Case Digest: Manila Race Horse Trainers Association, Inc. v. De La Fuente, 88 Phil. 60, G.R. No. L-2947, January 11, 1951

Taxation | Purposes of Taxation

Facts: 
  • Manila Race Horses Trainers Association, Inc. filed for declaratory relief alleging that their rights as owners of boarding stables for race horses were affected by Ordinance No. 3065 of the City of Manila approved on July 1, 1947.
    • SECTION 1. License. — No person shall own, keep, maintain, or conduct any boarding stable, or place where race horse are kept, fed, or boarded for others, for compensation or hire, and/or for race horse stable privately owned not for hire, without first having obtained a permit from the Mayor and license therefor from the City Treasurer
  • They made the Mayor of Manila, Manuel de la Fuente, defendant and prayed that said ordinance be declared invalid as violative of the Philippine Constitution.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 3065 of the City of Manila, which imposes a license fee on boarding stables for race horses, in question is unconstitutional. NO

Held:

We do not share plaintiff's opinion, apropos the second proposition, that the ordinance in question is discriminatory and savors of class legislation. In taxing only boarding stables for race horses, we do not believe that the ordinance, makes arbitrary classification. In the case of Eastern Theatrical Co. Inc., vs. Alfonso, 46 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 11, p. 303,* it was said there is equality and uniformity in taxation if all articles or kinds of property of the same class are taxed at the same rate. 

Thus, it was held in that case, that "the fact that some places of amusement are not taxed while others, such as cinematographs, theaters, vaudeville companies, theatrical shows, and boxing exhibitions and other kinds of amusements or places of amusement are taxed, is not argument at all against the equality and uniformity of tax imposition." Applying this criterion to the present case, there would be discrimination if some boarding stables of the same class used for the same number of horses were not taxed or were made to pay less or more than others.

From the viewpoint of economics and public policy the taxing of boarding stables for race horses to the exclusion of boarding stables for horses dedicated to other purposes is not indefensible. The owners of boarding stables for race horses and, for that matter, the race horse owners themselves, who in the scheme of shifting may carry the taxation burden, are a class by themselves and appropriately taxed where owners of other kinds of horses are taxed less or not at all, considering that equity in taxation is generally conceived in terms of ability to pay in relation to the benefits received by the taxpayer and by the public from the business or property taxed. Race horses are devoted to gambling if legalized, their owners derive fat income and the public hardly any profit from horse racing, and this business demands relatively heavy police supervision. Taking everything into account, the differentiation against which the plaintiffs complain conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discrimatory within the meaning of the Constitution.

One ground of attack in the court below on the constitutionality of the ordinance — variance between the title and the subject matter — apparently has been abandoned. In its place a new question is brought up on the appeal in the third and last assignment of error. It is now contended, for the first time, that "the Municipal Board of Manila (is) without power to enact ordinance taxing private stables for race horses," and that the lower court erred in not so declaring. This assignment of error has reference to Class B or the second sub-paragraph of section 1 of the ordinance.

Not having been raised in the pleading, this question was properly ignored, not to say that even it had been raised it would not have been available as basis for a declaration of nullity of the ordinance. The clause of the ordinance taxing or licensing boarding stables for race horses does not prejudice the plaintiffs in any material way, and it is well settled that a person who is not adversely affected by a licensing ordinance may not attack its validity. Stated differently, he may not complain that a licensing ordinance is invalid as against a class other than that to which he belongs. (62 C. J. S.830, 831.) By analogy, where a municipal ordinance is valid in some of its parts and invalid as to others and the valid parts are separable from the invalid ones — in which latter case the valid provisions stand as operative — the plaintiff may contest the validity of the provisions that injure his interest but not those that do not.

We are of the opinion that the trial court committed no error and the judgment is affirmed with costs against the plaintiff-appellants.

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