Case Digest: Galapon v. Republic, G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020

 

CASE TITLE: Galapon v. Republic
GR No/ Date: G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020
PETITIONER: Cynthia A. Galapon Represented by: -	RESPONDENT: Republic of the Philippines Represented by: -
ACTION WITH THE SUPREME COURT: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PONENTE: Caguioa, J.
FACTS: On February 27, 2012, Cynthia A. Galapon, a Filipina, married Noh Shik Park, a South Korean national in Manila, Philippines. Their relationship turned sour, leading to a mutual agreement for divorce in South Korea. On July 16, 2012, the divorce was confirmed by the Cheongju Local Court. Cynthia filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of the Foreign Divorce with the RTC Abigail Galapon, Cynthia's sister and attorney-in-fact, testified in court, affirming her Judicial Affidavit and explaining that Cynthia could not personally testify because her Korean visa expired after the divorce. Abigail claimed to have personal knowledge of the case and alleged that Park intended to marry his former girlfriend and that Cynthia was forced to agree to the divorce because Park made a threat to her life. RTC-Nueva Ecija: Granted Cynthia's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Divorce. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The OSG argued that: the Petition should have been filed in the RTC of Manila, where the marriage was recorded, under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; absolute divorce is not allowed in the Philippines and that Cynthia is not entitled to the benefits of Article 26 of the Family Code, as the divorce was obtained by both spouses, not just by the alien spouse. RTC-Nueva Ecija: Denied the OSG's motion The recognition of foreign divorce decrees can be sought through a special civil action for declaratory relief under Rule 63, as in the Republic v. Orbecido III case. The RTC found that the requisites for applying Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code were met: a valid marriage and a valid foreign divorce obtained by Park. The RTC ruled that the mutual agreement in the divorce did not preclude its recognition, as Cynthia was coerced into agreeing to the divorce. CA: Granted the OSG's appeal, reversing the RTC Decision and dismissing Cynthia's Petition. The CA found that the RTC had not erred in taking cognizance of the Petition despite improper venue claims, as the OSG failed to challenge the venue at the first instance. The CA ruled that the divorce decree could not be recognized because it was obtained by mutual agreement, and Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code applies only when the foreign spouse initiates the divorce. The CA also noted that Cynthia, as a Filipino citizen, remains subject to Philippine laws that do not recognize absolute divorce. The CA questioned the RTC's reliance on Abigail's testimony, which lacked personal knowledge and was not substantiated by Cynthia herself.
ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree obtained by Cynthia and her foreign spouse, Park. YES
PETITIONER ARGUMENTS:	DEFENSE:
Cynthia argued that the CA erred by substituting its judgment for the Korean courts regarding Park's legal capacity and that the CA's decision contradicts the intent of Article 26(2) of the Family Code. Cynthia referenced the case of Republic v. Manalo, arguing that mutual consent in foreign divorces should not bar the application of Article 26(2).
DECISION/DOCTRINE:   The Petition is granted. The controversy is centered on the interpretation of Article 26(2) as applied to divorce decrees obtained jointly by the foreign spouse and Filipino citizen. Article 26 of the Family Code states: All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.   In Orbecido, the Court laid down the elements for the application of Article 26(2), bearing in mind the spirit and intent behind the provision as reflected in the Committee deliberations. The Court held: x x x [The Court states] the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when [the Filipino spouse's] wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between [them]. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus x x x the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.  Here, the CA anchored the assailed Decision on the absence of the second element set forth in Orbecido. According to the CA, the fact that the divorce decree had been obtained by mutual agreement of Cynthia and Park precludes the application of Article 26(2), since the language of the provision requires that the divorce decree be obtained solely by the foreign spouse. Adopting the same view, the OSG argues that the divorce decree in question is not one "obtained x x x by the alien spouse alone[,] but [one obtained] at the instance of both [spouses]." Hence, the OSG insists that Article 26(2) simply cannot apply to Cynthia. In this connection, the OSG claims that Abigail 's testimony to the effect that Cynthia had been merely forced to agree to the divorce should not be given credence for being hearsay.  The CA and OSG are mistaken. In the recent case of Manalo, the Court en banc extended the scope of Article 26(2) to even cover instances where the divorce decree is obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. The Court's ruling states, in part: Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure." Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.: The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter. To reiterate, the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law. Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is:  obtained by the foreign spouse;  obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree by mutual agreement under the laws of South Korea. The sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance of said divorce decree and the governing national law of her husband Park was not put in issue. In fact, the CA considered said evidence sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity of the divorce in question: x x x [T]he records show that [Cynthia] submitted, inter alia, the original and translated foreign divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity. She also offered into evidence a copy of the Korean Civil Code, duly authenticated through a Letter of Confirmation with Registry No. 2013-020871, issued by the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Philippines. These pieces of evidence may have been sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity of the divorce obtained by the estranged couple abroad but [the CA agrees] with the OSG that the divorce cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as [Cynthia] is concerned since it was obtained by mutual agreement of a foreign spouse and a Filipino spouse.  In this light, it becomes unnecessary to delve into the admissibility and probative value of Abigail's testimony claiming that Cynthia had been constrained to consent to the divorce. As confirmed by Manalo, the divorce decree obtained by Park, with or without Cynthia's conformity, falls within the scope of Article 26(2) and merits recognition in this jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 27, 2017 and Resolution dated September 29, 2017 rendered by the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division and Former Eleventh Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 106950 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 3, 2015 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 in Special Proceedings No. SD(14)-417 is REINSTATED. By virtue of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code and the Certification of the Cheongju Local Court dated July 16, 2012, petitioner Cynthia A. Galapon is declared capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. SO ORDERED.