Case Digest: Mercader, Jr. vs. Bardilas, G.R. No. 163157. June 27, 2016.
- Get link
- X
- Other Apps
CASE TITLE: Mercader, Jr. vs. Bardilas | |
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 163157. June 27, 2016. | |
PONENTE: Bersamin, J. | |
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari | |
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS:
| |
FACTS:
| |
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners acquired their right to the road right of way by title. NO | |
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES | |
PETITIONER | RESPONDENTS |
|
|
PREVAILING PARTY: Respondents | |
DECISION/DOCTRINE: The owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement. We cannot sustain the petitioners' claim that they acquired their right to the road right of way by title. Easement or servitude, according to Valdez v. Tabisula, is "a real right constituted on another's property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person." "It exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another. " It is settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent easement in the context of Article 622 of the Civil Code, which provides that continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of title. But the phrase with existing Right of Way in the TCT is not one of the modes of acquisition of the easement by virtue of a title. Acquisition by virtue of title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to "the juridical act which gives birth to the easement, such as law, donation, contract, and will of the testator." A perusal of the technical description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A indicates that the phrase with existing Right of Way (3.00 meters wide) referred to or described Lot No. 5808-F-2-B,47 which was one of the boundaries defining Lot F-2-A. Moreover, under the Torrens system of land registration, the certificate of title attests "to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. The objective is to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land." The Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property described therein. What really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. As shown in the subdivision plan of Lot No. 5808-F-2, and based on the technical description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B as appearing in TCT No. 107915,52 the right of way in dispute, which is "Bounded on the SW., along line 1-2 by Lot 5808-F-J, Psd-07-01-004579; on the West along line 2-3 by Lot 5726, Cebu Cad.; on the North along line 3-4-5 by Lot 5725, Cebu Cadastre" was part of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the Spouses Bardilas. It is noteworthy that an encumbrance "subject to 3 meters wide right of way" was annotated on TCT No. 107915, which covers Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the Spouses Bardilas. As the owners of the servient estate, the Spouses Bardilas retained ownership of the road right of way even assuming that said encumbrance was for the benefit of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A of the Spouses Mercader. The latter could not claim to own even a portion of the road right of way because Article 630 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "[t]he owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement." With the right of way rightfully belonging to them as the owners of the burdened property, the Spouses Bardilas remained entitled to avail themselves of all the attributes of ownership under the Civil Code, specifically: jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus abutendi, jus disponendi and jus vindicandi. Article 428 of the Civil Code recognizes that the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. In that regard, the CA cogently pointed out: Moreover, as owners of the three (3) square meter wide road in dispute, the appellants (referring to the Bardilas spouses) may rightfully compel the petitioners-appellees to pay to them the value of the land upon which a portion of their (petitioners-appellees) house encroaches, and in case the petitioners-appellees fail to pay, the appellants may remove or demolish the encroaching portion of the petitioners-appellees' house. xxxx The second issue concerns the award of attorney's fees. Relying on Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, (Special Sixth Division), the petitioners argue that the CA erred "in awarding attorney's fees to the appellants after eliminating or refusing to award moral and exemplary damages;" that the CA did not make any finding to the effect "that the appellants were compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect their interest;” and that, consequently, the grant of attorneys' fees to the Spouses Bardillas lacked legal basis. The award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is governed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: (1) When exemplary damages is awarded; (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil case or proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim; (6) In actions for legal support; (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers; (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws; (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime; (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. APAC Marketing Corporation, the Court opined that whenever attorney's fees are granted, the basis for the grant must be clearly expressed in the judgment of the court. It expounded on why this is so: In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, this Court had the occasion to expound on the policy behind the grant of attorney's fees as actual or compensatory damages: (T)he law is clear the in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages under any of the circumstance provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. In Benedicto v. Villaflores, we explained the reason behind the need for the courts to arrive upon an actual finding to serve as basis for a grant of attorney's fees, considering the dual concept of these fees as ordinary and extraordinary: It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated to the amount paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the case within the ambit of these enumerated instances to justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be reasonable. We can glean from the above ruling that attorney's fees are not awarded as a matter of course every time a party wins. We do not put a premium on the right to litigate. On occasions that those fees are awarded, the basis for the grant must be clearly expressed in the decision of the court. In awarding attorney's fees, the CA relied on Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code. The exercise of the discretion to allow attorney's fees must likewise be justified. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, the Court said: Insofar as the present case is concerned, the lower court made no finding that it falls within any of the exceptions that would justify the award of attorney's fees, such as gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy a plainly valid, just and demandable claim. Even under the broad eleventh exception of the cited article which allows the imposition of attorney's fees "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses in litigation should be recovered," the Court stressed in Buan, supra, that "the conclusion must be borne out by findings of facts and law. What is just and equitable in a given case is not a mere matter of feeling but of demonstration . . . . Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code demands a factual, legal or equitable justification upon the basis of which the court exercises its discretion. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture." The summary award of counsel's fees made in the appealed judgment must therefore be set aside. Considering that the decision of the CA does not express any justification other than stating that attorney's fees were being awarded to the respondents "pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article 2208 of the New Civil Code," the award by the CA must be set aside; otherwise, attorney's fees would be turned into a premium on the right to litigate, which is prohibited. Moreover, attorney's fees, being in the nature of actual damages, should be based on the facts on record and the Court must delineate the legal reason for such award. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment promulgated on March 18, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 53153 with respect to Civil Case No. CEB-12783 subject to the MODIFICATION that the portion "ordering petitioners to pay the respondents the sum of ₱20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees" is DELETED; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. | |
- Get link
- X
- Other Apps
Comments
Post a Comment