Case Digest: Quimen vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996.

Easement

CASE TITLE: Quimen vs. Court of Appeals
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996.
PONENTE: Bellosillo, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: RTC - Action praying for a right of way CA - Appeal
FACTS: Anastacia Quimen and her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a property in Pandi, Bulacan and subdivided it equally. Anastacia's share, Lot No. 1448-B-1, is located at the extreme left, bounded by Sotero's Lot No. 14413-B-2 on the right. Catalina Santos later acquired the lots originally owned by Rufina and Sulpicio. Antonio's share, Lot No. 1448-B-C, was divided into Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. In February 1982, Yolanda Q. Oliveros, daughter of Sotero, purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is behind Anastacia's lot. Yolanda was hesitant to buy due to lack of road access, but Anastacia assured a right of way for P200.00 per square meter. Yolanda constructed a house on the lot and used a portion of Anastacia's property as a pathway. When Yolanda offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment and barred her from passing through the property. In February 1986, Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-B behind her parents' property, who provided a pathway to the road. The pathway was obstructed by Sotero's store, making direct access to the municipal road difficult. In December 1987, Yolanda filed for a right of way through Anastacia's property. An ocular inspection suggested an unobstructed path through Anastacia's property, except for an avocado tree. RTC: Dismissed the complaint, suggesting an extension of the existing pathway instead. CA: Reversed the decision, granting Yolanda a right of way through Anastacia's property as the least damaging option.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the one-meter by five-meter passage way proposed by private respondent is the least prejudicial and the shortest distance to the public road. NO
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES
PETITIONER	RESPONDENTS
Petitioner claims her agreement was to provide a right of way on another lot of Antonio Quimen, which was under her administration before it was sold to the private respondent. Petitioner insists that passing through Yolanda's parents' property is more accessible to the public road than detouring through her property and cutting down the avocado tree.	-
PREVAILING PARTY: Respondent
DECISION/DOCTRINE: But we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court granting a right of way to private respondent through petitioner's property. In fact, as between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their agreement has already been rendered moot insofar as it concerns the determination of the principal issue herein presented. The voluntary easement in favor of private respondent, which petitioner now denies but which the court is inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement or an easement by necessity constituted by law.  As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement. It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law.  A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass over another's property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.  The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway;  the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.  A cursory examination of the complaint of respondent Yolanda for a right of way readily shows that Even before the purchase of the said parcels of land the plaintiff was reluctant to purchase the same for they are enclosed with permanent improvements like a concrete fence and store and have (sic) no egress leading to the road but because of the assurance of the defendant that plaintiff will be provided one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long right of way in the sum of P200.00 per square meter to be taken from Anastacia's lot at the side of a concrete store until plaintiff reach(es) her father's land, plaintiff was induced to buy the aforesaid parcels of land . . . That the aforesaid right of way is the shortest, most convenient and the least onerous leading to the road and being used by the plaintiff's predecessors-in-interest from the very inception . . . The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that "[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway."  Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way proposed by private respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.  The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. This is the test. In the trial court, petitioner openly admitted Q. You testified during your direct examination about this plan, kindly go over this and please point to us in what portion of this plan is the house or store of the father of the (plaintiff )? A. This one, sir (witness pointed a certain portion located near the proposed right of way). xxx xxx xxx Q. Now, you will agree with me . . . that this portion is the front portion of the lot owned by the father of the plaintiff and which was (sic) occupied by a store made up of strong materials? A. It is not true, sir. Q. What materials does (sic) this store of the father of the plaintiff made of? A. Hollow blocks and the side is made of wood, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q. Just before your brother disposed that 1/2 portion of the lot in question, what right of way does (sic) he use in reaching the public road, kindly point to this sketch that he is (sic) using in reaching the public road? A. In my property, sir. Q. Now you will agree with me . . . the main reason why your brother is (sic) using this property is because there was a store located near this portion? A. Yes, and according to the father of Yolanda there is no other way than this, sir.  The trial court found that Yolanda's property was situated at the back of her father's property and held that there existed an available space of about nineteen (19) meters long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda's father; that the vacant space ended at the left back of Sotero's store which was made of strong materials; that this explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway. But notwithstanding its factual observations, the trial court concluded, although erroneously, that Yolanda was not entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property since a detour through it would not make the line straight and would not be the route shortest to the public highway. In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's father which would mean destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials.  Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence presented all over again where the petition would necessarily invite calibration of the whole evidence considering primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other, and the probabilities of the situation. In sum, this Court finds that the decision of respondent appellate court is thoroughly backed up by law and the evidence. WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED and the decision subject of review is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.