Case Digest: Buencamino vs. People, et al. GR Nos. 216745-46, November 10, 2020
Evidence | Rule 130
Caguioa, J,
Petitioner: Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino
Respondent: People of the Philippines, Sandiganbayan
Recit Ver:
The court found that the element of evident bad faith was not proven in the petitioner’s conviction. The prosecution's evidence failed both in admissibility and probative value. Several documentary evidence presented by the prosecution were deemed inadmissible as they were mere photocopies, violating the Best Evidence Rule, and were excluded due to timely objections. Even if admitted, the evidence failed to establish that the petitioner acted with evident bad faith in collecting pass way fees, as he relied on an inoperative resolution based on assurances from municipal officials. The court also found no sufficient proof that the petitioner acted with dishonest intent or ulterior motives, and the fees collected were properly remitted to the Municipal Treasury.
Facts:
Petitioner Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino, Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Bulacan was charged with two counts of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
SB-06-CRM-0419:
Buencamino allegedly collected an illegal "pass way" fee of Php 1,000 per truck from Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation (RMDC), knowing the fee was not legally sanctioned by any resolution or ordinance.
SB-06-CRM-0420:
Buencamino also allegedly ordered the impounding of RMDC trucks for failure to pay the "pass way" fee, causing undue injury to RMDC.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Constantino Pascual (President of RMDC), who testified that Buencamino demanded the illegal fee and impounded RMDC trucks. Constantino discovered that no ordinance covered the fees, and municipal officials confirmed no remittance to the treasury. He filed an administrative and criminal case after confirming the invalidity of the fees through a DILG investigation.
Zenaida Pascual (RMDC Operations Manager), who claimed RMDC's operations were harmed due to the impounding of trucks and diversion of royalties.
Marciano Cruz (Municipal Treasurer), who pointed out that there were irregularities in the issuance of receipts for the pass way fees (issued before the receipt books were released). A Librarian Aide, not a Cash Clerk, issued the receipts. Fee collections were remitted late but eventually deposited.
Clarissa Pascual (Corporate Secretary of RMDC), who confirmed paying the illegal pass way fees.
Buencamino denied knowledge of the invalidity of the ordinance authorizing pass way fees, claimed he followed legal advice, and refuted allegations of ordering the impounding of RMDC trucks. He argued that all fees collected were remitted to the municipal treasury.
Sandiganbayan: Buencamino was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both counts of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
He was sentenced to 6 years and 1 month to 8 years imprisonment, with perpetual disqualification from public office for both criminal cases.
Buencamino argued that the evidence used against him, such as photocopies of documents, were inadmissible and that his actions did not constitute evident bad faith.
He also claimed that he had no intent to cause harm, having relied on municipal officials' assurances, but the Sandiganbayan found these defenses insufficient.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner of two counts of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. YES
Held:
The petition is impressed with merit and the Court acquits.
In all criminal cases, the prosecution is burdened with the duty of establishing with proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of an accused. The determination of whether the prosecution has fulfilled such a heavy burden is left to the trial court, which, in turn, must be satisfied with moral certainty that an accused has indeed committed the crime on the basis of facts and circumstances to warrant a judgment of conviction. Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, acquittal must then follow,[89] for all accused are presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
Petitioner here is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
x x x x
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur, to wit:
the offender is a public officer;
the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial functions;
the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
The presence of the first and second elements are not disputed. Petitioner was the Mayor of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, and the acts complained of were done in the exercise of his official functions.
The dispute lies in whether the third element was proven, particularly whether his act of collecting the pass way fees was done in evident bad faith and resulted in giving RMDC or the government undue injury. The Court here finds that the prosecution failed to establish beyond doubt the third element of evident bad faith as charged under the Informations levelled against petitioner.
The case the prosecution built fails on two fatal points.
First, the Court agrees with petitioner's observation that a variance does exist between the mode of commission petitioner was charged with (i.e., evident bad faith) vis-Γ -vis the one he was convicted with (gross inexcusable negligence).
Second, and even granting in arguendo the prosecution's claim that the gross inexcusable negligence was discussed by the Sandiganbayan merely to flesh out the element of evident bad faith, and that no variance as to the mode of commission existed, the Court finds, after a careful contemplation of the entire body of evidence, that the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner's assailed acts were attended by evident bad faith. The Court here agrees with petitioner's objection to the admissibility of several pieces of documentary evidence offered by the prosecution on the ground of them being hearsay evidence. And still, even if the Court admits the entire body of documentary evidence as submitted by the prosecution, it is compelled to find that what it only managed to show is that petitioner's acts stemmed not from ill will or evident bad faith, but from an honest albeit erroneous reliance on a defunct legal authority.
Variance on Mode of Commission
It must first be considered that there are three modes by which the offense for violation of Section 3(e) may be committed:
Through evident bad faith;
Through manifest partiality;
Through gross inexcusable negligence.
To recall, the Informations alleged that petitioner committed two counts of violation of Section 3(e) through evident bad faith, as worded in the accusatory portions thereof:
Criminal Case No. SB-06-CRM-0419
x x x [T]he above-named accused, EDMUNDO JOSE T. BUENCAMINO, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Bulacan, while in the performance of his official duties and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, through evident bad faith, cause undue injury to Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation by collecting "pass way" fees, through a certain Robert Tabarnero, in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per truck x x x.[93]
Criminal Case No. SB-06-CRM-0420
x x x [T]he above-named accused, EDMUNDO JOSE T. BUENCAMINO, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Bulacan, while in the performance of his official duties and committing the crime in relation to his office, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, through evident bad faith cause undue unjury to Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation by ordering the apprehension and impounding of the delivery trucks bearing plate numbers PSZ-706 and UEX-283 of the Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation x x x.
The plain language of both Informations indicate that petitioner was charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 through the modality of evident bad faith. Against and inconsistent with this singular modality as charged, however, the Sandiganbayan's conviction of petitioner significantly grounded its finding of fault on the discussion of petitioner's gross negligence, to wit:
The accused imposed and collected payment for pass way fee knowing fully well that he is without authority of law, decree, ordinance or resolution to do so.
x x x x
Also, Buencamino's inexcusable negligence is manifest in his act of allowing an ex-Barangay Captain, not an employee of the municipality and not even a bonded person, to implement the collection of the [pass way] fee. He should have acted with much caution considering that he had just assumed the mayoralty on June 30, 2004, or just a few days prior the collection of [pass way] fee. Under the Local Government Code, the collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private person. Thus, Tabernero's designation to collect the [pass way] fees, made without the knowledge of the Sangguniang Bayan and the Municipal Treasurer, is highly irregular. Buencamino's acts and omissions are grossly negligent. Gross negligence is the pursuit of a course of conduct which would naturally and reasonably result in injury. It is an utter disregard of or conscious indifference to consequences.
Thus, we are persuaded from a study of the evidence that accused was actuated by a dishonest purpose or ill-will partaking of some furtive design or ulterior purpose to do wrong and cause damage. Accused acted recklessly or in utter disregard of consequence so as to suggest some degree of intent to cause injury. x x x
What is clear to the Court from the foregoing disquisition of the Sandiganbayan is that it convicted petitioner on the modality of gross inexcusable negligence, which is separate and distinct from the modality of evident bad faith petitioner was charged with in the Informations. This stark variance, as correctly pleaded by petitioner, is violative of his constitutional right to due process, specifically his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
The recently decided en banc case of Villarosa v. People is acutely instructive:
Yet, even as petitioner's actions were clearly not proven to be tinged with evident bad faith, there are still those that opine that an acquittal should not logically follow. The dissent advances the view that petitioner could still be convicted for violation of Section [3(e) of R.A.] 3019 because the latter's actions may be considered to fall under the rubric of gross inexcusable negligence regardless. The dissent further points out that such a conviction would be justified — even if the Informations against petitioner do not contain any allegation of gross inexcusable negligence — following the case of Sistoza v. Desierto. This is plain error.
Contrary to the dissent's view, it would be highly improper, nay unconstitutional, to convict petitioner on the basis of gross inexcusable negligence. It must be emphasized that the Informations tiled against petitioner all accuse the latter of violating Section [3(e) of R.A.] 3019] through the modality of evident bad faith only. Not one Information accused petitioner of violating the same provision through gross inexcusable negligence. As can be derived from our earlier discussions, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence are two of the three modalities of committing violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Also, by our previous discussion, we were able to establish that each modality of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is actually distinct from the others. Hence, while all three modalities may be alleged simultaneously in a single information for violation of Section [3(e) of R.A.] 3019, an allegation of only one modality without mention of the others necessarily means the exclusion of those not mentioned. Verily, an accusation for a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 committed through evident bad faith only, cannot be considered as synonymous to, or includes an accusation of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 committed through gross inexcusable negligence.
x x x x
x x x Convicting petitioner of violation of Section 3 (e) of [R.A.] 3019 on the basis of gross inexcusable negligence, when he was but charged of committing the violation by means of evident bad faith only, would be highly unfair as it effectively deprives the petitioner of the opportunity to defend himself against a novel accusation. This outcome simply cannot be countenanced.
x x x x
Alas, even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner may be held accountable for the issuance of the subject extraction permits, such is not for the offense charged in the present Informations, as the acts being complained of do not constitute the elements of the crime presently charged. x x x
The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Comment, reasons that the discussion on gross inexcusable negligence was only made to "paint the grand extent" of how an act of gross negligence can be considered evident bad faith.
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either:
by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or
by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence.
The two modalities of violating Section 3(e) are distinct in their nature of commission:
"evident bad faith" entails the willfulness to do something wrong,
whereas "gross inexcusable negligence" entails failure to exercise the required diligence that either results in a wrong or in the failure to prevent the occurrence of a wrongdoing.
Thus, "gross inexcusable negligence" and "evident bad faith" are separate and distinct modalities, and a charge of one in an Information may not be considered extendible to a conviction for the other. Petitioner here, therefore, may not be convicted on the basis of gross inexcusable negligence, since the said modality was not included in the charge levelled against him on both counts.
Element of Evident Bad Faith Not Proven or is otherwise Absent
Even without the glaring variance between the modality of commission which petitioner was charged with and the one he was convicted with, the Court remains unconvinced that petitioner's conviction is in order. The prosecution alleges that petitioner is guilty of evident bad faith. However, the Court agrees with petitioner and finds that there is no sufficient evidence to prove the element of evident bad faith on either count.
The failure on the prosecution's collective evidence is two-tiered:
admissibility and
probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. The prosecution's pieces of documentary evidence failed on both, in that even if they hurdled the requirement of admissibility, they still would fail when tested in the crucible of probative worth.
First, even before proceeding to the probative merit of the prosecution's evidence, the Court holds that several documentary evidence upon which the prosecution relied for establishing petitioner's guilt were correctly objectionable for being hearsay evidence, and are therefore inadmissible.
Petitioner specifically objected to the following documentary evidence for being hearsay:
photocopy of a certified photocopy of Kapasiyahan Blg. 504 of Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Bulacan dated September 11, 1989;
photocopy of a certified photocopy of the Second Indorsement dated August 10, 1989 from the Office of the Provincial Attorney; and
photocopy of a letter dated November 8, 2004 addressed to Atty. Palubon from the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan; and
photocopy of the DILG Preliminary Report dated issued on September 13, 2004.
The Best Evidence Rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence. As such, mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible. Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment, and courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered. In the case at bar, petitioner made timely objections to each challenged documentary evidence, and they are therefore fittingly excluded.
The OSP's argument that the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence does not apply when a party uses a document to prove the existence of an independent fact, as to which the writing is merely collateral or incident, is clearly misplaced. There is no gainsaying here that in the case at bar, the photocopies, which were submitted as documentary evidence, were offered not to prove an independent fact in relation to which the document's content is considered merely incidental or collateral. On the contrary, the questioned documentary evidence were offered to prove precisely the truth of the contents therein. As cited in the prosecution's own Formal Offer of Evidence, the documents sought to prove the truth of their written content:
Kapasiyahan Blg. 504 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan dated September 11, 1989, which disapproved Kapasiyahan 89A-055/Kautusang Bayan 029, was offered precisely "to prove that accused imposed and collected pass way fee or regulatory fee without any legal basis";[109]
The Second Indorsement dated August 10, 1989 from the Office of the Provincial Attorney was offered for the purpose of proving that "the Municipal Resolution No. 055/089-A could not be a valid for the imposition and collection of regulatory fee;" and that it was also offered to "prove the evident bad faith of the accused in his imposition and collection of regulatory fee or pass way fee without any legal basis";
The letter dated November 8, 2004 addressed to Atty. Palubon from the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan was submitted "to prove that the accused imposed the pass way or regulatory fee without any legal basis; [and was also] offered as part of the testimony of Prosecution witness Constantino Pascual";
The DILG Preliminary Report was offered and appreciated to have shown that despite the DILG's questioning of the propriety of the imposition of the pass way fees, petitioner nevertheless continued the collection of the same, which allegedly evidenced bad faith.
Clearly belying the OSP's submission, these photocopied documents were offered as proof of the facts of their contents, and not for any other independent fact. More, the probative purposes of these documents go into the heart of the accusation against petitioner, i.e., that he knowingly imposed the pass way fees fully aware of the absence of any legal authority for the same, and hence did so in evident bad faith. Therefore, since these documents, offered for the truth value of their contents, were mere photocopies, these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay and for failing to comply with the Best Evidence Rule.
At this juncture, the Court would be remiss in its duty if it did not call out this failure on the part of the Sandiganbayan to capture this patent inadmissibility. It does not help that the assailed Decision did not make any reference to or otherwise rule on petitioner's objections to the admissibility of the photocopy documentary evidence. The Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the objections over said documentary evidence immediately at that time, and already excluded them for being inadmissible under Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence. Had such a finding of inadmissibility been made, the case could have been dismissed at that point. Such a ruling on admissibility would have then spared everyone concerned the nearly six additional years and the sizeable cost of further litigation that the case took — all the way to this Court.
Second, even if the Court accords admissibility to the prosecution's core documentary evidence, the Court finds that they nevertheless fall short of persuading that petitioner's act of imposing the pass way fees was attended by evident bad faith.
"Evident bad faith" does not only mean bad judgment but a palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind that is positively motivated by some furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.
To recap, the Sandiganbayan found evident bad faith on the first count in petitioner's acts of
imposing the pass way fees even though he knew "fully well" that he had no authority to do so,
authorizing Tabernero to collect the pass way fees in behalf of the Municipal Treasurer, and
imposing the pass way fees in a confiscatory and excessive manner for having gone beyond the usually estimated amount per cubic meter cost under the defunct resolution.[
For the second count, evident bad faith was similarly appreciated in petitioner's act of instructing the impounding of RMDC's trucks for the latter's failure to pay the pass way fees even before he authorized Tabernero to receive said fees.
After careful consideration, the Court here finds there was insufficient evidence to persuade a finding of evident bad faith in the contemplation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Still conversely, the Court here finds a considerable number of factual instances that negate evident bad faith and convince that petitioner here clearly erred not pursuant to a surreptitious design, but out of an honest but misplaced reliance on an inoperative resolution.
First, contrary to the summary finding that petitioner knew that Kapasiyahan 89A-055/Kautusang Bayan 029 had been earlier revoked, and nevertheless persisted in imposing the pass way fees said resolution imposed, petitioner was consistent and unwavering in his denial that at the time he allowed the imposition of said fees, he was under the assured information from both the Municipal Treasurer and the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary that said resolution subsisted and was in force. Both on direct and cross examination, petitioner's testimony maintained that he was not aware of the revocation, as the same was never transmitted:
[ATTY. MENDOZA:]
Now, according to the testimony also of prosecution witness Mr. Constantino Pascual[,] this [Kapasiyahan Blg. 89A-055] or [Kautusang Bayan 029] which you just mentioned was already declared void by the provincial board of Bulacan, what do you say to this statement?
[MR. BUENCAMINO:]
I have no prior knowledge of that allegation of Mr. Pascual, sir. [In fact], as I have mentioned earlier[,] I was only informed by the municipal treasurer that there was an existing Kautusan and that the municipal treasurer 's office was collecting the fees from Mr. Pascual, sir.
Q
To your knowledge was there any record of the decision of the provincial board of Bulacan voiding the [Kapasiyahan Blg. 89A-055] in the record of your municipality?
A
No, sir. There is no existing record of the disapproval from the [Sangguniang Panlalawigan]. [In fact] if I may add, I also called the [Sangguniang] Secretary at that moment because I wanted to be doubly sure that we were collecting a legal fee and so the [Sangguniang] Secretary also confirmed to me that there is no record of any disapproval and we also confirmed that the said [Kautusan] was enforced, sir.
x x x x
A
Yes, sir. The [Sangguniang] Secretary issued a certification to the effect that there exist no record of any disapproval or transmittal of any communication whatsoever from the [Sangguniang Panlalawigan], sir.
x x x x
A
I have the certification from the Secretary of the [Sangguniang Panlalawigan] stating that they have also no record on file that they have ever transmitted the disapproval of the [Kautusan] as passed by the [Sangguniang Bayan].
But even if one believes that the revocation of the Kautusan had, in point of fact, been actually transmitted, petitioner's testimony reveals, if anything, that as a new local government head who has only assumed the mayoralty, he perhaps even conducted himself with the extra caution that was required in his efforts to first verify that such pass way fees were legally covered by a resolution or other issuance, before he authorized Tabernero to collect the same.
Second, with respect to the Sandiganbayan 's finding that petitioner acted in gross negligence amounting to bad faith when he authorized Tabernero to act in behalf of the Municipal Treasurer in collecting the pass way fees from RMDC, petitioner in his testimony was, on the contrary, able to fully explain the reason for the same. Petitioner amply testified that Tabernero, although not an official of the Municipal Hall, was nevertheless employed by the local government of San Miguel under a job order arrangement, and that he was the one who manned the Municipality's Sibul Springs Resort, which was where RMDC's trucks would pass. Petitioner explained that Tabernero out of an accommodation for Constantino, since his trucks would pass by the roads during hauling at night, and for convenience, it was Tabernero who was authorized to collect the pass way fees so that RMDC's trucks need not go all the way to the Municipal Hall to pay the fees there.
The pertinent portion of petitioner's testimony on cross-examination informs:
[PROSECUTOR LABOG:]
And, you also authorized Mr. Tabarnero knowing fully well that he is an ex-barangay captain, am I right?
[MR. BUENCAMINO:]
I do not see the connection, sir.
Q
That at that time you authorized Mr. Tabarnero he was not an employee of the Municipality of San Miguel?
A
He was a job order employee sir, receiving full salary from the municipal government, sir.
Q
What is the specific job description of Mr. Tabarnero at that time?
A
The specific job at that time sir, was that he was in-charge of the Sibul Springs Resort, sir.
Q
You will also admit that you authorized Tabarnero even if you know that he is not an official of the municipality?
A
No sir. If I may explain the word authorized is actually misleading. All of this authorization is actually just an accommodation on the request of Mr. Pascual that he be allowed to pay the pass way fee at his end in Sibul Spring because the trucks are supposed to pass during the night and so if the trucks are passing through the night, there is no way that they can pay through the municipal office as there is no one who must be in the office during the evening. So, he asked at that particular moment whether he could possibly just leave the money with Mr. Tabarnero who resides in Sibul Spring and who is in charge of the Sibul Spring Resort anyway and that for Mr. Tabarnero to just remit the money to the treasurer[']s office. [In fact] sir, we maintained a collection clerk in Sibul Spring, actually for that sole job of collecting entrance fees from the Sibul Spring Resort. x x x And, so I said okay, if that is the request and so I'll ask the Municipal Treasurer if that is okay and the Municipal Treasurer said, yes, it can be done provided that Mr. Tabarnero does not issue an official receipt, because Mr. Tabarnero is not a bonded employee.
Third, the Sandiganbayan found that even if Kapasiyahan 89A- 055/Kautusang Bayan 029 were still valid, petitioner imposed the pass way fees in a manner that was excessive and confiscatory. But this finding is completely belied by petitioner who testified that the computation of the total pass way fee per truck, based on a per-cubic meter cost, was not one which was within his tasks, and therefore could not be properly attributed to him. Still on cross examination, petitioner reasoned:
[PROSECUTOR LABOG:]
And, you admit before this Court that you implemented that Kapasiyahan Bilang 89 which was approved on June of 1989 using computation at that time in the year of 2004?
[MR. BUENCAMINO:]
Sir, the matter of computation is not within my competence. I am not an Engineer, I am not in the field. Whatever is to be collected is not determined by me, sir. As per my understanding, my responsibility is to see to it that any [Kautusan] is followed and implemented. How it is implemented and followed would actually rely upon the responsibility of the implementing party.[119]
Finally, with respect to the evident bad faith appreciated in petitioner's act of giving instructions for the impounding of the trucks before he even authorized Tabernero to receive the pass way fees, the Court is unpersuaded that this factual ruling holds in the face of petitioner's vehement denial that he ordered said impounding, as supported by the fact that the memorandum the prosecution submitted to prove the same did not bear any signature that would trace authorship of the same to petitioner.
On cross-examination, petitioner explained:
[PROSECUTOR LABOG:]
And in this memorandum addressed to the following: SPO2 Indasan, SPO1 Garcia, SPO1 Doria, PO3 Centeno and PO2 Santos, he mentioned here about and I quote:
"You are hereby directed to apprehend the following V-10 vehicles loaded with marble blocks for failure to pay the municipal regulatory fee as per instruction of the Municipal Mayor Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino." What can you say to this?
[MR. BUENCAMINO:]
I have no specific instruction regarding that memo, sir.
The Court further rules that the Certificate of Blotter dated August 23, 2004, which is the prosecution's main evidence to establish that petitioner ordered the impounding of RMDC's hauling trucks, failed to prove the same. As the Court has held before, entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries for they are often incomplete and inaccurate. Certificates of blotter, therefore, should not be given undue significance or probative value as to the facts stated therein, for they only stand as prima facie proofs of the facts stated therein. Absent any other corroborative evidence, the certificate of blotter here may not be considered as sufficient proof to trace the authorship of the impounding of RMDC's trucks to petitioner.
It is also worth noting that it was not disputed that the proceeds of the collection of pass way fees during petitioner's term were, in fact, remitted to the Municipal Treasury and deposited to the municipality's bank accounts, as attested to by petitioner and Marciano, and that there was no color of allegation that the proceeds were in any way misappropriated or otherwise diverted to petitioner's personal account.
In all, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to support a prayer of conviction. Reasonable doubt has been cast on the culpability of petitioner for the crime charged. The prosecution was unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner, in imposing the pass way fees, was moved by a clear, notorious, evident bad faith to consciously inflict injury on RMDC. Further, since there can be no presumption of bad faith, including cases involving violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, failure to adequately impute evident bad faith as required by its Section 3(e) must result in finding petitioner innocent as he is constitutionally presumed.
On these premises, the Court finds sufficient counterweight for petitioner's acquittal.
A Final Note
The Court takes this opportunity to now enjoin all courts to rule on the admissibility of each and every piece of evidence brought before them as soon as they are offered and objected to, and to refrain from deferring the resolution on admissibility at a later stage, i.e., during the drafting of the decision. The Court is not unaware of, and is in fact deeply concerned about, the proclivity of a number of courts to delay ruling on the admissibility of evidence until such time that the decision is rendered. Worse, the Court has likewise observed the penchant of a number of courts to admit evidence that are not otherwise admissible for the reason often used by these courts of "for whatever they are worth". As well, the Court has come to know that some courts have justified this admission of inadmissible evidence on the reason that "admissibility" is different from "probative value" — totally and illogically against the simple legal truism that inadmissible evidence cannot have any probative value at all. These practices can no longer be countenanced, as they are counterproductive, and result in a total waste of the time and effort of the appellate courts. These practices betray incompetence or indolence, or both. Certainly, these practices reek of grave abuse of discretion.
To be sure, the Court is acutely cognizant of the increasing volume of cases which constantly strains the courts' mental and temporal resources. It is precisely in light of this challenge that courts are now reminded that ruling on the admissibility of evidence upon offer and objection gives the court the earliest opportunity to assess whether a case further deserves the court's scarce time and attention, or otherwise warrants dismissal for lack of merit. For all cases brought before the courts are only as viable as their evidence can substantiate them, which is, in turn, finely woven with whether or not the evidence is admissible, to begin with. All prayers before the court, however impassioned or believed, must still be held up by the fibers of evidence, and it is the court's duty to make the earliest determination if the evidence are mere gossamer threads.
Lest it be forgotten, nipping an untenable case as soon as its baselessness is discernible is a crucial dimension of dispensing justice that courts cannot neglect without cost. For it not only frees up the court's resource, but perhaps, and more significantly, affords the parties to the case with the dignity of knowing better than to devote their own finite years, money, and energy to a futile exercise of a failed cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed February 18, 2015 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-06-CRM-0419-0420 finding petitioner Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
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