Case Digest: City of Baguio v. Niño 487 SCRA 21, G.R. No. 161811, April 12, 2006
Property | Movable Property, Order of Demolition
Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:
- Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not included in the preceding article;
- Real property which by any special provision of law is considered as personalty;
- Forces of nature which are brought under control by science; and
- In general, all things which can be transported from place to place without impairment of the real property to which they are fixed.
Facts:
- The Bureau of Lands awarded to Narcisa A. Placino a parcel of land (Lot No. 10) in Baguio City.
- Francisco Niño, who has been occupying the lot, contested the award by filing a Petition Protest.
- The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest. Niño appealed the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court but he did not succeed.
- DENR-CAR: Issued an Order of Execution directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the decision "by ordering Petitioner Niño and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto."
- Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed, prompting Narcisa to file a complaint for ejectment.
- MTCC: Dismissed Narcisa’s complaint for ejectment.
- Narcisa’s counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall petitioned the DENR-CAR for the issuance of a Special Order to demolish or remove the improvements on the lot introduced by Niño.
- DENR-CAR: Denied petition to authorize demolition, citing lack of jurisdiction over the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government.
- Atty. Claravall moved to have the Order of Execution previously issued by the DENR-CAR amended, which was granted.
- The Order of Execution amended to involve the City Sheriff of Baguio City, the Demolition Team of Baguio City and the Baguio City Police Station.
- Demolition Team of Baguio City: Started demolishing the houses of Niño and his co-respondents by virtue of amended Order of Execution. The demolition was, however, temporarily stopped upon the instructions of DENR-CENRO.
- Niño filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against DENR-CENRO, and authorities of Baguio.
- RTC: Dismissed Niño's petition.
- CA: Granted Niño's Petition for Review.
- Ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the amended order of execution by applying that Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the ROC applies:
- SEC. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.
- x x x x
- (d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. — When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
Issue:
- Whether the CA misapplied Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of ROC. NO
Held:
The petition fails.
While it is noted that respondent’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was erroneously brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, instead of under Rule 41, the RTC having rendered the questioned decision in the exercise of its original, not appellate, jurisdiction, this Court overlooks the error in view of the merits of respondents’ case.
Petitioners’ contention that the enforcement of the Amended Order of Execution does not need a hearing and court order which Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires does not lie.
That an administrative agency which is clothed with quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of Execution is of no moment, since the requirement in Sec. 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court echoes the constitutional provision that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority teaches:
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.
There is, however, no explicit provision granting the Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over the Land Management Bureau) the authority to issue an order of demolition — which the Amended Order of Execution, in substance, is.
Indeed,
[w]hile the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve the disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts.
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making the proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest.
Consequently, this Court held:
x x x the power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and turn over the possession of the land to the party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs only to the courts of justice and not to the Bureau of Lands.
In fine, it is the court sheriff which is empowered to remove improvements introduced by respondents on, and turn over possession of, the lot to Narcisa.
Petitioners’ invocation of the City Mayor’s authority under Sec. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code to order the demolition or removal of an illegally constructed house, building, or structure within the period prescribed by law or ordinance and their allegation that respondents’ structures were constructed without building permits were not raised before the trial court. Petitioners having, for the first time, invoked said section of the Local Government Code and respondents’ lack of building entry permits in their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision, it was correctly denied of merit, it being settled that matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
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