Case Digest: Icasiano vs. Icasiano, G.R. No. L-18979, June 30, 1964

Art. 805  | Succession, Witness Signature

Provision:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Ponente:
Reyes, JBL J.,

Petitioner:  Celso Icasiano

Respondents: Natividad Icasiano and Enrique Icasiano

Recit Version:

Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament, witnessed by three individuals and acknowledged by a Notary Public. The will consisted of an original and a duplicate, with missing signature of a witness on page three of the original. 

The Court ruled that inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament due to simultaneous signing should not automatically bar probate, as it appears to be an oversight rather than deliberate. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control.

Facts:

On June 2, 1956, Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in Manila.

• The will was witnessed by Atty. Justo P. Torres, Jr., Atty. Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy.
• The will was acknowledged by Josefa and the three witnesses before Atty. Jose Oyengco Ong, a Notary Public in Manila
• Atty. Fermin Samson, who prepared the document, was also present during the execution, along with former Bulacan Governor Emilio Rustia, Judge Ramon Icasiano, and a young girl.

Atty. Samson prepared one original and two copies of the will in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he brought only one original and one signed copy to Manila, keeping an unsigned copy in Bulacan.

The original will, marked as Exhibit "A," consists of five pages and is signed at the end and on every page except for page three, which lacks the signature of Atty. Jose V. Natividad.

The duplicate copy, marked as Exhibit "A-1," is signed by Josefa and all three attesting witnesses on every page.

Natividad testified on his failure to sign page three of the original.

He admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same.

On September 12, 1958, Josefa Villacorte died.

The special proceeding to probate the will of Josefa Villacorte began.

Celso Icasiano filed a petition to admit the original will and appoint him as executor.

Natividad Icasiano, daughter of Josefa Villacorte, filed her opposition to the probate requesting to be appointed as a special administrator. Enrique Icasiano, son of Josefa Villacorte, also voiced his opposition to the probate by adopting Natividad's stance.

Oppositors presented expert testimony challenging the authenticity of the signatures in the duplicate of the will.

CFI-Manila: Admitted to probate the original document and its duplicate.

Issues:

(1) WoN the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit "A-1") are not genuine. NO.

(2) WoN there is adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence.  NO.

(3) WoN the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is sufficient to justify denial of probate. NO.

Held:

(1) The opinion of expert for oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan, that the signatures of the testatrix appearing in the duplicate original were not written by the same had which wrote the signatures in the original will leaves us unconvinced, not merely because it is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but principally because of the paucity of the standards used by him to support the conclusion that the differences between the standard and questioned signatures are beyond the writer's range of normal scriptural variation. The expert has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the testatrix besides those affixed to the original of the testament; and we feel that with so few standards the expert's opinion and the signatures in the duplicate could not be those of the testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly so since the comparison charts Nos. 3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the are radical differences that would justify the charge of forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signatures, and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed right the original. These, factors were not discussed by the expert.

Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering the standard and challenged writings were affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole, therefore, we do not find the testimony of the oppositor's expert sufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental witnesses, Torres and Natividad (Dr. Diy being in the United States during the trial, did not testify).

(2) Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary dispositions that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of non-heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occasion. Fraud and undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite evidence against the validity of the will.

(3) The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause."

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated; and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect. These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate (Exh. A-1) is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma; if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.

That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a new publication does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the petition for probate. The amended petition did not substantially alter the one first filed, but merely supplemented it by disclosing the existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new interests were involved (the contents of Exhibit A and A-1 are admittedly identical); and appellants were duly notified of the proposed amendment. It is nowhere proved or claimed that the amendment deprived the appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in admitting the amended petition.