Case Digest: Kondo v. Civil Registrar General, GR No. 223628, March 04, 2020

 

CASE TITLE: Kondo v. Civil Registrar General
GR No/ Date: G.R. No.  223628, March 04, 2020
PETITIONER: Edna S. Kondo Represented by: Luzviminda S. Pineda (Attorney-in-Fact)	RESPONDENT: Civil Registrar General Represented by: -
ACTION WITH THE SUPREME COURT: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PONENTE: Lazaro-Javier, J.
FACTS: On March 15, 1991, Edna S. Kondo, a Filipina, married Katsuhiro Kondo, a Japanese national, in Japan. They registered their Marriage Certificate with the National Statistics Office in the Philippines. On July 3, 2000, after around nine years of marriage, they obtained a divorce by agreement in Japan and were issued a Report of Divorce. On November 7, 2012, Edna, through her sister and Attorney-in-Fact Luzviminda S. Pineda, filed a petition for judicial recognition of the divorce decree. The petition cited Article 26(2) of the Family Code, which allows a Filipino spouse to remarry if the foreign spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad. Edna argued that the divorce allowed Katsuhiro to remarry under Japanese laws and sought to have the divorce recognized and annotated on her Marriage Certificate. Luzviminda testified during the trial that Katsuhiro divorced Edna to marry a Japanese woman. Luzviminda presented among others, the Report of Divorce and Katsuhiro's authenticated Family Register record, both with English translation, stating that he and Edna divorced by agreement on July 3, 2000. Luzviminda also presented her judicial affidavit and other supporting documents. However, she withdrew her offer to present additional evidence, including an authenticated English translation of the relevant Japanese Civil Code articles. RTC: Denied Edna's petition for judicial recognition of the divorce decree. Reason: The divorce was obtained by mutual agreement, not by the alien spouse as required by Article 26(2) of the Family Code. Additionally, the Japanese Civil Code provisions presented did not show that Katsuhiro was allowed to remarry after the divorce. Edna filed a motion for a new trial, presenting newly discovered evidence: a copy of Katsuhiro's Report of Divorce allegedly indicating his remarriage. She argued that not admitting this evidence would create an absurd situation where she remains married to Katsuhiro despite his remarriage. RTC: Denied the motion, citing Edna's failure to file an Affidavit of Merit and the lack of an authenticated document proving Katsuhiro's remarriage. The trial court reiterated that Article 26(2) of the Family Code does not apply because the divorce was by mutual agreement. CA: Affirmed the trial court's decision. It emphasized that Rule 37, Section 2(2) of the Rules of Court requires supporting evidence like affidavits or authenticated documents, which Edna failed to provide. The second Report of Divorce was not considered newly discovered evidence, as Edna could have presented it during the trial. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of Article 26(2) of the Family Code, noting that the law aims to prevent a situation where the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot.
ISSUES: Whether the case should be remanded to the trial court for reception of additional evidence?. YES
PETITIONER ARGUMENTS:	DEFENSE:
Kondo acknowledges lapses due to logistical and financial issues. Kondo notes that although divorce and remarriage occurred in 2000 and 2001, respectively, she could only afford to file the petition in November 2012, leading to delays in presenting documentary evidence.	OSG argues that the appeal does not involve a legal question. OSG supports the Court of Appeals' denial of Edna's Motion for New Trial, stating that the second Report of Divorce was not newly discovered evidence under the Rules of Court. OSG concedes that while agreeing with the lower court rulings, it is up to the Court's discretion to possibly relax the rules due to Edna's situation. OSG notes that denying the petition for recognition of foreign judgment based on status does not imply res judicata, which would result in re-filing and inefficient use of court resources.
DECISION/DOCTRINE:   We grant the petition. Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court sets forth the grounds for a motion for new trial, viz: Section 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. — Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party: (a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or (b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result. Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.   For the court to grant a new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence, the following requirements must be met: the evidence was discovered after trial;  such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, it cannot be considered newly discovered. We find the first and second requirements sorely missing. Here, Edna herself did not deny, as she in fact admitted that the second Divorce Report was already existing during the proceedings below. To be sure, Katsuhiro allegedly married Tsukiko as early as May 30, 2001. If this were true, she should have promptly secured and presented a copy of the document during the trial. The Divorce Report could not therefore be deemed as newly discovered evidence. More so, since the trial court gave her an additional opportunity to present evidence through its Order dated December 3, 2013, but she still failed to present the second Divorce Report. Be that as it may, what is at stake is not merely Edna's status, but also her actual marital and family life. In fact, Edna addressed a handwritten letter, dated April 22, 2017, to this Court stating she had been anxiously worried for years about the possible repercussions that Philippine laws may have on her because she, too, had remarried in Japan in November 2014. Considering the recent jurisprudence on mixed marriages under Article 26 of the Family Code, the trial court should have been more circumspect in strictly adhering to procedural rules. For these rules are meant to facilitate administration of fairness and may be relaxed when a rigid application hinders substantial justice. The landmark case of Republic v. Manalo is instructive. Respondent therein offered the following in evidence:  Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and  Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national.  The Court found though that the Japanese law on divorce was not duly established. It noted, nonetheless, that the existence of the divorce decree was not denied, jurisdiction of the divorce court was not impeached, nor the validity of the foreign proceedings challenged. Thus, the Court exercised liberality and remanded the case for further proceedings, specifically for reception of evidence to prove the relevant Japanese law. In Racho v. Tanaka, therein petitioner was divorced by her Japanese husband. She obtained an authenticated Divorce Certificate from the Japanese embassy which the trial court deemed insufficient to prove the divorce decree. The Court, nonetheless, ruled that the Filipino spouse may be granted the capacity to remarry once it is proven that the foreign divorce was validly obtained and that the foreign spouse's national law considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute. For it would be unjust to insist, as the OSG did, that petitioner should still be considered married to her foreign husband. The Court noted that justice would not have been served if petitioner was discriminated against by her own country's law. In the recent case of Moraña v. Republic of the Philippines, therein petitioner offered mere printouts of pertinent portions of the Japanese law on divorce and its English translation from a website, sans any proof of its correctness. The lower courts denied her action for recognition of divorce report because she did not present an authenticated Divorce Certificate issued by the Japanese government. The Court acknowledged that petitioner duly proved the fact of divorce but failed to prove the Japanese law on divorce. Relying on Racho and Manalo, the Court nonetheless relaxed procedural requirements and granted the petition. It likewise remanded the case to the trial court for presentation of the pertinent Japanese law on divorce for a new decision on the merits. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court could not determine if respondent, a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally recapacitated to remarry despite the evidence already offered which included: Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; and Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate, among others. Hence, the Court remanded the case to the trial court to receive evidence to show respondent's legal capacity to remarry. Indeed, the Court has time and again granted liberality in cases involving the recognition of foreign decrees to Filipinos in mixed marriages and free them from a marriage in which they are the sole remaining party. In the aforementioned cases, the Court has emphasized that procedural rules are designed to secure and not override substantial justice, especially here where what is involved is a matter affecting lives of families. The Court sees no reason why the same treatment should not be applied here. Consider: First. Edna presented an Authenticated Report of Divorce in Japanese Language; an English translation of the Report of Divorce; and an Authenticated Original copy of the Family Register of Katsuhiro. Too, she actively participated throughout the proceedings through her sister and attorney-in-fact, Luzviminda, despite financial and logistical constraints. She also showed willingness to provide the final document the trial court needed to prove Katsuhiro's capacity to remarry. Second. As the OSG noted, the present case concerns Edna's status. Hence, res judicata shall not apply and Edna could simply refile the case if dismissed. This process though would be a waste of time and resources, not just for both parties, but the trial court as well. In RCBC v. Magwin Marketing Corp.,  the Court surmised that there was no substantial policy upheld had it simply dismissed the case and required petitioner to pay the docket fees again, file the same pleadings as it did in the proceedings with the trial court, and repeat the belabored process. This reenactment would have been a waste of judicial time, capital, and energy. Third. In its Comment, the OSG did not object to Edna's prayer to have the case remanded, viz: Hence, the OSG interposes no objection if this Honorable Court remands this case to the trial court and allows petitioner to present evidence to prove her case bearing in mind that only this High Court can relax its own rules for compassionate justice. Finally. The present case stands on meritorious grounds, as petitioner had actually presented certified documents establishing the fact of divorce and relaxation of the rules will not prejudice the State. Verily, a relaxation of procedural rules is in order. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 16, 2016 in CA-G.R. CV No. 103150 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court - Branch 4, Manila for presentation in evidence of the pertinent Japanese law on divorce and the document proving Katsuhiro was recapacitated to marry. SO ORDERED.