Case Digest: Leonardo vs. CA, G.R. No. L-51263, February 28, 1983
Succession | Iron Curtain Rule
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
Ponente:
De Castro, J.:
Facts:
In 1942, Francisca Reyes died intestate, leaving behind daughters Maria and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo (son of deceased daughter Pascuala Cailles).
In 1944, Sotero Leonardo died.
In 1949, Silvestra Cailles died without children.
In 1964, Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be Sotero Leonardo's son, filed a complaint for ownership of properties and accounting, seeking a declaration as one of Francisca Reyes's lawful heirs entitled to a half share in her estate.
Maria Cailles claimed exclusive ownership of the properties and argued that Cresenciano, as an illegitimate child, couldn't inherit through representation.
James Bracewell also claimed ownership through a deed of sale from Maria Cailles, and the properties were mortgaged to Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc.
CFI-Rizal: Ruled in favor of Cresenciano.
CA: Reversed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
WoN Cresenciano Leonardo has the right be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes. NO
Held:
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive properties of the private respondents.
There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as each has its own distinct factual setting.
- The first was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale.
- After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija,
- Francisca Reyes managed the property and paid the realty tax of the land.
- However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and declared the same in her own name. Because of this, plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously thinking that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the same.
- The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under a deed of sale.
- After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes administered the property and like in the first case, declared in 1949 the property in her own name.
- Thinking that the property is the property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same allegedly represents the share of his father,
As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff principally because defendants' evidence do not sufficiently show that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917, are the same as the properties sought by the plaintiff.
Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the lands in question.
To begin with, the deed of sale of 1908 clearly states that the land sold to Maria Cailles is en la cane Desposorio in Las Pinas Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the time, including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co.
With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the description fits the land now being sought by the plaintiff, as this property is also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the property described in the deed and in the tax declaration is one and the same property.
The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several decades have already passed between the deed and the declaration and 'during that period, many changes of abode would likely have occurred.
Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio St. and they have paid the realty taxes of this property from May 29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt that this property is the same, if not Identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is now being sought after by the plaintiff.
With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is no similar boundaries to be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until 1948.
Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting that since the present petition is one for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. 3 None of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:
Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944, survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by right of representation.
In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.
Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence to his tale.
This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question.
That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
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