Case Digest: Ortega vs. Valmonte, G.R. No. 157451, December 16, 2005

Arts. 798-800 | Succession, Date, Capacity

Provision:

Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

Ponente:
Panganiban, J.,

Petitioner: Leticia Valmonte-Ortega

Respondent: Josefina C. Valmonte

Recit Version:

After retiring, 80-year-old Placido Valmonte married 28-year-old Josefina Cabansag. He executed a notarial will leaving properties to his wife and appointing her as the sole executrix. Leticia Valmonte-Ortega, a relative, opposed probate, alleging non-compliance with legal formalities and Placido's mental incapacity. 

The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden satisfactorily. The conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion."

Facts:

In 1980, Placido Valmonte, retired and came home to stay in the Philippines from the United States. He owned a house and lot in Makati, co-owned with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte.

In 1982, 80-year-old Placido married a 28-year-old woman named Josefina Cabansag.

In 1983, Placido executed a notarial will leaving half of the described properties to Josefina and the rest of his estate to her as well. He also appointed her as the sole executrix. The value of property both real and personal left by the testator is worth more or less P100,000.00.

In 1984, Placido died due to cor pulmonale.

Leticia Valmonte-Ortega, Placido's relative, opposed the probate, claiming non-compliance with legal formalities and alleging Placido's mental incapacity at the time of its execution.

Josefina testified along with witnesses: Atty. Floro Sarmiento (notary public), and instrumental witnesses Eugenio Gomez, Jr., Feliza Gomez, and Josie Collado. Spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez were their wedding sponsors

Josefina stated that she discovered the will after his death and asserted Placido's good health, mentioning his ability to travel, cook, clean, and claim his monthly pension.

Notary Public Floro Sarmiento testified that Placido, along with the witnesses, requested the will's preparation in June 1983. The formal execution occurred on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.

The attesting witnesses confirmed Placido's sound mind during the will's execution, stating that Josefina was not present.

RTC: Disallowed probate based on non-compliance with formalities and Placido's mental incapacity.

CA: Reversed the decision, admitting the will to probate, citing credible testimonies and finding Placido had testamentary capacity.

Issue:

WoN the will of Placido Valmonte is valid. YES

Held:

Existence of Fraud in the Execution of a Will

Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud. Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testator’s wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life to almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who was thrice her age x x x and who happened to be a Fil-American pensionado," thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason, logic and common experience" for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.

We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made."

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care of the testator in his twilight years."

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion." More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA that "the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses."

The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985, October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as follows:

"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:

Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and his witnesses were supposed to be in your office?

A Yes sir.

Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?

A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.

x x x x x x x x x

Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement appearing therein. Was this the actual date when the document was acknowledged?

A Yes sir.

Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective signature on the first and second pages of exhibit C?

A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.

Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of the document as well as the attestation clause?

A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own handwriting August 9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)

Eugenio Gomez:

Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us this discrepancy in the date?

A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?

A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.

Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your companions?

A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte.

Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:

Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?

x x x x x x x x x

A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first time. We went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go back on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9 and that was the time we affixed our signature. 

Josie Collado:

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired?

A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.

Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?

A Yes, Sir.

Q For what purpose?

A Our purpose is just to sign the will.

Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?

A Yes sir.

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in the commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.

Capacity to Make a Will

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: 

(1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, 

(2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and 

(3) the character of the testamentary act. 

Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."