Case Digest: Sps. Castro v. Sps. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 190122, January 10, 2011

Possession

CASE TITLE: Sps. Castro v. Sps .Dela Cruz
GR No/ Date:  G.R. No. 190122, Jan 10, 2011
PONENTE: Carpio Morales, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: RTC - Annulment of the Deed of Sale, Writ of possession, Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction CA - Petition for certiorari
FACTS: On November 15, 1996, Spouses Eduardo and Charito Perez obtained a loan of P250,000 from the petitioners Spouses Isagani and Diosdada Castro, secured by a real estate mortgage on an unregistered 417 square meter parcel of land in San Isidro, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Tax Declaration No. 01844. When Spouses Perez failed to settle the loan, the petitioners extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and bought the property as the highest bidder at a public auction on February 4, 1999. Before the foreclosure, Spouses Perez sold the property to Spouses Regino Se and Violeta dela Cruz in 1997, who then had TD No. 01844 canceled and replaced with TD No. 01892 in their name on August 15, 1997. On April 8, 1999, the petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Sale and TD No. 01892, and for damages, before the Malolos Regional Trial Court (RTC), which was raffled to Branch 7. During the pendency of the complaint, the petitioners filed an ex-parte motion before Branch 16 of the RTC for a writ of possession over the property, which was granted and enforced on August 2, 2001, evicting Spouses dela Cruz. On December 7, 2002, the petitioners amended their complaint, alleging that Spouses Perez failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary period. Spouses dela Cruz prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore them to physical possession of the property, which Branch 7 of the RTC granted on October 29, 2004. CA: Denied the petition for certiorari finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the writ.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of respondent spouses was proper.
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES
PETITIONER	RESPONDENTS
Petitioners argue that they have the right to possess the property because they extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage after Spouses Perez defaulted on the loan.  Petitioners were the highest bidder at the public auction, and a writ of possession was duly issued in their favor by Branch 16 of the RTC.	Spouses dela Cruz contend that they purchased the property from Spouses Perez in 1997 before the foreclosure and were in actual possession of it. They obtained a new Tax Declaration (TD No. 01892) in their name, showing their ownership. Spouses dela Cruz allege that when they purchased the property, there was no indication of the mortgage on the Tax Declaration they inspected, and they had no knowledge of the mortgage when they constructed their house on the property.
PREVAILING PARTY:  Dela Cruz
DECISION/DOCTRINE: The trial court anchored its assailed Order granting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on Article 539 of the Civil Code. The Article reads: Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court. x x x x Undoubtedly, respondent Spouses dela Cruz actually took possession of the property before the real estate mortgage covering it was foreclosed, and had in fact cancelled the TD in Spouses Perez’ name and had one issued in their name. It appears, however, that petitioners did not inform Branch 16, RTC of the previous sale of the property to third parties, herein respondent Spouses dela Cruz, and the latter’s actual possession thereof. For an injunctive writ to issue, a clear showing of extreme urgency to prevent irreparable injury and a clear and unmistakable right to it must be proven by the party seeking it. The primary objective of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The rule is well-entrenched that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court. It bears reiterating that Section 4 of Rule 58 gives generous latitude to the trial courts in this regard for the reason that conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more often than not involve a factual determination which is not the function of appellate courts. Hence, the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse, which is wanting in the present case. Indeed, the rule is well-entrenched that for grave abuse of discretion to exist as a valid ground for the nullification of an injunctive writ, there must be a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Or the power must be exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.  Recall that respondent Spouses dela Cruz had long before the foreclosure of the mortgage or sometime in 1997 bought and took possession of the property, and had in fact cancelled the seller-respondent Spouses Perez’ TD and had one issued in their name. By petitioners’ seeking ex parte the issuance to them on February 1999 of a writ of possession over the property, which was granted and the writ enforced against respondent Spouses de la Cruz, they disturbed the status quo ante litem. The trial court did not thus commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of Spouses de la Cruz. For the enforcement of the writ of possession against respondent Spouses dela Cruz, who did not take part in the foreclosure proceedings, would amount to taking of real property without the benefit of a proper judicial intervention. The procedural shortcut which petitioners is impermissible. Even Article 433 of the Civil Code instructs that "Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property." The contemplated judicial process is not through an ex-parte petition as what petitioners availed of, but a process wherein a third party, Spouses de la Cruz herein, is given an opportunity to be heard. The jurisdictional foundation for the issuance of a writ of injunction rests not only in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, among other considerations, but also in the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Since petitioners failed to show that the appellate court erred in upholding the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the challenged Decision stands. Parenthetically, the issuance of the challenged writ does not render petitioners’ case closed. Whether there existed a conspiracy between both sets of respondent spouses to defraud petitioners can be only be determined after the principal action is tried on the merits during which the parties are afforded the opportunity to present evidence in support of their respective claims. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.