Case Digest: ABC Davao Auto Supply, Inc. vs. CA,G.R. No. 113296 January 16, 1998
Rule 120: Judgment, Judges | Criminal Procedure
Facts:
In October 1980, ABC Davao Auto Supply filed a complaint for a sum of money, attorney's fees, and damages before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Davao City.
The case went through several judges due to reorganization in the judiciary.
The pre-trial was conducted by Judge Pacita Canizares-Nye and later by Judges Alejandro Siazon and Cristeto Dinopol.
Judge Renato Fuentes heard the evidence for petitioner and private respondent, during the trial on November 20, 1984,
Judge Roque Agton assumed office on August 1, 1985, and heard the cross-examination and presentation of rebuttal evidence.
Judge Romeo Marasigan assumed office on February 3, 1987, and was assigned to Branch XVI. He acted on private respondent’s motion for extension of time to file memorandum.
Judge Agton rendered a decision in favor of ABC Davao Auto Supply on June 9, 1987.
Private respondent Southern Engineering Works moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by Judge Marasigan.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that Judge Agton had no authority to render the decision since he was no longer the judge in Branch XVI at that time.
CA: Nullified Judge Agton’s decision on the ground that at the time he rendered the judgment, he was neither the judge de jure nor the judge de facto of RTC Branch XVI. Remanded the case to the lower court.
Issue:
WoN the decision of Judge Agton, who had been transferred to another branch, was valid. (NO)
Held:
It is a rule that a case is deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the rules, or by the court. Records disclose that this case was submitted for decision sometime on March 1987 after the parties’ submission of their memoranda as required by the court, at which time Judge Marasigan was already presiding in Branch XVI.
Thus, the case was submitted for decision to Judge Marasigan and not to Judge Agton who by then was already transferred to another branch. Judge Agton’s decision, therefore, appears to be tainted with impropriety.
Nevertheless, the subsequent motion for reconsideration of Judge Agton’s decision was acted upon by Judge Marasigan himself and his denial of the said motion indicates that he subscribed with and adopted in toto Judge Agton’s decision. Any incipient defect was cured. Besides, the presumption that both magistrates (Agton and Marasigan) have regularly performed their official functions, have not at all been rebutted by contrary evidence.
Moreover, for a judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears thereon. This is in line with the Court’s En Banc Resolution of February 10, 1983 implementing B.P. 129 which
"merely requires that the judge who pens the decision is still an incumbent judge, i.e., in this case, a judge of the same court, albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the time the decision is promulgated."
Branches of the trial court are not distinct and separate tribunals from each other. Hence, contrary to private respondent’s allegation, Judge Agton could not have possibly lost jurisdiction over the case, because jurisdiction does not attach to the judge out to the court. The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the death, resignation, or cessation from the service of the judge presiding over it. To remand a validly decided case to the incumbent Presiding Judge of Branch XVI, as what the CA suggests, would only prolong this rather simple collection suit and would run counter to the avowed policy of the Court to accord a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition for every action.
The decision of Judge Agton is REINSTATED.
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