment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
The accused will be estopped to question whatever procedural error there was in the arraignment by actively participating in the trial of his case without bringing up the alleged invalidity or defect thereof.
Waiver of the right.
The Supreme Court (1905) ruled that the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him may be waived.
The Supreme Court (1936) said that the right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. It is a fundamental right of the accused not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law, and the provisions regarding the sufficiency of the complaint or information, duplicity of offenses, preliminary investigation and the reading of the information at the arraignment and the furnishing of a copy thereof to the accused are all intended to give effect to the fundamental right.
Hence, it is imperative that the information must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed. Similarly, it was ruled that the right may not be waived. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of 'not guilty' in their behalf. However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. The defense can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the reading of the complaint or information.
E. RIGHT TO HAVE A SPEEDY TRIAL
Concept of the right.
(1) Right dependent upon the circumstances.
Although our statutes do not outline with precision what constitutes time for speedy trial in criminal cases, yet it has been pronounced with good authority that a ."speedy trial" means one that can be had as soon as possible, after a person is indicted and within such time as the prosecution, with reasonable diligence, could prepare for it.
It should be a trial "conducted according to fixed rules, regulations, and proceedings of law, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays." It does not mean undue haste but one conducted with reasonable promptness consistent wit due course of justice.
(2) Right not susceptible to precise quantification.
Whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to precise quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is necessarily relative, consistent with reasonable delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case. (
''The right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept than other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when the right must be asserted or considered waived."
Test in determining denial of the right to speedy trial.
Balancing Test
1. Conduct of both the prosecution and the accused is weighed;
2. Consideration of factors such a:
length of delay,
reasons for delay,
the accused's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice or damage to the accused resulting from delay.
Counting the delay from the time of the filing of the information.
Any delay should be considered in relation to the entirety of the proceedings.
Government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay:
1. The accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and
2. There was no more delay that is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
(3) Right not preclude rights of public justice.
Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern of courts and judges. More than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness which is the primordial objective of the courts.
The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the same cannot be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting or prosecuting criminals.
It secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.
Both the State and the accused are entitled to due process. The right cannot be successfully be invoked where to sustain the same would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution.
(4) Swift trial is what the Bill of Rights outlaws.
"The argument of procedural delays in the civil courts and need of prompt and certain punishment has been long cut down by the late Justice Frank Murphy in his concurring opinion in Duncan vs. Kahanamoku when he stressed that 'civil liberties and military expediency are often irreconcilable' and that 'the swift trial and punishment which the military desires is precisely what the Bill of Rights outlaws.
We would be false to our trust if we allowed the time it takes to give effect to constitutional rights to be used as the very reason for taking away those constitutional rights."'
(5) Period of trial.
The right to a speedy trial does not extend to the pronouncement of sentence. Trial and judgment are two different stages of a judicial proceeding.
The period of trial ends when the judgment begin. A delay in refiling a case that has been p'rovisionally dismissed is not a delay in trial.
(6) Separate trial.
A separate trial is in consonance with the right of an accused to a speedy trial.
It necessarily requires a repetition of the presentation of the same evidence. But the resulting inconvenience and expense on the part of the government cannot be given preference over the right to a speedy trial and the protection to a persons life, liberty, or property guaranteed by the Constitution.
Rule 119, Sec. 16. Trial of several accused. – When two or more accused are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court, in its discretion and upon motion of the prosecutor or any accused, orders separate trial for one or more accused.
(7) Availability of right.
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and the right to a speedy disposition of cases are distinct, albeit kindred guaranties the most obvious difference being that the secured obtains regardless of the nature of the case.
In fine, the first is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies.
Importance of the right.
That the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays is important. Its salutary objective is to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose.
A long delay in the judicial process serves as a refuge of the accused if he is guilty and a continuing injustice for him if he is innocent.
The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of the courts to see that the criminal proceedings against an accused come to an end.
When the right deemed violated. (VCOD-UP-LPTAE)
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (R.A. No. 8493) provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be one hundred eighty (180) days.
However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
The right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
(1) the proceedings are attended by vexations, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
(2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
(3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Remedy of the accused whose right is violated. (MCD-HCF)
(1) Where a prosecuting officer without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time (e.g., for more than a year), the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain freedom.
What offends the right of the accused to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolonged trial for an unreasonable length of time. The courts should balance the right of the accused and the right of the State to punish people who violate its penal laws. As earlier noted, both the State and the accused are entitled to due process.
(2) A dismissal premised on violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is thereby a bar to a prosecution for the same offense.
A motion to quash the information is not strictly the proper remedy because a denial of the right to speedy trial is not one of the grounds upon which a motion to quash a complaint or information may be grounded. The denial of the right will give rise to a motion to dismiss.
Waiver of the right. (A-N)
The right to a speedy trial as any other right conferred by Constitution or statute, except when otherwise expressly so provided by law, may be waived by the accused. It must, therefore, be asserted.
(1) Delay acquiesced in or caused by accused himself.
Where the delay is acquiesced in by the accused, or is attributable to him, he cannot claim to have been denied speedy trial.
This, where the delays in the prosecution were caused by the accused himself through requests for postponements and reinvestigation and tactical maneuvers, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to speedy trial.
Delay on his own making cannot be oppressive to him.
(2) Right not asserted or claimed by accused.
The right must be asserted. The accused must claim the right. Silence on his part cannot be considered a demand for trial.
He should ask not for the dismissal of the case, but for its trial, whereupon, if the prosecution, for lack of reasonable ground for postponement, is ordered to proceed and fails to do so, he becomes entitled to an absolute and definite dismissal which will bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense on the ground of double Jeopardy.
F. RIGHT TO HAVE AN IMPARTIAL TRIAL
Concept of the right. (DQA)
(1) A basic requirement of due process.
An impartial trial is certainly a basic requirement of due process in criminal proceedings.
Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."
All the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless, if the ultimate decision were to come from a biased judge.
(2) Qualities expected of presiding judge.
The true intention of the Constitution is that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent because, however upright the judge and however free from the slightest inclination to do other than justice, there is a peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice, or of a former opinion ex parte that may still linger to affect unconsciously his present judgment, or of his being moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not or cannot, under the rules of evidence, be revealed or stated at the trial.
(3) Absence of interest by judge in outcome of case.
Impartiality implies an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases which shall be decided solely on the basis of the evidence and in accordance with law without any improper influence, inducement, pressure, or interference, direct or indirect, from any source.
To this end, no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the outcome.
Confidence in judge's impartiality.
A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. While judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and apply the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although required primarily for the benefits of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary.
(1) Judgment of conviction expresses judge's indignation of crime.
The fact that the judgment of conviction is interspersed with statements and phrases which properly should not have been made as they may be wrongly interpreted as indicative of bias and prejudice, such statements and phrases do not per se constitute evidence of bias and partiality as to violate the accused's right to an impartial trial as where they are merely an expression of the judge's "fully justified indignation and revulsion at the commission of such a monstrous crime."
(2) Judge intervenes in the cross-examination of witnesses.
Nor does the trial judge's intervention in the cross-examination of witnesses be construed as constituting lack of impartiality and objectivity. It is not only the right but often times the duty of a trial judge to examine witnesses when it appears to be necessary to develop the truth and to get at the real facts.
The extent to which such examination may be conducted rests in the discretion of the judge, the exercise of which will not be controlled unless his discretion has already been abused to the prejudice of either party to the case.
Disqualification. (PERRF)
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges contemplates two kinds of inhibition:
(1) Compulsory inhibition, which conclusively assumes that a judge cannot actively or impartially sit in a case for the reasons therein stated; and
(2) Voluntary inhibition, which leaves to the judge's discretion whether he should desist from setting in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his conscience to guide him.
Duty of judge to inhibit himself.
The rule on disqualification of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due process. It is beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and just.
(1) Relationship with one of the parties.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only possible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion.
(2) Clear and convincing evidence to prove partiality.
While it is true that partiality and prejudgment may constitute a just or valid reason for the trial judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case, it is not enough that the same be merely alleged.
It is now settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties to the case is not enough; there should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and prejudice.
G. RIGHT TO HAVE A PUBLIC TRIAL
Concept of the right. (DQA)
(1) When trial public.
A "public trial" is meant one which is not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community but is open to the free observation of all.
The trial is public when everyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings his courtroom may do so. There is no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown.
(2) Not necessarily one to which whole public admitted.
The requirement that the trial be public is not meant, however, that every who sees fit shall in all cases be permitted to attend criminal trials. A public trial is not necessity one to which the whole public is admitted. Rather, it is one so far open to al, as that of the accused's friends and relatives and others who may be inclined to watch the proceedings in order to see if justice is intelligently and impartially administered, so they may have an opportunity to do so.
(3) Attendance of particular persons may be banned.
There may be and often is justifiable occasion to exclude from a trial those who are inclined to attend from idle or morbid curiosity only and especially in cases (e.g., prosecution for rape) where public morals and public decency require it.
Purpose of the right.
The right to a public trial is manifestly intended to protect the rights of a person accused of a crime, so that the public may see that he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly tried and that the presence of spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.
The thought that lies behind the safeguard is the belief that thereby, the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.
Waiver of the right. (A-R)
The right to a public trial is also waivable. Thus:
(1) The defendant was held to have waived his right to a public trial, by his acquiescence where for the convenience of the witnesses, the criminal case was tried in Bilibid Prison, without any objection on his part as to the place of trial or that it was not public at the time.
(2) Where the accused refused, for security reasons, to be brought to court for which reason the court directed the holding of the arraignment and trial in the national penitentiary, and the accused did not object during the trial, the public was not actually excluded, and the accused was not prejudiced, it was held that his right to a public trial was deemed waived.
Trial by publicity.
Trial by publicity may amount to a denial of one's right to a fair trial. The publicity attending the ventilation of the accusations against a person and the conduct of the investigation and trial accompanied by insinuations or innuendoes against the accused invariably has a telling effect on the public's perception of his guilt and thus may influence the judgment of the judge hearing the case.
Radio-TV coverage of judicial proceedings.
Relying on Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the case of Estes v. Texas, the Supreme Court issued on October 27, 1991 En Banc Resolution Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel Case, totally prohibiting said coverage of court proceedings.
!n Perez vs. Estrada, the Supreme Court denied the petition filed by the Secretary of Justice to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The petition sought, in effect, a re-examination of the October 23, 1991 Resolution of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled:
(3) Right to a public trial.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago.
A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities or a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
H. RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES
Reasons for the right. (AOCCW-JOSOW)
The accused person has the right to meet the witnesses face to face at his trial There are two important reasons behind this right.
(1) The first and primary reason is to give the accused an opportunity (a) to confront and (b) to cross-examine witnesses against him, particularly to test their recollection and veracity. He may not, therefore, be convicted upon the mere depositions, certificates, reports, or ex parte (of or from of the party) affidavits, of his accusers. Thus, a doctor who executes a medical certificate must be presented for examination.
(2) The secondary reason is to give the judge as the trier of facts, an opportunity to see and observe the demeanor and appearance of witnesses while testifying.
But it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just decision, since he can rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision.
Nature of right of cross-examination.
(1) The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation be it criminal or civil in nature or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers is a fundamental right which is part of due process. Note that mere opportunity and not necessarily actual cross-examination is the essence of the right.
Cross-examination is an indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give substance and meaning to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to show his innocence. The right does not necessarily require an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise the right if desired. The failure of the court to afford the accused his right of cross-examination constitutes reversible error.
(2) The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law.
(3) The right is not an absolute one which a party can demand at all times. The right is a personal one which may be waived, expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination, such as by admission by the accused that a witness, if present, would testify to certain facts stated in the affidavit of the prosecution.
The matter of presentation of the witnesses is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witness.
Exceptions to the hearsay rule. (TPDW)
The hearsay rule excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination. While the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence, such testimony has no probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
As the accused in a criminal case has the right to confrontation, the witnesses against him must be produced to testify, subject to cross-examination. This right, however, is not absolute. Thus:
(1) Testimony given by a witness at a former trial.
It is generally recognized that it is sometimes impossible to produce again a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, as when the witness has died or is otherwise unavailable, in which event, his previous testimony in its entirety is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule, particularly where the party against whom the evidence is offered had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness who gave the testimony.
(2) Period of preliminary investigation or examination.
The term criminal prosecutions, as used in the Constitution, means proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Hence, the right of confrontation is not available during the period of preliminary investigation. Neither is it constitutionally guaranteed during investigation referred to in Section 12(1).
But the right is statutorily recognized during preliminary investigation although not during preliminary examination, the purpose of said examination being merely to determine whether or not there is sufficient reason to issue a warrant of arrest. The constitutional provision commanding the determination of probable cause prior to issuance of a warrant of arrest requires no notice to an accused. A preliminary examination is generally a proceeding ex parte in which the person charged has no right to participate or be present.
(3) Dying declarations. - An exception to the provision securing to accused persons the right of confrontation is a "dying declaration."
(4) Waiver of the right.
As previously mentioned the right is a personal one which may be waived, expressly or impliedly.
(a) An accused who escapes after he has been duly tried in absentia impliedly waives his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.
(b) Where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.
(c) The right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it must be express. The task of recalling a witness for cross-examination is, in law, imposed on the party who wishes to exercise said right. After a party has presented his witness, the burden shifts to his opponent who must make the appropriate move.
Effects of absence of or incomplete cross-examination. (CFA)
Until the cross-examination of a witness has been finished his testimony cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case.
(1) Through fault of cross-examiner/direct examiner.
Where the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part through the fault of the cross-examiner, then the testimony on direct testimony may be taken into account; but when cross-examination is not or cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.
In such a case, it is proper to present a motion to strike out from the records the testimony already given on direct examination by the opposing party.
(2) By reason of a fortuitous event.
On the other hand, where the cause for the non-completion of the cross-examination was a fortuitous event under such circumstances that no responsibility can be attributed to either party, it is a harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the direct examination. To avoid any inflexible rule, the prudent alternative to wholesale exclusion should be to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of cross-examination can be shown to be not in that instance a material loss. More compellingly so where the adverse party was afforded a reasonable chance for cross-examination.
(3) On admissibility in evidence of testimony on direct examination.
The effects of absence of or incomplete cross-examination of witness on the admissibility in evidence of his testimony on direct examination were discussed in People vs. Seneris, thus:
(a) Stricken out only insofar as not covered by cross-examination.
As a general rule, the testimony of a witness, given on direct examination, should be stricken where there is not an adequate opportunity for cross-examination, as where the witness by reason of his death, illness, or absence cannot be subjected to cross-examination. x x x. The direct testimony of a witness who dies before conclusion of the cross-examination can be stricken only insofar as not covered by the cross-examination.
If one is deprived of the opportunity of a cross-examination without fault upon his part, as in the case of the illness or death of a witness after direct examination, it is generally held that he is entitled to have the direct testimony stricken from the record.. This doctrine rests on the common law rule that no evidence should be admitted but what was or might be under the examination of both parties, and that ex parte statements are too uncertain and unreliable to be considered in the investigation of controverted facts.
(b) Striking out not warranted.
Absence of a witness is not enough to warrant striking his testimony for failure to appear for further cross-examination where the witness has already been sufficiently cross-examined, or the matter on which further cross-examination is sought is not in controversy.
I. RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE
Need to secure order from court.
The accused has the right to have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence, testimonial or otherwise, in his behalf.1
The right must be exercised during the trial; otherwise, it is deemed waived and can no longer be invoked on appeal.
(1) Under the Rules of Court, an accused person is entitled to have subpoenas (order to a person to appear and testify in court) issued to compel the attendance of witnesses in his favor, including a warrant of arrest, if needed.
He must, however, make reasonable and diligent effort to have them cited to appear and testify; otherwise, the court may properly refuse to postpone the trial in spite of the absence of his witnesses.
He may also ask the court to order a person to produce in court certain documents, articles, or other evidence and testify with respect to them. This order is called subpoena duces tecum.
A subpoena ad testificandum is used to compel a person to testify.
(2) Likewise, the court, upon proper application of the defendant, may order the prosecution to produce or permit the inspection of evidence (e.g., written statements given by the complainant and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense) material to any matter involved in the action, in the possession or under the control of the prosecution, the police, or other law investigating agencies.
Thus, another mode is assured the accused of meeting the evidence that might be presented to prove his guilt.
Failure to comply with the order of the court is punishable as contempt of court. The witness, if necessary, may even be arrested.
J. RIGHT NOT TO APPEAR AT TRIAL
Right of the accused to remain silent.
An accused has the right to remain silent and not to present evidence on his behalf.
(1) The right of the accused to be exempted from testifying applies equally to any compulsory disclosure of the guilt of the offender himself, whether sought directly as the object of the inquiry or indirectly and incidentally for the purpose of establishing facts involving an issue between other parties.
(2) An accused, as a prosecution witness, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is propounded at him, an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. This may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial.
The former rule did not allow waiver of the right. But it was relaxed years later by making the presence of the accused indispensable only at the following stages: (1) at the arraignment; (2) at the time of the defendant's answering the complaint, if he pleads guilty and (3) at the time of the pronouncement of the judgment.
When trial in the absence of the accused allowed.
The constitutional right of the accused to be personally present and to be heard in his defense by himself may be waived by him, expressly or by implication, such as by his repeated failure to be present at the hearings without justifiable reason.
The right may also be waived in view of the rule allowing trial in absentia. Thus, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided, however, that three (3) conditions concur, namely:
(1) He has been arraigned;
(2) He has been duly notified of the trial; and
(3) He fails to appear and failure to appear is unjustifiable.
The rule is in the interest of a speedy administration of justice which should be afforded not only to the accused but to the offended party as well. An accused cannot, by simply escaping from prison or confinement, or by jumping bail, or fleeing to another country, thwart his prosecution and possibly, eventual conviction provided only that the three (3) conditions mentioned are present. The prisoner or accused is considered to have waived his right to be present at the trial and to have received notice of the subsequent hearing.
To have a valid trial in absentia, there must be a prior arraignment because it is during the arraignment that the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Actual arraignment is an element of due process.
Where the accused fails to appear during the promulgation of judgment (of conviction) despite notice, his arrest and the cancellation of his bail is proper.
The non-appearance of the accused at the trial on a particular date is merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial at such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates.
Where presence of accused essential for purposes of identification.
(1) Presence may be compelled.
The provision of the Constitution authorizing trial in absentia of the accused in case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite notice simply means that he thereby waives his right, among others, to meet the witnesses face to face.
However, he cannot waive totally his right to be present when his presence is necessary for purposes of identification by prosecution witness which is vital for his conviction.
In such case, he may be compelled by the court to be present despite his waiver, otherwise, he may, in his defense say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal. Furthermore, it is possible that a witness may not know the name o t the culprit but can identify him ifc he sees him again, in which case the latter's presence in court is necessary.
(2) Exception.
An exception (i.e., his presence may not be compelled) is when the accused unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as defendant in the case on trial.
But a written waiver stating that the accused "admits that he can be identified by the prosecution witnesses in his absence," is vague and far from unqualified and the accused cannot, therefore, seek the benefit of the exception. He may be ordered arrested for failure to appear.
Where accused jumps bail.
Except at the arraignment and at the trial when his presence is necessary for purposes of identification, the accused may waive his presence and he should not be ordered arrested for non-appearance. He has a right not to appear.
(1) The right not to appear does not give the accused the right to jump bail.
Thus, where the accused continuously failed to appear in court every time the case was called for trial the usual procedure provided by the Rules of Court to determine the liability of the bondsmen should be followed. He may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the court.
(2) He can also be tried in absentia, and a warrant of arrest issued for his apprehension would be proper.
(3) If the accused remains at large, he should not be afforded the right to appeal from a judgment of conviction promulgated after the trial in absentia unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested.
(4) While at large, the accused cannot seek relief from the court as he is deemed to have waived the same and has no standing in court. The court has the discretion to postpone the resolution of his case or to dismiss his appeal.
Promulgation of judgment in criminal cases.
(1) Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Courts, a new provision, provides for the promulgation of judgments in criminal cases:
(a) The first paragraph of Section 6. deals with the personal presence of the accused at the promulgation of judgment and its exception, i.e., in the case of a light offense where his personal presence is dispensed with. He may appear through counsel or . representation.
(b) The third paragraph, a new provision, provides for the promulgation of judgment in absentia. The amendment is intended to obviate the situation in the past where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the promulgation of judgment. Where the civil liability ex delicto was instituted with the criminal action, the offended party could not enforce, without the amendatory provision, either the primary liability of the accused or any subsidiary civil liability, where proper and involved in the case, as no judgment could be promulgated. Since the promulgation of the judgment is merely the procedural culmination of the trial, the promulgation thereof can justifiably be made in absentia in the manner set out in Section 6.
(2) All the accused, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged against them or the penalty imposed on them, must be given notice of the promulgation of judgment and the requirement of their presence, in person or, in the case of those facing a conviction for a light offense, through counsel or representative. If the judgment is for conviction, the failure of the accused to appear without valid justification will not only cause the issuance of an order for his arrest but also for the confiscation of his bail bond if he is on bail.
The absence of counsel during the promulgation of judgement will not violate any substantial right of the accused, and does not affect the validity of the promulgation.