Case Digest: De Guzman vs. CA, August 7, 1996

Evidence | Rule 130

Mendoza, J.

Recit Ver:

Spouses Cresenciano and Lucila De Guzman-Sioson filed a complaint against Celestina De Guzman for the collection of P92,000, which they claimed she owed. The spouses presented a letter from Celestina offering to pay the amount, but she denied the debt, claiming the letter was forged. Cresenciano alleged that Celestina managed the riceland co-owned by Lucila and her deceased husband, Andres, but failed to deliver Lucila’s share of the harvest. After negotiations, Cresenciano agreed to accept P92,000, but Celestina never paid. The couple sought legal action after Celestina ignored a demand letter from their lawyer. 

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts in favor of the spouses. Celestina’s denial of every allegation, even on uncontested matters, damaged her credibility. The court noted her inconsistency, especially when she initially denied, then later admitted her signature on various documents. The court ruled that her mere denial, unsupported by evidence, was weak compared to the testimony of credible witnesses. The court also upheld the admission of the photocopied letter as secondary evidence, given that the original was proven lost, with the execution of the document properly established during the trial.

Facts:

• Spouses Cresenciano Sioson and Lucila De Guzman-Sioson, filed against petitioner Celestina De Guzman, for collection of the amount of P92,000 which the spouses claimed petitioner owed to them. 

• They presented a letter from the petitioner offering to pay P92,000:

• Alam naman ninyong ako ay nagkaroon ng stroke kaya’t sana ay magpatawad na tayo sa mga pagkukulang ng bawat isa sa atin. Ang handa ko lang bayaran sa inyo ay P92,000 at sa ano man oras na kunin ninyo ay ibibigay ko.

• Petitioner denied owing any money and claimed the letter was forged.

• Petitioner and Lucila were sisters-in-law; petitioner was the widow of Lucila's elder brother, Andres.

• Allegations:

• Cresenciano Sioson claimed petitioner managed riceland co-owned by Lucila and petitioner’s deceased husband, Andres.

• Cresenciano alleged that petitioner failed to deliver Lucila’s share of the harvest from the riceland.

• In May 1987, Cresenciano demanded the delivery of 1,500 cavans of palay.

• In July 1987, Cresenciano received a letter from petitioner offering P92,000 instead of the harvest.

• Initially, Cresenciano rejected the offer but later agreed to accept P92,000 due to financial need.

• Despite the agreement, petitioner did not pay the amount.

• The private respondents consulted a lawyer, Atty. Ildefonso Jose J. Cruz, who sent a demand letter to petitioner.

• Petitioner did not respond to the demand letter, prompting private respondents to file a legal action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

• Defense:

• Petitioner denied managing the farm, sending the letter, or being confronted about it.

RTC: Ruled in favor of Spouses Cresenciano Sioson and Lucila De Guzman-Sioson, requiring the petitioner to:

• Pay P92,000 with 6% interest per annum from June 21, 1989, until fully paid.

• Pay P10,000 as attorney's fees.

CA: Upheld the RTC.

Issues:

1. Whether the lower court erred in giving credence to the plaintiff’s testimony that the defendant acknowledged the payment of P92,000.00 as shown in Exhibit "C". NO

2. Whether the lower court erred in believing the loss of the original of exhibit "C". NO

3. Whether the lower court erred in not dismissing the case and in not granting damages to the defendant in view of the filing of a malicious and vindictive case, instead granted damages to the plaintiffs. NO

Held:

The petition has no merit. To begin with, it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence by the parties all over again. Our jurisdiction is in principle limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the Court of Appeals. A fortiori, where the factual findings of the trial court are affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there is greater reason for not disturbing such findings and for regarding them as not reviewable by this Court. 6

In any event, we think the Court of Appeals correctly accorded credence to private respondents’ claims. Petitioner’s claims are rendered doubtful by her tendency to deny practically every one of private respondents’ allegations. As it turned out however, some of these allegations involved undisputed collateral matters. For example, during the cross-examination, petitioner denied that the signatures on several documents shown to her by the opposing counsel were hers. On redirect examination, however, she made a complete turnabout and acknowledged that after all the signatures were actually hers. Indeed she could not very well deny her signature without doing greater harm to her cause. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, "there is substantive basis to conclude that [petitioner] must have been preconditioned to deny any and all" of private respondents’ assertions, thus making her testimony unworthy of credence and belief.

Indeed, petitioner’s only defense is one of denial. The rule is that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 

Petitioner makes much of the fact that it took private respondents two years from receipt of the letter to bring this suit in the RTC. But this was due to the fact that, as explained by Cresenciano, he and petitioner talked of settling his claim. He said that in the beginning he really did not agree to settle for P92,000, as petitioner had offered in her letter but after negotiations, which took time, he thought it prudent to accept the offer and thus avoid having to sue in court. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court. Private respondents should not therefore be begrudged the time taken by them before filing their action in court.

Nor did the appellate court err in affirming the trial court’s decision admitting Exhibit C in evidence although it is a mere photocopy of the letter sent by petitioner to private respondents. The original letter was lost, according the Cresenciano. He explained that of the City Fiscal of Cabanatuan for the hearing of an estafa case involving the parties to this case. Cresenciano handed the original of the letter to his lawyer but the latter asked him to have it photocopied outside at a photocopying service being operated within the premises of the Cabanatuan City Hall. After the hearing, his lawyer gave him the xerox copy of the letter, with advice to him to keep the original which he was supposed to have. He then discovered that he had forgotten to get back the original from the operator of the photocopying center but his efforts were to no avail. He tried to look for it at the City Fiscal’s Office on the chance that he might have left it there but it was not there.

The due execution of the document was duly proven during the trial. Evidence respecting handwriting may be given by a comparison made by the comparison made by the court with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered. In the case at bar, as the trial court noted, there are obvious similarities between petitioner’s signature on Exhibit C and her acknowledged signatures on several documents, as well as her specimen signatures executed during the trial.

It appearing that the execution and the loss of the original document have been duly proven, the introduction in evidence of a photocopy thereof was proper. It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of witness. There was basis therefore for the trial court to consider the copy as secondary evidence of the letter.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.