Case Digest: Vda. de Crisologo vs. CA, G.R. No. L-44051, June 27, 1985

Succession | Iron Curtain Rule

Article 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Ponente:

Gutierrez, Jr. J.:

Facts:

Eufrancia Vda. de Crisologo filed an action against Bernardo Mallillin for ownership, annulment of sale, and possession of properties, claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, Lutgarda Capiao. They seek to annul deeds of sale covering 17 parcels of land and a house sold to the respondent.

Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing petitioners were strangers to Lutgarda Capiao and had no cause of action as they were not real parties in interest.

Trial Court: Rendered a summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint based on findings that, according to Article 992 of the Civil Code, legitimate relatives cannot inherit from an illegitimate child and vice versa based on the following:

1. That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao;
2. That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao was married to Raymundo Zipagan, both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and 1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs' 
3. That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at Cauayan, Isabela, without any will inestate succession took place and the herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to her were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs;
4. That Lutgarda Leogarda is undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not Taccad, retaining the surname or family name of her mother Julia Capiao.

CA: Denied the petition.

Issues:

WoN the trial courty committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the appeal of petitioners on the ground that the record on appeal was filed out of time. NO

WoN the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition acted in accordance with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court and whether or not it departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings as set down by this Court. NO

Held:

With regard to the first issue, we hold that the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the record on appeal was filed out of time. The records bear out the fact that the petitioners filed their record on appeal nineteen days after the last day to perfect the appeal. Moreover, it did not incorporate the Motion for Summary Judgment with its Annexes and Exhibits nor was it accompanied by any motion for an extension of time to file a record on appeal which, if approved, could have justified its having been filed late. Furthermore, the appeal bond was filed fifteen (15) days late. We, therefore, rule that no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed against the respondent judge. As we held in the case of Garcia v. Echiverri (132 SCRA 638-639):

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Well-rooted is the principle that perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory that deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal.

In the case at bar, it is admitted that the decision of the lower court was received by private respondents on March 9, 1976. On March 29, 1976 (or on the 20th day) private respondents filed their first motion for reconsideration. On April 29, 1976, private respondents received the lower court's order denying the first motion for reconsideration, therefore, the last day for perfecting their appeal would be May 9, 1976. Since private respondents filed their notice of appeal only on June 4, 1976, the same was filed out of time. Consequently, the decision appealed from is already final and executory.

On certain occasions, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal outside the period prescribed by law in the interest of justice. Emphatic in the decisions cited by the petitioner are strong considerations of substantial justice. The present case does not warrant such liberality because the decision of the lower court is satisfactorily supported by the records. It is clear from the records that the petitioners cannot inherit the properties in question because of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Being relatives on the legitimate line of Julia Capiao they cannot inherit from tier illegitimate daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao predeceased the daughter, Lutgarda Capiao. As explained by Manresa, whom the private respondents cited:

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Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. In this Article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumptive will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

In the case of Castro vs. Court of Appeals (123 SCRA 787) we ruled:

Where the interests of justice would not be served by a policy of liberality, however, we cannot cite a lower court as having acted with grave abuse of discretion simply because it has correctly but strictly applied the rules, In the instant case, the decision of the respondent court is supported by the records. A remand for further proceedings, therefore, would only result in needless delays—a few more years perhaps of a tortuous journey through new proceedings in the trial court, an intermediate appeal, and another resort to this Court through a petition for review to finally achieve the same result which is an order to pay an admitted indebtedness.

Anent the second issue raised by the petitioners, we hold that the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus on the ground that it had no appellate jurisdiction over the same. It should be noted that the petitioners stated that they were appealing the main case to this Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals could not have exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the petition for mandamus since it was merely incidental to the main case. In the case of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals (8 SCRA 254), the same case relied upon by the appellate court, we ruled:

It is evident from the above-quoted resolution that the Court of Appeals denied the petition for mandamus because it found that petitioner unequivocably manifested in its notice of appeal dated September 1, 1960 its intention to appeal directly to the Supreme Court on purely questions of law and that it reiterated the same intention in the record on appeal it submitted on September 9, 1960 wherein it prayed that the same be approved and duly transmitted to the Supreme Court. And the Court of Appeals predicated its resolution on Section 30 of Republic Act 296 wherein it is expressly provided that the Court of Appeals shall have original jurisdiction to issue, among others, a writ of mandamus when such remedy is invoked merely in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This has been interpreted to mean that, should the main case be appealed and the appeal should fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, it is only then that said court can act on the special civil action of mandamus; otherwise, the jurisdiction to act thereon would devolve upon the Supreme Court ...

Similarly, in the case of Philippine Product Co. v. Court of Appeals (21 SCRA 874), we ruled:

Petitioner's submission that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed Before it is well taken. By statute (Section 30, Republic Act 296 [The Judiciary Act]) the Court of Appeals may only issue writs of certiorari and prohibition "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This phrase has been consistently interpreted to mean that should the main case be appealed and the appeal fall under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, then only can it act on said special civil actions concerning a matter incidental to the main case. Otherwise, i.e., if the main case is not properly appealable to the Court of Appeals, jurisdiction to act on the special civil actions would devolve on the Supreme Court exclusively. (Miailhe v. Halili, 103 Phil. 639; Albar v. Carangdang, L-18003, Sept. 29, 1962; PNB v. Court of Appeals, L-18728, May 31, 1963; and Tuason v. Jaramino, L-18932-34, etc., Sept. 30, 1963)

Furthermore, it is an established principle that the writ of mandamus may not be issued to control the discretion of a judge or to compel him to decide a case or motion in a particular way, the writ being available only to compel him to exercise his discretion or jurisdiction. (Phil. Air Lines Employees Association v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 111 SCRA 220). The respondent judge, therefore, cannot be compelled by such special civil action to approve the petitioners' appeal which was perfected after the reglementary period to do so had expired. The petitioners contend that the appellate court should have certified the petition to the Supreme Court, thus leaving the resolution of the issues to this Court. Since the main case is manifestly without merit, the action of the appellate court cannot be impugned. No considerations of substantial justice which would warrant the exercise of equity powers exist in this petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioners.