Case Digest: Bartolata vs. Republic, G.R. No. 223334. June 7, 2017.
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CASE TITLE: Bartolata vs. Republic | |
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 223334. June 7, 2017. | |
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr., J. | |
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari | |
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS:
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FACTS:
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ISSUES: Whether or not the subject property owned by petitioner is subject easement of right of way in favor of the government; Whether or not respondents are liable to pay just compensation to petitioner; and Whether or not petitioner should return the initial payment made by respondents in the amount of P1,480,000. | |
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES | |
PETITIONER | RESPONDENTS |
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PREVAILING PARTY: Bartolata | |
DECISION/DOCTRINE: The petition is partly meritorious. The easement of right of way in favor of the government subsists despite the enactment of PD 2004 Resolving the first issue, the Court rejects petitioner's claim that the subject property is no longer subject to the 60-meter width easement of right of way in favor of the government. First, no less than the Order of Award granting petitioner title over the subject property reads that the parcel of land conferred to him is subject to the restrictions contained under Sec. 109-114 of CA 141, which necessarily includes the easement provided in Sec. 112. Notably, petitioner was awarded the subject property in 1987, while PD 2004, which allegedly removed all encumbrances and restrictions from awarded properties, was signed into law much earlier in 1985. This alone raises suspicion on the applicability of PD 2004 to the subject property. Second, the Court finds no reversible error in the RTC and CA's interpretation of the coverage of PD 2004 and RA 730. The title of RA 730 itself supports the rulings of the courts a quo that the laws petitioner relied upon only cover the sale of public lands for residential purposes and to qualified applicants without public auction. To quote: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 730 – AN ACT TO PERMIT THE SALE WITHOUT PUBLIC AUCTION OF PUBLIC LANDS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES TO QUALIFIED APPLICANTS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS It can readily be inferred from the title of RA 730 that the definite ambit of the law could not be extended to sales of public lands via public auction, through which mode of disposition petitioner acquired the subject property. Consequently, when RA 730 was amended by PD 2004 to the effect of removing encumbrances and restrictions on purchased properties without public auction, petitioner could not have benefitted from the same. Lastly, even the contents of RA 730 belie petitioners claim. The foremost section of the law reads: Section 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of sections sixty-one and sixty-seven of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-one, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-three, any Filipino citizen of legal age who is not the owner of a home lot in the municipality or city in which he resides and who has in good faith established his residence on a parcel of the public land of the Republic of the Philippines which is not needed for the public service, shall be given preference to purchase at a private sale of which reasonable notice shall be given to him not more than one thousand square meters at a price to be fixed by the Director of Lands with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It shall be an essential condition of this sale that the occupants has constructed his house on the land and actually resided therein. Ten per cent of the purchase price shall be paid upon the approval of the sale and the balance may be paid in full, or in ten equal annual installments. As can be gleaned, RA 730 was crafted as an exception to Sees. 61 and 67 of CA 141. These provisions govern the mode of disposition of the alienable public lands enumerated under Sec. 59 of the same law.[26] Synthesizing the provisions, CA 141 provides that public lands under Sec. 59 can only be disposed for residential, commercial, industrial, and other similar purposes through lease or sale, in both cases, "to the highest bidder." The conduct of an auction is then required under Secs. 61 and 67. By way of exception, however, RA 730 now allows the sale of public lands without public auction to qualified applicants. It is through this exceptional case of purchase of public land without public auction wherein PD 2004 would apply. Petitioner's assertion that both sales of public land with and without public auction are subsumed under the coverage of PD 2004 is contrary to the very tenor of the law. Sec. 2 of RA 730, as amended by PD 2004, is clear and unambiguous: SEC. 2. Lands acquired under the provisions of this Act shall not be subject to any restrictions against encumbrance or alienation before and after the issuance of the patents thereon. Under its plain meaning, only public lands acquired by qualified applicants without public auction and for residential purposes are free from any restrictions against encumbrance or alienation. The provision is inapplicable to petitioner's property which was awarded to petitioner not in accordance with RA 730, but through public auction. What is more, the easement of right of way under Sec. 112 of CA 141 is not subsumed in the phrase "restrictions against encumbrance or alienation" appearing in the amendment introduced by PD 2004. This becomes obvious upon examining the original text of Sec. 2 of RA 730, before PD 2004 took effect: Sec. 2. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under the provisions of this act shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation before the patent is issued and for a term of ten years from the date of the issuance of such patent, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of the said period. No transfer or alienation made after the said period of ten years and within fifteen years from the issuance of such patent except those made by virtue of the right of succession shall be valid unless when duly authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the transferee of vendee is a Filipino citizen. Every convenyance made shall be subject to repurchase by the original purchaser or his legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of conveyance. Any contract or agreement made or executed in violation of this section shall be void ab initio. Consequently, it was erroneous for petitioner to harp on Sec. 2 of RA 730, as amended by PD 2004, in his bid to unshackle his property from its servient state, to release it from the statutory lien prescribed under Sec. 112 of CA 141. Petitioner is not entitled to just compensation The Court now determines how the subsisting easement of right of way in favor of the government bears on petitioner's entitlement to just compensation. In resolving petitioner's principal claim, we apply the doctrine in Republic v. Andaya (Andaya). The seminal case of Andaya likewise involved property subject to the statutory lien under Sec. 112 of CA 141. As held in the case: It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-way in favor of the Republic. Andaya's transfer certificates of title contained the reservation that the lands covered thereby are subject to the provisions of the Land Registration Act and the Public Land Act. Section 112 of the Public Land Act provides that lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements existing thereon that may be affected. In view of this, the Court of Appeals declared that all the Republic needs to do is to enforce such right without having to initiate expropriation proceedings and without having to pay any just compensation. Hence, the Republic may appropriate the 701 square meters necessary for the construction of the floodwalls without paying for it. The Court affirmed the CA's interpretation of Sec. 112 of CA 141 and ruled that the Republic was under no obligation to pay therein respondent Andaya just compensation in enforcing its right of way. Be that as it may the Court did not foreclose the possibility of the property owner being entitled to just compensation if the enforcement of the right of way resulted in the "taking" of the portions not subject to the legal easement. Jurisprudence teaches us that "taking," in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, "occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property." As in Andaya, even though the Republic was not legally bound to pay just compensation for enforcing its right of way, the Court nevertheless found that its project to be undertaken—the construction of floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project—would prevent ingress and egress in Andayas private property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River, effectively depriving him of the normal use of the remainder of his property. To the mind of the Court, this resulted in a "taking" of what was left of Andaya's property, entitling him to consequential damages, awarded by the Court in the form of just compensation. To demonstrate in concrete terms, the property involved in Andaya contained a total area of 10,380 square meters, which can be divided in the following manner:
The 701 square meter easement in Andaya was the site for the floodwall project. This was the extent of the right of way enforced by the government. The Court affirmed the CA ruling that the Republic may acquire the 701 square meter property free of charge, save only for the value of the improvements that may be affected. As previously discussed, the floodwall project on the 701 square meter property would have deprived Andaya of the normal use of the remainder, i.e., both the 3,742 and the 5,937 square meter residual portions. But of the two, the Court held that Andaya is entitled to just compensation only for the 5,937 square meter span. The Court ratiocinated that though unutilized, the 3,742 square meter portion is still covered by Sec. 112 of CA 141 that limits the property owner's compensation to the value of the improvements, not of the value of the property per se. To recapitulate, two elements must concur before the property owner will be entitled to just compensation for the remaining property under Sec. 112 of CA 141:
This doctrine in Andaya was reiterated in the recent Republic v. Regulto. We now apply the same parameters for determining petitioner's entitlement to just compensation in the case at bar. Recall that the subject property in this case is a 400 square meter parcel of land. The 223 square meter portion of the subject property was traversed by respondents' Metro Manila Skyway Project. And as noted by the CA, the subdivision plan shows that the covered area corresponds to the widths of 13.92 meters and 13.99 meters, well within the 60-meter width threshold provided by law. Respondents are then not under any legal obligation to pay just compensation for utilizing the 223 square meter portion pursuant to the Republic's right of way under Sec. 112 of CA 141, and in accordance with our ruling in Andaya. Anent the remaining 177 square meters of the 400 square meter lot, suffice it to state that it was never proved that the said area was not subject to the statutory lien. Neither was it established that despite not having been utilized for the Metro Manila Skyway Project, the enforcement of the easement resulted in the "taking" of the remaining property all the same. There is then no evidentiary basis for awarding petitioner just compensation, as correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA. However, petitioner remains the owner of the said 177 square meters and can fully exercise all the rights of ownership over the same. Respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering the initial payment of P1,480,000 from petitioner Guilty of reiteration, Sec. 112 of CA 141 precludes petitioner from claiming just compensation for the government's enforcement of its right of way. The contract allegedly entered by the parties for the government's acquisition of the affected portion of the property in exchange for just compensation is then void ab initio for being contrary to law. Consequently, petitioner has no right to collect just compensation for the government's use of the 223 square meter lot. Anent the P1,480,000 partial payment already made by respondents, such amount paid shall be governed by the provisions on solutio indebiti or unjust enrichment. "Solutio indebiti" arises when something is delivered through mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has been received through mistake. As defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, the concept has two indispensable requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered through mistake; and second, that something was received when there was no right to demand it. As discussed above, petitioner was never entitled to collect and receive just compensation for the government's enforcement of its right of way, including the P1,480,000 payment made by respondents. For its part, the government erroneously made payment to petitioner because of its failure to discover earlier on that the portion of the property acquired was subject to a statutory lien in its favor, which it could have easily learned of upon perusal of petitioner's Order of Award. These circumstances satisfy the requirements for solutio indebiti to apply. Regardless, respondents' action to compel petitioner to return what was mistakenly delivered is now barred by the doctrine of estoppel. The doctrine is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case. As a general rule, the State cannot be barred by estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. But as jurisprudence elucidates, the doctrine is subject to exceptions, viz: Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except [in rare] and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations ..., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals. In this case, petitioner was erroneously paid P1,480,000 on August 14, 1997 when respondents appropriated the amount in his favor. However, because of respondents' representation that the amount was a mere downpayment for just compensation, petitioner never objected to the taking of his land and peacefully parted with his property, expecting to be paid in full for the value of the taken property thereafter. As the events unfolded, respondents did not make good their guarantee. Instead, they would claim for the recovery of the wrongful payment after almost twelve (12) years, on July 9, 2009, as a counterclaim in their Supplemental Answer. Indubitably, respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering from petitioner the amount initially paid. A modification of the assailed CA ruling is, therefore, in order. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The award to respondents for the recovery of the P1,480,000 initial payment is hereby DELETED as their right to a refund has already prescribed. Petitioner Danilo Bartolata remains the owner of the 177 square meter portion and can exercise all rights of ownership over the said lot. SO ORDERED. Bersamin, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe,* and Tijam, JJ., concur. | |
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