Case Digest: Santillon vs. Miranda, G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965

Succession | Intestate Succession

Art. 892. If only one legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. In case of a legal separation, the surviving spouse may inherit if it was the deceased who had given cause for the same.

If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants.

In both cases, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be taken from the portion that can be freely disposed of by the testator.

Art. 996. If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.

Ponente:

Bengzon, C.J.:

Facts:

In 1953, Pedro Santillon died intestate.

He was survived by his wife, Perfecta Miranda, and one son, Claro Santillon. 

In 1957, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. 

Perfecta Miranda and Spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales filed an opposition based on the following grounds: 

1. that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; 
2. that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario;
3. that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and
4. that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.

In 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate.

After deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, Claro claims 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

CFI-Pangasinan: Ruled and ordered that after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties, Perfecta Miranda shall inherit 1/2 share and the remaining 1/2 share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. 

Issue:

WoN Atty. Claro Santillon is entitled to 3/4 of his father estate. NO

Held:

The First Issue: — It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore, appealable to this Court.

Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled."

The Second Issue: — Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of the New Civil Code which provides that:

If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... .

As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites Art. 996 which provides:

If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.

Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.

Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular "child."

Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession; 

whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession.

Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.

Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the Pangasinan court.

This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:

One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)

The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions:

1. Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial construction and analogy; 
2. Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get 1/2 in intestate.

A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. 

So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child" in the following articles:

ART. 887. — The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and descendants ... .

ART. 888. — The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate ... .

ART. 896. — Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).

In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given to Art. 996.

B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies:

1. where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and 
2. where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception)

Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we are not called upon to discuss — but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to enforce.

The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.