Case Digest: Kramer vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 83524, October 13, 1989

Torts and Damages

Gancayco, J.

Facts:

• On April 8, 1976, fishing boat F/B Marjolea, owned by Ernesto and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila when it collided with inter-island vessel M/V Asia Philippines, owned by Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago.

• As a result, F/B Marjolea sank, losing its fish catch.

• Both captains filed marine protests with the Philippine Coast Guard’s Board of Marine Inquiry.

• Board of Marine Inquiry: 

• Concluded that the negligence of the crew of M/V Asia Philippines caused the collision.

• Philippine Coast Guard Commandant:

• Issued a decision on April 29, 1982, suspending the second mate of M/V Asia Philippines from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.

• On May 30, 1985, the Kramers filed an action for damages against Trans-Asia Shipping Lines.

• Trans-Asia argued that the suit was time-barred under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, as the four-year prescriptive period had passed since the collision occurred in 1976.

• The Kramers contended that the prescriptive period should begin from April 29, 1982, when the Board’s findings on negligence became final, as maritime collisions involve complex technical issues best analyzed by experts.

RTC-Pasay: Ruled that the four-year prescriptive period started in 1982, not in 1976, and thus the case was filed in time.

CA:  Reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the prescriptive period began in 1976 when the collision occurred, and dismissed the case for being filed beyond the four-year limit.

Issue:

Whether the complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations. NO

Held:

The pertinent portions of the Decision of the appellate court are as follows —

It is clear that the cause of action of private respondent (the herein petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer) accrued from the occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and from which relief from the court is presently sought. Private respondents should have immediately instituted a complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict within four years from the said marine incident because its cause of action had already definitely ripened at the onset of the collision. For this reason, he (sic) could cite the negligence on the part of the personnel of the petitioner to exercise due care and lack of (sic) diligence to prevent the collision that resulted in the total loss of their x x x boat.

We can only extend scant consideration to respondent judge's reasoning that in view of the nature of the marine collision that allegedly involves highly technical aspects, the running of the prescriptive period should only commence from the finality of the investigation conducted by the Marine Board of Inquiry (sic) and the decision of the Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, who has original jurisdiction over the mishap. For one, while it is true that the findings and recommendation of the Board and the decision of the Commandant may be helpful to the court in ascertaining which of the parties are at fault, still the former (court) is not bound by said findings and decision. Indeed, the same findings and decision could be entirely or partially admitted, modified, amended, or disregarded by the court according to its lights and judicial discretion. For another, if the accrual of a cause of action will be made to depend on the action to be taken by certain government agencies, then necessarily, the tolling of the prescriptive period would hinge upon the discretion of such agencies. Said alternative it is easy to foresee would be fraught with hazards. Their investigations might be delayed and lag and then witnesses in the meantime might not be available or disappear, or certain documents may no longer be available or might be mislaid. ... 

The petitioners filed a Motion for the reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated May 27, 1988.

Hence, the instant Petition wherein the arguments raised by the petitioner before the trial court are reiterated. In addition thereto, the petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The private respondent filed its Comment on the Petition seeking therein the dismissal of the same. 

It is also contended by the private respondent that the ruling of the Court in Vasquez is not applicable to the case at bar because the said case involves a maritime collision attributable to a fortuitous event. In a subsequent pleading, the private respondent argues that the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations cannot have the effect of repealing the provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of actions.

On September 19,1988, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

The petition is devoid of merit. 

Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. 

In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.

In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court held as follows-

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: 

1. a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 

2. an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and

3. an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.

It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.

From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.

It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.

Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.