Case Digest: Sps. Santos, et al. vs. Pizardo, et al., G.R. No. 151452, July 29, 2005

 

CASE TITLE:  Santos vs. Pizarro
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 151452, July 29, 2005
PONENTE: Tinga, J.
CASE WITH THE SC: PETITION FOR REVIEW on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS:
FACTS: In 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries after a vehicle collision involving a southbound Viron Transit bus he was driving and a a northbound Lite Ace Van, resulting in four deaths and injuries to five passengers. MCTC (1998): Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months; no civil liability was pronounced as a separate civil action was reserved. On October 20, 2000, the victims' families filed a civil complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit, and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris. Viron Transit sought to dismiss the complaint, citing improper service of summons, prescription, laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. RTC-QC: Dismissed the complaint, ruling it had prescribed under the four-year period applicable to quasi-delict actions, despite the petitioners' claim that the action was based on the final judgment of conviction, which prescribes in ten years. The trial court also initially cited improper service of summons as a ground for dismissal but later reconsidered this ruling. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, with the trial court reiterating that the cause of action was based on quasi-delict and had prescribed. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. CA: Dismissed the petition due to an error in the mode of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause of action invoked by petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action had prescribed. YES
ALLEGATIONS	DEFENSE
Petitioners argued that the action was based on criminal liability (ex delicto) and should be exempt from the rigid rules of procedure.	Private respondents countered that the action was for quasi-delict, subject to a four-year prescriptive period, and that certiorari was improper as appeal was the appropriate remedy.
PREVAILING PARTY:
DECISION/DOCTRINE: GRANTED We grant the petition. Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three notable exceptions:  first, when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the accused;  second, when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and  third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case. Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed the institution of the criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states: Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others. The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages. In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial. Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latter’s civil liability. Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private respondents’ civil liability arising from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners’ cause of action was based on quasi delict and should have been brought within four (4) years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident. A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners’ claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and independent civil liabilities, such as those  not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or  where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company was decided upon a similar set of facts. Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property. The plaintiff made an express reservation for the filing of a separate civil action. The driver was convicted which conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi delict which was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was instituted more than six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action, this time based on the subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court dismissed the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to the filing of the action to enforce the bus company’s subsidiary liability. We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee. Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners’ allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime. This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons. Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the order of dismissal of the trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be exempted from the strict application of the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of securing substantial justice. We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a final judgment of conviction based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an injustice. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing the present action and denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.