Case Digest: Estel vs. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., G.R. No. 174082. January 16, 2012.

CASE TITLE:  Estel vs. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr.
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 174082. January 16, 2012.
PONENTE: Peralta, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: MTCC - Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order RTC - Appeal CA - Appeal
FACTS: The Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry, Damages, and Injunction against Georgia T. Estel, claiming ownership of the 306-square-meter parcel of land through a contract of sale. The petitioner voluntarily delivered possession of the land. However, the petitioner and others allegedly uprooted the fence, entered the lot, and destroyed trees and plants. MTCC:  Ruled in favor of respondents, ordering petitioner to vacate the premises, RTC:  Upheld the MTCC decision. CA: Affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether MTCC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. YES
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES
PETITIONER	RESPONDENTS
Petitioner argues that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction over the case because respondents failed to specify the location of the disputed land in their complaint. Respondents never had possession of Lot 19, and argued that the sale agreement was void and that the respondents were actually given Lot 16.	Respondents claimed they bought a 306-square-meter lot (Lot 19) from the petitioner in 1991, paid ₱17,000.00 as down payment, and had uninterrupted possession since then.
PREVAILING PARTY:  CA
DECISION/DOCTRINE: A review of the records shows that petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction or venue in her Answer filed with the MTCC. The CA correctly held that even if the geographical location of the subject property was not alleged in the Complaint, petitioner failed to seasonably object to the same in her Affirmative Defense, and even actively participated in the proceedings before the MTCC. In fact, petitioner did not even raise this issue in her appeal filed with the RTC. Thus, she is already estopped from raising the said issue in the CA or before this Court. Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court.  One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate the lower court's decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such relief The Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. In any case, since the Complaint is clearly and admittedly one for forcible entry, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is, thus, upon the MTCC of Gingoog City. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, as well as Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Hence, as the MTCC has jurisdiction over the action, the question whether or not the suit was brought in the place where the land in dispute is located was no more than a matter of venue and the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the case, could determine whether venue was properly or improperly laid. There having been no objection on the part of petitioner and it having been shown by evidence presented by both parties that the subject lot was indeed located in Gingoog City, and that it was only through mere inadvertence or oversight that such information was omitted in the Complaint, petitioner's objection became a pure technicality. As to respondents' supposed failure to allege facts constitutive of forcible entry, it is settled that in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction.  First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. In the present case, it is clear that respondents sufficiently alleged in their Complaint the material facts constituting forcible entry, as they explicitly claimed that they had prior physical possession of the subject property since its purchase from petitioner, who voluntarily delivered the same to them. They also particularly described in their complaint how petitioner, together with her two sons and five other persons, encroached upon the subject property and dispossessed them of the same. Respondents' complaint contains the allegations that petitioner, abetting and conspiring with other persons, without respondents' knowledge and consent and through the use of force and intimidation, entered a portion of their land and, thereafter, uprooted and destroyed the fence surrounding the subject lot, as well as cut the trees and nipa palms planted thereon. Unlawfully entering the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them through violence and force. Anent respondents' alleged defective verification, the Court again notes that this issue was not raised before the MTCC. Even granting that this matter was properly raised before the court a quo, the Court finds that there is no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of respondents' complaint as there is compliance with the requirement regarding verification. Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC provides: Sec. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. A reading of respondents’ verification reveals that they complied with the abovequoted procedural rule.  Respondents confirmed that they had read the allegations in the Complaint which were true and correct based on their personal knowledge.  The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of our own personal knowledge" did not violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being sufficient that the respondents declared that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct based on their personal knowledge.20 Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.  As to respondents' certification on non-forum shopping, a reading of respondents’ Verification/Certification reveals that they, in fact, certified therein that they have not commenced any similar action before any other court or tribunal and to the best of their knowledge no such other action is pending therein. The only missing statement is respondents' undertaking that if they should thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, they shall report such fact to the court. This, notwithstanding, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance on the part of respondents. It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping, the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant case. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.