Case Digest: Dela Llama v. Biong, GR No 182356, December 4, 2013

 

CASE TITLE: Dela Llama v. Biong
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013
PETITIONER: Dra. Leila A. Dela Llano Represented by: Henry Ll. Yusingco, Jr.	RESPONDENT: Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading Represented by: Salvador B. Hababag
ACTION WITH THE SUPREME COURT: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PONENTE: Brion., J.
FACTS: On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving a Toyota Corolla with his sister, Dra. dela Llana in the front seat, and a certain Calimlim, when a dump truck rammed the car from behind in Quezon City. The car was stopped at a red light when a dump truck carrying gravel and sand rear-ended it, causing significant damage and shattering the rear windshield.  Dra. dela Llana suffered minor cuts from glass splinters. The traffic investigation identified the truck driver as Joel Primero, who was found to be recklessly imprudent. Joel Primero's employer was Rebecca Biong, operating under "Pongkay Trading" in the gravel and sand business. In early May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began experiencing increasing pain in her neck and shoulder, eventually losing mobility in her left arm. Dra. dela Llana was diagnosed with a whiplash injury and underwent physical therapy without improvement. Dr. Eric Flores, a neuro-surgeon, suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. Despite surgery, Dra. dela Llana was unable to return to her profession since June 2000. On October 16, 2000, Dra. dela Llana demanded compensation from Rebecca Biong, who refused to pay. On May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana filed an action against Rebecca for damages, including medical expenses, loss of income, and other damages. Rebecca argued there was no direct connection between the accident and the injury, noting the symptoms appeared over a month after the accident. During the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness. Dra. dela Llana testified about her injury and presented a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, supporting her claim of a whiplash injury. Joel testified that the truck's brakes failed, causing the accident. Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana appeared healthy shortly after the accident and asserted she exercised due diligence in hiring and supervising Joel. A witness, Alberto Marcelo, testified that he had checked the truck on the morning of the accident, finding it in good condition, and suggested a damaged compressor caused the accident. RTC: Ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana, finding Joel's reckless driving as the proximate cause of her injury and held Rebecca vicariously liable. ₱570,000.00 actual damages ₱250,000.00 moral damages CA: Reversed the RTC ruling, stating Dra. dela Llana failed to prove the accident caused her injury and noting the lengthy time between the collision and her symptoms. The medical certificate did not explain how and why the vehicular accident caused the injury. Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of Appeals: Courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue.
ISSUE: Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. NO
PETITIONER ARGUMENTS:	DEFENSE:
Dra. dela Llana argues that the case of Nutrimix is not applicable to her situation. Nutrimix dealt with hidden defects under Articles 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code, which is not relevant to her case. Unlike in Nutrimix, where no evidence showed the sale of poisonous animal feeds, Dra. dela Llana claims she provided sufficient evidence that Joel's negligent driving caused her whiplash injury. She presents three pieces of evidence to support her claim: Photographs of her damaged car suggest a strong collision, supporting the occurrence of a whiplash injury. A medical certificate from Dr. Milla confirms that she suffered from a whiplash injury. Her own testimony is credible because she is a surgeon, and she asserts that the injury resulted from the vehicular accident. Dra. dela Llana contends that the medical certificate is credible and should have probative value, citing cases where uncorroborated certificates were accepted if unchallenged. She argues that expert opinion is unnecessary for matters of common knowledge, such as the fact that whiplash injuries are common in car accidents. She believes that a judge can act as an expert to determine the causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her injury.	Rebecca argues that Dra. dela Llana's appeal raises a factual issue, which is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She maintains that the Court of Appeals' (CA) findings of fact are final and conclusive. Rebecca stresses that Dra. dela Llana’s arguments lack substantial merit to warrant the Supreme Court's consideration.
PREVAILING PARTY: Respondents
DECISION/DOCTRINE:  Very case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact and questions of law.  Questions of fact are the parties and their counsel to respond to, based on what supporting facts the legal questions require; the court can only draw conclusion from the facts or evidence adduced. When the facts are lacking because of the deficiency of presented evidence, then the court can only draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail for lack of evidentiary support. Our Ruling  We find the petition unmeritorious. The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari when the findings of fact by the lower courts are conflicting The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, the CA’s findings of fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. It is not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can only review the presented evidence, by way of exception, when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the CA. We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the relevant evidence presented before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict."  Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: damages to the plaintiff; negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual duties that civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from non-contractual relations of certain members of society to others.  Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer. She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.  Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.  Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee."  The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.  In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.  The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.  In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.36 Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: the pictures of her damaged car, the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below.  A. The pictures of the damaged car only demonstrate the impact of the collision Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that the massive impact of the collision caused her whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that these pictures show the causation grossly belies common logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures. B. The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be considered in resolving this case for the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in an order dated September 23, 2004.  Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule that evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.  Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence except in very unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.  The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.  Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court. During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified: "Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the reason why you were feeling that pain in your left arm? A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she stated that my condition was due to a compression of the nerve, which supplied my left arm and my left hand. Court: By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.? Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist.  Atty. Yusingco: You mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a medical certificate. What relation does this medical certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do with that certificate, you said was made by Dra. Milla? Witness: This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for me. Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H. Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result of that feeling, that pain that you felt in your left arm? Witness: Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a re-evaluation of my condition after three months indicated that I needed surgery. Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery? Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my spine. Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of that surgical operation? Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve the compression on my nerve, which did not resolve by the extensive and prolonged physical therapy that I underwent for more than three months."  Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate. However, she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and affirm the contents of the medical certificate.  Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings. We also point out in this respect that the medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joel’s reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering from whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed to substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury. Rather, the medical certificate only chronicled her medical history and physical examinations. C. Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that Joel’s negligence caused her whiplash injury has no probative value Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this quasi-delict case, was the lone physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as an ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana essentially claimed in her testimony that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an expert witness.  The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding: the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.  On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess. However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert's opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded. In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury.  Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony. The Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court shows that Dra. Dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s negligence causes her whiplash injury was not established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments. In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her claim, unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on. WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice