Case Digest: Leviste vs. CA, G.R. No. L-29184, January 30, 1989

Succession | Intestate Succession

Art. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.

Ponente:

Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:

In 1963, Benedicto Leviste agreed to represent Rosa del Rosario in a probate case for a property bequeathed to her by Maxima C. Reselva's holographic will, with a contingent fee of 35% of the property.

The attorney conducted legal research, interviewed witnesses, filed the probate petition, made publications, and presented witnesses during the trial.

In 1965, Del Rosario terminated the attorney's services due to perceived conflicting interests as the attorney was morally obliged to protect his brother-in-law, whom other parties intended to eject from the bequeathed property.

The attorney filed a motion to intervene to protect his right to fees, but it was denied by the trial court for failure to file a claim for fees or record an attorney's lien.

Despite the denial, the attorney continued to receive court orders and filed pleadings. The case proceeded without the respondents' evidence.

Del Rosario and another party filed a motion to withdraw the probate petition, which the court initially denied as it went against public policy.

In 1967, the court disallowed the will due to insufficient witness testimony.

The attorney attempted to appeal but faced opposition on the grounds of not being a party in interest. 

Trial Court: Dismissed the appeal and denied the attorney's motion for substitution.

CA: Dismissed the petition for insufficient form and substance, as he did not appear to be the proper party for the appeal.

Issue: WoN an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client's refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court. NO

Held:

Under his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.

The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules established in this Code, it may belong.

he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor (which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contigent attorney's fees.

The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.

Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name.

This Court had ruled in the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract (for contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs. Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees."

The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while it is true that, as contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow that every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which should be observed and requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated. Those procedures and requirements were not followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential.

Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a prospective heir. In Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occassion to rule that one who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. Thus:

... the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, 246.)

Similary, in Morente vs. Firmalino, 40 O.G. 21st Supp. 1, We held:

We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that notice of an attorney's lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case his client is awarded a certain sum by the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.