Case Digest: Sps. Ocampo vs. Heirs of Bernardino U. Dionisio, G.R. No. 191101 October 1, 2014.

Possession

CASE TITLE: Sps. Ocampo vs. Heirs of Bernardino U. Dionisio
GR No/ Date:  G.R. No. 191101 October 1, 2014.*
PONENTE: Reyes, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: MTC - Recovery of possession  RTC - Appeal CA - Petition for Review
FACTS: In 1996, Bernardino U. Dionisio filed a complaint for forcible entry against Mario Ocampo and Felix Ocampo, seeking to recover possession of a portion of his property covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-4559 in Dalig, Cardona, Rizal. He alleged that Mario and Felix built a piggery on his property without his consent. MTC: Dismissed Dionisio's complaint for forcible entry, ruling that Dionisio failed to establish his prior possession of the disputed land. In 1997, Dionisio died. His heirs later filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Spouses Mario and Carmelita Ocampo, seeking to recover the same portion of the land. MTC: Dismissed the complaint for recovery of possession on the ground of res judicata, citing the finality of the earlier decision in the forcible entry case. RTC: Reversed the MTC's decision, ruling that the doctrine of res judicata did not apply because the forcible entry case only involved possession while the recovery case involved ownership as well. CA: Afirmed the RTC's decision, agreeing that res judicata did not apply and that the heirs of Dionisio sufficiently established their ownership of the property.
ISSUE: Whether the finality of the decision in the forcible entry case constitutes res judicata, which would warrant the dismissal of the respondents' complaint for recovery of possession.
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES
PETITIONER	RESPONDENTS
Petitioners argue that the decision in the forcible entry case should constitute res judicata, that the respondents did not sufficiently prove ownership, and that their complaint should be barred by laches.	-
PREVAILING PARTY: Heirs of Bernardino U. Dionisio
DECISION/DOCTRINE: The Ruling of the Court The petition is denied. First Issue: Res Judicata The doctrine of res judicata is laid down under Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides that: Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:  x x x x (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and (c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.18 In Judge Abelita III v. P/Supt. Doria, et al.,19 the Court explained the two aspects of res judicata, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal. But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. For res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior judgment, to apply, the following requisites must concur, viz:  finality of the former judgment;  the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; it must be a judgment on the merits; and there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. The first three requisites are present in this case. The Decision dated September 12, 1997 in the forcible entry case rendered by the MTC, a court which has jurisdiction over the subject property and the parties, had long become final. The said MTC decision is an adjudication on the merits. However, the fourth requisite is not present. Although there is identity of parties and subject matter as between the forcible entry case and recovery of possession case, there is no identity of causes of action. As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the forcible entry case only involves the issue of possession over the subject property while the recovery of possession case puts in issue the ownership of the subject property and the concomitant right to possess the same as an attribute of ownership. In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact, or physical possession of real property, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading. If plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property. Thus, even the MTC, in its Decision dated September 12, 1997 in the forcible entry case, stressed that its determination is only limited to the issue of who has "actual prior possession" of the subject property regardless of the ownership of the same. On the other hand, the recovery of possession case is actually an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. A perusal of the complaint filed by the respondents in the recovery of possession case shows that the respondents, as successors-in-interest of Dionisio, are asserting ownership of the subject property and are seeking the recovery of possession thereof. A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action. Such determination does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only as to the MTC's determination that the petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since the respondents failed to prove their prior physical possession; it is not conclusive as to the ownership of the subject property. Besides, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a "judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land." Second Issue: Ownership of the Subject Property The respondents were able to prove that they have a superior right over the subject property as against the petitioners. It is undisputed that the subject property is indeed covered by OCT No. M-4559, which is registered in the name of Dionisio, the respondents' predecessor-in-interest. Between the petitioners' unsubstantiated and self-serving claim that the subject property was inherited by Carmelita from her father and OCT No. M-4559 registered in Dionisio's name, the latter must prevail. The respondents' title over the subject property is evidence of their ownership thereof. That a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein and that a person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to the possession thereof are fundamental principles observed in this jurisdiction. Further, it is settled that a Torrens Certificate of Title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title. Accordingly, the petitioners may not assail the validity of the issuance of OCT No. M-4559 in the name of Dionisio in their answer to the complaint filed by the respondents for recovery of possession of the subject property; it is a collateral attack to the validity of OCT No. M-4559, which the RTC and the CA aptly disregarded. Third Issue: Laches Equally untenable is the petitioners' claim that the respondents' right to recover the possession of the subject property is already barred by laches. As owners of the subject property, the respondents have the right to recover the possession thereof from any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Assuming arguendo that the petitioners indeed have been occupying the subject property for a considerable length of time, the respondents, as lawful owners, have the right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. Jurisprudence consistently holds that "prescription and laches can not apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system" because "under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 2, 2009 and Resolution dated January 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106064 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.