Case Digest: Light Rail Authority v. Natividad, G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003

Commercial Laws 2: Common Carriers

Vitug, J.

Recit Ver:

On October 14, 1993, Nicanor Navidad, intoxicated, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token. While standing on the platform near the tracks, he was approached by security guard Junelito Escartin, leading to a misunderstanding that escalated into a fistfight. There was no evidence regarding who initiated the altercation. During the scuffle, Navidad fell onto the tracks and was struck by a train operated by Rodolfo Roman, resulting in his immediate death. Navidad's widow and children subsequently filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), Metro Transit, and Prudent Security.

The issue before the court was whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding LRTA and Roman liable for Navidad's death. The Court ruled that a contract of carriage existed once Navidad purchased his token and entered the LRT premises, making LRTA responsible for exercising extraordinary diligence to ensure passenger safety. The Court also found that LRTA failed to provide such care, making them liable for the accident. It noted that common carriers are required by law to ensure passenger safety, both during travel and while passengers are within their premises, even if the cause of harm involves strangers or other passengers. The Court rejected LRTA’s argument that Roman was an employee of Metro Transit, maintaining that LRTA’s liability stemmed from the failure to exercise due diligence in preventing the accident.

LRTA's liability arose from its contractual obligation to safely transport passengers, which was breached when Navidad was killed on its premises. However, Prudent Security was exonerated from liability due to insufficient evidence proving negligence by Escartin, its employee. The court emphasized that the responsibility of common carriers, such as LRTA, is not diminished by their employment of third-party contractors like security agencies. Despite this, Roman was absolved of personal liability, as the court found no direct evidence of negligence on his part, nor was there a contractual relationship between Roman and Navidad that could make him liable.

Facts: 

• On October 14, 1993, at around 7:30 PM, Nicanor Navidad, intoxicated, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token.

• While standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Navidad was approached by security guard Junelito Escartin, leading to a misunderstanding or fist fight.

• There was no evidence indicating how the altercation started or who initiated the fight.

• During the altercation, Navidad fell onto the LRT tracks and was struck by an incoming train operated by Rodolfo Roman, resulting in his instant death.

• Navidad's widow, Marjorie, and her children filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, Roman, Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), Metro Transit, and Prudent Security.

• LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent.

• Prudent Security denied liability, claiming it exercised due diligence in selecting and supervising its security guards.

• LRTA and Roman presented their evidence, while Prudent and Escartin filed a demurrer, arguing that Navidad had failed to prove Escartin’s negligence.

RTC-Pasig:

• Ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Marjorie Navidad and her children) and ordered Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin to pay:

• Dismissed the complaint against LRTA and Rodolfo Roman, as well as LRTA and Roman’s counterclaim.

CA:

• Exonerated Prudent Security and holding LRTA and Rodolfo Roman jointly and severally liable.

• The appellate court reasoned that a contract of carriage existed when Navidad entered the passenger area after purchasing a fare token.

• Prudent was exempted from liability as there was no evidence linking the security agency to Navidad's death.

• The court found no proof that Escartin physically harmed Navidad, establishing that his death was due to being hit by the train operated by Roman.

• Petitioners failed to present expert evidence regarding the inability to stop the train with emergency brakes.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding the petitioners liable for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. NO

Held:

Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate court’s conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.

Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.

Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:

"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."

"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."

"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.

The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers

1. through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or 

2. on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.

The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 2 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180  of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. 

Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.

There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.

The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.  It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. 

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.