Case Digest: Rana vs. Wong, G.R. No. 192861 and 192862. June 30, 2014

Nuisances

CASE TITLE: Rana vs. Wong
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 192861 and 192862. June 30, 2014
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: RTC -  Abatement of Nuisance with Damage CA - Appeal
FACTS: Teresita Lee Wong and Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong own residential land in Peace Valley Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City (Wong-Ong property). The Wong-Ong property abuts a 10-meter wide subdivision road (subject road). Across the subject road are lots owned by Spouses Wilson and Rosario Uy (Uy property) and Spouses Reynaldo and Linda Rana (Rana property). The Rana property is about two meters higher than the Uy property, while the Wong-Ong property is at the same level as the subject road. In 1997, Sps. Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the subject road to level it with their gate and backfilled the perimeter fence between the Rana and Uy properties without a retaining wall. Wong, Sps. Ong, and Sps. Uy filed a complaint for abatement of nuisance with damages against Sps. Rana, seeking to: Declare the elevated portion a nuisance affecting their ingress and egress. Declare the backfilling a nuisance posing danger to the Uy family due to potential fence collapse. Compel Sps. Rana to restore the subject portion and remove backfilling materials. Pay damages and legal fees. Sps. Rana’s Answer: No existing road before their residence construction; they developed the subject portion for access. Wong and Sps. Ong’s property faces another road (Justice Street), so they do not need the subject portion. Denied backfilling along the Uy property boundary due to the natural elevation of their property. Wong, et al. filed a Motion for Heavy Equipment for intermediate development of the Wong-Ong property using the subject road for access. RTC: Granted permission to use heavy equipment to develop the area. Wong, et al. leveled the subject portion, hindering Sps. Rana’s property access and entrapping their vehicle in the garage. Sps. Rana's Supplemental Answer: Restoration of soil, boulders, grade, contour, and level of the subject portion. Payment of moral, actual, consequential, and exemplary damages. RTC: Civil Case No. CEB-20893: Both parties acted in bad faith and were denied relief. Sps. Rana’s backfilling constituted a nuisance, and they were ordered to build a retaining wall. Civil Case No. CEB-21296: Despite findings of slight encroachment, both parties' claims of bad faith were dismissed. CA: Civil Case No. CEB-20893: Affirmed that Sps. Rana’s actions curtailed Wong and Sps. Ong’s property use. Wong, et al.’s actions hampered Sps. Rana’s property access. Both parties were at fault and not entitled to relief. Required Sps. Rana to undertake necessary works to prevent backfilling hazards. Civil Case No. CEB-21296: Upheld the dismissal of the complaint and parties' claims for damages.
ISSUE: Whether the Court applying the in pari delicto doctrine against them and failing to abate the nuisance which still continues and actually exists as Sps. Rana caused the same to be reconstructed and restored to their prejudice.
ARGUMENTS/LEGAL BASES
PETITIONER	RESPONDENTS
Petitioner Linda Rana faults the RTC in not finding Wong and Sps. Uy guilty of malice and bad faith  failing or refusing to grant the reliefs initially prayed for, among others, the reconveyance of the encroached property.	Petitioners Wong, et al. fault the RTC in  applying the in pari delicto doctrine against them and failing to abate the nuisance which still continues and actually exists as Sps. Rana caused the same to be reconstructed and restored to their prejudice, and not finding Sps. Rana guilty of bad faith.
PREVAILING PARTY:
DECISION/DOCTRINE: The petitions are partly meritorious. As both petitions traverse the issues intersectingly, the Court deems it apt to proceed with its disquisition according to the subject matters of the cases as originally filed before the RTC. A. Civil Case No. CEB-20893 For Abatement of Nuisance and Damages. Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is defined as "any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:  Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or  Annoys or offends the senses; or Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or  Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or  Hinders or impairs the use of property. Based on case law, however, the term "nuisance" is deemed to be "so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort." Article 695 of the Civil Code classifies nuisances with respect to the object or objects that they affect. In this regard, a nuisance may either be: a public nuisance or one which affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal; or  a private nuisance or one that is not included in the foregoing definition or, as case law puts it, one which violates only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few persons. Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary abatement (that is, corrective action without prior judicial permission).  In this regard, a nuisance may either be:  a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity; a nuisance per accidens or that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance. It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated.  In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. Jac Liner, Inc., the Court, citing other cases on the matter, emphasized the need for judicial intervention when the nuisance is not a nuisance per se, to wit: In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals, this Court held: Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per sea nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac where the appellant-municipality similarly argued that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the Municipal Council via an ordinance, this Court held: "Suffice it to say that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed. This appellant failed to do." Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should be taken under the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private nuisances) of the Civil Code, a private person whose property right was invaded or unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission, establishment, business or condition of the property of another may file a civil action to recover personal damages. Abatement may be judicially sought through a civil action therefor if the pertinent requirements under the Civil Code for summary abatement, or the requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance per se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of abatement and damages are cumulative; hence, both may be demanded. In the present cases, Wong, et al. availed of the remedy of judicial abatement and damages against Sps.Rana, claiming that both the elevated and cemented subject portion and the subject backfilling are "nuisances" caused/created by the latter which curtailed their use and enjoyment of their properties. With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the same is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was admittedly located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong properties. Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per se (but actually a nuisance per accidens as will be later discussed) it cannot be summarily abated. As such, Wong, et al.’s demolition of Sps. Rana’s subject portion, which was not sanctioned under the RTC’s November 27, 1997 Order, remains unwarranted. Resultantly, damages ought to be awarded in favor of Sps. Rana particularly that of  nominal damages – for the vindication and recognition of Sps. Rana’s right to be heard before the court prior to Wong, et al.’s abatement of the subject portion (erroneously perceived as a nuisance per se) – and  temperate damages – for the pecuniary loss owing to the demolition of the subject portion, which had been established albeit uncertain as to the actual amount of loss. Sps. Rana’s entitlement to the above-mentioned damages, however, only stands in theory.  This is because the actual award thereof is precluded by the damage they themselves have caused Wong, et al. in view of their construction of the subject portion. As the records establish, Sps. Rana, without prior consultation with Wong, et al. and to their sole advantage, elevated and cemented almost half of the 10-meter wide subject road. As homeowners of Peace Valley Subdivision, Wong, et al. maintain the rights to the unobstructed use of and free passage over the subject road. By constructing the subject portion, Sps. Rana introduced a nuisance per accidens that particularly transgressed the aforesaid rights. Thus, for the vindication and recognition of Wong, et al.’srights, Sps. Rana should be similarly held liable for nominal damages. Under Article 2216 of the Civil Code, courts have the discretion to determine awards of nominal and temperate damages without actual proof of pecuniary loss, as in this case. Assessing the respective infractions of the parties herein, the Court finds it prudent to sustain the CA’s verdict offsetting the damage caused by said parties against each other. The Court can, however, only concur with the CA in result since the latter inaccurately applied, as basis for its ruling, the in pari delicto principle enunciated in the case of Yu Bun Guan v. Ong (Yu Guan).In said case, the Court discussed the in pari delicto principle with respect to the subject matter of inexistent and void contracts, viz.: Inapplicability of the in Pari Delicto Principle The principle of in pari delictoprovides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. However, this principle does not apply with respect to inexistent and void contracts. Said this Court in Modina v. Court of Appeals: "The principle of in pari delicto non oritur actio denies all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. It applies to cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration orthe purpose of the contract. When two persons are equally at fault, the law does not relieve them. The exception to this general rule is when the principle is invoked with respect to inexistent contracts." Clearly, no void or inexistent contract is hereinat issue, hence, the Court’s disagreement with the CA’s invocation of Yu Guanin this respect. As for the subject backfilling touching the perimeter fence of the Uy property, records show that the said fence was not designed to act as a retaining wall but merely to withhold windload and its own load. Both the RTC and the CA found the subject backfilling to have added pressure on the fence, consequently endangering the safety of the occupants of the Uy property, especially considering the higher elevation of the Rana property. With these findings, the Court thus agrees with the courts a quo that there is a need for Linda Rana to construct a retaining wall which would bear the weight and pressure of the filling materials introduced on their property. The Court, however, observed that neither the RTC nor the CA specified in their respective decisions the backfilled areas which would require the retaining wall. Due to the technicality of the matter, and considering that the due authenticity and genuineness of the findings/recommendation of the OBO and the accompanying sketch thereto were not specifically denied by Sps. Rana, the required retaining wall shall be constructed in accordance with the said sketch which showed the area backfilled. B. Civil Case No. CEB-21296 For Recovery of Property. Now, with respect to Civil Case No. CEB-21296, the Court finds that the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s dismissal thereof considering that it was determined that Sps. Uy had actually encroached upon the Rana property to the extent of 2 sq. m. Settled is the rule that in order that an action for the recovery of property may prosper, the party prosecuting the same need only prove the identity of the thing and his ownership thereof. In the present cases, the Report of the court-appointed commissioner, Atty. Pintor, who conducted a relocation survey of the Rana and Uy properties identified and delineated the boundaries of the two properties and showed that Sps. Uy’s perimeter fence intruded on 2 sq. m.of the Rana property.  Both the RTC and the CA relied upon the said report; thus, absent any competent showing that the said finding was erroneous, the Court sees no reason to deviate from the conclusions reached by the courts a quo.  Having sufficiently proven their claim, Sps. Rana are, therefore entitled to the return of the 2 sq.m. encroached portion. Corollary thereto, compliance by Linda Rana with the directive in Civil Case No. CEB-20893 to build a retaining wall on their property shall be held in abeyance pending return of the encroached portion. C. Claims Common to Both Civil Case No. CEB-20893 and Civil Case No. CEB-21296: Malicious Prosecution of Both Cases, Moral and Exemplary Damages, Attorney’s Fees, and Litigation Expenses. As a final matter, the Court resolves the claims common to both Civil Case No. CEB-20893 and Civil Case No. CEB-21296, particularly those on malicious prosecution, as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. As the Court sees it, the filing by the parties of their respective complaints against each other was not clearly and convincingly shown to have been precipitated by any malice or bad faith, sufficient enough to warrant the payment of damages in favor of either party. As correctly pointed out by the CA, malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence of two (2) elements, namely: (a) malice; and (b) absence of probable cause. Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person; and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and baseless. Hence, the mere filing of a suit which subsequently turns out to be unsuccessful does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. As the aforementioned elements were not duly proven, the claims for malicious prosecution are hereby denied. With respect to the claims for moral damages, although the Court found the parties to have sustained nominal damages as a result of the other parties’ acts, an award of moral damages would nonetheless be improper in this case. Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "[m]oral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission." Corollary thereto, Article 2219 of the same code (Article 2219) states that "[m]oral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; [and] (10) Actsand actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35." Here, it was not proven that the damage caused by (a) Sps. Rana against Wong, et al., arising from the elevation and cementing of the subject portion and the subject backfilling, and (b) Sps. Uy against Sps. Rana, by virtue of their 2 sq. m. encroachment, could be characterized as a form of or had resulted in physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or any other similar injury. Neitherwas it convincingly shown that the present controversies fall within the class of cases enumerated under Article 2219. Therefore, no moral damages should be awarded. Similarly, the Court deems that an award of exemplary damages would be inappropriate since these damages are imposed only "by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages." Bluntly placed, the Court does not view the present matters of such caliber. Hence, there is no reason to grant the parties’ claims for the same. Lastly, considering that neither of the parties was able to successfully prove (a) their claims for malicious prosecution, (b) their entitlement to moral and exemplary damages,81 and (c) the attendance of any of the circumstances under Article 220882 of the Civil Code, their respective claims for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses against each other are also denied. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 13, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 18, 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78463 are SET ASIDE and a new one is entered as follows: In Civil Case No. CEB-20893: (a) The awards of damages in favor of each party are OFFSET against each other as herein discussed; (b) Linda Rana is hereby ORDERED to build, at her own expense, a retaining wall on the property covered by TCT No. 124095 in accordance with the sketch of the Office of the Building Official of Cebu City attached to the records of the case, subject to the condition as shall be hereunder set; and (c) All other claims and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of legal and factual bases. In Civil Case No. CEB-21296: (a) Spouses Rosario and Wilson Uy are DIRECTED to return to Linda Rana the 2-square meter encroached portion as reflected in the relocation survey conducted by court-appointed commissioner Atty. Reuel T. Pintor, after which Linda Rana shall be OBLIGED to build the retaining wall as directed by the Court; and (b) All other claims and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.