Case Digest: Chan vs. Chan, GR No. 179786, July 24, 2013

Evidence | Rule 130

Abad, J.

Petitioner: Josielene Lara Chan

Respondent: Johnny Chan

 

Facts:

• On February 6, 2006, Josielene Lara Chan filed a petition to nullify her marriage to Johnny Chan, dissolve their conjugal partnership, and gain custody of their children.

• Josielene claimed Johnny neglected his family and was diagnosed as mentally deficient due to drug and alcohol abuse, for which he underwent rehabilitation.

• Johnny denied the claims.

• He asserted that Josielene failed in her wifely duties. 

• He also claimed that during an attempt at marriage counseling, he was forcibly injected and confined in the hospital.

• During pre-trial, Josielene marked a Philhealth Claim Form submitted by Johnny showing he was confined for "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse."

• On August 22, 2006, Josielene requested a subpoena duces tecum for Johnny's medical records from Medical City.

• Johnny opposed, citing physician-patient privilege.

RTC-Makati: Denied Josielene’s motion and motion for reconsideration.

CA: Denied her petition, stating that medical records are protected by physician-patient privilege unless waived, which Johnny had not done.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.

Held:

This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.

Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records of Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in support of her action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:

SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

x x x x

(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk. 

The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems.

Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:

SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.

Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.

It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.  

But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. 

But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.

For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.

SO ORDERED.