Case Digest: Heirs of Dela Cruz vs. CA, GR No. 117384, October 21, 1998

Evidence | Rule 130

Romero, J

Recit Ver:

The petitioners argued that despite presenting only a photocopy (Exhibit "A") of the original carbon copy of the deed of sale, they had provided substantial evidence to prove the existence of the sale. They relied on the testimony of Atty. Tabangay, the notary public, who confirmed the due execution of the deed, as well as their long possession of the land since 1959, which included significant improvements, suggesting ownership. However, the court found that the petitioners failed to account for all the originals of the deed of sale, as required before presenting secondary evidence, and their claim that the originals were lost was unsupported by official certification. As such, Exhibit "A," though admitted, had limited probative value due to its lack of signatures and accuracy.

Despite these procedural shortcomings, the court noted the private respondents' failure to object to Exhibit "A" and to cross-examine Atty. Tabangay, which elevated the photocopy to primary evidence. Even so, the court ultimately ruled that the document’s reliability was questionable. Nevertheless, the petitioners' long and unopposed possession of the land, coupled with the improvements they made, demonstrated a clear exercise of ownership. The respondents, particularly the Madrids, had not protested the petitioners' possession for nearly 30 years, which led the court to apply the equitable principle of laches, barring the Madrids and Marquez from asserting their ownership claims despite having Torrens titles. Marquez's claim of being an innocent purchaser for value was also dismissed due to his knowledge of the petitioners' long possession of the land.

Petitioner: Heirs of Teodoro Dela Cruz represented by Edronel Dela Cruz

Respondents: 

• Court of Appeals

• Pacifico Marquez

• Filomeno Madrid

• Gregorio Madrid

Facts:

• In November 1986, petitioners Heirs of Teodoro Dela Cruz filed an action for reconveyance with damages over a 3,277 sqm parcel of land in Poblacion, San Mateo, Isabela.

• Petitioners claimed that their predecessor bought the land from the Madrid brothers, Filomeno Madrid and Gregorio Madrid for P4,000 on May 18, 1959, and they had been in continuous possession since then.

• However, in October 1986, Pacifico Marquez and the Madrid brothers, obtained a Torrens Title over the land, surprising the petitioners.

• The Madrid brothers denied executing the deed of sale and claimed that any such document was fictitious and falsified. They acknowledged the petitioners' possession but argued it was in defiance of their demands to vacate.

• Pacifico Marquez asserted that he was an innocent purchaser for value, having bought the land from the Madrids in 1976.

• Petitioners could not produce the original deed of sale during the trial and instead offered a photocopy (Exhibit "A") of the carbon copy of the deed.

RTC-Isabela: Ruled that Exhibit "A" is inadmissible because petitioners failed to prove the loss of the original or obtain copies from the notary public.

• The court dismissed the petitioners' complaint and declared the defendants the lawful owners, ordering the petitioners to vacate the portions of the land they occupied.

CA: Ruled that Exhibit "A" was admissible because the private respondents failed to object when it was offered during the trial.

• The CA noted that respondents' failure to object to the exhibit's admissibility waived their right to challenge it.

• Despite ruling Exhibit "A" admissible, the CA found it had no probative value, as it lacked sufficient evidence to prove the alleged sale in 1959.

• No witness corroborated Atty. Tabangay's testimony about the deed

• The signatures of the Madrid brothers were not included for comparison

• The CA affirmed the trial court's decision but remanded the case to determine the value of improvements made by the petitioners for reimbursement by the respondents.

Issue: Whether the photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale is admissible as evidence.

Held:

Petitioners maintain that even if Exhibit "A" were a mere photo copy of the original carbon copy, they had presented other substantial evidence during the trial to prove the existence of the sale. 

1. First, the testimony of the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, who acknowledged the due execution of the deed of sale. 

2. Second, their long possession of the land in question, bolstered by the construction of various improvements gives rise to the disputable presumption of ownership.

While we concur with the Court of Appeals' finding that Exhibit "A" does not prove that the sale of the land indeed occurred, still we are constrained to reverse its decision in view of the circumstances present in this case.

To begin with, Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary public who notarized the deed of sale, testified that the document has about five (5) copies. Hence, it is imperative that all the originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be presented. These petitioners failed to do. Moreover, records show that none of these five copies was even presented during the trial. Petitioners' explanation that these copies were lost or could not be found in the National Archives was not even supported by any certification from the said office.

It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production of the original document itself can be regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable.

Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit "A" was presented private respondents failed, not only to object, but even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, regarding its execution. Forthwith, upon private respondents' failure to object to Exhibit "A" when it was presented, the same becomes primary evidence. To be sure, even if Exhibit "A" is admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade must be considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. 

As earlier stated, Exhibit "A" was merely a photocopy lifted from the carbon copy of the alleged deed of sale. A cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of the parties and undated as to when it was executed. Worse, when Atty. Tabangay typed Exhibit "A," the contents were based on an alleged carbon original which petitioners' predecessor-in-interest presented to him, without bothering to check his own files to verify the correctness of the contents of the document he was copying. In other words, Atty. Tabangay's failure to determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest renders Exhibit "A" unreliable.

However, despite our prescinding discussion, all is not lost for the petitioner.

The records show that the disputed petitioners since 1959. They have since been introducing several improvements on the land which certainly could not have escaped the attention of the Madrids. Furthermore, during all this time, the land was enclosed, thus signifying petitioners' exclusive claim of ownership. The construction of various infrastructure on the land — rice mill, storage house, garage, pavements and other buildings — was undoubtedly a clear exercise of ownership which the Madrids could not ignore. Oddly, not one of them protested.

We cannot accept the Madrids' explanation that they did not demand the petitioners to vacate the land due to the unexplained killings within the area. Not a single shred of evidence was presented to show that these killings were perpetrated by the petitioners. All told, their remonstration and fears are nothing but pure speculation. To make matters worse, the record is bereft of any documentary evidence that the Madrids sent a written demand to the petitioners ordering them to vacate the land. Their failure to raise a restraining arm or a shout of dissent to the petitioners' possession of the subject land in a span of almost thirty (30) years is simply contrary to their of ownership.

Next, the Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can operate against them because their title to the property is registered under the Torrens system and therefore imprescriptable. The principle raised, while admittedly correct, are not without exception. The fact that the Madrids were able to secure TCT No. 167250, and Marquez, TCT Nos. 167220 and 167256, did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership, especially considering the fact that both the Madrids and Marquezes obtained their respective TCT's only in October 1986, twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners first took possession of the land. If the Madrids and Marquezes wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their respective names. For as earlier mentioned, Certificates of Title do not establish ownership.

Even if we were to rule that the Certificates of Title to the private respondents would ripen into ownership of the land, and therefore, the defense of prescription would be unavailing, still, the petitioners would have acquired title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches. The Madrids' long inaction or passivity in asserting their rights over disputed property will preclude them from recovering the same. 

The above ruling was stressed in the following cases:

Miguel v. Catalino declared:

Notwithstanding the errors aforementioned in the appealed decision, we are of the opinion that the judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Florencio Catalino must be sustained. For despite the invalidity of his sale to Catalino Agyapao, father of defendant-appellee, the vendor Bacaquio suffered the latter to enter, possess and enjoy the land in question without protest, from 1928 to 1943, when the seller died; and the appellants, in turn, while succeeding the deceased, also remained inactive, without taking any step to reinvindicate the lot from 1944 to 1962, when the present suit was commenced in court. Even granting appellants' proposition that no prescription lies against their father's recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf. As a result, the action of plaintiffs-appellants must be considered barred and the Court below correctly so held. Courts can not look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense. . . . .

Pabalete v. Echarri stated:

Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. We hold that the defense of prescription or adverse possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of laches. Otherwise stated, we hold that while defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor's long continued possession for 37 years, the original owner's right to recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentee's inaction and neglect been converted into a stale demand. (Quoting Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277).

x x x           x x x          x x x

This defense is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect he should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant. . . .

Lastly, Marquez' claim that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value does not inspire any merit. In his testimony, he admitted that he knew the land in question.  Curiously, in his Answer to the complaint filed by the petitioners, he stated that he has been aware that the former were in possession of the land since 1959. Where a purchaser was fully aware of another person's possession of the lot he purchased, he cannot successfully pretend later to be an innocent purchaser for value. Moreover, one who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure. 

In fact, it would have been expected that in the normal course of daily life, both the Madrids and Marquezes talked about the status of the property. This being so, it would be difficult to imagine that the latter were not made aware of the petitioner's possession of the land. Armed with such information, they should have acted with the diligence of a prudent man in determining the circumstances surrounding the property. Otherwise, the law does not give him the benefit afforded to an innocent purchaser for value. 

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 24, 1994 in CA-G.R. No. 25339 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, petitioners are hereby declared as the legal owners of the subject land. No costs.

SO ORDERED.