Case Digest: Sps. Benitez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104828. January 16, 1997

CASE TITLE:  Sps. Benitez v. Court of Appeals
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 104828. January 16, 1997
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: MeTC - Ejectment Case RTC - Appeal CA - Appeal
FACTS: In 1986, Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a 303-square-meter parcel of land from Cavite Development Bank. Private respondents Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal purchased a neighboring 361-square-meter lot in the same year. The Macapagals filed a case against the Benitezes for the recovery of possession of an encroached portion of their lot. They reached a compromise where the Benitezes purchased the encroached portion from the Macapagals. In 1989, private respondents purchased another property adjacent to petitioners' land, discovering that part of their property was occupied by petitioners' house. In 1990, private respondents filed a civil case for ejectment against petitioners. MeTC: Ruled in favor of private respondents, ordering petitioners to vacate the premises. RTC: Affirmed the decision. CA: Denied the appeal.
ISSUES: Whether the possession of the portion of the private respondents' land encroached by petitioners' house can be recovered through an action of ejectment, not accion publiciana. YES
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES
PETITIONER	RESPONDENTS
Petitioners insist that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the case as it should have been filed as an accion publiciana, not unlawful detainer. They argue that the case is not forcible entry or unlawful detainer because private respondents did not have prior possession of the contested property.	Private respondents counter that petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC after they voluntarily participated in the trial on the merits and lost.
PREVAILING PARTY:  CA
DECISION/DOCTRINE: The petition lacks merit and should be denied. First Issue: MeTC Has Jurisdiction The jurisdictional requirements for ejectment, as borne out by the facts, are: after conducting a relocation survey, private respondents discovered that a portion of their land was encroached by petitioners' house; notices to vacate were sent to petitioners, the last one being dated October 26, 1989; and private respondents filed the ejectment suit against petitioners on January 18, 1990 or within one (1) year from the last demand. Private respondents' cause of action springs from Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides: "Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when -- Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs...." That petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents' purchase thereof does not negate the latter's case for ejectment. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment. This is one of the distinctions between forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; thus, he must allege and prove prior possession. But in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied. In such a case, prior physical possession is not required.  Possession can also be acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution of the deed of sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or physical occupation is not always necessary. In the case before us, considering that private respondents are unlawfully deprived of possession of the encroached land and that the action for the recovery of possession thereof was made within the one- year reglementary period, ejectment is the proper remedy. The MeTC of San Juan had jurisdiction. In addition, after voluntarily submitting themselves to its proceedings, petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the MeTC. This Court will not allow petitioners to attack the jurisdiction of the trial court after receiving a decision adverse to their position. Second Issue: Compensation For Occupancy Petitioners erroneously construed the order of the MeTC to pay private respondents Nine Hundred Thirty Pesos (P930.00) a month starting July 17, 1989 until they (petitioners) finally vacate the subject premises as "rentals". Technically, such award is not rental, but damages. Damages are recoverable in ejectment cases under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.14 These damages arise from the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which private respondents may have suffered but which have no direct relation to their loss of material possession.15 Damages in the context of Section 8, Rule 70 is limited to "rent" or "fair rental value" for the use and occupation of the property.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary There is no question that petitioners benefited from their occupation of a portion of private respondents' property. Such benefit justifies the award of the damages of this kind. Nemo cum alterius, detrimenti locupletari potest. No one shall enrich himself at the expense of another. Third Issue: Option To Sell Belongs To Owner Article 448 of the Civil Code17 is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another in good faith builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner. The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the landowner's choice. Not even a declaration of the builder, planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this option to him per Article 450 of the Civil Code.  This advantage in Article 448 is accorded the landowner because "his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing."  There can be no pre-emptive right to buy even as a compromise, as this prerogative belongs solely to the landowner. No compulsion can be legally forced on him, contrary to what petitioners asks from this Court. Such an order would certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the lower courts were correct in rejecting the petitioners' offer to buy the encroached land. Fourth Issue: A Review of Factual Findings Is Unwarranted Petitioners ask this Court to review the alleged error of the respondent Court in appreciating bad faith on their part. According to them, this is contradictory to the fact that private respondents acquired their lot and discovered the encroachment after petitioners bought their house. After careful deliberation on this issue, this Court finds this petition for review inadequate as it failed to show convincingly a reversible error on the part of the respondent Court in this regard. Thus, for very good reasons, this Court has consistently and emphatically declared that review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals is not a function that is normally undertaken in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such findings, as a general rule, are binding and conclusive.20 The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the records or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute reversible error.  Even respondent Court has taken note of the inadequacy of the petition before it, as it wryly said:  "The Petition for Review is not certainly a manifestation of clarity nor an example of a well-organized summation of petitioners' cause of action...... xxx xxx xxx A careful scrutiny of the above issues discloses that they are mere repetitions in a rehashed form of the same issues with the same supporting arguments raised by petitioners when they appealed from the decision of the (MeTC) to the RTC. x x x." This petition is no different. We share the foregoing sentiments of the respondent Court. In essence, respondent Court merely affirmed the decision of the MeTC. The Court of Appeal's finding of petitioners' bad faith did not alter nor affect the MeTC's disposition. Petitioners want this Court to declare them in good faith and to determine their rights under Article 448, Civil Code. However, the mere fact that they bought their property ahead of the private respondents does not establish this point. Nor does it prove that petitioners had no knowledge of the encroachment when they purchased their property. Reliance on the presumption in Article 526 of the Code is misplaced in view of the declaration of the respondent Court that petitioners are not builders in good faith. What petitioners presented are mere allegations and arguments, without sufficient evidence to support them. As such, we have no ground to depart from the general rule against factual review. In sum, the petition has not shown cogent reasons and sufficient grounds to reverse the unanimous ruling of the three lower courts. The MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals were all in agreement in sustaining private respondents' rights. And we uphold them. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolution is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.