Case Digest: Chiao Liong Tan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106251. November 19, 1993

CASE TITLE:  Chiao Liong Tan vs. Court of Appeals
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 106251. November 19, 1993.
PONENTE: Nocon, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: RTC - Replevin and damages CA - Appeal
FACTS: Chiao Liong Tan asserts ownership of an Isuzu Elf van, which he purchased in March 1987 and registered under his name. Tan Ban Yong testified that CLT Industries, a family business, needed a vehicle for machinery delivery.  He gave Chiao Liong Tan money for a down payment, which was used to register the vehicle in Chiao Liong Tan's name.  Tan Ban Yong paid the balance of the purchase price from a loan obtained from Tan Pit Sin. Tan Pit Sin confirmed lending money to Tan Ban Yong for the purchase of the van.  Gina Lu from Balintawak Isuzu Motors testified that Tan Ban Yong paid the balance, but the receipt was issued in Chiao Liong Tan's name to maintain consistency with the initial down payment. RTC: Ruled in favor of Tan Ban Yong, declaring him the owner entitled to possession of the vehicle or alternative payment.  CA: Affirmed the decision.
ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in disregarding the Certificate of Registration of the subject motor vehicle as proof of ownership by the petitioner-appellant. NO
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES
PETITIONER	RESPONDENTS
Chiao Liong Tan claims possession, enjoyment, and utilization of the vehicle until his brother, Tan Ban Yong, took it from him.	Tan Ban Yong testified that he gave Chiao Liong Tan money for a down payment, which was used to register the vehicle in Chiao Liong Tan's name.
PREVAILING PARTY:  CA
DECISION/DOCTRINE: Since the Court of Appeals merely affirmed the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses that testified before it, petitioner is in effect questioning the factual findings of said court and its appraisal of their testimony which this Court cannot review, its jurisdiction being limited to questions of law. The considerable weight given to the findings of the trial court is not without any reason. It had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses which is usually not reflected in the transcript of records. The profundity of the conclusions thus reached is just the result of such observance. When the Court of Appeals affirmed said findings, it goes to show that no misapprehension of facts was committed as said Court has the power to scrutinize said factual findings under existing rules of procedure. In concluding that the testimonies of Tan Ban Yong, Tan Pit Sin and Gina Lu cast doubt on the petitioner's ownership of the motor vehicle in question, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals attached significance to their respective interlocking accounts on how the motor vehicle was acquired, complete with the financing source and mode of repayment. Respondent Tan Ban Yong's declaration that he borrowed P140,000.00 from Tan Pit Sin and paid the balance of the purchase price of the motor vehicle himself to Gina Lu of the Balintawak Isuzu Motors, is corroborated by the above-mentioned persons themselves. Tan Pit Sin not only confirmed the loan but also stated that the same was paid in three (3) months; P50,000.00 on the first payment; another P50,000.00 on the second payment and P40,000.00 on the last payment. Gina Lu, who testified at the instance of petitioner, declared that the downpayment of P5,000.00 was paid by petitioner and so the receipt for the same was issued in his name but the balance of P133,000.00 was paid by private respondent and to make the record consistent, she issued the receipt in the name of petitioner again. In contrast to the clear and categorical averments of private respondent and the witnesses in this case negating petitioner's ownership of the motor vehicle in question, petitioner's averments before the trial court and this Court are not only disparate but conflicting. In his testimony below, petitioner averred that he used his own money to purchase the motor vehicle by paying the sum of P100,000.00, which testimony is negated by his admission on page of his petition before this Court that private respondent borrowed money from Tan Pit Sin with which to purchase the subject motor vehicle. Then, in his pleading before the court below, particularly in his reply to the answer of private respondent, petitioner alleged that the motor vehicle was intended for his exclusive use and not to service the family business. And yet , in his petition before this Court, he claimed that the subject motor vehicle was purchased for CLT Industries, which he solely owned and accordingly, registered in the latter's name.  On top of these entangled averments, petitioner did not have in his possession the Certificate of Registration of the motor vehicle and the official receipt of payment for the same, thereby lending credence to the claim of private respondent who has possession thereof, that he owns the subject motor vehicle. A certificate of registration of a motor vehicle in one's name indeed creates a strong presumption of ownership. For all practical purposes, the person in whose favor it has been issued is virtually the owner thereof unless proved otherwise. In other words, such presumption is rebuttable by competent proof. The New Civil Code recognizes cases of implied trust other than those enumerated therein.Thus, although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties herein, it is undeniable that an implied trust was created when the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle was placed in the name of the petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private respondent. The principle that a trustee who puts a certificate of registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration is one of the well-known limitations upon a title. A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another, especially between brothers, does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document. Even under the Torrens System of land registration, this Court in some instances did away with the irrevocability or indefeasibility of a certificate of title to prevent injustice against the rightful owner of the property.  It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of possession. Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determined nothing more than the right of possession. However, when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendant's plea and by reason of the policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the possession of the property in controversy, the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding. Procedure-wise, the Court observes that the action by petitioner as plaintiff in the trial court was only one for Replevin and Damages. Since replevin is only a provisional remedy where the replevin plaintiff claims immediate delivery of personal property pending the judgment of the trial court in a principal case,  the petitioner should have filed in the trial court as a main case an action to recover possession of the Isuzu Elf van which was in the possession of the private respondent. Logically, the basis of petitioner's cause of action should have been his ownership of said van. In the State of California, from whose Code of Procedure we copied our rule on replevin, their old replevin rule which allowed the immediate delivery of the chattel at the commencement of the action upon application with bond by the replevin plaintiff had already been struck down as early as July 1, 1971 in the case of Blair v. Pitchess.  As in fact, on June 12, 1972 when the United States Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes in Fuentes v. Shevin, most of the states, on their own, changed their replevin statutes to include a mandatory preliminary hearing before the writ could be issued, similar to our mandatory preliminary hearing before the writ of preliminary injunction can be issued.  If that had been the case in this jurisdiction, then the trial judge would have discovered right away at the preliminary hearing that private respondent should have immediately staked his claim of ownership and that would have created serious doubts about petitioner's claim of ownership. Most likely, the writ would not have been issued and the complaint would have been dismissed motu proprio by the trial court upon the discovery that the petitioner did not have a principal case therein. As it is, the complaint proceeded its course to the detriment of private respondent. Finally, although a "replevin" action is primarily one for the possession of personality, yet it is sufficiently flexible to authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties, arising from or growing out of the main controversy. Thus, in an action for replevin where the defendant is adjudged entitled to possession, he need not go to another forum to procure relief for the return of the replevied property or secure a judgment for the value of the property in case the adjudged return thereof could not be had. Appropriately, the trial court rendered an alternative judgment. WHEREFORE, the questioned decision being in accordance with the law, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.